IR 05000250/1979019

IE Insp Repts 50-250/79-19 & 50-251/79-19 on 790611-15. Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Follow Tech Specs Re Placement of Plastic Sleeve & Failure to Establish Procedure for Fluid Transfer Between Monitor Tanks

ML17338B081
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	07/03/1979
From:	Verdery E, Vogtlowell R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML17338B075	List: IR 05000250/1979019 L-79-200, Notifies That Response to NRC Violations Noted in IE Insp Repts 50-250/79-19 & 50-251/79-19 Will Be Submitted by 790810 L-79-223, Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in IE Insp Repts 50-250/79-19 & 50-251/79-19.Corrective Actions: Existing Tech Spec Procedures Re Plastic Sleeve Implemented on 790731 & Operating Procedure 5163.1 Being Revised ML17338B074
References
50-250-79-19, 50-251-79-19, NUDOCS 7909200368
Download: ML17338B081 (8)

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-250/79-19 and 50-251/79-19 Licensee:

Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33101 Facility Name:

Turkey Point Units 3 and

Docket Nos.

50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.

DPR-31 and DPR-41 Inspection at Turkey Point Site near Florida City, Florida Inspector:

R. J-L ell 7-3-7f Date Signed

. Verdery, Actin ection Chief, RONSB ate Signed SUMMARY Inspection on June 11-15, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 31 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of restoration of plant systems following refueling of Unit No. 4; followup on reportable events, open items, review of plant operations; and plant tour.

Results Of the four areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviation vere identified in three areas; tvo apparent items of noncompliance vere found in one area.

(Infraction - Failure to Follow Procedures-Multiple Examples-Paragraph 5); and Infraction - Failure to Establish a Procedure for Fluid Transfer betveen Monitor Tanks (Paragraph 5).

DETAIIS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

&. E. Yaeger, Plant Manager

+J.

E. Moore, Operations Superintendent Nuclear D.

W.

Haase, Technical Department Supervisor W. A. Klein, Engineer, Technical Department

+P. Hughes, Health Physics Supervisor

+J. A. Olsonoski, Quality Control Engineer

+R. J.

Spooner, Operations QA Supervisor V. A. Kaminskas, Reactor Engineering Supervisor

+D.

G. Whittier, Licensing Engineer, Corporate Office R. Nelson, Contractor Coordinator L. Huenniger, Nuclear Plant Supervisor A. Byrnes, Nuclear Operator W. Lightfoot, Nuclear Operator Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators and office personnel.

+Attended exit interview.

2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings vere suaanarized on June 15, 1979 vith those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

The inspector informed the Plant Manager that the findings related to paragraph 5 of this report would be discussed with the inspector's regional supervision for noncom-pliance categorization and that he vould notify the Plant Manager of the results.

Via a telepohone call on June 18, 79, the Plant Manager vas apprised by the inspector of the decision to categorize the inspection findings as presented in paragraph 5 of this report.

The Plant Manager did not take exception to the findings.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.

Unresolved Items s.

Unresolved items vere not identified during this inspection.

Plant Operations The inspector reviewed the circumstances associated vith the unplanned release of contaminated water to the storm drain system vhich took plac~

at 1:30 p.a.

on June 11, 197 The following observations were made:

a.

A plastic sleeve, placed over the 8 Monitor Tank (MT) overflow line in order to contain some airborne activity emanating from this line, resulted in the creation of a siphon effect which led to the unplanned release of contaminated water.

In that no safety evaluation was performed as required by AP 103.2 for any plant changes that result in any change in function of a plant system, this activity constitute failure to follow procedure.

b.

The shift supervisor responsible for overall plant operations was not.notified of the placement of the plastic sleeve thereby eliminating him from the concurrence chain of the corrective action on the original airborne activity problem.

c ~

Discussions with the plant operators responsible for effecting valve lineups associated with manipulations of the Monitor Tanks revealed that, although recirculation of monitor tanks is addressed in plant operating procedures (Paragraph 8.4 of OP 5163. Q, these recircula-tions were in fact being performed without awareness or use of such procedures.

Also, fluid transfer from one monitor tank to another, although not addressed by any operating procedure; had been taking place sometime earlier on the day of the unplanned release.

d.

A review of the "Nuclear Operator's" (Title as used in AP 103.2)

logs for the day of the unplanned release revealed no mention whatsoever of the release nor of the fluid transfer evolution between the monitor tanks which the inspector had been told took place on that day.

In that paragraph 8.4.2.3 of AP 103.2 requires the Nuclear Operator to include in his log entries such items as:

"Normal operation, e.g., significant changes in plant conditions equipment status and lineup changes" and "Problems experienced during the shift", not doing so constitutes failure to follow procedures.

Two apparent items of noncompliance have been identified as a result of the above observations.

The first (an infraction) is failure to implement plant procedures as required by paragraph 6.8.1 of the Technical Specifications and as described in the above paragraphs a,

c and d.

(50-250/79-19-01)

The second (an infraction) is failure to establish a procedure, as required by paragraph 6.8.1 of the Technical Specifications, for use in transferring fluid from one monitor tank to another.

{50-250/79-19-02)

6.

Pollowup on Reportable Events The following events were reviewed to ascertain that:

a.

reporting requirements were met; b.

corrective action was taken as required by Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50; c.

the event was reviewed and evaluated; and d.

the facility was operated within the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 and Technical Specifications subsequent to the event.

50-250/79-14

"Emergency Diesel Generator Ready-to-Start-Light Failure" 50-250/79-15

"Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Line Failure"

'50-250/79-20

"Emergency Diesel Generator Failure of Planned 24 Hour Load Test" The following event was closed out based upon a review in the Regional Office:

50-250/79-13 "Failure of a Turbine stop Valve to Fully Close" No items of noncompliance or deviations werc identified within the areas inspected.

7.

Followup on Open Items (Closed) 50-251/79-13-02 Special Instruction for Completion of the "Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Limitiag Conditions for Refueliag Operations".

The inspector determined through a records review that the Limiting Conditions for Refueling Operations data sheet had been completed prior to reinsertion of the last nine fuel assemblies in the Unit 4 core.

(Open) 50-251/79-13-01 Revision of Appendix B to OP 0204.3 to require Calibration of the Reactivity Computer for both Positive and Negative Reactivities".

The inspector determined through discussions with the licensee's reactor engineeriag staff that the scheme for calibrating the reactivity computers for negative periods was being refined and would be finalized for use prior to coneencing startup physics testing on Unit 4.

8.

Plant Tour

%bile conducting a tour of the Unit No. 4 containment the inspector visited the upper elevation of the Pressurizer cubicle and noticed several locations on the pipiag where insulation material ("angel hair") had been left exposed without being covered with octal lagging.

Following discus-sions with the cognizant licensee personnel, the inspector received assurance that thc insulation material ("angel hair") although different from the Natcrial initially used on the pressurizer, Net or cxcceded the pertinent insulation qualifications of the original material.

Furthermore,

-4-plant work order (H%) number 2138 was initiated which would result in the covering of all visible "angel hair" on the pressurizer with metal lagging.

The inspector had no further questions.