IR 05000250/1996009
| ML17353A878 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/23/1996 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Stratton L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17353A877 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-96-09, 50-250-96-9, 50-251-96-09, 50-251-96-9, NUDOCS 9609100152 | |
| Download: ML17353A878 (9) | |
Text
~pg RECT,Mp0 V
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 303234199 Report Nos.:
50-250/96-09 and 50-251/96-09 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-250 and 50-251 Facility Name:
Turkey Point Plant Units 3 and
Inspection Conducted:
July 22 - 26, 1996 Inspector:
r>
ratton, a eguar s
nspector ate igne Approved by:
au re roc son, ie Special Inspection Branch Division of Reactor Safety te cygne SUMMARY Scope:
This announced inspection was conducted in the various aspects of the Physical Security Program for ~ower Reactors.
Specific areas evaluated were training and qualification, records and reports, security program plans, and a portion of the licensee's Fitness for Duty and Access Authorization Programs.
Results:
In the areas inspected, there were no violations identified.
The licensee continued to have a strong training and qualification program which was evidenced by records review and knowledgeable security force members.
Records and reports continued to be timely and thorough and addressed accordingly.
In addition, the inspector noted upper management's efforts to raise employees'wareness of numerous events with respect to weapons being found by Security prior to entrance of the protected area.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's 50.54(p)
plan change to incorporate the new provisions of
CFR 73.55(7)-(10),
Vehicle Barrier Rule, into the Physical Security Plan.
The plan change adequately addressed inspection of the newly installed vehicle Enclosure 9609l00i52 960823 PDR ADOCK 05000250 PDR
barrier system, as well as appropriate compensatory measures to be taken by the licensee in the event of degradation.
Further inspection of the vehicle barrier system itself will be conducted in the future.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's random selection process of individuals chosen to submit to a chemical test and found the process to be in accordance with 10 CFR 2 REPORT DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted l. 1 Licensee Employees
- T. Abbetiello, equality Manager, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (TPNP)
D. Bonthron, Access Program Supervisor, Florida Power and Light Company (FP&L)
¹C. Burton, Plant Services Manager, Plant St.
Lucie (PSL)
¹A. Cummings, FFD Coordinator, PSL
- G. Hollinger, Licensing Manager, TPNP
- D. Jernigan, Plant General Manager, TPNP
- J. Kirkpatrick, Fire Protection/Safety Supervisor, TPNP
- F. Marcussen, Plan Security Supervisor, TPNP
- C. Mowrey, Compliance Specialist, TPNP
- R. Rose, Haterial Manager, TPNP
- B. Waldrep, Mechanical Maintenance Department Head, TPNP
¹E.
Weinkam, Licensing Manager, PSL
¹B. White, Security Manager, PSL Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, technicians, security force members, and administrative personnel.
- L. George, Project Manager, SBI Nuclear 1.3 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector, TPNP
¹M. Miller, Senior Resident Inspector, PSL
- Attended exit interview
¹Attended exit interview by telecon 2.0 Physical Security Program for Power Reactors (81700)
2. 1 Training and qualification Currently the licensee is committed to the provisions outlined in the NRC approved Training and qualification Plan (ThgP), Revision 13, dated October 21, 1992.
The inspector toured the firing range with the licensee.
The range consisted of a moving target system that ran off d/c current at a
speed of approximately three miles per hour.
In addition, the licensee had installed in 1993, a turning target system which consisted of 12 targets.
Through discussion with licensee representatives, the inspector was informed that the licensee plans to install ten pop-up targets between the rotating targets in the future.
An 11 foot tower is also utilized to better simulate weapons firing in true plant condition The inspector reviewed "Training and gualification Plan Implementation Guidelines and Performance Standards,"
dated November 7, 1995.
These guidelines clearly outline responsibilities and qualification of training instructors, training guidelines, and task qualification descriptions.
The inspector reviewed ten randomly selected training and qualification records for the current security force to verify the licensee was training in accordance with the NRC approved T&gP.
Documentation of the positions reviewed by the inspector included the armed responder and CAS/SAS operator.
The inspector determined the records reviewed contained all information necessary to meet the licensee's T8(P commitments.
Through record review, interview of licensee representatives and security force officers, and observation, the inspector concluded that the licensee continued to maintain a strong training and qualification program.
There were no violations of regulatory requirements noted in this area.
2.2 Records and Reports 2.2. 1.
Possible Vital Area Barrier Breach The inspector reviewed the licensee's Safeguard Event Logs (SELs) for the period of April 1, 1996 to present, in addition to Security Information Reports for June 1996.
The following event was noted:
On July 15, 1996, a security officer informed security management there was a possible breach in the Unit 3 Pressure Transmitter Enclosure, which is a vital area.
The licensee immediately measured the opening in question and found it to be less than 96 square inches.
Upon visiting the area, the inspector noted the opening did appear to be greater than
"man size."
The definition of man-size in the licensee's Physical Security Plan (PSP) states,
"Openings in a physical barrier (other than doors, gates, hatches, etc.)
exceeding 96 square inches with the smallest dimension equal to or greater than 6 inches."
The inspector and Senior Resident Inspector independently measured the opening and determined it to be less than 96 square inches.
In order to alleviate appearance of a barrier opening greater than 96 square inches, licensee representatives informed the inspector that a Condition Report was initiated on June 15.
The inspector reviewed the Condition Report and noted that the recommended action documented was to have another barrier strap installed across the opening to remove the perception that the barrier was degraded.
2.2.2 Ongoing Weapons Events Inspection Report No. 50-250, 50-251/96-03 noted an increase in events of weapons being found by Security prior to entrance into the protected area.
The inspection report documents five incidents in approximately five months (August - December 1995).
For the period of March to July, three more weapon events were noted by the inspecto In an effort to raise employees'wareness of the continuing weapons events, the licensee introduced two "To The Point" bulletins which noted the increase of events and reiterated the suspension without pay disciplinary policy.
Licensee representatives informed the inspector that they will continue to monitor the situation and may initiate a human performance assessment.
There was no violations of regulatory requirements noted in this area.
2.3 Security Plan and Implementing Procedures The inspector reviewed
CFR 50.54(p)
changes to the licensee's, PSP, proposed in Revision 9.
The main changes consisted of implementation of inspection and compensatory measures, relative to the newly installed vehicle barrier system.
The inspector determined those changes were consistent with the guidelines developed in NEI 96-01,
"Guidelines for Operational Planing and Maintaining Integrity of Vehicle Barrier Systems,"
dated January 1996.
The inspector determined the other PSP changes described in Revision 9 would be reviewed at a later date.
Procedures reviewed during this inspection period were concise and clearly outlined responsibilities and duties.
There were no violations of regulatory requirements noted in this area.
3.0 Fitness for Duty (81502)
and Access Authorization (TI 2515/157)
3. 1 Fitness for Duty (FFD)
Random Selection Process In accordance with 10 CFR 26. 10(a), the licensee must provide reasonable assurance that nuclear power plant personnel will perform their tasks in a reliable and trustworthy manner and are not under the influence of any substance, legal or illegal, or mentally or physically impaired from any cause, which in any way adversely affects their ability to safely and competently perform their duties.
The inspector reviewed FFD-1, "Selection and Notification for Drug/Alcohol Testing Instruction," Revision 5, dated June 21, 1996.
The procedure clearly outlines the selection process as follows:
Log on the Nuclear Employee Plant Access (NEPA) computer system with assigned password Choose Report l2 or 13 (one for each FPKL site)
Select the number of personnel you wish to have selected Select date.(current date is displayed)
The inspector reviewed the above process, and at each step had the licensee try to manipulate the computer system in various ways.
For example, an attempt was made to log on the system, not knowing the password.
This could not be completed.
Through discussion with licensee representatives, the
inspector determined that limited personnel have been assigned a password in order to complete the selection process.
After logging in the system, choosing a report number, and receiving a generated list, an attempt was made to change names and social security numbers on the list.
This was not possible.
Each time a manipulation was attempted, the computer software did not respond.
The NEPA system has programmed capability to randomly select candidates for testing.
Once a list is generated, it is stored in the system's memory and cannot be altered or destroyed.
An attempt to change the report's date was also tried, but again was not possible.
The inspector reviewed ten randomly chosen FFD records of individuals who have or had unescorted access to the FPRL sites.
In comparison, the inspector reviewed five Random Candidates Lists to coincide with the dates personnel where tested in accordance with the records reviewed.
The five Random Candidates Lists dates, names, and social security numbers, matched those dates, names, and social security numbers in the records reviewed.
Through document review, observation, and discussion with licensee representatives, the inspector concluded the licensee's selection of candidates for drug and alcohol testing was random and in accordance with
CFR 26.
There were no violations of regulatory requirements noted in this area.
3.2 Access Authorization Followup Inspection Report 50-250,251/96-08 documents an event on July 5, 1996, where a
contr actor was found lying on the floor on the Monitor Room, inside the protected area.
After a medical review, the individual admitted to doing drugs onsite that morning.
The results of the individual's for cause test revealed approximately 148,000 nanograms of cocaine.
The licensee's cutoff level is 300 nanograms.
The licensee's Hedical Review Officer contacted the individual with the test results.
On July 6, 1996, the individual's unescorted access was denied and on July 8 he was terminated.
The licensee performed a review of the individual's work for the last 90 days and found it to be satisfactory.
The licensee reported the event to the NRC within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> as required by
CFR 26.
By letter dated April 3, 1992, the licensee submitted Revision 1 to the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant PSP committing to the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56 and NRC Regulatory Guide 5.66, Access Authori ation Pr ram for Nuclear Power Plants.
The inspector reviewed the individual's Access Authorization records to determine if i,.~e provisions of 10 CFR 73.56 were followed.
The record revealed that'll elements of the Access Authorization Program were completed in accordance with the licensee's PSP, to include a pre-access chemical test which was negative.
The inspector did note that on the individual's Personal History guestionnaire (PHg), the individual failed to complete a question in the FFD section.
The question asked if the individual had ever tested positive for alcohol, used alcohol which resulted in on duty impairment, been
subject to a plan for substance abuse, or been removed from activities due to drug or alcohol use.
The individual failed to check either the
"NO" or "Yes" box.
The inspector determined that although the question was not answered in the individual's PHg, the question was answered on the individual's Personnel guestionnaire - Access Authorization form.
However, in response to the inspector's concern of inattention to detail, the licensee initiated a
Condition Report to develop a self-checking system of access authorization documents.
Through review of documents and discussion with licensee representatives, the inspector determined that the individual's Access Authorization records met the requirements outlined in the licensee's PSP and
CFR 73.56.
There were no violations of regulatory requirements noted in this area.
4.0 Exit Interview The Exit Interview was held July 26 1996, with those so noted in Paragraph 1.0 in attendance.
The licensee was advised that the inspector found training and qualification to be well managed and an asset to the Security program.
Additionally, the inspector noted the continuing weapons events and acknowledged the licensee's concern.
There were no dissenting comments received from the licensee.