IR 05000250/1979012

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IE Insp Rept 50-250/79-12 & 50-251/79-12 on 790312-21. Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Take Corrective Action on Unsatisfactory Instrumentation Channel Check
ML17338A823
Person / Time
Site: Turkey Point  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/19/1979
From: Cantrell F, Verdery E
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML17338A802 List:
References
50-250-79-12, 50-251-79-12, NUDOCS 7906260614
Download: ML17338A823 (8)


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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.

ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-250/79-12 and 50-251/79-12 Licensee:

Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida Facility Name:

Turkey Point Units 3 and

Docket Nos.

50-250/79-12 and 50-251/79-12 License Nos.

DPR-31 and DPR-41 Inspection at T ey int Site near Homestead, Florida Inspector:

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. Uerdery Approved y:

F.

S. Cantre l, cP Chief, RONSB SUMMARY Inspection on March 12 - 21, 1979 ate Signed (C te Si ned This routine announced inspection involved 22 inspector-hours on site in the areas of plant operations, refueling maintenance, followup on open items, and coordination of equality Assurance Inspection Team activities and 12 inspector hours at the General Office.

Results Of the three areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations vere identified in two areas; one apparent item of noncompliance vas found in one area (Infraction - Failure to take corrective action on unsatisfactory instrumentation channel check (251/79-12-01).

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Em lo ees-H. E. Yaeger, Plant Manager-J. K. Hays, Plant Superintendent, Nuclear

-"J. E. Moore, Operations Superintendent, Nuclear V. B. Wager, Operations Supervisor, Nuclear

  • D. W. Jones, equality Control Supervisor D.

W. Haase, Technical Department Supervisor J.

P. Mendieta, I 6 C Department Supervisor G. D. Whittier, Iicensing Engineer, G.O.

Other licensee employees contacted included two technicians and three operators.

-"Attended exit interview.

2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 15, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

The inspector discussed the item of noncompliance regarding pressurizer level instrumentation, the licensee agreed that the noncompliance did occur.

In addition, the inspector summarized the preliminary findings of the NRC equality Assurance inspection team which had not completed its inspection activities and informed the licensee that the inspection would continue the following week.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s Not inspected.

4.

Pressurizer Level Channels Out of Tolerance The inspector noted during a tour of the Control Room on March 15, that the pressurizer level channels on Unit 4 were indicating as follows; Ll-4-459 L1-4-460 L1-4-461 46 percent 56 percent 50 percent

-2" These same indications had been logged in the Nuclear Control Center Operator (NCCO) Log Sheet for the 0100, 0500 and 0900 readings or as

percent, 56 percent and 50 percent, respectively.

The inspector inquired as to what action was being taken to correct this deviation in the allowed tolerance between level channels.

The tolerance between level channels was specified on the panel as 8 percent and had been promulgated by the Instrumentation and Control Department Supervisor in a memorandum dated gu]y 28>

1978 to the Plant Superintendent, Nuclear.

The inspector was informed that a Plant Work Order (PWO) had been submitted on March 13, 1979 addressing this problem.

According to an I 6 C Department member, no work had been performed on this PWO (j/7435) because the problem had been identified as a leaking valve on the pressurizer level detector for channel Ll-4-459.

The inspector questioned the Nuclear Plant Supervisor (NPS)

as to why the affected level channels had not been declared inoperable and the output bistable placed in a trip condition.

The NPS was-apparently not aware that the level deviation existed but indicated to the inspector that the output bistable should have been tripped.

The Nuclear Control Center Operator was also apparently unaware of why the out of tolerance limits on nuclear safety related instrumentation had been posted on the instrumentation panel face.

Technical Specification 4.1 requires that calibration, testing and checking of analog channels shall be performed as specified in Table 4.1-1.

Pressurizer Water Level is required to receive a channel check once per shift.

The failure to declare the pressurizer level channels inoperable when their indication was out of tolerance has been designated as an infraction in the Notice of Violation (251/79-12-01).

In response to the inspector's inquiry the licensee commenced corrective action and placed Ll-4-460 in the trip condition and performed calibration.

The inspector emphasized that when two channels are out of tolerance, the proper corrective action would be calibrate one or both of the detector, in sequence until all level channels are within the specified tolerance.

Plant 0 erations - General The inspector reviewed general plant operations including an examination of selected operating logs, special instructions, jumper and clearance logs, equipment out of service logs, minimum equipment lists and schedule of periodic checks for the period March 1-15, 1979.

This inspection was made to determine compliance with Technical Specifications and to ascer-tain if any events had occurred during the period which were reportable to the NRC.

One item of noncompliance was identified and is discussed in paragraph

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Switches for Valve Position Indication Inside Containment The inspector verified that no stem mounted limit switches which have not been environmentally qualified have been used on containment isolation valves inside containment.

The facility does have NAMCO D2400x snaplock switches installed on other safety-related equipment located inside containment.

7.

GE Induction Disc Rela s

The inspector verified through discussions with licensee personnel that none of the subject relays are installed at Turkey Point.

No GE relays are utilized in safety-related systems or component t

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