IR 05000250/1998003
| ML17354A890 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 04/01/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17354A888 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-98-03, 50-250-98-3, 50-251-98-03, 50-251-98-3, NUDOCS 9804210401 | |
| Download: ML17354A890 (13) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos:
License Nos:
~ Report Nos:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspector:
Approved by:
50-250.
50-251 DPR-31, DPR-41 50-250, 50-251/98-03 Florida Power and Light Company Turkey Point 925 West Flagler Street Miami. Florida 33102 March 2
- 6.
1998 L. Stratton, Safeguards Inspector George A. Belisle, Chief Special Inspection Branch Division of Reactor Safety 98042i040i 98040i PDR ADQCK 05000250
T V NEAR Turkey Point NRC Inspection Report 50-250, 50-251/98-03 This routine.
announced inspection was conducted in the area of plant support by a Regional Safeguards Specialist.
The specific area evaluated was the Physical Security Program for Power Reactors.
A random review of records and procedures determined that the licensee's appeal process was clearly documented and available to those individuals who were denied unescorted access.
(S1.2)
Three Physical Security Plan change revisions reviewed by the inspector were within the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p).
(S3. 1)
The inspector determined that limited information regarding security's response to a steam line break warranted an Unresolved Item.
(S3.3)
A drill conducted by the FBI with minor participation by the Turkey Point security force was observed.
(S5. 1)
Training records reviewed by the inspector were appropriate and within the requirements specified in the licensee's Training and Qualification Plan.
(S5.2)
Sl Conduct of Security Activities S1.2 A hri in a.
n in The inspector evaluated the licensee's appeal process under the provisions of 10 CFR 73.56(e) with respect to individuals denied unescorted access to the facility.
rv i
n n
Fi in On March 2, 1998, the inspector randomly selected five access authorization (AA) records at the corporate office located at Juno Beach. Florida.
These five records were selected for the period of January 1 to September 30.
1997, of those individuals who had been denied unescorted access to Turkey Point.
Interdepartmental Procedure (IP) 904 'Nuclear Division Access Appeal Process,"
dated January 17.
1997, outlined the licensee's appeal process for denial of unescorted access.
Records reviewed appropriately stated the licensee's reason for denial of unescorted access and clearly outlined the individual's right to appeal that decision.,
c. ~nl~i A random review of records and procedures determined that the appeal process was clearly documented and available to= those individuals who were denied unescorted access.
S3 Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation S3.1 ri Pr r
l n
a.
n i
The inspector reviewed recently submitted Physical Security Plan changes to determine if the changes decreased the effectiveness of the plan under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p).
rv i n n
Fi in The inspector reviewed Revisions 9.
10.
and 11 to the Physical Security Plan and noted that all changes were within the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p).
However. the inspector noted that Revision 11 documented numerous organizational changes'ith respect to the deletion of three of the four Security Specialist positions.
These changes transferred licensee oversight duties to the contract security supervisors.
Howevers the security force remains under the supervision of the Protective Services Manager and the Security Operations Supervisor, both licensee employees.
This organizational change became effective December 15, 1997; therefore, performance trending was minimal.
l
'
Three Physical Security Plan change revisions reviewed by the inspector were within the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p).
S4 Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance
~
S4.2 a.
n The inspector reviewed security's response to a steam line break that occurred on February 16, 1998.
rv i
n
'
Fin in On February 16 '998.
a steam line break occurred above the security
-.
ready room. which housed the security response force members.
Through discussion with licensee representatives, the inspector determined that the response force was trapped inside the ready room for approximately one hour with a loss of communications early during the event.
At the time of the steam line breaks another shift of security officers were reporting to duty.
The inspector reviewed Safeguard Event Logs during this time period and found no entry detai ling the event:
nor was a one hour telephone notification made to the NRC.
The licensee informed the inspector that it was determined the event was not reportable.
The inspector determined that unti 1 further review and inspection are completed. this issue will be documented as Unresolved Item 50,-250, 50-251/98-03-0 The inspector determined that limited information regarding security's response to a steam line break warranted an Unresolved Item.
S5 Security Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification S5.1 ri Tr inin n
lifi i n a.
n in On March 4, 1998. the inspector observed a large scale drill which utilized the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the licensee on a
limited basis.
Additionally, the inspector observed security training on March 6, 1998, located at the licensee's firing range and training facilities.
rv i
n n
Fin in On March 4.
1998, the licensee participated in a drill which was directed and operated by the FBI.
Approximately 250 - 300 FBI agents and management were in attendance from Miami. Jacksonville, Tampa, and Puerto Rico.
The drill started approximately at 4: 15 a.m.
A mock intrusion of three adversaries began the drill.
The adversaries attempted a penetration of Turkey Point via the protected area entrance at the turnsti les.
The security force appropriately followed response procedures.
No protected area penetration occurred.
The security force's involvement after this initial attempted intrusion was minimal.
The three adversaries who attempted penetration, along with seven others located in the owner controlled area continued the scenario.
with hostages added for negotiating skills.
The purpose of the drill was to familiarize and train FBI management.
A command post was established at the Homestead Air Force Base. with a tactical operations center at the licensee's security training facilities.
The exercise terminated at approximately 9:50 p.m. with one adversary terminated and one FBI agent wounded.
There were no actual injuries during the drill.
The licensee's Training and Qualification Plan, Revision 13. dated October 21, 1992, outlined the training requirements for security force members.
The inspector observed eight officers performing Tactical Firearm Training on March 6.
1998.
Training was well controlled, instructors knowledgeable of the program, and officers attentiv A drill conducted by the FBI with minor participation by the Turkey Point security force was observed.
Weapons training observed by the inspector was appropriate.
22.2
~Ti
2 a.
n in The inspector reviewed randomly selected training records to verify training was being conducted in accordance with the Training and Qualification Plan.
rv in F'he inspector rev'iewed a sample of ten training records of security force members to include Central and Secondary Alarm Station operators and supervisors.
The inspector identified that physical fi,tness requirements were conducted on an annual basis.
as well as medical physicals to ensure good health.
Requalification of the security members on the handgun and shotgun was timely. as w'ell as the rifle.
Tasks and duties were tested on an annual frequency. with officers only performing those tasks they were qualified to perform.
c.
QEM~ig Training records reviewed by the inspector were appropriate and within the requirements specified in the licensee's Training and Qualification Plan.
X
i M
in mm r The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on March 5, 1998.
The licensee acknowledged the findings presente PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
~i<~n<~
T. Abbatiello, Quality Manager L. George.
Project Manager, SBI Nuclear G. Hollinger. Licensing Manager R. Hovey, Vice President J.
Kirkpatrick. Security Supervisor C. Mowry. Compliance Specialist J. Stone, Security Systems Coordinator A. Thompson, Engineering Manager R. West. Operations Manager W. Zinn, Security Specialist R, Reyes, Senior Resident Inspector J.
York, Resident Inspector INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 81700:
Physical Security Program for Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Q~n 50-250/251/98-03-01 URI possible failure to report a
safeguards vulnerability, to the NRC
Cl