ML17347B258

flow.

The operators

secured

from the test.

Investigation of this event revealed

that stop valve (4-20-341) to steam

generator

C

from the

pump

was

closed

under

clearance

order

4-89-05-149,

thus

preventing

the

C steam

generator

from receiving

feed

flow during the

performance

of surveillance

procedure

4-0SP-075.1,'AFW

Train

1 Operability Verification.

Review by the licensee

revealed

that

the Train

1

AFW control valve 4-2818

was listed in the

Equipment

Out of

Service

Log sheet.

Also another

clearance

existed at this time for the

Train

1

AFW flow control valve filters and

instrument air check valves

(clearance

number 4-89-05-154).

When the operators

were verifying proper

AFW system

alignment prior to testing, this clearance

was lifted.

How-

ever,

the operators

did not identify the other

remaining

clearance

on

Train 1'FW.

The test

was

subsequently

performed sucessfully

and

train

1

was

returned

to serv'ice

prior to the expiration of the 72-hour

Action Statement.

3.

The root

cause

was attributed to personnel

error

and is considered

an

isolated event.

The licensee

counseled

the operator regarding

the circum-

stances

of this event.

TS 6.8. 1 requires

that written procedures

and

administrative

policies shall

be established,

implemented

and maintained

that meet or exceed

the requirements

and recommendations

of Section

5. 1 of

ANSI

N18. 7-1972.

ANSI

N18. 7-1972,

Sec tion

5.1. 2,

speci fi es

that

procedures

shall

be followed.

Surveillance

Procedure

4-OSP-075. 1,

Train

1 Operability Verification, dated

March

29,

1989,

Section

3.2,

required

that

the

AFW system

be aligned

in normal

standby

service

per

Operating

Procedure

4-0P-075, Auxiliary Feedwater

System.

Attachment

1

to

Operation

Procedure

4-0P-075,

dated

March 24,

1989,

requires

that

valve

4-20-341

be

locked

open for normal

AFW system

operation.

Contrary to the above,

valve 4-20-341

was found closed during

the

performance

of 4-OSP-075.

1 on

May 22,

1989, which prevented

AFW flow

to the

C steam

generator.

However, this violation is not being cited

because

criteria specified

in Section

V.A of the

NRC Enforcement

Policy

were satisfied.

This

item is identified

as

Non-Cited Violatiop

(NCV)

50-250,251/89-27-02.

Followup on Inspector

Followup Items (92701).

(Closed)

IFI 50-250,251/89-24-05,

Resolution of the Failure. of MOV-4-751.

This item is discussed

in detail in paragraph.6.a.

This item is closed.

4.'nsite

Followup

and In-Office Review of Written Reports

of Nonroutine

Events

and

10 CFR Part 21 reviews

(92700/90712/90713).

The Licensee

Event

Reports

(LERs)

and

10 CFR Part 21 Reports

discussed

below were

reviewed

and closed.

The inspectors

verified that reporting

requirements

had

been

met, root cause

analysis

was performed,

corrective

actions

appeared

appropriate,

and

generic

applicability

had

been

considered.

Additionally, the inspectors

verified that the licensee

had

reviewed

each

event,

corrective actions

were

implemented,

responsibility

for corrective actions

not fully completed

was clearly assigned,

safety

questions

had

been

evaluated

and resolved,

and violations of regulations

or

TS conditions

had

been identified.

When applicable,

the criteria of

10 CFR 2, Appendix C, were applied.

(Closed)

LER 50-250/86-41,

RHR

Pumps

Not in Operation

as

Required

by

Techni ca 1

Speci ficati ons.

The

inspectors

revi ewed

the

compl eted

corrective actions

and found them acceptable.

This item is closed.

(Closed)

LER 50-250/87-23,

Safety Injection

and

Reactor Trip due to

a

Failed

High Steam

Flow Instrument.

The corrective actions

taken,

as

a

result of this event,

were reviewed

and found to be adequate.

This item

is closed.

(Ref. Inspection

Report 50-250/87-39)

(Closed)

LER 50-250/87-33,

Reactor

Trip During Controlled

Shutdown

When

Source

Range

High Neutron

Flux Trip Unblocked.

The inspectors

reviewed

the completed corrective actions

and found them acceptable.

This item is

closed.

(Ref. Inspection

Report 50-250/87-51)

(Closed)

LER 50-250/88-09,

guality Assurance

Discovered

Missed Technical

Specification

Surveillances

for Station Battery Pilot Cell

Rotation

and

EDG

Fuel Oil Sampling Analysis.

The inspectors

reviewed

the

completed

corrective actions for these

items

and found

them acceptable.

This item

is closed.

(Closed)

LER 50-250/88-22,

Diesel

Generators

Inoperable

Due to Planned

Maintenance

and

Fuel Filter Flow Restriction.

The inspectors

opened

Inspector

Followup Item 50-250/88-30-01

to track the licensee's

corrective

actions.

This item is closed.

(Closed)

LER 50-251/87-13,

Failure of the

480 Volt Undervoltage

Relay.

The corrective actions required,

as

a result of the failure, were reviewed

and found to be adequate.

This item is closed.

(Closed)

LER 50-251/87-'6,

Failure of 4A ICW Pump Causing

Auto Start of 4C

ICW Pump.

The corrective actions

taken,

as

a result of the failure, were

reviewed

and found to be adequate.

This item is closed.

(Closed)

LER 50-251/87-26,

Auto Start of 4B

CCW Pump when Returning

4C

CCW

Pump to Service.

The corrective actions required, for this event,

were

reviewed

and found to be adequate.

This item is closed.

(Closed)

LER 50-251/87-27,

Failure to Estimate

Steam

Generator

Blowdown

Flow Rate.

The corrective actions specified in this

LER were reviewed

and

found to be adequate.

This item is closed.

(Closed)

P2185-01,

" Potential

Problem

with

Pipe

Clamps

during

Installation.

Licensee

review of the subject

pipe clamps identified and

determined

that

they

were

purchased

for the

St.

Lucie Plant

and

no

purchase

orders for Turkey Point could be located.

However, the licensee

stated

that current

ISI

procedures

regarding

visual

examination

were

sufficient to detect this problem and discrepancies

would be corrected,

as

required.

This item is closed.

Monthly Surveillance

Observations

(61726)

The

inspectors

observed

TS required surveillance

testing

and verified,

that the test

procedures

conformed to the requirements

of the TS, testing

was performed'n

accordance

with these

procedures,

and that the test

instrumentation

required to perform the tests

was calibrated.

In addition,

the

inspectors

verified that

the test results

met acceptance

criteria

requirements,

were

properly

reviewed

by

personnel

other

than

those

directing

the test,

deficiencies

identified were properly reviewed

and

resolved

by management

personnel

and that system restoration

was adequate.

For completed tests,

the inspectors verified that testing frequencies

were

met and tests

were performed

by qualified individuals.

The

inspectors

witnessed/reviewed

portions

of

the

following test

activities:

0-0SP-16.26,

Electric Driven Fire

Pump Operability Test.

O-NCZP-030,

Component

Cooling Water Sampling.

4-0SP-200.3,

Section 7.2,

Main Turbine Trips Test.

4-OSP-089. 1, Turbine Generator

Overspeed

Trip Test.

O-OSP-062.2,

3B Safety Injection

Pump Inservice Test.

3-0SP-075.2,

Auxiliary Feedwater

Train

2 Operability

Verification.

OP-4004.2,

Safeguard

Relay Rack Train A,

B - Periodic Test

on

Unit 4.

3-SMI-071.5,

Steam Generator

Protection

Set III (gR-18) Analog

Channel

Test.

0-OSP-023. 1, Diesel

Generator Operability Test.

On June

24,

1989,

the operators

performed 3-0SP-075.2,

to test the Unit 3

AFW System Train 2.

- The

B and

C AFW pumps are normally aligned for Train

2 Service.

The

B

AFW pump was tested satisfactorily,

however, during the

C

pump test,

the governor oil level

was low in the sightglass.

Further

investigation

revealed

an oil leak existed

at

a governor

housing

plug.

The

C

AFW pump was declared

OOS due to the oil leak.

Unit 3 was in Mode

2

at the time

and

was

preparing

to

go

on line.

Technical

Specification

3. 18, Auxiliary Feedwater

System

requires

that

two trains of

AFW be

operable

while in Modes 1,,

2 or 3.

This section

also allows the third

AFW pump to be

00S for 30 days

and that

TS 3.0.4 is not applicable to the

third

pump (i.e.,

Unit

3

could

change

modes

with the third

pump

inoperable).

Since

the

A and

B

pumps

were aligned to train

1

and

2,

respectively,

the provisions of TS 3. 18 were met.

Unit 3 was

placed

on

line later

that

day.

The

C AFW

pump

was

repaired

and

tested

satisfactorily

on June

27,

1989,

which

ended= the Limiting Condition for

Operation

(LCO).

0

Most of the surveillances

witnessed

during this inspection

period

were

conducted

to support

the Units

3

and

4 startups.

The inspectors

noted

that test

personnel

performed

the tests

in

a controlled,

deliberate

manner.

The tests

were completed without major discrepancies,

and minor

discrepancies

were adequately

resolved

in accordance

with administrative

controls.

No violations or deviations

were identified in the areas

inspected.

6.

Monthly Maintenance

Observations

(62703)

Station

maintenance

activities

on safety related

systems

and

components

were

observed

and

reviewed

to ascertain

that

they were

conducted

in

accordance

with approved

procedures,

regulatory guides,

industry codes

and

standards,

and in conformance with 'TS.

The following items

were considered

during this review,

as appropriate:

That

LCOs were met while components

or systems

were removed

from service;

=

approvals

were

obtained

prior to initiating work; activities

were

accomplished

using

approved

procedures

and were inspected

as applicable;

procedures

used

were

adequate

to control

the activity; troubleshooting

activities

were controlled

and repair

records

accurately

reflected

the

maintenance

performed;

functional

testing

and/or

calibrations

were

performed prior to returning

components

or'ystems

to service;

gC records

were maintained;

activities

were

accomplished

by qualified personnel;

parts

and materials

used

were properly certified; radiological controls

were properly

implemented;

gC hold points

were established

and observed

where

required;

fire prevention

controls

were

implemented;

outside

contractor

force activities

were

controlled

in

accordance

with the

approved

gA program;

and that housekeeping

was actively pursued.

The

inspectors

witnessed/reviewed

portions of the following maintenance

activities in progress:

Troubleshooting

Cranking Diesel

No. 2.

Would not synchronize

on

line.

Repair

of MOV-3-750,

MOV-3-751,

MOV-4-750

and

MOV-4-751 to

eliminate pressure

binding.

(See discussion

below).

Repair of CV-3-2821 for excessive

seat

leakage.

Repair of Unit 4 Flux Mapper Assemblies.

Repair of Unit 4 High Pressure

Turbine Cylinder Heating

Steam

Leak.

Replacement

of 3A RHR Pump Mechanical

Seal.

The modifications to MOV-750 and

751

on Units

3 and

4 were previously

discussed

in Inspection

Report

50-250,251/89-24

and identified

as

IFI

89-24-05.

The

licensee

performed

testing

on

the Unit 4 valves

and

determined that. the binding of the valves

was

caused

by pressure

trapped

between

the

discs

of the

valve.

The testing

was

accomplished

by

increasing

the pressure

between

the valve discs using

a test

pump and then

performing

MOVATS testing

on the actuator

which showed that

as

pressure

was

increased

between

the discs,

the pull out torque

or thrust

also

increased.

This

phenomenon

was previously discussed

in

INPO

SOER 84-07

which

was

evaluated

by the licensee

and

EBASCO in several

letters

and

documents

(JPE-PTP0-87-836,

PTP-87-120,

JPE-PTPO-87-1521

and

REA-TPN-85-39) in mid 1987.

The correspondence

identified the valves

in

the plant,

that could

be subjected

to thermal

or pressure

binding

and

provided

several

methods

to correct

the

problem, if required.

The

licensee

concluded,

in JPE-PTP0-87-1521,

that the identified valves did

not present

an operability concern.

Their conclusion is based

on existing

plant

procedures

that demonstrate

valve operability

by periodic cycling

and

a lack of reported failures

due to thermal or pressure

binding.

Since

this fai lure

was directly attributed

to pressure

binding,

the licensee

implemented

PC/M 89-373 for Unit 4 and

PC/M 89-375 for Unit 3.

These

PC/Ms installed

bonnet equalizing

lines

from the bonnets

of MOV-750 and

751 for both units

through

the existing

packing leak-off lines to

a

connection

upstream of the subject valve.

This would allow any pressure

trapped

between

the discs

to

be vented to the upstream

side of the valve

and thus eliminate the effects of pressure

binding.

Testing

was conducted

after installation .of the

PC/Ms

which verified the modification did

eliminate

the

pressure

binding effect experienced

in these

valves.

The

licensee

also

evaluated

the other valves identified

as

a result of the

SOER

and

determined

that

due

to lack of failure history

and

valve

application

that

no further corrective action

was required at present.

The

residents

discussed

this

issue

with the

Region

and

due

to the

potential

generic

application

the

Region is currently considering

the

issuance

of an Information Notice.

The licensee notified the industry of

the failure

and

cause

via Operating

Plant

Experience

Report,

OE 3376,

dated

June 2,

1989.

No violations or deviations

were identified in the areas

inspected.

Operational

Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors

observed

control

room operations,

reviewed applicable logs,

conducted

discussions

with control

room

operators,

observed

shift

turnovers

and confirmed operability of instrumentation.

The inspectors

verified the operability of selected

emergency

systems,

verified that

maintenance

work orders

had

been submitted

as required

and that followup

and prioritization of work was

accomplished.

The inspectors

reviewed

tagout records,

verified compliance with TS

LCOs

and verified the return

to service of affected

components.

In addition,

by observation

and direct interviews, the inspectors verified

that the physical security plan was being implemented.

Plant

housekeeping

and implementation

of radiological controls were'lso

observed.

The inspectors

found the cleanliness

conditions in the plant

and the implementation of radiological controls to be satisfactory.

Tours of the intake structure

and diesel, auxiliary, control

and turbine

buildings

were

conducted

by the

inspectors

to observe

plant equipment

conditions

including potential fire hazards,

fluid leaks

and excessive

vibrations.

The inspectors

walked

down accessible

portions of the following safety

to verify operability and proper valve/switch alignment:

A and

B Emergency

Diesel

Generators

Control

Room Vertical Panels

and Safeguards

Racks

Intake Cooling Water Structure

'160

Volt Buses

and

480 Volt Load and Motor Control Centers

Unit 3 and

4 Feedwater

Platforms

Unit 3 and

4 Condensate

Storage

Tank Area

Auxiliary Feedwater

Area

Unit 3 and

4 Main Steam Platforms

Auxiliary Building

The inspectors

also

reviewed

the licensee's

administrative

program for

ensuring

that

a

licensed

operator

that fails

his

requalification

examination

is

removed

from licensed

duties.

Administrative Procedure

0301,

Licensed

Operator

Requalification

Program,

provides

for the

administrative

controls in this area.

Step 8.4.2.2.

requires

that

any

individual that fails

the requalification

examination

be

placed

in

a

remedial training program until the responsible

supervisors

are satisfied

that

the

individual

is

again

proficient.

Proficiency

shall

be

demonstrated

by passing

another

examination.

When an individual fails the

examination,

the Training Department

sends

a memorandum to the Operations

Supervisor

informing

him that

the

individual failed to

complete

the

requalification requirements

and is to be relieved of all licensed duties

effective immediately.

At this time the individual is removed

from the

watch bill and is not allowed to assume

the watch until requalification

requirements

have

been

successfully

met.

When the individual is again

deemed proficient the Training'epartment

sends

another

memorandum to the

'Operations

Supervisor

informing him that the individual

may again

assume

licensed duties.

At this time the individual is placed

back

on the watch

bill.

In this inspection

the inspectors

reviewed

AP 0301,

memorandum

removing

and

reinstating

individuals,

and

held

discussions

with

responsible

Training

and Operations

Department

personnel.

In the past,

the

inspectors

have

personally

witnessed

the

removal

of

a

licensed

individual

from licensed

duties

due to failure of 'a requalification

examination.

~

No violations or deviations

were identified in the areas

inspected.

Installation

and Testing of Modifications (37828)

a 0

The

inspectors

reviewed

PC/M 88-535,

Pressurizer

PORY Air a'nd

Nitrogen Supply Tubing Enhancement,

Revision 4, Supplement

3.

Recent

PORV stroke

time measurements

had revealed

that opening times, for

both instrument air and nitrogen

sources,

were

not within the

two

second

opening

time requirement

stated

in the

OMS design analysis.

This

issue

was

discussed

in Inspection

Report

88-26

and is being

followed up as Violation 50-250,251/89-27-01

as noted in paragraph

2

of .this report.

The inspectors

observed

the installation of various

components

and

determined

that

proper

preoperational

testing

was

performed.

The

preoperational

test procedures

were reviewed for proper setpoints

and

to insure that test results

met the test criteria.

The modification

package

and

procedures

were controlled

in accordance

with licensee

administrative

procedures.

Drawings

were

updated

to reflect the

modification except

as noted:

4-0P-041.2,

Pressurizer

Operation,

dated

5/10/89,

attachment

2,

page

4 of 4, lists

4-40-240

and

4-40-250 nitrogen cylinder

isolation

valves

as

open.

Drawing

5610-M-339,

Auxiliary

Feedwater,

MSIV and

Pressurizer

PORY Nitrogen

Backup

Supply

Systems,

Revision 39,

does

not show the noted valves.

4-0SP-041.4,

Overpressure

Mitigating System Nitrogen Backup Leak

and Functional Test,

dated 5/2/89, refers to valves

4-40-240

and

4-40-250.

These

valves,

as

noted

above,

are

not

shown

on

drawing 5610-M-339.

b.

The

inspectors

reviewed

PC/M 88-245,

Main

Steam

Isolation

Valve

(MSIV) Air Accumulator

System,

revision dated October

13,

1988.

The

purpose

of this modification

was to provide safety

related air

accumulators

capable

of closing

each

MSIV in five seconds

or less.

This modification ensured

that the

MSIV can

be maintained

closed for

one

hour before operator

action outside

the control

room would

be

required.

The inspectors

witnessed

various

stages

of installation

and testing

to verify that the appropriate

work controls

were

being followed.

The following preoperational

tests

were witnessed/reviewed

by the

inspectors:

POP

0800.212,

Unit 4

MSIV Air Accumulator

Backup

System

Cold

Test.

POP

0800.213,

Unit 4

MSIV Air Accumulator

Backup

System

Hot

Test.

The inspectors

performed

a walkdown of the

system

using appropriate

drawings

and procedures

to verify that:

Major system

components

were properly labeled.

10

Instrumentation

was properly installed, functional,

and process

parameter

values

normal.

Valves in the

system

were aligned in the correct position for

normal operation.

Drawings

and

procedures

reflected

the

proper

system

configuration.

The documentation

reviewed included:

4-0P-072,,Main

Steam

System,

dated April 28.

1989.

4-0P-013,

Instrument Air System,

dated April 6,

1989.

Drawing

5610-M-735,

MSIV Air Operator

and Air Accumulator

Back-up System

POV-4-2604,2605,2606,

Unit 4, Revision 0.

Drawing

5610-T.-E-4061,

Sheet

5,

MSIV Air Operator

and Air

Accumulator Back-up System.POV-4-2604,

2605,

2606,

Revision 0.

The inspectors

noted the following discrepancy:

4-0P-013,

Attachment

1,

page

58,

had the operator verify the

position of valve 4-40-2166,

Instrument Air to MSIY POV-4-2604,

2605,

and

2606 Isolation,

two times.

One time to verify the

valve to

be

open,

the other to verify the valve closed.

The

normal

system alignment required the valve to be open.

c.

The inspectors

reviewed

the Unit 4 High'ensity

Spent

Fuel

Rack

Project,

as outlined in Procedure

No. FPL-0113-P-l,

Revision

1.

The

following procedures

were reviewed:

FPL-0113-P-l,

Rev.

1

Project

Administrative

Procedure

for

High Density

Spent

Fuel

Rack Project

(HDSFRP).

FPL-0113-P-2,

Rev.

1

Rack removal for HDSFRP.

FPL-0113-P-4,

Rev.

1

Hydrolasing for HDSFRP.

FPL-0113-P-5,

Rev.

1

Underwater

Vacuuming for

HDSFRP.

FPL-0113-P-7,

Rev.

1

Drag Test for HDSFRP.

FPL-0113-P-8,

Rev.

1

Housekeeping

Procedure for HDSFRP.

Topics for possible

enhancements

to the

procedures

were discussed

wi,th appropriate

licensing personnel.

t

11

The inspectors

observed

various

rack manipulations

both outside

and

inside the Spent

Fuel Building.

On June

19,

1989, while the licensee

was

attempting

to lower old rack

No. 3, to the ground,

the nylon

strap rigging failed and the rack dropped

a small distance

to the

ground.

Personnel

in the

area

immediately

secured

the operation,

sealed

the

area off and took prompt actions

to survey the area for

any possible

contamination.

There

was

no contamination,

or injuries

due to the

dropped

rack.

The licensee

immediately

began

a lessons

learned

review and

by the

end of the week were ready to make their

recommendations

to management

to preclude similar incidents.

During

the inspectors

observations,

various incidents of lack of attention

to detail

were

noted to the licensee.

The licensee

took positive

steps

to prevent recurrence.

By the end of June

23,

1989,

old rack

No.

3 was

boxed

and

on

a flat bed truck ready for shipment.

Old rack

No.

4 was

moved into old rack No.

3 position in the Spent

Fuel Pool,

ready to be hydrolased

and removed.

New rack No.

4 has

been

Dry Drag

tested

and the rigging installed,

ready to

be put in the pool.

The

inspectors

also

reviewed

various

Daily Project Status

Reports,

as

required

by Project Administrative Procedure,

FPL-0113-P-1.

Correction of the

noted discrepancies

in items

8a.

and

b.

above

by the

licensee will be followed as Inspector

Followup Item 50-250,251/89-27-03.

No violations or deviations

were identified.

9.

Followup on Onsite

Events

(93702)

The following plant events

were reviewed to determine facility status

and

the

need for further followup action.

Plant parameters

were evaluated

and

the significance of the event

was evaluated

along with the performance

of

the appropriate

safety

systems

and the actions

taken

by the licensee.

The

inspectors

verified that required notifications

were

made

to the

NRC.

Evaluations

were

performed

relative

to the

need for additional

NRC

response

to the event.

Additionally, the following issues

were examined,

as

appropriate:

details

regarding

the

cause

of the

event;

event

chronology;

safety

system

performance;

licensee

compliance with approved

procedures;

radiological

consequences,

if any;

and

proposed

corrective

actions.

On June

12,

1989, with Unit 3 in Mode 5,

leakage

was

noted during

system fill and vent.

Investigation

by the licensee

revealed

RVS-200,

Reactor

Coolant Vent System drain valve,

was approximately

one half turn

open.

This valve was required to be closed during the fill and vent.

The

valve had

a hose attached

which ran to

a floor drain.

The. floor drain

had

overflowed.

The valve

was

closed

and the fill and vent

was completed.

The

licensee

could not determine

how the valve

was

opened.

The site

guality Assurance

Performance

Monitoring Section

reviewed the incident and

issued

a

summary

on

June

20,

1989,

(gAO-PTN-89-993).

The corrective

actions

for this event

were to change

the fi11

and vent

procedures

to

include verification of valve

RYS-200 to be closed if it is not used

as

a

vent path.

Also,

a verification of blank flanges

and caps

was being

added

12

to post alignment checks.

This step

was already in the process

of being

incorporated

at the time'f this event.

This

was part of corrective

actions

to

a similar event for Unit

4

on

March 9,

1989.

This event

.resulted

in

a Violation 50-250,251/89-12-03.

This item is still open

and

the completed corrective actions will be reviewed to determine if they are

adequate

to prevent recurrence.

On June

16,

1989, at

11: 15 a.m., with Unit 3 in Mode 5; PRMS rack 66 was

de-energized

causing

process

radiation

monitors

R-11

and

R-12 to trip

resulting

in

Containment

Isolation

on Unit

3

and

the

Control

Room

Ventilation System to automatically shif't to the Recirculation

Mode.

All

equipment

functioned

as

required

and

the licensee

notified the

NRC in

accordance

with

10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii).

The

event

occurred

when

ILC

personnel

were troubleshooting

the pressurizer

safety

valve acoustical

monitoring circuitry using

an oscilloscope.

The oscilloscope

was plugged

into

a vital

AC outlet in the bottom of rack

67 and

when the

scope

was

turned

on it caused

breaker

3P08-19 to trip which de-energized

R-Il and

R-12.

The licensee

is taking the following actions to prevent recurrence;

( 1) clearly identify, by labeling, all vital AC power feeds

and electrical

receptacles;

(2) install protective

covers

over the vital

AC receptacles

(3) require

personnel

to obtain

permission

from control

room personnel

prior to

using

unidentified

power

feeds

and electrical

receptacles;

(4) determine if the electrical

loading

on the breaker

is close to its

trip setpoint

as

the oscilloscope

only

draws

about

two

amps

and

was

checked to be functioning properly.

On

June

16,

1989, at 9:49 p.m., with Unit

3 in

Mode 5,

an inadvertent

Train "B" safeguards

actuation

occurred while re-energizing

the safeguards

relay

racks

after

maintenance

in

accordance

with

3-ONOP-049.

All

equipment

functioned

as

expected

and

was verified using

3-EOP-E.O.

The

licensee notified the

NRC of the event

as required

10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii ).

Initial troubleshooting

indicated

the pushbutton for relay 3SIB-2, manual

safety injection block pushbutton,

failed to remain inserted

which caused

the actuation

when the pushbutton

was released.

The

ISC Department

found

a

cracked

wafer in the contact

block which

was

replaced.

On

June

17,

1989, at 4: 13 p.m.,

the

same

event occurred while re-energizing

the Train

"A" safeguards

relay racks.

Again, all equipment

functioned

as expected

and

the

NRC

was notified.

Licensee

investigation

into the occurrence

indicated

the

SI

Block Switch

was mislabeled

in that the "Block" and

"Unblock" positions were reversed.

The licensee

obtained

a picture of the

switch and the general

area of that portion of the control

room panel that

clearly

shows

the

switch labeling opposite

to that at present.

The

picture

was

made in March of 1989 by simulator personnel

for training and

simulator validation use,

which indicated

the labeling

had

been

changed

between

March

and

June of this year.

The licensee's

investigation into

the

issue

identified that the

person installing the

new label

did not

verify that the switch positions

were the

same

as the positions

on the

label

to

be

removed.

TS 6.8.1

requires

that written procedures

and

administrative

policies shall

be established,

implemented

and maintained

that meet or exceed

the requirements

and recommendations

of Appendix

A of

USNRC Regulatory

Guide 1.33

and Sections

5. 1 and 5.3 of ANSI N18.7-1972.

13

O-ADM-209, Equipment

Tagging

and Labeling, provides the responsibilities,

precautions,

limitations

and instructional

guidance for establishing

and

maintaining

an accurate,

complete

and effective plant tagging

program.

Contrary to the above,

engraved

label

plates

were replaced

on the Unit 3

Safety

Injection

Block

Switch without following the

requirements

of

O-ADM-209, resulting in two separate

safeguard

actuations within a

24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months

period.

This is identified as Violation 50-250,251/89-27-04.

On June

17,

1989, with Unit 4 at approximately

30% power, the

RCO received

a

Generator

Field

Brush

Contact

Failure/Ground

annunciator

alarm.

Inspection of the generator exciter revealed

a Turbine Plant Cooling- Water,

(TPCW) leak.

The leak

was located

on

a copper tubing drain line from the

exciter

D air cooler.

The

operators

commenced

a

load reduction at

5:32 a.m.

and

took

the unit off line at

5:52 a.m..

The

licensee

determined

that the tubing failure was

due to the tube vibrating against

the clamps.

The defective tubing was replaced

and

a protective sleeve

was

installed to protect the tube.

The Unit 3 exciter cooler drain lines are

stainless

steel,

therefore,

they

are

less

susceptible

to this failure

mode.

The

licensee

plans

to replace

the

copper tubing with stainless

steel

during

an outage of sufficient duration.

The licensee

dried and

megger

tested

the exciter.

Unit 4 was returned to service

on June

18,

1989.

10.

Followup on Licensee

Employee

Concerns

(RII-88-A-0066)

The

inspectors-

reviewed

the following licensee

employee

concerns

which

resulted

from

NRC interviews.

The concerns

are described

below with their

disposition.

a

~

A

concern

was

raised

involving configuration

of electrical

penetration

cannisters.

Each cannister

has

a nitrogen fill line

which is provided to maint'ain the cannister

from 15 to 19 psig.

The

cannisters

are

pressurized

with nitrogen

to verify cannister

integrity for the

LLRT and the ILRT, and also to maintain

a moisture

free environment.

On June ll, 1986,

NCR 86-293

was written.

The

problem described

was that the

used

to monitor the cannister

nitrogen pressure

did not appear

on any prints or on the g-list.

The

NCR disposition

stated

that the

could

be

used

as is.

The

cannisters

are

checked

by the Electrical

Maintenance

Department

during quarterly preventive

maintenance

per

MI 51003

and

51004 for

Units

3 and 4, respectively.

If the pressure

is found less

than

15

psig,

the Technical

Department

is notified to implement repair

and

perform

a

LLRT. The

are not calibrated

since

the pressure

is

checked

during the

LLRT with calibrated

gauges.

The

NCR also stated

that

the cannisters

are

provided with an isolation valve located

between

the cannister

and pressure

gauge.

This valve is maintained

closed except

when monitoring nitrogen pressures.

The inspectors

walked

down electrical

penetrations

for Units

3 and

4

using

drawing

5610-E-54A-1,

sheet

1, revision

1.

The inspectors

noted that the drawing did not match

the field installation in that

14

the

gauge

isolation valve

was

not included

on the drawing.

The

inspectors

brought this discrepancy

to the Engineering

Department's

attention.

The licensee

subsequently

performed

a

walkdown which

generated

NCR 89-0237,

on

June

12,

1989.

Another discrepancy

was

identified in that the drawing specified pressure

have

a range

of 0-100 psig.

The installed

have

a range of 0-30 psig.

This

item is being adequately

addressed

by., the licensee.

A concern

was raised

involving excessive

AC

hum in NIMS.

This item

was submitted

to the licensees

on March 30,

1989.

The

NIMS was

installed in May 1984

and

June

1985 for Units

4 and

3 respectively..

Shortly after installing both Units,

NIMS developed

a 120 Hertz noise

contamination.

The systems

were still operable

and could detect

a

2

foot-pound

impact at

3 feet

as originally designed.

The

vendor

suggested

that the noise

contamination

could

be

removed

by lifting

the shield connection of any noisy channel

in the control

room NIMS

rack,

In

October

1986,

a

REA

was

generated

to

address

the

noise

contamination

in both units.

The

REA recognized

that the noise

was

caused

by shield connections

being grounded

on both the control

room

and containment

side of the system.

In August

1987,

the Unit 3 loop ground

was

removed

permanently

by

lifting the shielded

connections

in the containment

and relanding the

control

room connections.

In March 1989,

the

NIMS vendor performed

a system operability check

and

a

system calibration

on Unit 4.

The vendor also

reviewed

the

licensee's

NIMS procedures

to insure

that

the

system

was

being

operated

and maintained

to conform with the original design.

The

Unit 4 loop ground

was

removed

in April of

1989

by lifting the

containment

connections

and

by

relanding

the

control

room

connections.

Subsequent

investigations

revealed

cracked

glass

insulators

on the

accelerometers.

This condition

caused

a ground in the containment

and with the control

room side

grounded,

noise

was still present.

Therefore,

the containment

side will be grounded

and the control

room

connections will be lifted to remove the ground loop.

The incorporation of vendor

recommendations

into plant procedures

and

the

elimination of noise

contamination

should

ensure

reliable

operation

of the

NIMS.

This

concern

was

adequately

addressed

according to

ADM -002,

Employee

Concerns

Reporting

System

Program.

A concern

was raised

that the

PAHMS did not work properly.

This

concern

was submitted to the licensee's

on March 30,

1989.

The

licensee

formed

a task

team in November

1988 to address

the numerous

LCO hours

due to

PAHMS inoperability.

Discussions

with the equipment

vendor

have

led to corrections

and clarifications

to

OP 0204.2,

15

d.

Periodic

Tests,

Checks,

and

Operating

Evolutions.

The licensee

expects

these corrections'o

reduce

the

number of out of service

hours

on

PAKMS.

Additionally, I&C and the task

team are monitoring

the

performance

of

PAHMS and further corrective

actions will be

initiated, if necessary.

The inspectors

found that this

item was

addressed

satisfactorily by ADM 002.

A concern

was

raised

that

the

PASS did not work properly.

This

concern

was submitted to the licensee's

on March 30,

1989.

The

licensee

responded

that

since

the

PASS

was

installed

in

1980,

numerous

design

and operational

problems

have

been encountered.

One

by one,

the problems

have

and continue to be corrected.

The chloride

analyzer is the last non-functional

analyzer.

The licensee

plans to

issue

a design

package

which will replace

the chloride analyzer

in

1989.

In the meantime,

the

sample

cask is available for offsite

reactor

coolant chloride analysis.

However,

PASS reliability is

still being evaluated.

Items targeted for further evaluation

include

the oxygen analyzer,

hydrogen analyzer,

flow instruments

and tempera-

ture instruments.

The

PASS is considered

operational

in accordance

with

NRC

requirements.

The

PASS modifications

and

operational

testing is

an ongoing

NRC concern

which is discussed

in Inspection

Report

50-250,251/88-29.

The inspectors, found that this

employee

concern

was addressed

in accordance

with ADM-002.

e.

A concern

was raised that

due to deficient procedures

and drawings,

availability of the

Halon Fire Suppression

System

was questionable.

This concern

was submitted

to the licensee's

on March 30,

1989.

The trip energy

source for the release

valves is provided

by

a pair

of nitrogen bottles.

Adequate

nitrogen

pressure

is monitored

by

pressure

switches

mounted

on

each bottle.

These

pressure

switches

are calibrated

by the vendor..

One of the problems

noted

was that

during

nitrogen

bottle

replacement

the

pressure

switch

is

decalibrated.

The licensee

determined,

by checking bottle pressures,

that

an operability problem did not exist.

However,

a

REA is being

developed

to resolve

the calibration concern.

The inspectors

found

that

this

employee

concern

was

addressed

by the

licensee

in

accordance

with ADM-002.

A concern

was raised

involving inadequate

reactor trip relay timing

tests.

This

concern

was

submitted

to the licensee's

Generic Letter 88-17 (TI 2515/101)

and

adequately

addressed

in accordance

with ADM-002.

This concern

was

also

discussed

in

NRC Inspection

Report 50-250,254/89-06,

paragraph

5.

ll.

This TI addresses

the licensee's

short-term

program entitled "Expeditious

Actions" for the

Loss of Decay

Heat

Removal

issue

discussed

in Generic Letter 88-17.

The licensee

responded

to the

NRC recommended

expeditious

actions

in letter

L-88-559

dated

January

3,

1989.

The

licensee

implemented

the

recommendations

of the

Generic

Letter

in

procedure

16

3/4-0P-041.9,

Reduced

Inventory Operations,

which provides instruct'ional

'uidance

for operation of the unit when

RCS level is lower than three feet

below the reactor

vessel

flange with irradiated fuel in the vessel.

The

review of this TI, to assure

the licensee

actions

to prevent

and, if

necessary,

respond

to loss of decay

heat

removal

during operations

with

the

RCS partially drained,

consisted of the following:

a

~

General

b.

The

licensee

completed its response

to the expeditious

actions

in

licensee

letter L-88-559,

dated

January

3,

1989.

The

inspectors

reviewed the subject

response

for implementation

by discussions

with

responsible

licensee

personnel

in operations

and training, review of

the implementing procedure

(3/4-0P-041.9)

and referenced

procedures,

and

a visual

inspection

of the

components

or systems

required for

this

mode of operation.

Training

Turkey Point currently provides training

on

RCS midloop operations

and

recovery

from loss of

RHR for licensed

operators.

Training

topics

presented

since

the fourth quarter of 1988 were

the Diablo

Canyon event,

lessons

learned,

the implications of

the

event

and

loss

of

RHR off normal

procedure.

In addition,

licensed operators

received simulator training concerning

loss of RHR

flow at midnozzle

operation.

Prior to operating

in

a

reduced

inventory condition,

Turkey Point will provide training on operation

in a reduced

inventory condition with irradiated fuel in the reactor

vessel.

Procedure

3/4-0P-41.9

requires

that operating

shifts

be

briefed prior to and

as part of shift turnover when operating

the

in

a reduced

inventory condition.

This briefing shall

include what

equipment,

indications,

and actions

are required to monitor

and

RHR parameters

during reduced

inventory operation

and recovery from

loss of

RHR.

Available sources

of