ML17354A560
| ML17354A560 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 06/25/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17354A559 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-97-05, 50-250-97-5, 50-251-97-05, 50-251-97-5, NUDOCS 9707030317 | |
| Download: ML17354A560 (36) | |
See also: IR 05000250/1997005
Text
Docket Nos:
License
Nos:
Report
No:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspectors:
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION
REGION II
50-250,
50-251
50-250/97-05,
50-251/97-05
-Florida Power -and Light"Company
Turkey Point Units 3 and 4
9760 S.
W. 344 Street
Florida City, FL 33035
Hay 12
- 16,
1997
W. Sartor,
Exercise
Team Leader
L. Cohen,
Senior
Emergency
Preparedness
Specialist
J. Kreh, Radiation Specialist
G. Kuzo, Senior
Radiation Specialist
Approved by:
K. Barr, Chief, Plant Support Branch
Division of'eactor
Safety
9707030817 970625
ADQCK 05000250;;,<.
6
~
Enclosure
EXECUTIVE SUHHARY
Turkey Point Units 3 and 4
NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-250/97-05,
50-251/97-05
This routine,
announced
inspection involved the observation
and evaluation of
the biennial
emergency
preparedness
exercise.
This full participation
exercise
involved mobilization of Florida Power
& Light (FP8L), Nuclear
Regulatory Commission
(NRC), State of Florida,
Dade County,
Honroe County,
and
Collier County personnel
and resources to respond to a simulated accident
scenar io,:,-The plume exposure
pathway exercise
was conducted
on Hay 13,
1997
and the ingestion pathway exercise
was conducted
on Hay 14,
1997.
This report
summarized-the-observations-of
the%our-person
NRC-'team that asses'sed
the
adequacy of.the licensee's
emergency-preparedness
program
as =it implemented
its Emergency Plan and Procedures
in response to the simulated accident
scenario for the plume exposure exercise.
The
NRC evaluators
concluded that
the licensee's
emergency
response
program was effective as
a result of the
performance
observed.
One Exercise
Weakness
was identified for the delayed
damage
assessment
of the safety-related
equipment that may have been affected
by the fire.
Summarized observations
from the key emergency
response
facilities follow:
Control
Room Simulator
The Nuclear Plant Supervisor
(NPS)
assumed
the responsibilities
as the
Emergency Coordinator
(EC) following his declaration of the Notification of
Unusual
Event
(NOUE).
The shift properly implemented their emergency
procedures.
Technical
Su
ort Center
Good
command
and control by the
EC in the TSC assisted
the implementation of
effective accident mitigation.,
0 erational
Su
ort Center
The
QSC was promptly activated
and provided
OSC Teams
as directed by the TSC.
Damage
assessment
of the intake cooling water
(ICW) pump area
was not
conducted in,a timely manner.
Emer enc
0 erations Facilit
The Recovery Hanager
was effective in coordinating licensee activities related
to the emergency
and providing information to the Federal,
State,
and local
authorities
responding to the simulated radiological
emergency.
Emer enc
News Center
The
ENC operated effectively in managing the coordination of information made
available to the public about the emergency conditions.
~
'
Re ort Details
Summar
of Exercise Events
This biennial
emergency
preparedness
exercise
included full participation by
the State of Florida and associated
risk counties,
along with NRC
participation including a Headquarters
Executive
Team in Rockville, Haryland,
and
a Region II base
and site team.
The plume exposure exercise
which was
evaluated
by an
NRC inspection
team was conducted
from 7:30 a.m. to 2:04 p.m.
on Hay 13, 1997.'layer critiques were conducted
by the licensee's
emergency
response
participants in the Emergency
Response Facilities
(ERFs) following.
termination of the plume exposure portion of'he exercise.
The ingestion
pathway exercise
was not evaluated
by the
NRC inspection team.
The
NRC exit
-meeting- was -conducted-on=Hay-15
,
1997-, fol'lowing the 'licensee's
presentation
to management .of exercise results.
I
VI. Plant
Su
ort
P4
Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness
(EP)
P4.1
Exercise Scenario
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
82302
The inspectors
reviewed the exercise
scenario to determine whether
provisions
had been
made to test the integrated capability and
a major.
portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's
plan.
b.
Observations
and Findin s
The licensee
submitted its detailed scenario
package to the
NRC on
Harch 27,
1997.
A review of the package indicated that the scenario
was
challenging
and progressed
from a
NOUE to an Alert, Site Area Emergency
(SAE),
and
a General
Emergency
(GE).
The scenario fully exercised the
onsite
and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee
and provided
sufficient information to the State
and local government
agencies for
their full participation in the exercise.
c.
Conclusion
'he
scenario
developed for this exercise
was effective for testing the
integrated
emergency
response
capability.
P4.2
Onsite
Emer enc
Or anization
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
82301
The inspectors
observed the functioning of the onsite emergency
organization to determine whether the responsibilities for emergency
response
were defined and whether adequate staffing was available to
respond to the simulated
emergency.
Observations
and Findin s
The inspectors
noted that the responsibilities for emergency
response
were clearly defined.
The Nuclear
Plant Super visor assumed
the
responsibilities of the Emergency Coordinator
(EC),
and other personnel
assumed
pre-established
responsibilities.
The EC classified the
and approved the notification message
to the offsite authorities.
Following his classification of the Alert, the
EC had the emergency
response
organization
respond to staff the emergency
response facilities
(ERFs).
Sufficient trained personnel
then responded to staff and then
activate the ERFs.
An issue
was identified that focused
on the ability of the emergency
organization
and resources
to assess
an emergency condition and respond
appropriately.
The issue
was the delayed
assessment
of the safety-
related equipment that may have been affected by the simulated fire.
The need for the assessment
was identified by the
EC in the Control
Room
Simulator at 9:35 a.m.
when he approved the Alert notification message.
The EC's need for the assessment
was deduced
from his change to the
incident description
on the notification message--specifically,
he lined
out the statement
"No safety systems
are threatened
at this time" and
replaced it with "Unable to determine extent of damage to ICW system at
this time". 'he inspectors
became
aware of the problem with the
assessment
after going to the TSC for obser vations at 10:18 a.m.
Upon
entering the TSC the inspectors
noted that the TSC Haintenance
Hanager
's
briefing board indicated the high priority task to be the fire team
assessment.
Approximately 20 minutes later the inspectors
noted that
the TSC
EC stated that the team should be out and wanted the
Coordinator to get personally involved and expedite dispatch.
The
NRC
team observer in the
OSC noted
and licensee
documentation verified that
the team was dispatched
at 10:45 a.m.
Factors that may have contributed
to the delayed dispatch of the team included:
~
Personnel
selected to perform assessment
were not familiar with
the
OSC setup nor quickly under stood the designated
route to be
taken to the intake cooling water
(ICW) pump area.
~
No dedicated
Health Physics
coverage
was available to the team.
Therefore, the team was provided instruction on the use of dose
rate instrumentation they would use
upon their departure
from the
OSC.
~
Separate
briefings of the radiological conditions were given to
the team members.
The need for a prompt damage
assessment
of the safety related equipment
was intensified by the System Dispatcher informing the Control
Room
Simulator that the system load was tight and requested that they hold up
reducing load or reduce
as slowly as possible while alter nate power was
sought.
Although the fire was reported extinguished at 9:51 a.m., it
was not until ll:11 a.m. that the damage
assessment
team was debriefed
C.
3
and the information forwarded that there
was no damage to the
ICW pump
or motor as
a t'esult of the fire and no adjacent
equipment
had been
affected.
The inspectors identified the above issue
as
an Exercise
Weakness.
Although in this series of events there were no consequences
from the
delayed
assessment,
the failure to perform a timely assessment
of damage
to safety-related
equipment while the unit was operating
was considered
a finding that the licensee's
demonstrated
level of preparedness
could
have precluded effective implementation of'he emergency plan.
~
Inspector
Follow=-up Item (IFI) 50250,251/97-05=01:
Exercise
Weakness-Failure
to perform a prompt damage
assessment
of safety-
- related equipment.
Conclusion
The initial on-duty Simulator staff and augmented call-out staff were
sufficient to respond
and perform defined emergency responsibilities.
However, the emergency
response
team needed to access
the damage to the
safety-related
equipment affected by the fire was neither established
nor dispatched in a timely manner.
P4.3
Emer enc
Classification
S stem
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
82301
The inspectors
observed
selected
emergency
response
personnel
to
determine whether
a standard
emer gency classification
and action level
scheme
was in use by the licensee.
b.
Observation
and Findin s
Section
3 of the licensee's
Emergency Plan provided
a system for
categorizing off-normal events
or conditions at the plant into the four
emergency classifications.
The
NPS became the
EC and declared
a
NOUE at
8:44 a.m.
based
on the loss of assessment
functions for greater than 15
minutes.
He then declared
an Alert at 9:25 a.m.
based
on a fire in the
vicinity of 3A ICW pump and offsite support required.
The
classification
system
was next used by the
EC in the TSC at 11:01 a.m.
with the declaration of a SAE based
on the loss of all A/C power for
greater than
15 minutes.
The
EC then declared the
GE at 11:30 a.m.
based
on the loss of reactor coolant greater than 50 gallons per minute
and exceeding charging
pump capacity,
and the containment
pressure
greater
than 20 psig.
c.
Conclusion
The licensee
had
a standard
system for emergency classifications
and
used it effectively to classify the off-normal events promptly and
correctly.
0
p4.4
a.
b.
C.
p4.5
b.
C.
4
Notification Hethods
and Procedures
Ins ection Sco
e
82301
The inspectors
observed the licensee's
notification of State
and local
governmental
organizations
and emergency
personnel
fo determine whether
timely and substantive
emergency information was provided in accordance
with procedures.
Observations
and Findin s
The-initial-emergency-notification to the State of Florida and counties
was made by the Communicator
in the Control
Room Simulator,
as was the
upgrade to the Alert.
The upgrade notification for the
SAE was
made
from the TSC and'the
GE upgrade
was made from the
EOF.
All
notifications were made promptly following the emergency
classifications.
Conclusion
The licensee
demonstrated
the ability to make initial and follow-up
notifications to the States
and counties -in a timely manner with
essential
information for the upgraded classifications.
Emer enc
Communications
Ins ection Sco
e
82301
The inspectors
observed the flow of communications within the emergency
re'sponse
organization
and from and between the
ERFs to determine whether
provisions existed for the prompt transmission of emergency information.
Observation
and Findin s
The inspectors
observed that the communications
between the utility and
., offsite agencies
and amongst the
ERFs were effective for the prompt
transmission of emergency information.
Responsible
personnel
were kept
informed of ongoing events
and communicated effectively in performing
accident mitigation and initiating protective actions for both onsite
and offsite personnel.
Conclusion
Provisions existed for the prompt communications
among principal
response
organizations
to emergency personnel,
and they were effectively
used during the exercise to provide timely information and coordinate
emergency
response.
P4.6
Public Education
and Information
a.
Ins ection Sco e
82301
The inspectors
observed
how information concerning the simulated
emergency
was made available to the public.
b.
Observations
and Findin s
FPSL established its Turkey Point Emergency
News Center
(ENC) in its
General Office at 9250
W. Flagler St. in Hiami.
From this location the
licensee coordinated-information
about the
nuclear-emergency'w'ith'ounty,
state
and federal
agencies.
The licensee's
news media group was
.-aggressive
in producing
11 timely and informative press
releases
during
the .exercise.
c.
Conclusions
The
ENC and its staff were activated
and organized in a manner that
provided for the dissemination of timely and accurate
information to the
public.
P4.7
Emer enc
Facilities and
E ui ment
a.
Ins ection Sco e
82301
The inspectors
observed the activation, staffing,
and operation
of'elected
ERFs to determine whether
adequate
emergency facilities and
equipment
were available
and maintained to support
an emergency
response.
b.
Observations
and Findin s
Control
Room Simulator
- An inspector observed that the on-shift
designated
crew in the Simulator acted promptly to initiate the
emergency
response.
The facility and equipment
supported the crew as
they responded to the simulated emergency.
Technical
Support Center
- The TSC was promptly activated with assigned
emergency
response
personnel.
The facility layout provided for the
necessary
communication
between the
EC and his staff.
The strong
command
and control exhibited by the
EC was considered
a strength.
Operational
Support Center
- The
OSC was activated in accordance
with
procedures
and in a timely manner.
Congestion
and noise were minimized
and habitability of the facility was verified on a routine basis.
The
facility and equipment
supported
OSC mission accomplishment.
Team
formation and briefings were reasonably timely with the noted exception
of the damage
assessment
team discussed
in P4.2.
A licensee
observer
identified an issue with maintaining accountability of OSC personnel.
0
6
Emergency Operations Facility - This was the first full participation
exercise in which plant personnel
from Turkey Point responded to the
and provided. the required staffing.
The facility and equipment
supported the staff well as they performed required functions and
interacted with offsite officials.
c.
Conclusion
The
ERFs were organized,
equipped,
and maintained in a manner that
provided for the emergency
response.
-===--
==P4;-8
-Protective
Res onses ---
-
.
Ins ection Sco
e
82301
The inspectors
observed the protective actions
implemented for onsite
personnel
and the protective action recommendations
(PARs) provided by
the licensee to the offsite agencies.
b.
Observations
and Findin s
The
EC implemented appropriate protective actions for onsite personnel
as the emergency classification escalated to a SAE.
The Recovery
Hanager
made the appropriate
PARs to the State with the
GE declaration.
c.
Conclusion
The licensee
demonstrated the'bility to implement protective measures
for onsite personnel
and to make the required
PARs for the protection of
the public.
P4.9
Exercise Criti ue
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
82301
The inspectors
observed the facility critiques immediately following the
exercise
and portions of the controller/evaluator
or ganization critique
process to determine
whether
weaknesses
noted in the licensee's
emergency
response
organization were formally presented
to licensee
management.
b.
Observations
and Findin s
The licensee
conducted effective player critiques following exercise
termination.
From the player comments
and the controller /evaluator
observations,
the controller/evaluator staff determined the performance
of the emergency organization responding to the simulated accident to be
generally satisfactory.
A good summary of this performance
and-
supporting observations
were provided to licensee
management
on Hay 15,
1997, just prior to the
NRC Exit Heeting.
0
c.
Conclusion
The controller/evaluator organization did a good job of analyzing
exercise
performance.
Substantive
comments
were provided by the
evaluators to their management.
V. Mana ement Meetin s
X1
Exit Meeting Stmmary
--The Team=L+ader-presented=the
inspection
summary to members of licensee-
management
at the conclusion of the inspection
on Hay 15,
1997.
The summary
indicated fully satisfactory
performance with the exception of the exercise
weakness
addressing
the delayed
damage
assessment.
No proprietary information
is contained in this report.
8
Licensee
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSON
CONTACTED
T. Abbatiello, Site guality Hanager
P. Bailey, Scenario
Developer'.
Franzone,
Acting Haintenance
Hanager
L. Hollinger, Licensing Hanager
B. Hovey, Site Vice President
T;- Jones,
Operations-Super visor
J. Kirkpatrick, Fire Protection/Safety
Super visor
H. Lacal, Training Hanager
R. Hothena,
Hanager,
Plant Ser vices
J.
Rone,
Emergency
Preparedness
Analyst
E. Thompson,
Engineering
Hanager
R. West, Operations
Hanager
INSPECTION PROCEDURES
USED
IP 82301:
-Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors
IP 82302:
Review of Exercise Objectives
and Scenarios for Power Reactors
~0ened
ITEHS OPENED,
CLOSED,
AND DISCUSSED
50-250,
251/97-05-01
IFI
Exer cise Weakness--Failure
to perform
a prompt
damage
assessment
of safety-related
equipment.
Attachment
(13 pages):
Scope,
Objectives,
Narrative Summary,
and Timeline
FLORIDAPOKER &LIGHTCOMPANY
TUIGCKYPOINT NUCLXARPLANT
--EVALUATEDEXERCISE
MAY13 & 14, 1997
2.1 SCOPE
To assure that the health and safety of the general public is protected in, the event of an accident at Turkey
Point Nuclear Plant, Horida Power & Light Company (FPL) conducts
an annual emergency
preparedness
exercise.
This exercise involves mobilization ofFPL, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, State ofHorida, Dade
County, Monroe County, and Collier County personnel
and resources to respond to a simulated accident
'scenano,
A'Con'trollert.organization will.control,-observe; evaluate-and -critique.the-exercise
to assess
the
emergency response capabilities ofthe utility and government agencies.
An PPL Controller Organization wig
control, observe,
evaluate,
and critique the PIN portion of the Exercise.
The FPL Emergency Response
Organization (ERO) and Controller Organization will be evaluated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
. The State ofHorida, Dade County, Monroe County, and Collier County emergency response
organizations
willbe evaluated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Due to the compressed timeline ofthe exercise, some portions ofthe FPL ERO may be pre-positioned.
All
onsite Emergency
Response
Facilities 'will be activated
in accordance
with simulated
conditions
and
appropriate emergency response procedures for the exercise.
Exercise participants ("players") will not have
any prior knowledge ofthe simulated accident events, operational sequence,
radiological eQIuents, or weather
conditions.
The'exercise incorporates the following:
Radiological MonitoringDrill- both onsite and offsite teams willbe dispatched during the exercise to
obtain required air samples
and measurements
associated with a simulated offsite release of
radioactivity, and communicate these results to the appropriate Emergency Response Facility.
(Field monitoring team protective clothing and respiratory protection willbe simulated.)
Health Physics Drill- involves the respons'e to, and analysis of, simulated elevated activity airborne or
liquid samples; radiation exposure control; emergency
dosimetry; and the use of protective
equipment onsite.
Communications Drill- actual use of emergency response
communications
links and equipment to
demonstrate their integrity.
Medical Drill- involves a simulated contaminated individual, with provisions for participation by local
support sefvlces.
The preceding sub-drills are incorporated into the exercise scenario and will be demonstrated
concurrently in
the course ofthe exercise.
The overall intent ofthe exercise is to demonstrate that the FPL ERO is adequately
trained to perform in accordance with the Emergency Plan and its implementing procedures.
Additionally, the
scenario assists the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, State and local government agencies in demonstrating
that they are adequately trained to perform in accordance withtheir emergency plans and procedures
=
97-AFJRcv02I03/497
2.1-1
FLORIDAPOWER &LIGHTCOMPANY
TUIUCEYPOINT NUCKZARPLANT
EVALUATEDEXERCISE
MAY13 & 14, 1997
2.2 OBJECTIVES
The Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (PTN) emergency preparedness
exercise objectives are based upon Nuclear
Regulatory Commission requirements provided in 10 CFR 50.47, Emergency Plans; 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilisadon Facilities; and NRC Inspection
Manual, Inspection Procedure 82302, Review ofExercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors.
Additional. guidarice provided =in-NUREG-0654;FERA-REP-1-;- Revision-1 ,Criteriafor Preparation and
Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response
Plans and Preparedness
in Support ofNuclear Power
Plants, was used in developing the objectives.
The exercise willbe conducted and evaluated using a realistic
basis for 'activities.
~
~
The followingubjectives are consistent withthe referenced planning documents:
E.
E~PI
Conduct an exercise ofthe PTN Emergency Plan.
2.
Provide an opportunity for the NRC, State ofFlorida and Dade, Conier, and Monroe Counties
to participate in an exercise.
3.
Prepare an exercise information package to include:
The objectives ofthe exercise and appropriate evaluation criteria.
b.
The date, time period, place, and a list ofparticipating organizations
The simulated sequence ofevents.
d.
The time schedule ofreal and simulated initiating events.
The narrative sutnmary.
4.
Conduct a critique ofthe exercise and prepare an evaluation report.
5.
Demonstrate that corrective actions are tracked until completion.
P
97-AEJRcvOI/02<7-97
2.2-1
2.2 OMEMYVKS (Continued)
0
Emer en
r anizations
u
ort andRes
urce
Demonstrate the prompt activation, adequacy of the staf5ng, and set up (as appropriate) of
emergency response facilities as follows:
-Control Room
-Technical Support Center (TSC)
-Operations Support Center (OSC)
-Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
-Emergency, News Center (ENC)
Demonstrate the capabdity ofthe FPL Emergency Response Organization (ERO) to implement
their Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
3.
Demonstrate
the ability of the Emergency Response
FaciTity Managers
and Supervisors to
provide overall direction, including "command and control" by initiating, coordinating, and
implementing timely and effective decisions during a radiological emergency.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to effectively transfer command and control of emergency
response
functions &omthe Control Room to the TSC and EOF.
5.
Demonstrate the provisions for continuous staKng ofthe emergency facilities.
6.
Demonstrate the interface capability between the %PL ERO, the NRC and the State ofFlorid,
Dade, Monroe, and Collier Counties, for effective response
coordination to a radiological
emergency and adequate protection ofthe health and safety ofthe public.
7.
Demonstrate the abilityto control access to emergency facilities.
8.
Demonstrate
the ability to provide
a liaison at
each
participating
offsite governmental
Emergency Operations Center (EOC).
9.
Demonstrate adequacy ofdesignated facilities and equipment to support emergency operations.
10.
Demonstrate,
as appropriate, the ability to identify the need for, notify, and request assistance
&omFederal agencies.
ll.
Demonstrate
the availabiTity of outside support
agencies
and organizations
who may'be
requested to provide assistance in an emergency.
12.
Demonstrate the ability of corporate personnel to augment the ERO and support the plant
staff
13.
Demonstrate the abilityto notify emergency response personnel.
97.AE/RcvOI/3/4)97
2.2-2
2.2 OBJECFIVES (Continued)
1.
Demonstrate the avadab6ty ofmethods, equipment, and expertise to make rapid. assessments
of the consequences
of any radiological hazards, including the dispatch and coordination of
Field Monitoring Teams.
2.
Demonstrate
the ability to recognize
Emergency
Action Levels
and
properly
classify
emergencies in accordance with the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
D.
Notificationand
mmunication
1.
Demonstrate the abTiity to notify oFsite emergency organizations within 15 minutes of each
emergency classi6cation.
2.. Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC ofany emergency classi6cation within one hour of
the declaration.
3.
Demonstrate the abilityto notifyFPL Emergency Response Organization personnel.
4.
Demonstrate the abilityto develop and send timely information to State and local authorities as
required by the Emergency Plan.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to communicate among the Control Room, TSC, OSC, EOF, and
ENC, as appropriate.
6.
Demonstrate that adequate communication capabilities exist between FPL and the State and
local EOC's.
7.
Demonstrate the adequacy of communications capabilities between the Emergency Response
Facilities and the o8site radiation monitoring teams.
S.
Demonstrate the ability to communicate among the Control Room, TSC, EOF, and NRC
Operations Center.
E.
Radi
I
cal C ns
uen
Assessment
l.
Demonstrate methods and techniques for determining the source term of releases or potential
releases ofradioactive material.
2.
Demonstrate the adequacy of methods and techniques for determining the magnitude of the
releases ofradioactive materials, based on plant system parameters and eQluent monitors.
97-AKlkcvOlOl487
2.2-3
2.2 OBJECTIVES (Continued)
3.
Demonstrate the ability to estimate integrated dose &om projected or actual dose rates, and to
formulate Protective Action Recommendations.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to monitor and control emergency worker radiation exposure,
and to
implement exposure guidelines, as appropriate.
Demonstrate
the availability of respiratory protection
and protective
clothing for onsite
emergency response personnel.
6.
Demonstrate the availability of a procedural mechanism to expeditiously evaluate risks and
" auth'orize emergency workers,to.receive. doses. in excess of..lO-CFR 20 limits - as appropriate; -
7.
Demonstrate the capability for onsite contamination control.
8.
Demonstrate the abilityto decontaminate onsite personnel, as appropriate.
9.
Demonstrate the capability to transport a contaminated injured person offsite.
'10.
Demonstrate the capability for onsite and offsite radiological monitoring, to include collection
and analysis ofsample media, and provisions for communications and record keeping.
11.
Demonstrate the capability to collect.and prepare for shipment simulated elevated airborne or
liquid samples, as required.
12.
Demonstrate the capability to use the Post Accident Sampling System (walk-through/simulate).
13.
Demonstrate the capability to analyze simulated fiuid samples
and provide the isotopic and
chemical results ofthe analysis withinthree hours ofthe time the sample was first requested.
F.
Protective Action
Demonstrate the abilityto recommend protective actions to appropriate offsite authorities.
2.
Demonstrate the abilityto advise individuals onsite, or in owner controlled areas, ofemergency
conditions.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct search
and rescue procedures for persons
identified as
missing during accountability procedures.
G.
Public Information
1.
Demonstrate the operations ofthe ENC, and the availability ofspace for the media.
WO~CUSlflEVAUPt14CCtJAK
97-AE/Ra4) l3/4/97
2.2-4
2.2 OBJECITVES (Continued)
H. R~
l.
Demonstrate the availability ofprocedures to support re-entry and recovery
De-escalation/termination from the emergency phase, and transition to recovery phase.
b.
Inform the State ofthe opportunity to reduce the need for protective actions.
2.
Demonstrate the availability of corporate technical support for planning and re-entry/recovery
organizations.
I.
Exam)~ti ~
Areas ofthe PTN Emergency Plan that willN~T be demonstrated during this exercise include:
. Site evacuation and relocation ofnon-essential personnel.
2.
Onsite personnel accountability.
Security will demonstrate
accountability through the use of
simulated personnel rosters.
3.
Actual shift turnover gong term shift assignments willbe demonstrated by rosters).
Real time activation ofthe EOF non-P'IN responders.
5.
Actual drawing ofa sample utilizingthe Post Accident Sampling System.
2.2-5
FLORIDAPOWER &LIGHTCOMPANY
TURKEYPOINT NUCLEARPLANT
EVALUATEDEXERCISE
MAY13 & 14, 1997
3.1 NARRATIVESUIVIMARY
3.1.1
Initial Conditions
Unit 3 has been operating at 100% power forthe last ninety days. The core is at the middle oflifewith
a boron concentration of700 ppm.
-"-Unit-4 is in%Code-l-at-100-%.power-.
The followingitems are ofinterest:
- The 4A Safety Injection Pump is out of service for repair of leaking inboard and outboard
sealS. (Expected return to service - 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />)
- The 3A Emergency Diesel Generator
is out of service.
The ¹4 cylinder head gasket was
identified as leaking during the last surveillance performed on May 12 and is disassembled for
repair. (Expected return to service - 24)
- Both units are in a 72 Hour Action Statement, but the return ofthe 3A EDG to service will
leave Unit 3 in a 30 day LCO.
- The 3C CC% Pump is running for a PMT aQer a shdt seal replacement.
System Operation: Demand on the system is high with anticipated peak of 15,000 MWe. Service area
conditions are normal. The Manatee Plant is oQ'line forforced outage.
Meteorological Conditions: The current temperature is 84 'F, with winds fiom the southeast at five to
seven miles per hour. The forecast calls for unseasonably warm weather with temperatures in
the low to mid 90's, with late aAernoon and evening thundershowers
likelyfor the next four
days.
t
WOC74)%lllSOVEVAUhfl~IAE
FPIJPIH
91.AE/Rcv02/3l4/t/7
3.1-1
FLORIDAPOWER &LIGHTCOMPANY
TURKEYPOINT NUCLEARPLANT
EVALUATEDEXERCISE
MAY13 & 14, 1997
3.2 'IIMELINE
TIME
EVENTS
EVENT
Initial Conditions
Unit 3 is on-line at 100% power in the middle ofcore life. Boron concentration
-is at 700 ppm. Power history has been 100% for the last 90 days.
Unit 4 is in
Mode 1 at 100% power. The following are items ofinterest:
4A Safety Injection Pump is out ofservice for repair ofleaking inboard
and outboard mechanical seals.
The 3A Emergency Diesel Generator is out of service for 84 Cylinder
Head
leak.
The
leak
was
detected
on May
12,
1997
surveillance.
(Expected return to service - 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />)
~
The 3C CCW Pump is running for a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> PMT after a shaft seal
replacement.
'
Unit 4 SFP exhaust fan out ofservice for motor PM.
Demand on the system is high, with an anticipated peak demand of 15,000 MWe.
Service area conditions are normal.
Weather has been unseasonably
warm for
the last week, with occ'asional late afternoon and evening thunder showers.
The
forecast is for partly cloudy skies, temperatures
in the low 90's, with occasional
afternoon showers for the next three days.
The current temperature is 84', with
winds from the Southeast at five to seven miles per hour.
0730
Commence Exercise
0740"
1
Security Alarm Station - Central Alarm Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm
Station (SAS) receive spurious door alarms on the east auxiliary building door
requiring an investigation.
0745
2
R-7 Alarms (ARMS Channel for Unit 3 SFP Transfer Canal)
A mechanic working in the Unit 4 demineralizer valve gallery overhead, cleaning
and inspecting CV-4-244, falls and sustains a compound fracture ofhis right arm
and is contaminated.
He is found by the Security Officer investigating the
auxiliary building door alarm.
(A Security Guard is posted in the auxiliary
building.
The Controller will ensure Security is not in the area while injured
person is being staged.)
0750
In response to the R-7 Alarm, Unit 3 Control Room requests an HP survey.
F!IEFtWOROC)IIJLLSOTEVAllh&4EC$2AE
3.2-1
CONFIDENYIAL<~aos Is wl.
97~3/481
FLORIDAPOWER dk LIGHTCOMPANY
TURKEYPOINT NUCLEAR
PLAN'I'997
EVALUATEDEXERCISE
MAY13 dk 14, 1997
3.2 TIMELINE
TIME
EVENT¹
EVENT
0755
First Aid Team
and
Contract Medical Response
Personnel
respond
to the
'edical emergency.
- 0805
4
The Unit 3 CCW Deluge System inadvertently actuates
as a result of a short
.circuit>n the control panel.
This results in aZ) 4kv bus ground target-in-the-
control room.
The 3C CCW pump fails to trip and Breaker 3AD04 will not.
open.
This results in the loss ofthe 3D 4kv bus.
3AD04 cannot be racked out
'ue
to a stripped rack screw.
Electrical Maintenance will need to remove and
replace the rack screw. (Do not recover during exercise)
0810
Upon investigation, operators determine that there is no fire. The deluge system
is isolated.
0820
5
The contaminated/injured individual is transported to the on-site medical facility.
Offsite medical assistance
is requested.
E
A loss of all annunciators
occurs when Breaker 3D01 trips due to a ground on
the Unit 3 Annunciator Panel power supply. (Annunciators willbe restored prior
to initiating a plant trip/transient.)
0835
ERT determines annunciator power supply failure and initiates repairs.
The contaminated/injured individual is being transported to Baptist Hospital.
An Unusual Event should be declared based on the unplanned loss of most or
all safety system annunciators for greater than fifteen minutes.
0900
6
0910
7
The 3D01 Breaker is energized and annunciators are restored.
A fire alarm in the Unit 3 ICW Pump area, Alarm Point 27, comes into the
Control Room.
An employee contacts the control room and reports a fire is
underway.
The Fire Brigade is activated to combat the fire.
0920
The Fire Brigade arrives at the scene and finds a fire underway.
Weld material in
the area has ignited oily rags, with the blaze spreading to several unmarked
barrels being stored in the area.
0925
The Fire Brigade Leader advises the Control Room that off-site support will be
necessary to combat the fire.
E'IEFtWORM)RtLLSWEVAUA97-EEC37AE
3.2-2
CONFIDENTIAL<~ oW&977
97AEIRn02IOV&97
FLORIDAPO%ER &LIGHTCOMPANY
TURKEYPOINT NUCLEAR
PLAN'I'997
EVALUATEDEXERCISE
MAY13 & 14, 1997
3.2 TIMELINE
TIME
EVENT¹
EVENT
0930
Conditions are in place for the declaration ofan Alert Eme
enc
based on an
uncontrolled fire, potentially affecting safety systems
and o8'-site support
is
- required. = .
0940
Activation ofthe on-site emergency response facilities has been'initiated.
Responders
should be enroute to the EOF for the activation and operation of
that facility.
0945
0950
1010
Off-site fire support arrives on-site (simulated).
The fire is out.
The TSC and OSC should be declared operational.
1015
A previously unidentified crack in the 8 Loop Cold Leg develops a 3 gpm leak
at the junction for the cold leg injection.
1020
Operators
and the STA have
conducted
RCS leak rate calculations,
using
charging and letdown mismatch and containment sump levels.
RCS leakage is
determined
to
be
greater
than
Technical
Specification
limits of
1
gpm
1025
A controlled reactor shutdown will commence in accordance
with GOP 103,
Power Operation to Hot Standby.
The System Dispatcher informs the Control Room that the system load is tight,
as Manatee Plant
has been forced off line, and requests
that they hold up
reducing load or reduce as slowly as possible while alternate power is sought.
1030
HP personnel should be dispatched to do on-site radiation surveys.
Chemistry
personnel should be dispatched to sample the RCS and S/G's in response to the
RCS leakage.
FAFFIWOROIDIU!LSBEVALUI9TSE(3?AE
3.2-3
CONFIDENTIAL<¹¹IIIO9
I9-99'1AFJRcv02/03IIII99
FLORIDAPOWER &LIGHTCOMPANY
TKRKEYPOINT NUCLEARPLANT
EVALUATEDEXERCISE
MAY13 & 14, 1997
3.2 'IIMELINE
TIIlFIE
EVENT¹
EVENT
1045
10
A ground
fault occurs
on the Unit 3
Startup
Transformer,
resulting
in
misoperation
of
the
generator
protection
system,
causing
a
main
generator/transformer
lockout. Rx trip/turbine trip. A loss ofall AC occurs (at
this time-or-80%-power;whichever comes first).
The 3B RCP Breaker 3AB01 fails to open and the 3B EDG Breaker will not
close on the bus. This results in the loss ofall AC power. The loss ofthe D bus
leaves the station blackout tie breaker ineffective.
The operating crew enters
ECA-O.O.
1050,
The EOF should be declared operational.
1100
Conditions are in place for the Declaration of a Site Area.Eme
encv
based
on a loss ofall AC power for greater than fiAeen minutes.
1105
leak rate increases.
Containment
pressure
increases
to -3 psig (.01
simulator).
Upon receipt ofthe Safety Injection signal the 4B Safety Injection Pump starts,
but seizes immediately, sheering the shaft and rendering it inoperable.
843-A
and 843-B Bit outlets to cold leg fail to open and are bound in their seat.
'115
The RCS leak rate continues to increase.
Containment pressure
increases to
-12 psig (.08 simulator)
1125
(Simulator Note: Initiate fuel failure of20%)
1130
The RCS piping completely
shears
at the junction for cold leg injection.
Containment pressure spikes above 26 psig.
1132-1133
12
The sudden increase in containment pressure
is enough to force POV-3-2602
and POV-3-2603, the purge exhaust valve, offoftheir closed seat, resulting in a
release to the environment.
FMRWORM)RILLSO7EVAUA97SECMAE
3.2-4
CONFIDENTIALI~ous >77
77ABRcvOll03f&97
FLORIDAPOWER Ec LIGHTCOMPANY
'I'URKEYPOINT NUCLEARPLANT
EVALUATEDEXERCISE
MAY13 dk, 14, 1997
3.2 'IllUQ"LINE
TIIIIE EVENT¹
EVENT
1140 'onditions are in place for the declaration ofa General Eme
enc
based on:
RCS leakage greater than 50 gpm and greater than available charging
= '-pump capacity-and Containment pressure greater than 20 psig.
RCS leakage'greater
than 50 gpm and greater than available charging
pump capacity and the loss of containment integrity, which provides a
flowpath to the environment.
Potential
core
damage
indicated
by (1)known LOCA greater
than
charging pump capacity, (2) failure of ECCS to deliver flow to the
core, and (3) CHIGMreading greater than 1.3 E4 Rem/hr.
Containment
High Range
Radiation
reading
greater
than
1.3
E5
Rem/hr.
Fuel element failure and (1) LOCA with a loss of containment cooling
or (2) LOCAwith a loss ofcontainment integrity which provides a flow
path to the environment.
1145
As the core is voided, fuel temperatures
begin to increase
significantly.
Gas gap activity and hydrogen concentrations begin to increase
as CET's
continue to rise,
(Input 6% nodule power over 10 minutes)
CHRRM's
increase to greater than 1.3x E5 R/hr.
1150
CET's reach temperatures of2300'F and greater.
- The following teams
should have been
dispatched:
3AB01, 3AA22,
3AC13, 4B HHSI Pump, and possibly 843A&B.
1200
The
release
is ongoing,
as
the
Containment
Purge
Exhaust
Valve
continues to leak.
1210
13
The B RCP Breaker is repaired and able to be opened.
Power willbe
restored to the 3B 4kv bus from the 3B EDG.
Containment pressure is -11 psig and the release continues.
F%'hWORIEI)RILLEWKYAllh9TSEC3ME
3.2-5
CONH
DENTINAL
{~on IsD
FLORIDAPOWER &LIGHTCOMPANY
TUIUCEYPOINT NUCXZARPLANT
EVALUATEDEXERCISE
MAY13 & 14, 1997
3.2 '11MELINE
TIME
EVENTS
EVENT
1220
As power
is
restored,
Emergency
Containment
Filters,
Emergency
Containment
Coolers,
and Containment
Spray begin to scrub and cool
containment and the reduction in containment pressure
is eliminating the
. release-through -the-Containment -Isolation-Purge. Exhaust Valves POV-2-
=
--.
2602 and POV-3-2603.
Plant vent radiation levels begin to decline.
Field
monitoring activities continue.
The Emergency Response
Teams continue
to stabilize the reactor, verify safe shutdown and evaluate
containment
integrity. The release continues.
1230
CET's have decreased
significantly, as flow to the core has been restored.
The core has been reflooded.
1240
=
14
Containment pressure
has been reduced to - 2 psig and POV-3-2602 and
POV-3-2603 have reseated, terminating the release.
1330
Recovery Action should be considered at this time, with the identification
of personnel
for
backshiA,
possible
de-escalation
of the
General
Emergency, and logistical needs for the continued operation ofthe facility.
1400
A representative
from American Nuclear Insurers contacts the company
requesting information regarding the accident.
1430
Termination ofplume exposure pathway play.
0
FAEBWORM)iUl.i.R97EVhLIA9i.SECMAE
3.2-6
CONHDENTIAL<~o9i99/i
97hBRcv02/03/t991
I
0