ML17348A586
| ML17348A586 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 09/21/1990 |
| From: | Butcher R, Crlenjak R, Schnebli G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17348A585 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-90-30, 50-251-90-30, NUDOCS 9010120033 | |
| Download: ML17348A586 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000250/1990030
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-250/90-30
and 50-251/90-30
Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company
9250 West Flagler Street
Miami, FL'3102
Docket Nos.:
50-250
and 50-251
License 'Nos.:
and
Facility Name:
Turkey Point
3 and
4
Inspection
Conducted:
.August 4,
1990 through August 31,
1990
Inspector:
R.
C.
u cher,
Senior Resident
Inspector
Dat
Si
ned
Approved
y:
. A. Sc
b i, Res dent Inspector
R.
. Cr enja Section
ief
Division of Reactor Projects
Dat
Signed
qz( po
ate Signed
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine resident
inspector
inspection
entailed direct inspection at the
site
in the
areas
of monthly surveillance
observations,
monthly maintenance
observations,
operational
safety,
and plant events.
Results:
Within the
scope
of this
inspection,
the
inspectors
determined
that
the
licensee
continued to demonstrate
satisfactory
performance
to ensure
safe plant
operations.
One violation was identified.
50-250,251/90-30-01,
Violation.
Failure
to incorporate
revised
instrument
setpoint into instrument calibration data sheet.
REPORT'ETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employe'es
T. V.
- L. W.
- T. A.
R. J.
S. T.
K. N.
'E.
F.
R.
G.
V. A.
J.
A.
G. L.
R.
G.
"L. W.
~D.
R.
K. L.
C.
V.
G.
M.
R.
N.
J.
C.
F.
R.
- M. B.
J.
D.
A. T.
Abbatiello, guality Assurance
Supervisor
Bladow, guality Manager
Finn, Assistant Operations
Superintendent
Gianfrencesco,
Assistant
Maintenance
Superintendent
Hale, Engineering Project Supervisor
Harris, Senior Vice President,
Nuclear Operations
Hayes,
Instrumentation
and Controls Supervisor
Heisterman,
Assistant Superintendent
of Electrical Maintenance
Kaminskas,
Operations
Superintendent
Labarraque,
Senior Technical Advisor
Marsh,
Reactor Supervisor
Mende, Operations
Supervisor
Pearce,
Plant Manager,
Nuclear
Powell, Superintendent,
Plant Licensing
Remington,
System
Performance
Supervisor
Rossi,
equality Assurance
Supervisor
Smith, Service
Manager,
Nuclear
Steinke,
Chemistry Supervisor
Strong, Mechanical
Department Supervisor
Tirmons, Site Security Superintendent
Wayland, Maintenance
Superintendent
Webb, Assistant Superintendent
Planning
and Scheduling
Zielonka, Technical
Department Supervisor
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
included
construction
craftsman,
engineers,
technicians,
operators,
mechanics,
and electricians.
- Attended exit interview on August 31,
1990
Note;
An alphabetical
tabulation
of acronyms
used
in this report is
listed in paragraph
10.
Followup on Items of Noncompliance
(92702)
A review
was
conducted
of the following noncompliances
to assure
that
corrective actions
were adequately
implemented
and resulted
in conformance
with regulatory
requirements.
Verification of corrective
action
was
achieved
through
record
reviews,
observation,
and
discussions
with
licensee
personnel.
Licensee
correspondence
was evaluated
to ensure
the
responses
were timely and corrective actions
were
implemented within the
time periods specified in the reply.
(Closed)
Violation 50-250,251/89-43-03.
This violation concerned
an
inadequate
clearance
resulting
in the
disassembly
of
a valve in
a
pressurized
system
which resulted
in
a personnel
injury.
The licensee
determined
the root cause for this event
was
inadequate
training for the
-'task.
Corrective
actions
accomplished
included
the following:
The
accounts
of this
event
were
described
in plant safety'eetings;
Supervision
was reinstructed
to clearly communicate their job scope
and
clearance
requirements
to the control
room, includihg re-evaluation
each
time the job scope
changes;
Procedures
O-GME-102.8,
102.9,
and 102.10,
addressing
MOV operator
inspection
and overhaul,
have
been
revised
to
include
a precaution
and caut'.ons
in the body of the procedure to address
. the removal of the stem lock nut or upper bearing
housing with thrust load
'applied
or if the valve is
under
pressure;
and electrical. department-
personnel
assigned
to work on valve actuators
were'rained
on methods,to
render
a pressurized
valve actuator
safe for disassembly.
The inspector
considers
the actions
taken
were
adequate
to prevent
recurrence.
This
item is closed.
Followup on Previous
Inspection
Findings
(92701)'Closed)
URI 50-250,251/90-25-02.
Concerning
the
improper setpoint for
Unit 4
CCW pump automatic start pressure
switch.
On January
6,
1988, the
setpoints
for PC-3/4-611
were
changed
from 75.0 psig
+ 1.5 psig to 60.0
psig
+ 1.5 psig in accordance
with Administrative Procedure
AP 0140.2,
=
"Changing Setpoints,"
which required
a
10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation
and
subsequent
review by the
PNSC.
This setpoint
change
was
deemed
necessary
to prevent
nuisance
automatic starts
of the
standby
CCW pump(s)
due to
flow transients
when
switching
from two
pump to
one
pump operation.
Single
pump operation results
in
CCW pump discharge
pressures
close
to
75.0
psig.
On
January
19,
1988,
PC-3-611
and
PC-4-611'ere
recalibrated
to 60.0
psig
+ 1.5 psig.
Calibration of these
pressure
controllers
was performed under
a
PWO using the setpoint
change
package
as
guidance.
The master
instrument calibration data
sheet for PC-3/4-611
should
have
been
revised
to reflect the
new low pressure
set point and
attached
to the
PWOs at this time.
This administrative
task
was not
performed.
During the Unit 4, Cycle
12 refueling outage,
PC-4-611
had to
be
moved
due to mechanical
interference
with the
CCW heat
exchanger
tube
bundle
replacement.
Upon reinstallation,
PC-4-611
was calibrated to 75.0
psig
+ 1.5 psig using the instrument calibration data sheet
as guidance in
lieu of 60.0 psig
+ 1.5 psig because
the data sheets
had not been revised
to the
new setpoint.
TS 6.8. 1 requires
that written procedures
and
administrative policies shall
be established,
implemented
arid maintained
that meet or exceed
the requirements
and
recommendations
of Appendix
A of
USNRC Regulatory
Guide
1.33
and Sections
5.1
and 5.3 of ANSI N18.7-1972.
Section
5. 1 requires
that administrative
policies
be
provided to control
the
issuance
of documents,
including changes,
that
prescribe
activities affecting safety-related
structures,
systems,
or
components.
On July 26,
1990, the Unit 4A
CCW pump automatically started
due to pressure
switch
PC-4-611
being set at the wrong value,
75
+ 1.5
psig in lieu of the required
60
+ 1.5 psig.
The root cause for the
improper setpoint of the switch
was inadequate
administrative controls to
ensure
that
revisions
to setpoints
were
incorporated
into instrument
calibration
data
sheets.
This
item
is
identified
as
violation
50-250,251/90-30-01.
4.
(Closed)
IFI 250,251/87-07-03.
Generation of Electrical
Breaker Setpoint
Document.
The status
of this item was reviewed in a telephone
conference
between
Region II Division of Reactor
Safety
(Operational
Programs
Section) staff
and
the licensee
on September
7,
1990.
The licensee
is
tracking
completion
of this
item
.on the
Integrated
Schedule
and
has
established
a
completion
goal
of
May 1991.
The Integrated
Schedule
provides
a tracking vehicle; therefore', this IFI is considered
closed.
Onsite
Followup
and In-Office Review of Written Reports
of Nonroutine
Events
and
10 CFR Part 21 Reviews
(90712/90713/92700)
The Licensee
Event Reports
and/or
10 CFR Part 21 Reports
discussed
below
were reviewed.
The inspectors
verified that reporting requirements
had
been
met, root cause
analysis
was
performed,
corrective actions
appeared
~
appropriate,
and generic applicability had
been considered.
Additionally,
the inspectors
verified the licensee
had reviewed
each
event,
corrective
actions
were
implemented,
responsibility for corrective actions not'fully
completed
was clearly assigned,
safety
questions
had
been
evaluated
and
resolved,
and
violations of regulations
or
TS conditions
had
been
identified.
When applicable,
the criteria of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, were
applied.
~ (Closed)
LER 50-250/89-01.
Concerning
the
3A
ICW being declared
OOS while
performing operability tests
of the
8
EDG.
This issue
was previously
discussed
in detail in IR 50-250,251/88-40.
This
LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-250/89-02.
Concerning
a reactor
shutdown required
by TS
due to
a
RCS leak at the seal table.
This issue
was previously identified
as IFI 50-250,251/88-40-03
and subsequently
closed in IR 50-250,251/89-52.
This
LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-250/89-03.
Concerning
the automatic isolation of control
room ventilation
system
during testing.
This
issue
was
previously
discussed
in detail in IR 50-250,251/88-40.
This
LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-250/89-09.
Concerning
Appendix
R safe
shutdown analysis.
This issue
was previously discussed
in IR '50-250,251/89-18.
This
LER is
closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-250/89-10.
Concerning
a
loss
of power to the vital
instrument
rack
and automatic isolation of control
room and containment
ventilation.
This event
was discussed
is detail
in IR 50-250,251/89-27.
This
LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-250/89-11.
Concerning
two safeguards
actuations
due to
personnel
error.
This
event
was
previously identified
as Violation
50-250,251/89-27-04
which was subsequently
closed in IR 50-250,251/89-54.
This
LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-250/89-14.
Concerning
CCW flow rates
to the
being
below design
basis
accident
requirements
due to inadequate
administrative
controls.
This issue
was discussed
in detail in IR 50-250,251/89-43
and
identified as
NCV 89-43-01.
This
LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-250/89-20.
Concerning
corrosion of the terminal
blocks
for the NSIVs.
This issue
was previously discussed
in IR 50-250,251/89-54=
and
was identified as Violation 89-54-02.
Close out of this issue will be
accomplished
when closing out the violation.
This
LER is closed.
(Closed).
LER 50-250/89-21.
Concerning
the
use
of
a
high integrity
container
not authorized
in the process
control
program.
This issue
was
previously discussed
in
IR 50-250,251/89-35
and
was identified
as
NCY
89-35-02.
This
LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-251/89-01.
Concerning
the
A
EOG inoperable with 4B
pump
00S
due
to miscommunication
between
personnel.
This
issue
was
previously discussed
in
IR 50-250,251/89-06
and identified
as
an'NCV.
This
LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-251/89-02.
Concerning
a
safeguards
actuation
due to
personnel
error while installing fuses in the safeguard
racks.
This issue
was
previously
identified
as
Violation
50-250,251'/89-18-01
and
subsequently
closed in IR 50-250,251/89-52.
This LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER
50-251/89-03.
Concerning
a
reactor trip during
the
performance
of
SG protection
channel
test.
This issue
was previously
identified as Violation 50-250,251/89-24-01
and subsequently
closed in IR
50-250,251/90-04.
This
LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-251/89-04.
Concerning
the
loss of alternate
hot leg
injection flow path
due to hydraulic locking of the injection valve.
This
event
was
previously
identified
as
IFI
50-250,251/89-24-05
and
subsequently
closed in IR 50-250,251/89-27.
This
LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-251/89-05.
Concerning
the
4A accumulator
level
TS not
being
met
due to wrong level transmitter identified
as malfunctioning.
This event
was previously discussed
in IR 50-250,251/89-34
and identified
as
NCV 50-251/89-34-01.
This
LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-251/89-06.
Concerning
degraded
ICW flow to
CCW heat
exchangers
due to valve failure.
This event
was previously discussed
in
IR 50-250,251/89-34.
This
LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER
50-251/89-08.
Concerning
the
pump
being
00S for
maintenance
longer
than
the
TS allowed period
due to increased
motor
vibration.
This event
was previously discussed
in IR 50-250,251/89-40.
This
LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-251/89-12.
Concerning
the
A loop of containment
wide
range level indication being de-energized
longer than the
TS allowed time
period.
This issue
was previously discussed
in IR 50-250,251/89-45
and
identified as
NCV 89-45-04.
This
LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-251/89-13.
Concerning
a missed
surveillarice
on
ICW to
.
TPCW isolation valves
due to personnel
error.
This issue
was previous y
1
identified
as
50-250,251/89-45-05
and
later
as
50-250,251/89-52-07.
This
LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-251/90-07.
Concerning
the improper setpoint for Unit 4
pump automatic start
pressure
switch.
This
issue
was
previously
identified as
URI 50-250,251/90-25-02
and is discussed
in paragraph
3 of
this report.
This
LER is closed.
5.
Monthly Surveillance
Observations
(61726)
The inspectors
observed
TS required surveillance
testing
and verified:
the test
procedure
conformed
to the requirements
of the TS; testing
was
~
performed in accordance
with adequate
procedures;
test, instrumentation
was
calibrated; limiting 'conditions for operation
were met; test re'suits
me't
acceptance criteria requirements
and were reviewed
by personnel
other than
the
individual directing
the test;
deficiencies, were identified,
as
appropriate,
and
were
properly
reviewed
and
resolved
by
management
ersonnel
and
system restorati.on
was adequate.
For completed tests,
the
inspectors verified testing
frequencies
were met and tests
were performe d
by qualified individuals.
The
inspectors
witnessed/reviewed
portions
of
the
following test
activities:
6.
OP 1604. 1, Full Length
RCC - Periodic Exercise
OP 4004.2,
Safeguard
Relay
Rack Train A,B - Periodic Test
O-OSP-022.4,
EDG Fuel Oil Transfer
Pump Inservice Test
O-ADM-716, Infrared Thermography
(For
EDG Fuel Oil Transfer
Pumps)
The inspectors
determined that the above testing activities were performed
in
a satisfactory
manner
and
met
the
requirements
of the
TS.
No
violations or deviations
were identified in the areas
inspected.
Monthly Maintenance
Observations
(62703)
Station
maintenance
activities of safety-related
systems
and
components
were observed
and
reviewed to ascertain
they were conducted in accordance
with approved
procedures,
regulatory guides,
industry codes
and standards,
and in conformance with TS.
The following items
were considered
during this review,
as appropriate:
LCOs were
met while
components
or systems
were
removed
from service;
approvals
were
obtained
prior
to initiating work; activities
were
accomplished
using
approved
procedures
and were inspected
as applicable;
procedures
used
were
adequate
to control
the activity; troubleshooting
activities
were controlled
and repair records
accurately
reflected
the
maintenance
performed;
functional
testing
and/or
calibrations
were
performed prior to returning
components
or systems
to service;
gC records
were
maintained;
activities
were
accomplished
by qualified personnel;
parts
and materials
used
were properly certified; radiological controls
were properly
implemented;
gC hold points
were established
and
observed
where
required;
fire prevention
controls
were
implemented;
outside
contractor
force activities
were
controlled
in
accordance
with the
approved
gA program;
and housekeeping
was actively pursued.
The inspectors
witnessed/rev'iewed
portions of the following maintenance
activities in progress:
Troubleshooting
No.
3 Blackstart
Diesel
High Level Transfer
Switch
Failure.
Cleaning of 48
TPCW Heat Exchanger.
Repair of 4A Heater Drain Pump Seal.
For those
maintenance
activities observed,
the inspectors
determined that,.
the activities'ere
conducted
in a satisfactory
manner
and that the work
was
properly
performed
in accordance
with approved
maintenance
work
orders.
No violations
or deviations
were identified in the
areas
inspected.
7.
Operational
Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors
observed
control
room operations,
reviewed applicable logs,
conducted
discussions
with control
room
operators,
observed
shift
turnovers,
and confirmed operability of instrumentation.
The inspectors
verified
the
operab'ility
of
selected
emergency
systems,
verified
maintenance
work orders
had
been
submitted
as
required,
and verified
followup and prioritization of work
was
accomplished.
The inspectors
reviewed
tagout
records,
verified compliance
with
TS LCOs,
and verified
the return to service of affected
components.
By observation
and direct interviews, verification
was
made that
the
physical security plan was being implemented.
Plant
housekeeping/cleanliness
conditions
and
implementation
of
radiological controls were observed.
Tours of the intake structure
and diesel, auxiliary, control,
and turbine
buildings
were
conducted
to observe
plant equipment conditions
including
potential fire hazards,
fluid leaks,
and excessive
vibrations.
The inspectors
walked
down accessible
portions of the following safety
related
systems
to verify operability and proper valve/switch alignment:
A and
B Emergency Diesel
Generators
Control
Room Vertical Panels
and Safeguard's.Racks
'
'
Intake Cooling Water Structure
4l60 Volt Buses
and 480 Volt Load and Motor Control Centers
Unit 3 and
Platforms
Unit 3 and
4 Condensate
Storage
Tank Area
Area
Unit 3 and
4 Main Steam Platforms
Auxiliary Building
On August
28,
1990,
at I:20
pm,
th'e licensee
secured
the Uni't 4
cooling sy'tem to determine
the
heatup rate.
This special
test
was'onducted
per
in preparation
for
the
upcoming
system
modifications scheduled
to start later this year.
The inspectors
reviewed
the licensee's
safety evaluation for adding additional
temper'ature
probes
for the test.
Initial SFP heater
temperature
was approximately
98 degrees
Fahrenheit.
The inspectors,
as
a result of routine plant tours
and various operational
observations,
determined
that
the
general
plant
and
system
material
conditions
were
being satisfactorily
maintained,
the
plant
security
program
was
being effective,
and
the overall
performance
of plant
operations
was
good.
No violations or deviations
were identified in the
areas
inspected.
Plant Events
(93702)
The following plant event
was
reviewed to determine facility status
and
the
need for further followup action.
Plant
parameters
were evaluated
during transient
response.
The significance of the event
was evaluated
along with the
performance
of the appropriate
safety
systems
and
the
actions
taken
by the licensee.
The inspectors
verified that required
notifications were
made to the
NRC.
Evaluations
were performed relative
to the
need for additional
NRC response
to the event.
Additionally, the
following issues
were
examined,
as
appropriate:
details
regarding
the
cause of the event;
event chronology; safety system performance;
licensee
compliance
with approved
procedures;
radiological
consequences,
if any;
and proposed corrective actions.
On August
12,
1990,
at 4:28
pm, with Unit 4 at
100K,
occurred
due to low-low level
in the
The event
was
caused
by
the
4B condensate
pump tripping
on overcurrent
which
was
immediately followed by
a trip of the
4A feedwater
pump.
The trip of the
pump initiated
a turbine
runback to less
than
60 percent
power
as designed.
levels
dropped
below
15 percent
narrow range
due to shrink
caused
by the
combined effects of a partial
loss of feed
flow, turbine runback,
and subsequent
The trip of a running
condensate
pump will normally start
the standby
condensate
pump
and not
trip the
SGFW
pump if the
swap
occurs within five seconds.
The five
seconds
is timed
by an Agastat relay in the
SGFW
pump breaker trip logic.
Upon investigation it was
discovered
that the Agastat relay
was set at
9.
10.
0. 15 seconds
in lieu of the required five seconds.
The low setting of the
'elay did not allow enough
time for the 'start of 'the standby
condensate'-'ump
to be sensed
by the breaker trip logic and therefore
a
SGFW
pump trip . "..
signal
was generated.
The relay was reset to 5.0 sec
+ 10% for the
A SGFW
pump
and
the relay for the
B
SGFW
pump was also reset after testing found
it to be set at 3.3 seconds.
The
ERT is currently trying to determine
the
cause for the
low setpoint
on the relay
and provide
a method of control.
The unit was
subsequently
returned
to service at 4:43
am
on August
14,
1990.
'
'No 'violations'or deviations
were identified in the areas
inspected.
Exit Interview (30703)
The
inspection
scope
and
findings
were
summarized
during -management
interviews held throughout
the reporting period with the Plant Manager-
Nuclear
and selected
members
of his staff.
An exit meeting
was conducted
on
August
31,
1990.
The
areas
requiring
management
attention
were
reviewed.
No proprietary
information
was
provided to the inspectors
during the reporting period.
The inspectors
had the following findings:
50-250,251/90-30-01,
Violation.
Failure to incorporate
revised
instrument
setpoint into instrument calibration data sheet.
and Abbreviations
ADM
CFR
DP
ERT
GME
ICW
IFI
IR
LCO
LER
LIV
Administrative
Administrative Procedures
American Society of Mechanical
Engineers
Component
Cooling Water
Code of Federal
Regulations
Containment
Spray
Differential Pressure
Emergency
Containment
Coolers
Emergency
Diesel
Generator
Emergency Notification System
Emergency
Response
Data Acquisition Display System
Event Response
Team
Power
& Light
Final Safety Analysis Report
General
Maintenance Electrical
High Head Safety Injection
Intake Cooling Water
Inspection
Enforcement
Inspector
Followup Item
Inspection
Report
Limiting Condition for Operation
Licensee
Event Report
Licensee Identified Violation
NRC
ONOP
OP
OTSC
PC/M
PNSC
RCO
.RCS
SFW
SNPO
TPCW
TS
Loss of Coolant Accident
Maintenance
Procedures
Motor Operated
Valve
Non-conformance
Report
Non-Cited Violation
Nuclear Plant Operator
Net Positive Suction
Head
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Off Normal Operating
Procedure
Out of Service
'perating
Procedure
On the Spot Change
Plant Change/Modification
Plant Nuclear Safety Committee
Plant Supervisor
Nuclear
Physical Security Procedures
Quality Assurance
Quality Control
Rod Control Cluster
Reactor Control Operator
Pump
Reactor
Coolant System
Residual
Heat
Removal
Spent
Fuel Pit
.Standby
Senior Nuclear Plant Operator
Senior Reactor Operator
Turbi.ne Plant Cooling Water
Technical Specification
Temporary
System Alteration
Unresolved
Item