IR 05000250/1996007
| ML17353A809 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 07/10/1996 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Stratton L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17353A808 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-96-07, 50-250-96-7, 50-251-96-07, 50-251-96-7, NUDOCS 9607230180 | |
| Download: ML17353A809 (9) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATlANTA,GEORGIA 303234199 Report Nos.
50-250/96-07 and 50-251/96-07 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.
50-250 and 50-251 Facility Name:
Turkey Point Plant Units 3 and
License Nos.
DPR-31, DPR-41 Inspection Conducted:
Inspect L
i St n,
afeguards spector une 12 - 14, 1996 Date Signed Approved by:
Pau Fredrickson, Chief Special Inspection Branch Division of Reactor Safety ate igned SUMMARY Scope:
This announced inspection was conducted to review the licensee's Access Authorization Program, as required by 10 CFR 73.56.
Specifically, psychological evaluations, and the training of personnel and supervisors was reviewed.
The inspector also reviewed the licensee's appeal process and the protection afforded personal information.
Additionally, 10 CFR 26, Fitness For Duty, with respect to call-in procedures was reviewed.
Results:
In the areas inspected, there were no violations identified.
The licensee's Access Authorization Program, in the areas inspected, was found to be in accordance with the site's plans and procedures.
Several personnel interviewed were unclear regarding the requirements for reporting arrests.
Additionally, the inspector found that the majority of personnel interviewed were unaware that an appeal process existed for access authorization elements, only associating the appeal process with Fitness For Duty concerns.
Within the area of Fitness For Duty, the inspector determined that call-in practices were documented in procedures and training; however, those procedures were unclear with respect to responsibility.
. ~
9607230i80 9607i0 PDR ADOCK 05000250
REPORT DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted l. 1 Licensee Employees
- T. Abbetiello, guality Hanager, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (TPNP)
B. Boger, GET/RCAT Training, TPNP
J.
Denton, Fitness for Duty Coordinator, TPNP
- D. Jernigan, Plant General Hanager, TPNP
- V. Kaminskas, Services Hanager, TPNP J. Kirkpatrick, Fire Protection/Safety Supervisor, TPNP
"*F. Harcussen, Plan Security Supervisor, TPNP
- C. Howrey, Compliance Specialist, TPNP
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, technicians, security force members, and administrative personnel.
1.2 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.0 Access Authorization Program (Temporary Instruction 2515/127)
On April 25, 1991, the Commission published
CFR 73.56, Personnel Access Authorization Re uirements for Nuclear Power Plants, which required licensees to fully implement their Access Authorization Program (AAP) by April 27, 1992.
By letter dated April 3, 1992, the licensee submitted Revision 1 to the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Physical Security Plan committing to the requirements of
CFR 73.56 and NRC Regulatory Guide 5.66, Access Authorization Pro ram for Nuclear Power Plants.
2.1 AAP Administration The licensee's AAP, at the time of this inspection, was solely managed and implemented at the Corporate level by the Access Program Supervisor.
All AAP functions, procedures and records are found at the Corporate Office, Juno Beach, Florida.
A previous inspection conducted during the period of November 15-17, 1994, and documented in Inspection Report No. 50-250/94-22 and 50-251/94-22 reviewed AAP administration.
Based on'he inspector's review, the licensee's AAP administration was adequate to support the intended function of 10 CFR 73.56.
There were no violations of regulatory requirements noted in this area.
2.2 Behavioral Observation Program (BOP)
The Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) has published the industry guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Access Authorization Programs (89-01) adopted by NRC's Regulatory Guide 5.66, titled "Access Authorization Programs for Nuclear Power Plants."
Paragraph 9.0 of NUMARC No. 89-01, Continual Behavior Observation Pro ram, requires that supervisors be given training in the detection of aberrant behavior, to include signs of drug and alcohol abuse as well as observing personnel for changing behavioral traits and patterns indicative of an adverse trend of their trustworthiness and reliability.
Additionally, Paragraph 9.0 also requires that individuals with unescorted access authorization must be notified of their responsibility to report any arrest that may impact upon their trustworthiness.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's manuals for training supervisors and escorts in detecting aberrant behavior.
The inspector verified that aberrant behavior training is provided to all personnel who are granted unescorted access and annually for supervisors.
It was noted during this review and substantiated through interviews of supervisors, that the training for detecting aberrant behavior is largely based upon detecting the signs of drug and alcohol abuse.
There appeared to be little training relative to the behavior changes indicative of a lack of trustworthiness and reliability of personnel.
However, upon further discussion during interviews with ten randomly selected supervisors, the inspector learned that supervisors related the detection of aberrant behavior with access authorization.
Recognition of
, aberrant behavior, as well as the responsibility to report arrests, is under the licensee's umbrella of fitness for duty, rather than access authorization.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's observation and will evaluate their training.
Eighteen individuals were interviewed as to their understanding of personal reliability and their responsibility to report any arrest.
The individuals appeared to have a good recall of this responsibility but were confused as to which arrests to report.
The inspector reviewed the "Fitness for Duty Employee/Escort Training Video Script" and found it states,
"Personnel are'equired to immediately report ANY arrest to their supervisor."
Overall, the personnel interviewed recalled that their responsibility for reporting arrests ranged from any arrest to only reporting of felony arrests.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's observation; however, they consider the subject sufficiently covered in the training material.
2.3 Psychological Testing I
The licensee administers the Minnesota Multiphasic Personalty Inventory (MMPI)
I or 2, which if warranted, is followed by a clinical interview with a licensed psychologist.
The inspector reviewed testing procedures and visited the testing facility onsite.
All personnel responsible for testing required positive identification from the "applicant.
Facilities accommodated the proctoring of the tests, were appropriately secure, and test materials were inventoried and secured when not in us ~l Ib T
Based on the inspector's review, the licensee's practice of administering psychological testing appeared to be adequate.
There were no violations of regulatory requirements noted in this area.
2.4 Revocations/Denials and Appeals During interview of 18 randomly selected individuals, the inspector noted that very few individuals knew that an appeal process was available for derogatory results from access authorization elements.
In fact, several believed there was no appeal process at all for the AAP.
Although the licensee's Fitness For Duty training, which contains the access authorization program, reveals there is an appeal process for positive drug and alcohol test results, there is no mention of an appeal process afforded to individuals for the AAP.
However, the inspector verified through discussion with licensee representatives and document review, that at the time a person is informed of the*denial or revocation of access, the licensee provides a written right to appeal.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's observation.
Based on the inspector's review of this area, the appeal process was considered adequate.
There were no violations of regulatory requirements noted in this area.
3.0 Fitness for Duty (81502)
In accordance with 10 CFR 26. 10(a), the licensee must provide reasonable assurance that nuclear power plant personnel will perform their tasks in a reliable and trustworthy manner and are not under the influence of any substance, legal or illegal, or mentally or physically impaired from any cause, which in any way adversely affects their ability to safely and competently perform their duties.
In or,"er to determine licensee compliance, the inspector reviewed O-ADN-018,
"Fitness for Duty: Call-Out of Personnel, For-Cause Testing, and Reportability," dated February 4, 1993.
Section 5.2, "Call-0ut," specifies that the manager or supervisor who makes or authorizes a call-out for non-emergency work related activity shall ensure that the individual called is asked the questions contained in the Call-Out Form:
I) Have you consumed alcohol within the last five (5) hours, (2) number of drinks within the last five (5) hours, (3)
how long since the last drink,'and (4) do you believe you are fit for duty?
Section 5.2.3 states that the Call-Out Form does not apply to emergency plan call-outs.
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP)
20104, dated June 30, 1994, denotes how emergency plan call-outs are performed, but fails to denote responsibility for determining Fitness For Duty capabilities.
Upon further discussion with licensee representatives, the inspector determined that during an emergency/drill, it is the responsibility of the individual being called to inform the caller that he/she is not fit for duty.
If the individual did consume alcohol within the last five hours but states he/she is fit for duty, it is the licensee's responsibility to provide transportation to the site and administer an alcohol test.
The inspector noted that although Fitness For Duty training stated the responsibility of
(
n I ~
being fit for duty lies within the individual who is granted unescorted access, there appeared to be a difference between Fitness For Duty training and the two procedures.
The licensee, in a subsequent discussion on June 27, 1996, acknowledged the two procedures were being revised to reflect consistent Fitness for Duty responsibility.
There were no violations or regulatory requirements noted in this area.
4.0 Exit Interview The Exit Interview was held on June 14, 1996, with those so noted in Paragraph 1.0 in attendance.
The licensee was advised that the inspector found the employees interviewed to be aware and knowledgeable of the AAP except as noted in Paragraphs 2.2 and 2.4.
Addi,tionally, the inspector noted that responsibility of Fitness For Duty requirements as related to call-ins was confusing in that the non-emergency call-in procedure specified responsibility and the emergency call-in procedure did not.
The licensee acknowledged all of the inspector's observations.
There were no dissenting comments received from the license Jt