IR 05000250/1979036
| ML17339A540 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1979 |
| From: | Martin R, Vogtlowell R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17339A538 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-79-36, 50-251-79-36, NUDOCS 8002110281 | |
| Download: ML17339A540 (10) | |
Text
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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-250/79-36 and 50-251/79-36 Licensee:
Florida Power 8 Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33101 Facility Name:
Turkey Point, 3 and
Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.
DPR-31 and DPR-41 Inspection at Turkey Point Site near Homestead, Florida Inspector:
R. J. Vogt-Lo
Approved by:
R. D. Martin, Section Chief, RONS Branch
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IZ-2l Date Signed 2'2-Z./ 7f Date Signed Inspection on November 1-30, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine inspection involved 104 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of preparation for Unit 3 refueling, plant physical protection, safety aspects of inadvertent safety system actuations, plant operations, followup on reportable events.
Results Of the 5 areas'inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
. Yaeger, Site Manager
. Hays, Plant Manager - Nuclear
. Moore, Operations Superintendent - Nuclear
. Haase, Technical Department Supervisor B. Wager, Operations Supervisor W. Hughes, Health Physics Supervisor G. Jones, Nuclear Plant Supervisor Brady, Nuclear Plant Supervisor C. Huenniger, Nuclear Plant Supervisor Pearson, Nuclear Watch Engineer Whitehead, Nuclear Watch Engineer Crockford, Nuclear Plant Supervisor
. Lanning, Nuclear Watch Engineer
. Kaminskas, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
. Mende, Unit 3 Reactor Engineer Becker, Unit 4 Reactor Engineer
. Bradford, Refueling Coordinator
. Klein, Licensing Engineer Suarez, Mechanical Engineer
. White, Maintenance Superintendent
. Mendieta, ISC Department Supervisor homas, Assistant Superintendent Nuclear Mainte
. Kilpatrick, Assistant Superintendent Nuclear Garrett, Plant Security Supervisor
. Hunt, Assistant Security Supervisor aux, QC Supervisor eycock, QC Engineer H. E J K J.
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H nance - Primary Maintenance Secondary Other licensee employees contacted included operators, craftsmen, technicians, security personnel, QA personnel, and engineering personnel.
Management. Interviews Management interviews were conducted on November 9 and 30, 1979, with the Site Manager or Plant Manager-Nuclear and selected members of his staff.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of his inspection activities.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.
Preparation for Refueling - Unit 3 The inspector reviewed the overall plans for the upcoming refueling outage for Unit 3, Cycle 7, scheduled to commence December 2, 1979.
Operating procedures were reviewed to verify that approved procedures were available for new fuel receipt and inspection, including the removal of new fuel assemblies from their shipping containers.
Various other procedures were reviewed to ascertain that provisions have been established to insure that the requirements of the Technical Specifications are met during the refueling process.
Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Plant Physical Protection The inspector observed on a routine basis personnel badging, searching, and escort; alarm response; and vehicle search and escort control.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were observed within the areas inspected.
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Safety Aspects of Inadvertent Safety System Actuations During Surveillance Testing In a June 26, 1979 letter to all PMR licensees NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation requested the following:
(1)
A review of the events described in the referenced letter, to determine whether similar errors have occurred or could occur at their facility and whether the potential exists for a problem associated with occurrences not previously considered (2)
A review and strengthening, as appropriate, of management policies and procedures to assure that multiple equipment failures in safety-related systems will be vigorously pursued and analyzed to identify potential failure modes not previously considered that could lead to a significant reduction in the ability of safety systems to function as required.
(3)
A review of engineered safety system surveillance procedures to deter-mine whether appropriate cautions are included and to ensure that plant operators and supervisors are aware of the importance of avoiding challenges to the facility's protective features.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions in response to the a'foremen-tioned requests and had no further questions.
Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie,
Plant Operations The inspector kept informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the operations staff on a regular basis.
Selected portions of daily operating logs and operating data sheets were reviewed on at least a weekly basis during the report period.
The inspector conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the control room.
Observations included witnessing work activities in progress, status of operating and standby safety systems, confirming valve positions, instrument readings and recordings, annunciator alarms, housekeeping, radiation area controls and vital area controls.
Informal discussions were held with operators and other personnel on work activites in progress and status of safety-related equipment or systems.
The inspector's questions were satisfactorily answered.
No items of non-compliance or deviations were identifed within the areas inspected.
9.
Followup on Reportable Events The following events were reviewed to ascertain that:
a)
reporting requirements were met; b)
corrective action was taken or required by Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50; c)
.the event was reviewed and evaluated; and d)
the facility was operated within the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 and the Technical Specifications subsequent to the event.
50-250/79-33,
"Reduction in Allowable FQ Limit".
The reduction in the allowable FQ limit came as a result of the discovery, by Westinghouse, of an error in the input data for the current ECCS analysis for Units 3 and 4.
Correction of this error resulted in a reduction of the allowable FQ limit associated with steam generator tube plugging less than or equal to 22'/ from 2.10 to a value of 1.90.
The inspector confirmed that augmented surveillance of power distribution was implemented as required and that reactor power limits were applied as approprate.
50-250/79-35,
"Reduction in Allowable FQ Limit".
The licensee reported on their notification by Westinghouse of a necessary reduction in the allowable FQ limit based on a review of the computer model in connection with Oak Ridge experiments on cladding swell and flow blockage.
During evaluation and exam-ination of the large break analytical model, Westinghouse discovered that clad heat up rates of less than 254F per second are possible.
This is a generic problem with 'their model, for their program does not account for rates less than 254F per second.
A lower heat up rate can cause earlier clad burst, which in turn can cause higher peak cladding temp'eratur Cl
The inspector reviewed the adjustments made to the augmented surveillance program to account for the reduced limit and confirmed that both units were being operated within the reduced limit as required by the technical speci-fications.