IR 05000250/1989040
| ML17347B353 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 09/19/1989 |
| From: | Butcher R, Mcelhinney T, Schnebli G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17347B352 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-89-40, 50-251-89-40, NUDOCS 8910030283 | |
| Download: ML17347B353 (23) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION R EG ION I I 101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-250/89-40 and 50-251/89-40 Licensee:
.Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.:
DPR-31 and DPR-41 Facility Name:
Turkey Point 3 and
'Inspection Conducted:.- July 29 August 25,. 1989 Inspe+cor.s.---
R.
C.
cher, Senjor Resi ent Inspector P c=~
T.
F.
. 1hinney, R
i ent'pector
~.
G. A.
nebli, Resident nspector Approved by:
R.
V. Crlenjak, Section Chief Division of Reactor Projects Date Si ned,
<pip~
D te igned Date signed Date ig d
SUMMARY Scope:
This routine resident inspector inspection entailed direct= inspection at the site in the areas of monthly surveillance observations, monthly maintenance observations, engineered safety features walkdowns, operational safety and plant events.
Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
The inspectors noted a strength in operations due to the. Unit 3 Reactor Control Operator's (RCO)
prompt corrective actions to prevent a turbine trip/reactor trip when a feedwater flow transmitter failed low.
(Paragraph 9)
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J.
W. Anderson, equality Assurance Supervisor J. Arias, Jr., Technical Assistant to Plant Manager K.
E. Beatty, Training, Superintendent
- L. W. Bladow, guality Assurance Superintendent
"J.
E. Cross, Plant Manager - Nuclear
- R. J. Earl, (}uality Control Supervisor T. A. Finn, Assistant Operations Superintendent S.
T. Hale, Engineering'Project Supervisor K.
N. Harris, Vice President G
~ Heisterman, Electrical Assistant Superintendent
"D.
W. Herrin, Regulation and Compliance Engineer.
R. J. Gianfrencesco, Assistant Maintenance Superintendent G. Marsh, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
- V. A. Kaminskas, Technical Department Supervisor J.
A. Labarraque, Senior Technical Advisor
"R.
G.
Mende, Operations Supervisor L.
W. Pearce, Operations Superintendent
"D. Powell, Regulatory and Compliance Supervisor
- G.
M. Smith, Services Manager - Nuclear J.
C. Strong, Mechanical Department Supervisor M. B. Wayland, Maintenance Superintendent
'.
D. Webb, Assistant Superintendent Planning and Scheduling Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsman, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, and electricians.
NRC Employees
- R. V. Crlenjak, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2B, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II
"Attended exit interview on August 25, 1989 Note:
An Alphabetical Tabulation of acronyms used in this report is listed in paragraph 12.
Followup on Items of Noncompliance (92702)
A review was conducted of the following noncompliances to assure that corrective actions were adequately implemented and resulted in conformance with regulatory requirements'erification of corrective action was achieved through record reviews, observation and discussions with licensee personnel.
Licensee correspondence was evaluated to ensure that the responses were timely and that corrective actions were implemented within the time periods specified in the repl (Closed) Violation 50-250,251/88-36-01, concerning the failure to initiate and NCR documenting technical justification to repair the reactor vessel head.
The licensee's corrective actions were reviewed and found to be adequate.
This violation is closed.
(Closed)
URI 50-250,251/88-36-03, concerning followup on licensee evaluation of potentially inadequate flood protection.,
This issue was sub'sequently reported to the NRC in LER 50-250,251/88-26 and revision 1 to
'he LER dated August 21, 1989.
The Licensee's response and corrective actions were reviewed a'nd found to be adequate.
This item is c'losed.
Followup on Inspector Followup Items ( IFIs),
(92701).
(Closed)
IFI 50-250,251/88-36-04, concerning the corrective actions for maintaining effective SG blowdown effluent monitoring.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and found them to be adequate.
This item is closed.
Onsite Followup and In-Office Review of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events and
CFR Part 21 reviews (92700/90712/90713)
The Licensee Event Reports and
CFR Part 21 Reports discussed below were reviewed and closed.
The inspectors verified that reporting requirements had been met, root cause analysis was performed, corrective actions appeared appropriate, and generic applicability had been considered.
Additionally, the inspectors verified that the licensee had reviewed each event, corrective actions were implemented, responsibility for corrective actions not fully completed was clearly assigned, safety questions had been evaluated and.
resolved, and violations of regulations or TS conditions had been identified.
When applicable, the criteria of
CFR 2, Appendix C, were applied.
(Closed)
LER 50-250,251/88-08, Design Basis Reconstitution Effort Identifies System Alignment Which Could Have Resulted In Insufficient NPSH For Certain Pumps During Post-LOCA Recirculation.
The licensee identified this potential deficiency on May 13, 1988.
Manual butterfly valve (887)
serves two functions:
One is to isolate the alternate low head injection flowpath from the RWST and the other function is to throttle RHR flow to prevent pump runout during refueling operations when water is being returned to the RWST.
This valve was found throttled at 30% open in order to meet the second functional requirement.
The licensee initially determined that with 887 30K open flashing could occur downstream of the valve when one RHR pump, one Containment Spray pump and two Safety Injection pumps were operating in the Post-LOCA recirculation phase.
Initial preoperational test data was reviewed which indicated that this valve was throttled to obtain a flow of 3750 gpm.
This would provide adequate NPSH for the SI or CS pumps during the recirculation phase.
However, no correlation between the preoperational testing and the 30K valve position could be obtained.
Therefore, the licensee implemented
administrative controls to maintain the valve 100% open in Modes 1 through
and to throttle the valve in Mode 6.
The licensee subsequently determined that sufficient NPSH would have been available with the valve in the as-found position.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's administrative controls and found them adequate.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-250/88-09, concerning missed survei llances for station battery pilot cell rotation and EDG fuel oil sample analysis.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and found them to be adequate.
This LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-250/88-16, concerning the containment spray pump being out of service for greater than the TS allowed allowed period.
This event is discussed in detail in Inspection Report 50-250,251/88-21.
The licensee's correction actions were reviewed and found to be adequate.
This LER is closed.
(Closed)
P2188-02, concerning Gamma-Metrics cable assemblies.
The license performed a
CFR 21 safety evaluation and found that the cable did not pose a potential safety hazard and was not reportable under
CFR 21.
This item is closed.
5..
Monthly Surveillance Observations (61726)
The inspectors observed TS required surveillance testing and verified:
The test procedure conformed to the requirements of the TS; testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; limiting conditions for operation (LCO) were met; test results met acceptance criteria requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; deficiencies were identified, as appropriate; and were properly reviewed and resolved by management personnel; and system restoration was adequate.
For completed tests, the inspectors verified that testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by qualified individuals.
The inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the 'following test activities:
4-0SP-046.3, CVCS-Boration Systems Flowpath Verification 0-OSP-075. 11, Auxiliary Feedwater Inservice Test O-SME-003.2, 125 Volt DC Station Battery Monthly Maintenance O-SME-003.3, 125 Volt DC Station Battery Quarterly Maintenance O-SME-003.4, 125 Volt DC Station Battery Annual Maintenance O-SME-003.7, 125 Volt DC Station Battery Weekly Maintenance No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspecte.
Engineered Safety Features Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors performed an inspection designed to verify the operability.
of the Unit 4 AFW system.
This was accomplished by performing a complete walkdown of all accessible equipment.
The following criteria were used, as appropriate, during this inspection:
a.
Systems lineup procedures match plant drawings and as built
. configuration.
b.
Housekeeping was adequate and appropriate levels of cleanliness are being maintained.
c.
Valves in the system are correctly installed and do not exhibit signs of gross packing leakage, bent stems, missing handwheels or improper l abel ing.
d.
Hangers and supports are made up properly and aligned correctly.
e.
Valves in the flow paths are in correct position as required by the applicable procedures'ith power available and valves were locked/lock wired as required.
f.
Local and remote position indication was compared and remote instrumentation was functional.
g.
Major system components are properly labeled.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
7.
Monthly Maintenance Observations (62703)
Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components were observed and reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and in conformance with TS.
The following items were considered during this review, as appropriate:
LCOs were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable;
. procedures used were adequate to control the activity; troubleshooting activities were controlled and repair records accurately reflected the maintenance performed; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; gC records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were properly.implemented; gC hold points were established and observed where required; fire prevention controls were implemented; outside contractor force activities were controlled in accordance with the approved gA program; and housekeeping was actively pursue The inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following maintenance activities in progress:
Overhaul of No.
4 Blackstart Diesel Troubleshooting Unit 4 Pressurizer Level Transmitter LT-461 Repair of Unit 3 MSIV Nitrogen Backup Leaks Repair of Unit 4 Generator Hydrogen Cooler Flow Blockage No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, conducted discussions with control room operators, observed shift turnovers and confirmed operability of instrumentation.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, verified that maintenance work orders had been submitted as required and that followup and prioritization of work was accomplished.
The inspectors reviewed tagout records, verified compliance with TS LCOs and verified the return to service of affected components.
By observation and direct interviews, verification was made that the physical security plan was being implemented.
Plant housekeeping/cleanliness
, conditions and implementation of radiological controls were observed.
Tours of the intake structure and diesel, auxiliary, control and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks and excessive vibrations.
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following safety related systems to verify operability and proper valve/switch alignment:
A and B Emergency Diesel Generators Control Room Vertical Panels and Safeguards Racks Intake Cooling Water Structure 4160 Volt Buses and 480 Volt Load and Motor Control Centers Unit 3 and 4 Feedwater Platforms Unit 3 and 4 Condensate Storage Tank Area Auxiliary Feedwater Area Unit 3 and 4 Main Steam Platforms Auxiliary Building No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspecte Plant Events (93702)
The following plant events were reviewed to determine facility status and the need for further followup actions Plant parameters were evaluated during transient response.
The significance of the event was evaluated along with the performance of the appropriate safety systems and the actions taken by the licensee.
The inspectors verified that required notifications were made to the NRC.
Evaluations were performed relative to the need for additional NRC response to the event.
Additionally, the following issues were examined,
'as appropriate:
details regarding the cause of the event; event chronology; safety system performance; licensee compliance with approved procedures; radiological consequences, if any; and proposed corrective actions.
On August 1, 1989, with Unit 3 at 100% power, the Nuclear Turbine Operator
- reported that the TPCW surge tank automatic fill control valve CV-3-1530 was approximately 55% open, thus supplying constant makeup.
This indica-tion, coupled with chemistry samples reporting a loss of molybdates in the TPCW system, supported the possibility of a
TPCW heat exchanger tube failure.
The licensee decided to reduce load to 60% power, in order to identify and repair the leaking tube(s).
A power reduction was commenced at 7:34 p.m.,
on August 1, 1989, and the unit was stabilized at 60% power at 9:00 p.m. that same night.
The 3B TPCW heat exchanger was determined to have four leaking tubes, which caused the loss of the molybdated fresh water to the ICW canal discharge.
The repairs were completed and Unit 3 was returned to 100% power at 12:45 p.m.
on August 2, 1989.
On August 7, 1989, with Unit 3 at 100% power, at 1:45 a.m.,
the RCO noted that the conductivities for the steam generators and condensate headers were increasing.
Nuclear Chemistry obtained samples and verified that the cation conductivities displayed in the control room were correct.
The operators placed steam generator blowdown in service at 50,000 lb/hr. per steam generator.
Nuclear Chemistry reported, at 3:20 a.m., that the steam generator cation conductivities were approximately F 85 umhos/cm, which placed Unit
in Action Level 1.
Administrative Procedure AOM-208, Secondary Plant Chemistry Control and Limits, 'dated September 22, 1987, provided guidance for the implementation of secondary water chemistry controls in accordance with the Electric Power Research Institute/Steam Generator Owner Group guidelines.
Section 4.0 'of this procedure defined Action Levels.
Action Level - Classification for remedial action necessary if monitored parameters are observed and confirmed to be outside the normal operating values.
Three action levels have been defined as follows:
Action Level 1 - when the normal value(s)
are exceeded but not enough to necessarily result in a proven corrosive conditio Action Level
when the normal value(s)
are exceeded sufficiently to create conditions which have been shown to result in
'some degree of steam generator corrosion during extended full power ( 100 percent)
operation.
Action Level 3 - when the normal value(s)
are exceeded sufficiently to create conditions which will result in rapid steam generator corrosion and continued operation is not advisable.
Section 5.3.3 specified the cation conductivity values for the Steam Generators during Power Operation (Mode 1) as follows:
Normal Value Action Level
Action Level
Action Level
<0.8 umho/cm
>2.0 umho/cm 27.0 umho/cm If the Steam Generators are in Action Levels, ADM-208 directs the operators to take corrective actions in accordance with ONOP -
1568. 1, Secondary Chemistry
- Operator Actions in the Event of Deviation from Limits, dated April 7, 1988.
Section 5. 1 of this procedure provided instructions for corrective actions when high cation conductivity is experienced.
The operators increased blowdown to approximately 100,000 lb/hr per steam generator, however, the cation conductivities increased to greater than 2.0 umho/cm (Action Level 2).
The Plant Supervisor - Nuclear decided to reduce load to less than 50%
power to take the B water boxes out of service.
The licensee suspected the 3B South Water Box due to initial higher conductivity readings.
The 3B1 and 3B2 Circulating Water Pumps were secured to take out the 3B South Water Box.
At 4:55 a.m.,
Chemistry notified operations that all three steam generators were in Action Level 3.
The operators decided to take the unit offline.
Unit
went offline at 5:43 a.m.
and entered Mode 3 at 7:55 a.m.
The licensee determined that a condenser tube in the 3B South Water Box had a leak.
The tube was plugged and the unit was returned to. service at ll:43 p.m.
that day.
On August 8, 1989, with Unit 4 at 100% power, the licensee removed the 4A CSP from service at 9:30 a.m.
The pump had been experiencing higher than normal motor vibrations and was in the alert range for pump vibration.
Surveillance Procedure 4-0SP-068.2, Containment Spray Pump Inservice Test, dated January 13, 1989, specified the Alert Range for pump, and the required action range for the motor as follows:
Pum Vibration bearin Alert Ran e
Re ui red Action Ran e
Outboard Vertical Outboard Horizontal 1 - 1.5 mils 1.4 " 2.1 Motor Vibration bearin Acce table Ran e
Re uired Action Ran e
Outboard Horizontal Inboard Horizontal 0 - 6 mils 0 - 6 a6 a6
The pump end bells were refurbished on April 8, 1989, and since that time the vibrations have been higher than 'normal.
The August 2, 1989, IST results placed the pump in the alert range with 1.6 mi ls vibration on the inboard horizontal bearing reading.
The motor outboard horizontal reading was 3.4 mi ls and the inboard horizontal reading was 2.8 mi ls.
The licensee decided to realign the pump in an attempt-to reduce the
'ibrations.
Mechanical Maintenance realigned the pump and at 12:33 a.m.,
on August 9, 1989, the pump was started for a balance check.
The pump was shutdown at 1:20 a.m.,
due to high motor vibrations.
Additional tests were performed after maintenance attempted to balance the pump, however, the motor vibrations were reading between
and 8 mils.
The pump vibration was within specifications, however, the motor vibrations could not be reduced below
mi ls.
TS 3.4.2,specified, that during 'power operation, one of the two CSPs may be out-of service provided it is restored to operable status within 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> s.
The TS LCO was due to expire at 9:30 a.m.,
on August 9, 1989.
Unit 4 would be required to shutdown using the guidance contained'in TS 3.0. 1, which requires the Unit to be in Mode 3 within six hours.
The licensee determined that the CSP motor would have to be replaced and this work could not be completed prior to exceeding the TS LCO.
Therefore, the licensee requested Discretionary Enforcement from TS 3.4.2 from Region II.
The licensee asked for a time limit of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> instead of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The NRC granted the request to extend the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Action Statement to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, such that the Action Statement now expired on August 11, 1989, at 9:30 a.m.
The NRC reviewed the licensee's letter (L-89-292) dated August 9,1989, which documented the basis for the request, which was discussed per telecon prior to approval.
The licensee determined that the cause of,the misalignment was an uneven footing.
Maintenance realigned the pump using shims under the motor.
At 11:32 p.m.,
on August 10, 1989, the pump was declared back in service after the IST was completed,.
The vibration readings were acceptable with the maximum pump vibration of.85 mi ls and the maximum motor vibration of 1.4 mils.
On August 11, 1989, with Unit 3 at 100% power, the controlling feedwater flow transmitter (FT-497) to the C. Steam Generator failed low.
The RCO received alarms indicating C
Steam Generator Actual-Setpoint level deviation and flow mismatch between steam flow and feedflow.
The RCO noted that the feedflow indication on recorder FR-3-498 showed zero feedflow and also that the 3C Steam Generator FWRV 3-498 demand open was at 100%.
The RCO noted the C Steam Generator level increasing rapidly and took manual control of the valve to reduce flow.
The RCO then selected the redundant feedwater control channel to remove the failed channel from service.
The RCO manually restored the C Steam Generator level to normal and transferred the'ontroller to automatic.
A PWO was written to troubleshoot the failed feedwater transmitter.
A review of the trend data for the channel indicated that the channel failed for approximately one minute forty seconds and then returned to reading normal.
IAC department troubleshooting could not identify a
problem with the channel.
The channel was returned to service on August 15, 1989, however, the licensee placed an information tag on FT-497 channel control switch to instruct the
operator's not to use this channel for feedwater control.
The Unit 3, RCO took prompt, decisive actions to identify and correct this problem, thus averting a
turbine trip and subsequent reactor trip on high -steam generator level.
On August 15, 1989, at 11:00 p.m. with Unit 4 at 85% power, the unit commenced a
shutdown to determine the cause of high hydrogen temperatures in the Unit 4 generator.
Hydrogen is used-to cool the generator winding which in turn is cooled by TPCW.
Based on testing and troubleshooting, while the unit was on the line, system engineers suspected that gasket material installed during the refueling outage on the hydrogen cooler end caps was blocking the flow through the coolers.
The gaskets were installed under Westinghouse direction and were full face gaskets rather than the rim type gaskets the licensee had used in the past.
When the cooler end cap was removed for inspection the licensee's diagnosis of the problem was correct and a
new rim type gasket was i'nstalled on the end caps of the four hydrogen coolers.
The root cause of the blockage was that the center portion of full face end cap gasket was partially cut by the end cap to cooler flange surface.
Flow through the two-pass cooler caused the cut portion of the gasket to migrate to outlet side of the cooler and block flow going out the outlet tubes.
The rim type gasket, installed by the licensee will eliminate this problem from recurrence.
All plant disciplines responded quickly and the job was completed 24 hou'rs ahead of schedule.
The unit was returned to service at 1:33 p.m.
on August 17, 1989.
On August 23, 1989, at 11:39 a.m., with both units at 100% power, the licensee'eclared an unusual event in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(a)(3).
The event was declared because the licensee discovered that they had not posted a continuous fire watch in both units Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
rooms as required by TS
~ 14.5.b.
The licensee initially thought they needed a continuous fire watch in lieu of a
hourly roving fire watch because the fire detection instrumentation in the RHR rooms was out of service at the same time a fire barrier impairment existed for the wall between RHR pumps.
The licensee immediately stationed a continuous watch as required by TS, however, the watch was not station'ed within the one hour specified.
In researching the issue the licensee determined that a
continuous watch was not required because the licensee was granted an exemption from Appendix R criteria for fire barriers between the RHR pump and heat exchanger rooms.
The exemption was granted in Chapter 9.6A of the FSAR, Section 4.C.4, Appendix R Exemptions.
Therefore, the licensee did not violate TS 3. 14.5.b and the Notification of Unusual event was not required.
The licensee notified the NRC that the notification was not required on August 25, 1989.
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte.
Closure of Outstanding Performance Enhancement Program (PEP)
Items The PEP Program was developed by the licensee and was endorsed and mandated by the NRC in a Confirmatory Order dated July 13, 1984.
The program was developed to meet four specific objectives:
Continued safe and reliable plant operation.
Improved plant and site material conditions.
Increased emphasis on quality performance in systems, controls, and personnel.
Continued responsiveness to regulatory requirements and corporate goals.
"
The action plan developed to satisfy those objectives led to the establishment of eleven major PEP projects:
Site facility Upgrade Operations Enhancements Procedures Configuration Control Program Training Management Action Plan Licensing QA and QC Maintenance Management System Technical Specification Upgrade Operabi lit'y of Safety Systems The closure of the following PEP open items was based on the following:
Review of a comprehensive audit co'nducted by the Quality Assurance Department in 1988 (QAS-PEP-88-1).
Discussions with responsible licensee personnel.
Review of applicable procedures.
Resident Inspectors knowledge of site facilities and program A.
PEP PROJECT 1 - Site Facility Upgrade PROJECT ELEMENTS:
2.0 3.0 4.0 1.2 2.1 2.'2
'23 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 Task No.
1.0 Task Facilit Evaluation Stud
- Juno Plant Engineering Review 7.01.01-01 Develop Initial Budget Site Pre aration Engineering Budget/Schedule Construction Nuclear Administrati on Buildin Engineering Budget/Schedule Contract Package Construction Personnel Relocation Phase IV U rade NRC No.
F 01.01-00 7.01.01-01 7.01.01-02 7.01.02-00 7.01.02-01 7.01.02-02 7.01.02-03 7.01.03-00 7.01.03"01 7.01.03-02 7.01 '3-03 7.01.03-04 F 01.03-05 7.01.04-00 5.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4 '
4'0 4.11 5.1 Provide decontamination shower facility Provide new HP control facility Convert N.M. Building from HP to Maintenance Facility Convert Contractor Entrance Building to security complex (Note 1)
Convert existing Maintenance Building to Chemistry and apprentice training facility Provide technical training facility Provide new HP training facility Provide structure for simulator Evaluate the need for additional facilities for stores and PGM Provide a contaminated motor overhaul facility Personnel relocation Phase V Im lementation Remove temporary facilities 7.01.04-01 7.01.04-02 7.01.04-03 7.01.04-04 7.01 '4-05 7.01.04-06 7.01 '4-07 7.01.04-08 7.01.04-09 7.01.04"10 7.01.04-11 7.01.05-00 7.01.05"01
B.
PEP PROJECT 2 - Operations Enhancements PROJECT ELEMENTS:
Task No.
Task NRC No.
1.0 1.2 1.3 0 erations Shift Mannin Provide Administrative Support to Control Room Complete Manning Evaluation Adjust Shift Complement (Note 2)
7.02.01-00 7.02.01-01 7.02.01-02 7.02.01"03 2.0 IP Sessions Dedicated to Communications 7.02.02-00 3.0 4.0 5.0 3.1 3.3 3.4
,4.1 4.2 4.3 Inde endent Verification Review and Consolidate Independent Verification Process Train Personnel Audit Implementation E ui ment Identification Development Equipment Identification Program Mark. Selected Equipment Audit Implementation 0 erations Turnover 7.02.03"00 7.02.03-01 7.02.03-03 7.02.03"04 7.02.04-00 7.02.04-01 7.02.04-02 7.02.04-03 7.02.05-00 5. 1 Develo'p Turnover Sheets 5.2 Issue for Trial Use 5.3 Train Operators 5.4 Audit Implementation C.
PEP PROJECT 4 - Configuration Control Program PROJECT ELEMENTS:,
7.02.05-01 7.02.05-02 7.02 '5-03 7.02.05-04 Task No.
11.00 11.15 Notes Task Select 8 System Review Unit 3 Outage Complete NRC No.
7.04.11-00 7.04.11"15 1.
Cancelled by FPL Letter 'L-85-243 of June 18, 1895.
2.
Currently in five shift rotation.
Plan for six shift rotation after next class is licensed (December 1989).
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews held throughout the reporting period with the Plant Manager,-
Nuclear and selected members of his staff.
An exit meeting was conducted on August 25, 1989.
The areas requiring management attention were reviewed.
No proprietary information was provided to the inspectors during the reporting period.
The inspectors had the following findings:
No violations or deviations were identified.
The inspectors noted that the
" Unit
RCO's prompt corrective actions prevented a
Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip when a feedwater flow-transmitter failed low.
Acronyms and Abbreviations ADM AFW ANSI AP ASME CCW CFR CS CSP ERT FPL FSAR FT FWRV 18(C ICW IEB IFI IST LCO LER LOCA MP NCR NPSH NRC NTO ONOP OOS OP OTSC PC/M PEP PWO QA Administrative Auxiliary Feedwater American National Standards Institute Administrative Procedures American Society of Mechanical Engineers Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulations Containment Spray Containment Spray Pump Event Response Team Florida Power 8 Light Final Safety Analysis Report Flow Transmitter Feedwater Regulating Valve Instrument and Control Intake Cooling Water Inspection.and Enforcement Bulletin Inspector Followup Item Inservice Test Limiting Condition for Operation Licensee Event Report Loss of Coolant Accident Maintenance Procedures Non-Conformance Report Net Positive Suction Head Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Turbine Operator Off Normal Operating Procedure Out of Service Operating Procedure On the Spot Change Plant Change/Modification Performance Enhancement Program Plant Work Order Quality Assurance
RWST SG SI SRO TPCW TS URI Quality, Control Reactor Control Operator Reactor Coolant Pump Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Refueling Water Storage Tank Steam Generator Safety Injection Senior Reactor Operator Turbine Plant Cooling Water Technical Specification Unresolved Item