IR 05000250/1979009
| ML17338A771 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 04/12/1979 |
| From: | Brooks E, Graham M, Martin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17338A770 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-79-09, 50-250-79-9, 50-251-79-09, 50-251-79-9, NUDOCS 7906200490 | |
| Download: ML17338A771 (8) | |
Text
~Pg RF00 P
~4
Cy C
I nO
r+n +a*++
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-250/79-09 and 50-251/79-09 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33101 Facility Name:
Turkey Point, Unit 3 and
Docket Nos.
50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.
DPR-31 and DPR-41 Inspection at Turkey Point Site, near Florida City, Florida Inspectors:
)V'.
H.
M.
.
Graham
'/-12-7 Date Signed
<</
Date Signed Approved by:
D.
artin, Secti Chief, RONS Branch Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on March 13-19, 1979 This routine, announced inspection involved 68 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of safety related piping support and restraint surveillance program, and containment integrated leakage rate testing.
Results Of the,two areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7 9062065)O
L/
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
"H
"P.
AJ H.
D.
E. Yeager, Plant Manager Sullivan, Maintenance Supervisor J. White, Maintenance Superintendent K. Hayes, Plant Superintendent Sinnamon, Test Engineer Haase, Technical Department Supervisor Bechtel Cor oration
/
G. Cranston, Test Engineer
-"Attended exit Interview, 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 16, 1979, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Ins ection of Pi e
Su ort and Restraint S stems All hydraulic snubbers have been replaced by'echanical snubbers in Units 3 and 4 with the exception of 6 snubbers in Unit 3.
The licensee was in the process of installing the remaining 6 snubbers in Unit 3 during this outage.
Visual inspection of the installed snubbers was conducted on March 13.
No inoperable snubbers were identified.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's files relating to change over from hydraulic to mechanical snubbers.
The files contained the licensee's mechanical snubber specifications, the vendor's materials certification data sheets and several snubber functional test reports.
The licensee's specifications require that only one snubber for each size be functionally tested.
The acceptance criteria for functional testing of the snubbers is stated as:
I
Breakaway friction shall not exceed 1$ of rated load or 5 lbs.,
whichever is greater.
After environmental testing (humidity, salt spray, sand and dust testing per MIL-E-5272C) an increase to 5g of rated load or 10 lbs., whichever is greater, is acceptable.
b.
Acceleration up to rated load in tension and compression shall not exceed 0.02 g's.
c.
Total excursion (lost motion)
during cyclic loading shall not exceed
+ 0.069 inch at any load up to rated load.
d.
When snubber is exposed to continuous loading in either tension or compression it shall continue to move without "locking up".
e.
Snubber shall withstand sustained load of twice rated load for a
period of at least one minute in both tension and compression without damage to the unit.
Verification of functional testing of all snubbers to those acceptance criteria could not be located in the licensee's files.
The Plant Manager was advised, at the exit interview, of the lack of sufficient documen-tation concerning the operability of the installed mechanical snubbers.
He agreed to provide to the NRC verification of functional testing of all installed snubbers.
By telephone conversation March 21, Mr. J. Hayes, Plant Superintendent, Nuclear, informed the inspector that all mechanical snubbers have been functionally tested by the vendor, Pacific Scientific Company, and documentation of such will be forwarded to the NRC.
This matter is identified for followup review.
(250/79-09-01)
6.
Containment Inte rated Leaka e Rate Test The containment isolation valve lineup as identified in the licensee's containment leakage rate test, Operating Procedure 13100.1, dated March 9, 1979, was inspected.
One containment air sample valve was found in the open position as opposed to the closed position as indicated on the tag attached to the valve, and as indicated on the valve position check list.
Prior to the start of the containment integrated leakage rate test (CILRT) the licensee performed an additional valve lineup to assure conformance with the procedure.
The inspector observed preparations for and performance of portions of the CILRT-..:Included were preparations of computer program, data taking, calculations and results, and analysis of results to identify the leakage rate.
The inspector performed parallel leakage rate calculations while the test was in progress using the licensee's dat "3-The containment pressure was increased from atmospheric to 42 psia during the period from approximately 2100 hours0.0243 days <br />0.583 hours <br />0.00347 weeks <br />7.9905e-4 months <br /> on March 16 to 0445 hours0.00515 days <br />0.124 hours <br />7.357804e-4 weeks <br />1.693225e-4 months <br /> on March 17.
After a 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> stabilization period, the leakage rate was steady at about 0.18$ per day.
The acceptance criterion is 0.077$ per day.
As a
means of locating leakage, the secondary side of the "A" steam generator was pressurized, and a decreasing leakage rate was observed.
Pressure was dropped to atmospheric on March 18, and survey teams entered the containment, finding and reparing a leaking vent valve on the "A" steam generator.
Repressurization took place from 2100 hours0.0243 days <br />0.583 hours <br />0.00347 weeks <br />7.9905e-4 months <br /> on March 18 until 0400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br /> on March 19.
Following a
hour stabilization period, leakage rate was steady at 0.08$ per day.
Survey teams found and repaired leakage at the personnel hatch at approxi-mately 2245, while the containment remained pressurized'he leakage rate subsequently dropped to 0.031$ per day.
The CILRT and the followup verification test were completed March 20.
The inspector observed activities throughout the period of March 17-19, and performed parallel leakage rate calculations while testing was in progress for the first pressurized period, and the second stabilization period, prior to discovery of the personnel hatch leak.
Subsequent parallel calculations have been completed using licensee-supplied data for the CILRT and verification test.
This item willbe inspected further following receipt of data for the period during which the personnel hatch leak was found and repaired (250/79-09-02).
By telephone conversation on March 22, the licensee provided detailed information concerning the personnel airlock leakage.
The leakage into the airlock was found to occur through an interlock penetration in the inner door, and through the airlock equalizing valve.
These leaks were repaired by injecting grease in the interlock penetration seal and by tightening the gland on the equalizing valve.
The licensee could not ascertain whether leakage was occuring past the airlock outer door.
By telephone conversation on March 30, the licensee, stated that a licensee event report (LER) will be submitted to the NRC concerning the cause of the airlock leakage, and the proposed corrective action.
This matter is identified as an open item (250/79-09-03)
~
I e