IR 05000250/1979005
| ML17338A924 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/29/1979 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Verdey E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17338A923 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-79-05, 50-250-79-5, 50-251-79-05, 50-251-79-5, NUDOCS 7907260508 | |
| Download: ML17338A924 (10) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-250/79-05 and 50-251/79-05 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33101 Facility Name:
Turkey Point Units 3 and
Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251 License No. DPR-31 and DPR-41 Inspection at y
int site near Florida City, Florida Inspecto
.
. Verdery Dat Signed Approved by:
F.
S.
Ca rell, Acting Section Chief, RONSB Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on May 1-3, 1979 Areas Inspected This special, announced inspection involved 24 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of verificatin of Engineered Safeguards Feature (ESF)
System valve breaker and switch alignments, review of facility operating procedures for ESF systems,'valuation of operator training conducted in accordance with IEB 79-06A.
Results Of the four areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie Sg
. r1 ~,
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
+H. E. Yaeger, Plant Manager
+J. K. Hays, Plant Superintendent, Nuclear
- J. E. Moore, Operations Superintendent, Nuclear V. B. Wager, Operations Supervisor, Nuclear
+D.
W. Jones, Quality Control Supervisor
- W. C. Miller, Assistant Training Instructor R. E. Dodson, Requalification Instructor C. A. Coker, Nuclear Plant Supervisor-R. Spooner, QA Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included two operators and three office personnel.
+Attended exit interview.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 3, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The inspector requested that the Special Instruction being issued to plant operations personnel be telecopied to the Regional Office by close of business on May 4, 1979.
The licensee agreed to issue the Special Instruction to plant operation personnel by close of business on May 3, 1979.
Subsequent to the exit interview on May 4, 1979, the inspector requested that the licensee designate the Nuclear Watch Engineer's phone as the open continuous channel of communications with the NRC Regional Office in accor-dance with IEB 79-06A, paragraph ll.
The licensee complied with this request.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
&
4.
Implementation of IEB 79-06A Onsite Inspection of Engineered Safety Features (ESF)
a.
The inspector reviewed the valve/breakers/switch alignment procedures for the following ESF systems:
Safety Injection and RHR Systems Emergency Containment Cooling System Emergency Containment Filtering System Component Cooling System
"2-These procedures were compared with a current set of plant training drawings and the inspector verified that the alignment procedures p aced these systems in a correct standby configuration for automatic operation.
Using a current copy of the procedure the inspector conducted a walkdown of the Safety Injection Residual Heat Removal, Containment Spray and Component Cooling Systems and verified that these systems were aligned in accordance with the procedure requirements.
The inspector verified the actual position of all accessible valves, breakers and switches in the major flowpaths and spot checked other valves in the system.
The positions of inaccessible valves were verified by a review of control room instrumentation.
No discrepancies were identified.
In addition the inspector verified the lineup of the AuxiliaryFeedwater System (steam supply and feedwater)
and identified no discrepancies.
The inspector reviewed the administrative controls in effect to assure proper return to service of ESF components following test and mainte-nance activities.
The inspector noted that the licensee does not employ valve/breaker/ switch/alignment check sheets to administratively control all major flow paths of ESF systems.
The procedures accomplish this purpose if properly implemented.
The inspector stated that the use of. such check sheets would provide a better assurance that these systans have been properly restored to service following maintenance.
The inspector verified that current surveillance test procedures f ures or hese systems return affected components and flowpaths to an operable condition.
Maintenance procedures do not accomplish this function, however, the surveillance test is normally required to be run following maintenance in order to demonstrate the operability of the system.
The licensee uses the In Plant Equipment Clearance system to control taking safety-related systems in and out of service for maintenance.
This approach is subject to error in that the clearance is reviewed and approved on a
case by case basis, however the licensee has had satisfactory success using it.
The inspector reviewed the following surveillance tests:
Procedure Unit Date Completed OP 4704.3 Containment Filter System, HEPA, Filters Performance Test
OP 4704.4 Absorber Cells Performance Test i/23/79 I/24/79 OP 5504.2 Post Accident Containment Vent System Absorber Cell Performance Test 1/26/79
OP 5504.3 Post Accident Containment Vent System HEPA Filter Performance Test 1/26/79 OP 0209.1 Valve Exercise Procedure App A App K App 0 OP 0209.2 ISI Pump Test RHR Safety Injection Containment Spray OP 0209.3 ISI Aux. Feed Pump A
OP 4304 '
Emergency Diesel Generator Periodic Load Test A D/G OP 3404.2 Intake Cooling Water System Periodic Test A B 6 C Pumps OP 4004.1 Containment Spray Pump Periodic Test
3/4
4/6/79 4/10/79 4/7/79 4/10/79 4/10/79 4/3/79 3/29/79 4/19/79 3/26/79 4/3/79 OP 4704.6 Emergency Containment Cooler Periodic Test OP 4104.1 Safety Injection System Periodic Test OP 4004.2 Safeguards System Relay Rack Train A 6 B 3/4 3/4 4/4/79 4/11/79 4/18/79 OP 5504.1 Post Accident Containment Vent System Equipment Inspection and Operation Test 3/4 3/23/79 No discrepancies were identified and all tests were satisfactorily completed.
f.
The licensee had suspended all surveillance testing on the pressurizer pressure bistables as of April 27, 1979, pending receipt of authoriza-tion from ONRR to modify the logic on safety injection initiation to 2 out of 3.
(These modifications were completed as of May 7, 1979 and surveillance testing has been reinstated.
No required surveillance testing was missed and revised procedures have been promulgated.)
g.
The inspector reviewed the administrative controls in effect to assure ESF systems are returned to operability at the conclusion of extended outages.
The licensee's startup procedures include checkoffs for ESF
system alignment and the requirement to verify completion of surveil-lance testing'f ESF systems prior to reactor startup.
With the exception of the licensee not using specific valve alignment checkoff sheets (as discussed in c above) these controls are considered adequate.
h.
The licensee does not employ independent verification of valve/breaker/
switch alignments at any time.
The licensee has designated two additional valves in the auxiliary Feedwater System for positive position control.
These valves are designated 3-400 and 4-400, Auxiliary Feedwater System and Condensate Transfer pump suction from condensate storage tanks for Unit 3 and 4, respectively.
5.
Onsite Assessment of Operating Procedures a.
The licensee does not require partial actuation of safety injection to assist in level control of the pressurizer during routine operational transients.
The safety injection pumps installed at this facility deliver flow only when RCS pressure drops below approximately 1400 psig.
Therefore even at the SI initiation pressure of 1715 psig no flow would be delivered.
b.
The inspector determined that licensee action, regarding reactor coolant pump operation, was not in conformance with IEB 79-06A require-ments.
The licensee had not implemented the requirement to leave at least two RCP's running in the event of SI initiation with RCP's operating.
Westinghouse had recommended to the licensee that normal pump operating limits be maintained.
The inspector questioned this position and achieved resolution with licensee representatives who promulgated a Special Instruction on May 3, 1979 to include specific instructions to operations personnel, implementing the IEB requirement.
c ~
The inspector noted that tagging practices on control panels had the potential for obsuring the view of certain plant status indicators.
The inspector requested the licensee to review this concern and develop a revised method of tagging components on control room panels so as to not obscure an operators'iew of any indicator. The 1icensee agreed to ensure that clearance tags not obscure an operator's view of any indication a I
l