IR 05000250/1979026
| ML17339A313 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 09/04/1979 |
| From: | Martin R, Vogtlowell R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17339A304 | List:
|
| References | |
| 50-250-79-26-01, 50-250-79-26-1, 50-251-79-26, NUDOCS 7911260250 | |
| Download: ML17339A313 (9) | |
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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100
'TLANTA,GEO RG IA30303 Report Nos.
50-250/79-26 and 50-251/79-26 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33101 Facility Name:
Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4 Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.
DPR-31 and DPR-41 Inspection at Turkey Point Site near Ft. Pierce, Florida Inspector:
R. J. Vogt-well Approved by:
R. D. Martin, Section Chief, RONS Branch SUHMARY Inspection on August 6-10, 1979 te Signed Date Sig ed Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 34 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of followup on reportable events; followup of licensee actions for IE Bulletins; unit trips from power operation; Chemical and Volume Control System Holdup Tanks; Plant Nuclear Safety Committee review of plant changes.
Results Of the five areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in three areas; two apparent items, of noncompliance were found in two areas (50-250/79-26-01:
Failure to follow procedures-paragraph 5.a; 50-250/79-26-03:
Failure to report-paragraph 7).
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
"H.
-V.
-D.
~J L.
R.
J.
W.
"R.
J.
E. Yaeger, Plant Manager K. Hays, Plant Superintendent, Nuclear E. Moore, Operations Superintendent, Nuclear B. Wager, Operations Supervisor, Nuclear W. Jones, equality Control Supervisor W. Haase, Technical Depaitment Supervisor P. Mendieta, IRC Department Supervisor L. Thomas, Assistant Superintendent Nuclear Maintenance-Primary E. Garrett, Plant Security Supervisor Hardy, Plant Engineer A. Klein, Engineer, Technical Department J.
Spooner, QAO Supervisor I.abarraque, Plant Engineer
>"Attended exit interview.
'xit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 10, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph.
1 above.
Based on a request by the inspector, licensee representatives committed to reviewing, by September 15, 1979, all nonvital loads on "D" Motor Control Center.
This review would focus on the corrective action that could prevent occurrences such as the August 3, 1979 trip of Unit 3 and thus result in the reduction of unnecessary challenges to the safety systems.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Unresolved item 50-250/79-24-02 is upgraded to an item of noncompliance (50-250/79-26-02).
For more information see paragraph 7 of this report.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Followup on Reportable Events The following events were reviewed to ascertain that:
a.
reporting requirements were met; b.
corrective action was taken as required by Appendix B to
CFR Part 50;
-2-c.
the event was reviewed and evaluated; and the Technical Specifications subsequent to the event.
50-250/79-11 Unit 4 Condensate Storage Tank Aligned to Unit 3 50-250/79-17 Sluggish operation of a Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Pressure Control Valve 50-250/79-21 Correction to Reactor Trip Setting on Steam Generator Water Level 50-251/79-08 Improper Setting on Undervoltage Time Delay Relay 50-251/79-10 Correction to Reactor Trip Setting on Steam Generator Water I,evel 50-251/79-11 Charging System Performance No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Followup of Licensee Actions for IE Bulletins The inspector reviewed the following IE Bulletins to evaluate the licensee's response:
(Closed)Bulletin 79-10, Requalification Training Program Statistics.
The Inspector verified that the licensee's response was acceptable to the Operator Licensing Branch of NRR.
(Closed)Bulletin 79-11, Faulty Overcurrent Trip Device in Circuit Breakers for Engineered Safety Systems.
A technically adequate response was ascertained by regional review.
7.
Unit Trips From Power Operation The inspector reviewed the "Reactor Trip Evaluation Sheets" (RTES) for trip numbers T143-796 and T100-390 on Units 3 and 4 respectively.
These trips occurred on August 3, 1979.
While performing a periodic test on channel
"C" of the T-Average and Delta T Protection Channels a
spurious signal on channel A completed a
2 out of 3 trip logic thus tripping Unit 4.
At this time, the Unit 4 startup transformer was out of service (due to performance of periodic maintenance)
thus resulting in a loss of offsite power condition for Unit 4.
This condition caused the initiation of the emergency diesel generator load sequencer which in turn resulted in the shedding of non-vital loads.
Among the non-vital loads shed, were those on Motor Control Center (MCC) "D" which is common to both units.
Since the Rod Position Indication System for both units is powered by the non-vital portion of MCC-D, a turbine runback on Unit 3 was initiated upon loss of rod position
indication.
This resulted in a reactor trip on high pressurizer pressure.
At the time, neither of the two pressurizer spray valves was available.
One was considered inoperable prior to the transient and the other, temporarily powered by the non-vital portion of MCC-D had become unavailable earlier as a consequence of the Unit 4 trip.
A review of the pressurizer spray valves disclosed inadequacies in the administrative controls over the correction of operational problems exhibited by spray valve PCV-3-455B.
The original Hagan controller for spray valve PCV-3-455B had been disconnected and was replaced by another manual controller which was plugged into the valve control circuit and which had been taped to the top of a console in the main control room.
No temporary procedure had been promulgated to ensure consistent understanding between shifts of the operational control of this unusual component configuration.
The lack of a temporary proce-dure indicates that A.P.0109.6>
"Temporary Procedures",
was not fol-lowed as required.
The actual installation of the manual controller was not performed under the guidelines of A. P.
1905.15,
"Plant Changes and Modifications" which defines a plant modification as "any change in the plant systems which accomplishes a given function by a new method or which alters the existing approach to accomplishing the function".
This condition also represents a failure to follow established plant procedures.
This is an item of noncompliance.
b.
The inspector reviewed the RTES for Unit 4 Trip Number T101-392 on August 5, 1979.
While performing routine, testing of the turbine trips a malfunction occurred in the trip reset lever and a turbine trip was indicated as reset when in fact it was not.
This resulted in a turbine trip and a reactor trip.
To prevent recurrence of trips due to malfunc-tions of the reset lever, a Plant Change/Modification was being processed for implementation on both units that would provide the operator with an indication light showing whether or not a turbine trip was reset.
The inspector had no further comments.
8.
Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) - Holdup Tanks The inspector reviewed the circumstances associated with the various failures experienced with the CVCS-Holdup Tanks (HUT).
Although the initiating events for the various failures have not been the same, the mode of failure
appears to be common for all instances and that is, a negative internal pressure causing the tanks to buckle.
A chronological listing of the failures is as follows:
(1)
"A" CVCS-HUT:
December 18, 1979 Reported in IZR 250-78-17 (2)
A CVCS HUT March 16 >
1979 Reported in LER 250-78-17 Update
(3)
"C" CVCS-HUT:
March 28, 1979 Reported in IER 250-79-8 (4)
"B" CVCS-HUT:
August 7, 1979 An IZR is being prepared for submittal At the present time, the licensee has issued for implementation a "Plant Change/Modification" (PC/M) which will result in the installation of vacuum breaking devices on each HUT thereby precluding future tank failures caused by a decrease in internal pressure.
Also, moisture traps will be installed in low points of the HUT Cover Gas System to rid the system of any condensa-tion that may take place.
As of this writing, HUT B and C have been repaired (excluding the PC/M),
and repair and installation of the PC/M on HUT A is in progress.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.
Plant Nuclear Safety Committee (PNSC) Reviews of Plant Changes The inspector reviewed item 4 of the June 8, 1979 PNSC meeting minutes concerning the Committee's review of the Non-conformance Report related to the installation of a transformer mounting bracket in the A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) voltage regulator cabinet.
The minutes of the meetings indicated that the committee had concluded that the bracket was acceptable for use as is.
A site investigation of the installation conducted by corporate Power Plant Engineer personnel disclosed that the installation was acceptable for use as is on a temporary basis but that repairs on the bracket should be initiated during the next scheduled main-tenance on the EDG.
At the conclusion of the inspection, a repair of the bracket was underway.
Initial inspector concerns over EDG operability were satisfied in that the PNSC, after reviewing the nonconformances, concluded the diesel generators were capable of performing their intended function with a high safety margin (although material certification of compliance was not available and the welder's qualification had expired).
However, as highlighted in the PNSC minutes referenced above, the "lack of proper control and documentation of the bracket fabrication and installation
~~
process" is representative of an observed inadequacy in "the implementation of administrative or procedural controls..." (dictated primarily by A. P.
190.15, Plant Changes and Modifications) and as such should have been reported to the NRC as required by Technical Specification 6.9.2.6.3.
Thus, unresolved item 50-250/79-24-02 is upgraded to an item of noncompli-ance (50-250/79-26-02).