IR 05000250/1979024
| ML17338B225 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1979 |
| From: | Verdery E, Vogtlowell R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17338B220 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-79-24, 50-251-79-24, NUDOCS 7911050177 | |
| Download: ML17338B225 (12) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Auo 2 1 >97~
Report Nos. 50-250/79-24 and 50-251/79-24 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33101 Facility Name:
Turkey Point Units 3 and
Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.
R. J.
Vo t-Lowell Approved by:
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E. H. Verdery, Section ief Inspection at Turkey oint Site, Florida City, Florida b
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e igned SUMMARY Inspected on July 17-20, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 28 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of procedure review; organization and administration; LER Followup; open item followup; Bulletin and Circular followup; Review of Plant Change Modifi-cations.
Results Of the 6 areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in 5 areas; 1 apparent item of noncompliance was found in 1 area (infraction - failure to follow equality Procedure 5.2 requirements for timely review of noncomformance reports - paragraph 10.a).
DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees-H. E. Yaeger, Plant Manager-J.K. Hays, Plant Superintendent, Nuclear-J. E. Moore, Operations Superintendent, Nuclear V. B. Wager, Operations Supervisor, Nuclear-D.
W. Jones, Quality Control Supervisor W. R. Williams, Supt. Electrical Maintenance-J.
P. Mendieta, IGC Department Supervisor-W. A. Klein, Licensing Engineer-Technical Department-R. J.
Spooner, QA Operations Supervisor-R. E. Tucker, QA-Operations J.
A. Olsonoski, Quality Control Engineer J.
W. Brown, Assistant Manager for QA Application - G.
O.
Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 20, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
Licensee Action on Previous Findings Not inspected.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or devia-tions.
New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 10.b.
Procedures The inspector reviewed a representative sampling of licensee procedures per-taining to safety-related equipment in the following procedural categories:
operating procedures, maintenance procedures, abnormal alarm procedures, emergency procedures, and administrative procedures.
The procedures were reviewed for adherence to the requirements of Technical Specification 6.8, FPL Quality Assurance Manual procedure QP 5.1 and
CFR part 50.59.
The inspector verified that:
(1) approved procedures have
"2" been established for 25 percent of the activities described in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A; (2)
each procedure received a.review and approval in accordance with Section 6.8 of the Technical Specifications; (3) over-all procedural content was consistent with the Technical Specification requirements; (4) there -was a method for procedures to receive a periodic review.
While reviewing maintenance procedures, the inspector noted the lack of procedures for maintenance on the Auxiliary Feedwater system.
Further investigation revealed that procedures for maintenance on this system were presently being written.
The inspector was able to review portions of the draft procedures which were made available to him by the licensee.
During the exit interview, the licensee committed to having available by October 1979, for use in final, approved form the following procedures:
AuxiliaryFeedwater Pump Turbine Overhaul AuxiliaryFeedwater Pump Turbine Throttle Trip Valve Overhaul AuxiliaryFeedwater Pump Overhaul and Maintenance This item will be tracked as Open Item 250-79-24-03 - pending inspector review of the finalized procedures during a subsequent inspection.
Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance, or deviations were identified.
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6.
Organization and Administration The inspector verified by review of records and interviews with personnel that:
(1) the licensee's onsite organization structure is as described in Technial Specification (TS) Figure 6.2.2; (2) The key personnel qualifica-tion levels are in conformance with TS 6.3.1; (3)
the authorities and responsibilities of licensee personnel have been delineated as specified in ANSI 18.7-1972; and (4)
the minimum shift crew composition of licensee personnel is in conformance with TS Table 6.2-1.
Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Licensee Actions on IE Bulletins and Circulars a
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IE Bulletin 79-06A and 79-06A (Revision 1)
Review of Operational Errors and System Misalignments Identified During the Three Mile Island Incident The inspector discussed various aspects of the licensee's responses to the bulletin with the plant Technical Supervisor.
In reference to response 9 contained in the June 4, 1979.followup transmittal to the initial bulletin response, the inspector was informed that the "Plant Change/Modification" (PCM) would'be issued by Power Plant Engineering
for review by the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee (PNSC) by the end of the week of July 23, 1979.
Actual implementation would be effected during the next refueling outage for each unit.
The inspector discussed with the Technical Supervisor the issue of continued Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) operation following a phase B
containment isolation which isolates the Component Cooling Water supply and return lines to the RCP's.
In the licensee's responses, there exists the implication that the generation of a phase B contain-ment isolation due to high containment pressure and the attendant need for containment spray would indicate a large rapid blowdown of the primary system, in which case the RCP's would not be of any use until after longer term reflooding had taken place.
The inspector pointed out though, that a high containment pressure phase B isolation signal could also result from a
steam line break inside the containment in which case the earlier rationale for not needing the RCP's (the assumed rapid blowdown of the primary system)
would not be applicable.
The cognizant licensee representative agreed that their position on RCP operation following phase B containment isolation needed to consider containment high pressure signals originating from breaks in the secondary system inside containment.
In reference to response 12, the inspector inquired about the licen-see's plans for reviewing their procedures to assure that their eval-uation of modes for removal of hydrogen gas from the primary coolant system and from the containment were translated into procedures or instructions to operators.
The licensee responded that although they felt that their procedures adequately covered this issue, a detailed procedure review had not been planned.
The inspector pointed out that such a procedure review was required by Item 12 of the bulletin and that the licensee's plans would be reviewed during a subsequent inspec-tion.
IE Circular 79-04-Loose Iocking Nut on Limitorque Valve Operators The inspector reviewed the licensee's action to determine whether the locking nuts on limitorque Type SMB valve operators were properly secured.
Review of the available plant mechanical/visual inspection reports was performed and subsequent information received from the licensee via telephone call on July 26, 1979 indicates that all per-tinent limitorque valves on Unit 3 and Unit 4 safety related systems have been inspected and have been determined to be acceptable for operation.
This item is closed.
IE Circular 79-08 - Attempted Extortion - Low Enrichment Uranium The inspector confirmed receipt of the subject circular by the licen-see and reviewed the documentation of the action taken.
Following plant receipt of the circular.,
copies were routed to the Health
Physics Supervisor and the Plant Security Supervisor for their review of plant applicability.
Such review was documented via signoff on the Turkey Point plant Bulletin/Circular/Information Notice cover sheet.
This item is closed.
8.
Open Item Followup The inspector conducted a preliminary review of the licensee action taken relative to open item 251-79-13-01 in IE inspection report 50-250/251-79-13.
A marked up copy of O.P.
12702.1, Normal Alignment of Reactivity Computer" was obtained by the inspector.
Based on the wording of this marked up copy this item will continue open at this time pending a review of inspector concerns such as the criteria for determination of whether a negative period check is desired for a particular test.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Followup on Reportable Events The following events were reviewed to ascertain that:
a.
reporting requirements were met; b.
corrective action was taken as required by Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50'
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d.
the event was reviewed and evaluated; and the facility was operated within the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 and the Technical Specifications subsequent to the event.
50-250/79-22,
"Failure of MCC D to Auto-Transfer to its Alternate Supply following loss of Normal Supply" The following events were closed out based upon a review in the Regional Office:
50-250/79-12,
"Damaged Threads on Steam Supply Stop Valve Operator Stem Nuts to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbines".
50-250/79-18,
"Missed Surveillance of Spent Fuel Pit Monitor Filter" 50<<250/79-19, "Inoperability of 3B Intake Cooling Water Pump" 50-251/79-07,
"Inoperable Charging Line Pump Support" No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
Review of Plant Change/Modifications a
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Nonconformance Report Dispositioning Paragraph 5.4.2 of Quality Procedure (Q.P.)
15.2 of the QA Manual requires that open nonconformance reports be periodically reviewed by the appropriate QC organization to assure that response to/and closure of nonconformances are being conducted in a timely manner.
The inspector noted that at the time of this inspection (July 17-20)
a Nonconformance Report (NCR) written by a plant QC engineer on June 8,
1979 against the installation of PC/M 79-42 (identifying such deficiencies as the inexistence of records that proper materials were used to implement the PC/M and the lack of evidence that a certified welder was used to perform the installation), had not yet received an "NCR No." as required by Q.P.5.2 and thus was not being tracked for dispositioning in a timely manner.
This is an item of noncompliance (50-250/79-24-01).
b.
Reporting Requirements The inspector reviewed the documentation for (PC/M) 79-42 associated with the installation of brackets in the "A" Diesel-Generator regulator cabinet.
During the course of this review, the inspector examined a
Nonconformance Report (NCR) prepared June 8, 1979 by a plant Quality Control (QC) engineer and concerning nonconformances identified with the implementation of PC/M 79-42.
These nonconformances were:
(1)
Completion of PC/M 79-42 prior to a review by the QC Supervisor.
(2)
Inexistence of records that proper parts and materials were used.
(3)
Unavailability of evidence that a certified welder was used to install the brackets.
(4)
Official unacceptability of an NDE Dye Penetrant examination conducted on the welds due to lack of appropriate certification of inspectors performing the test.
(5)
Lack of an implementation procedure for the safety-related PC/M.
Paragraph 8.1.1 of the Turkey Point CESAR states that, "All electrical systems and components vital to safety, including the emergency diesel generators (EDG) are designated as emergency diesel generators (DEG), are designated as Class I and designed so their integrity is not ingrained...".
Technical Specification (T.S.) 6.9.2.6.3 states that, "Observed inadequacies in the implementation of administrative or procedural controls which threaten to cause reduction of degree of redundancy provided in reactor protection
-6-systems or engineered safety feature systems",
shall be subject of a written report to the USNRC Regional Office within 30 days of the occurrence of the event.
In that the findings of the plant NCR prepared June 8, 1979 point to the poss'ible inability to certify meeting the design criteria for Class I structures, systems and equipment applicable to the EDG, this item will require additional information.
The inspector will follow up on this issue during his next inspection.
This item is unresolved (50-250/79-24-02).
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