IR 05000250/1996008
| ML17353A867 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/16/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17353A866 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-96-08, 50-250-96-8, 50-251-96-08, 50-251-96-8, NUDOCS 9608280159 | |
| Download: ML17353A867 (52) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos.:
50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.:
DPR-31 and DPR-41 Report Nos.:
50-250/96-08 and 50-251/96-08 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company Facility:
Turkey Point Units 3 and
Location:
9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 t
Dates:
June Inspectors:
16, 1996 through July 20, 1996 T.
P. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector B.
B. Desai, Resident Inspector E.
D. Testa, DRS Inspector W.
H. Miller, DRS Inspector J.
W. York, DRS Inspector Approved by:
K. D. Landis, Chief Reactor Projects Branch
Division of Reactor Projects 9608280i59 9608i6 PDR ADOCK 05000250
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 and
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection Report 50-250,251/96-08 This integrated inspection to assure public health and safety included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support.
The report covers a five week period of June 16 to July 20, 1996, of resident inspection.
In addition, the report includes regional announced inspections of radwaste, transportation, effluents, and health physics; fire protection; and, engineering.
0 erations A Unit 3 power reduction for testing and maintenance was well planned and executed (section 01. 1).
A Unit 4 short notice outage was well planned and executed (section 01.2).
Failure to follow the clearance procedure for the auxiliary feedwater system resulted in a non-cited violation (section 01.3).
The licensee has a proactive program to identify, track, and address operator work-around issues (section 02. 1).
A weakness pertaining to the backup nitrogen supply to the Hain Steam Isolation Valve surveillance test was identified (section 03.1).
The Company Nuclear Review Hoard was effectively carrying out their charter (section 07. 1).
guality Assurance assessments and reviews were noted to be thorough and independent, and provided a positive contribution to nuclear safety (section 07.2)
A previous violation related to Chemical and Volume Control Procedure affecting reactor coolant system boron concentration was closed (section 08. 1).
Maintenance Maintenance and surveillance activities witnessed were well performed (section Hl.l).
The licensee appropriately handled a lost time injury that occurred during intake service water pump maintenance (section Hl.2)
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A weakness in the work control and clearance processes resulted in a local flow indicator in the component cooling water system being out-of-service with no active work order documentation (section M2.1).
En ineerin The engineering reorganization (effective August 1, 1996)
combined the technical, the on-site, and the off-site engineering groups (section El.l).
The engineering department demonstrated strong self-assessment as evidenced by post-outage critiques (section E7. 1).
Plant Su ort The licensee has implemented an effective program for shipping radioactive materials, including a very good training program (sections Rl.l and R5:I).
An unplanned radioactive gas release on May 7, 1996, was appropriately followed up by the licensee (section R2. 1).
A personnel contamination event was appropriately addressed (section Rl.2).
A non-cited violation was identified for failure to survey and post the Unit 4 spent fuel pool area during fuel transfer.
A previous unresolved item was closed (section RS. 1).
The licensee had implemented effective and aggressive water chemistry control programs in accordance with the Technical Specification requirements for Pressurized Water Reactors primary and secondary water chemistry (section R2.3).
Housekeeping and the control of contaminated and radioactive material within the licensee's auxiliary, radioactive waste warehouse, scrap storage areas, and fuel handling building was acceptable.
However, the inspector did identify a malfunctioning carbon dioxide monitor in the radwaste materials warehouse (section R2.2).
The licensee implemented and maintained an effective program to monitor and control liquid and gaseous radioactive effluents (section R3. 1).
Licensee procedures, planning, and preparation for hurricane's were aggressive and conservative.
This included the use of an
"outage-like" schedule prior to storm arrival and a post-event critique.
However, the inspectors identified one weakness related to the Instrument Air compressor diesel not being included in an emergency plan implementing procedure (section Pl. 1).
Two fitness for duty related issues were appropriately dispositioned, including one on-site drug use by a temporary part-time fire watch.
Based on NRC comments, the licensee is considering ways of enhancing fitness for duty processes (section S8.1).
Essential safe shutdown cables in two fire areas were not provided with sufficient separation or fire protection features to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.
This item was identified by the licensee and is considered unresolved pending further NRC evaluation (section F2. 1).
TABLE OF CONTENTS Summary of Plant Status..................
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Operations..........................
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Haintenance..................................
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Engineering.....................
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Plant Support
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o 10 V.
Hanagement Heetings
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Partial List of Persons Contacted..................
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............24 List of Items Opened, Closed and Discussed Items...
.25 List of Inspection Procedures Used...........................
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations..........................
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.26
e REPORT DETAILS Summary of Plant Status Unit 3 At the beginning of this reporting period, Unit 3 was operating at or near full reactor power and had been on line since March 29, 1996.
The unit operated at or near full power during the period except for a load reduction to perform routine turbine testing and maintenance (section 01. 1).
Unit 4 At the beginning of this reporting period, Unit 4 was operating at or near full power and had been on line since April 10, 1996.
The unit was removed from service on July 12, 1996 to perform feedwater heater valve maintenance.
The unit was returned to service on July 14, and achieved full power on July 16, 1996 (section 01.2).
NRC Activities Other NRC activities that occurred during the period are summarized as follows:
Date s
Item June 17-18, 1996 Deputy Regional Administrator site tour, and Miami News Conference.
June 14-21, 1996 July 16, 1996 July 17-19, 1996 NRC License Operator Examination by Mr.
G. T.
Hopper (et.al.)
per NRC Inspection Report 50-250,251/96-300.
Severity Level II Violation and Civil Penalty per Enforcement Action 96-051 regarding discrimination of an FPL employee in 1991.
NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) Project Manager and Project Director site visit.
I.
0 erations Ol Conduct of Operations Ol. 1 Unit 3 Load Reduction For Maintenance and Testin 71707 The licensee reduced power on Unit 3 during the period June 28-30, 1996, in order to perform routine testing and maintenance.
Unit load was reduced to 40% reactor power in order to conduct turbine valve testing and turbine trip testing.
In addition, steam generator feedwater pump maintenance, heater drain pump
01.2 maintenance, turbine plant cooling water (TPCW) heat exchanger cleaning, condenser water box cleaning, and other miscellaneous secondary plant work was performed.
The licensee planned the work through a detailed schedule in the plan-of-the-day document.
Each major task had an appointed individual to ensure appropriate plans and implementation.
The inspector reviewed the plans; observed portions of the operating, maintenance, and test activities; and, discussed the load reduction, and related activities with appropriate licensee personnel.
The inspector concluded 'that the licensee's plans were thorough, and that the power changes and maintenance activities
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were well coordinated and effectively implemented.
Unit 4 Short Notice Outa e
SNO 71707 A SNO related power reduction was initiated on Unit 4 at 6:00 p.m.
on July 12, 1996.
The unit was brought to mode 2 at approximately 9:00 pm on July 12, 1996.
Following completion of maintenance, including on feedwater heater bypass valve 4-20-106, turbine oil.
system, TPCW heat exchangers, condenser water boxes, the unit was brought to Mode 1 at 2:48 a.m.
on July 15, 1996.
The unit was returned to 100% power on July 16, 1996.
The 1A and 2A Feedwater heater remained bypassed due to a potential 2A feedwater heater tube leak that is causing the heater level to be high.
The licensee has initiated efforts to confirm the cause of the high feedwater heater level.
The inspector observed portions of the operations activities and concluded that the SNO was executed as planned and without any significant complications.
01.3 Auxiliar Feedwater AFW S stem Clearance Issues 71707 The licensee conducted post maintenance testing (PMT) of the A AFW pump on July 3, 1996, following governor stem replacement and other routine maintenance activities.
At 1:30 a.m.,
during the PMT (3-0SP-75.9),
operators noted AFW flow on both trains.
The A
AFW pump was aligned to train 1, therefore, flow should have only been observed on that train.
Testing was secured, and operators verified the lineup.
Within ten minutes, valve AFPD-001 was found locked open instead of locked closed.
With this valve out-of-position, the A AFW pump discharge was aligned to both trains.
Operators conservatively declared AFW inoperable, and immediately entered technical specification (TS) action statement (TSAS)
3.7. 1.2. action 2 which required two hours to restore both trains of AFW to service, or, be in hot standby in six hours.
Valve AFPD-001 was repositioned to the required locked closed position, and the TSAS was exited in 20 minutes from time of discovery.
The licensee initiated condition report No.96-877 and performed an investigation.
The licensee concluded that valve AFPD-001 was
mispositioned during removal of clearance No. 0-96-06-039 at ll:29 p.m.
on July 2, 1996.
Thus, the licensee concluded that the valve was out-of-position for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 21 minutes; however, AFW was not inoperable.
Thus, no TSASs were exceeded.
The licensee concluded that root cause of the failure to follow the clearance procedure O-ADM-212, In-Plant Equipment Clearance Orders, was due to operator personnel error caused by a lack of self checking and inattention to detail by both the valve positioned and checker.
This was validated by an independent guality Assurance (gA) assessment and review of the event.
Corrective actions included:
a letter to all operators addressing the event and corrective actions, disciplinary action for the individuals involved, counselling for Nuclear. Plant Supervisor (NPS),
independent gA review of the event, root cause assessment and corrective actions per condition report, procedure enhancements to be performed, Human Performance Evaluation System (HPES) review training and briefing for all crews, valve training per Operation Department Instruction (ODI)-
C0-18, Valve Manipulation Expectations, development of a dual verification process when repositioning clearance related valves (Note:
This is in addition to the independent verification.
Thus, three checks for valves will be accomplished),
and engineering assessment per the Probablistic Safety Assessment (PSA) that this event was not risk significant.
The inspector followed up on the event including reviewing the condition report, control room logs, the clearance order, HPES assessment plans, engineering PSA, gA review and assessment, ODI and selected training, and the technical specifications.
The inspector also observed portions of the surveillance testing.
The inspector concluded that no TSASs were violated.
Further, the inspector concluded the AFW system would have performed its intended function for any of the three AFW pumps or two AFW trains.
AFW functionality was demonstrated during the PMT
surveillance test.
However, failure to follow the clearance procedure is a violation.
This licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a non-cited violation (NCV),
consistent with section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
NCV 50-250,251/96-08-01, Failure to Follow Clearance Procedure, is closed.
02.1 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 0 erator Work-Around Pro ram 71707 40500
03.1 The inspector reviewed the licensee's program to document, track, and close operator work-arounds.
The licensee defines an operator work-around as
"any problem that impedes an operator in performing duties within approved procedures or in accordance with the intended design.
The licensee tracks and reviews open work-arounds daily in the plan-of-the-day (page'8-2).
As of July 10, 1992, nine were open and 21 were closed since the program began in 1993.
The licensee's goal is less than 15 open work-arounds.
The licensee also tracks the program, and informs site personnel (including operators)
by using a training brief.
Brief No.
636 dated July 3, 1996, delineated the current status.
In addition, the NPS tracks open work-arounds which could effect operator transient response.
A listing was maintained and'osted in the NPS office.
Further, periodic meetings among operations, engineering, technical, and maintenance personnel, were held to address work-around status and priorities.
The inspector reviewed the tracking programs and the above documentation, attended one status meeting, and questioned operators regarding the program.
The inspector noted a high level of management attention in this area.
The inspector concluded that the licensee has a very good operator work-around tracking and closure program.
Operations Procedures and Documentation Main Steam Isolation Valve MSIV 0 erabilit Durin Nitro en N2 Backu Periodic Tests 71707 During the observance of the quarterly surveillance procedure 3-OSP-072.2, HSIV N2 Backup periodic test on June 28, 1996, the inspector questioned the Assistant Nuclear Plant Supervisor (ANPS)
as to why the associated HSIV was not considered out-of-service nor logged as such in the control room logs.
After internal discussions, the ANPS concluded that the HSIV should have been declared inoperable and appropriately logged.
The Unit 3 HSIVs use backup N2 bottles as the safety related motive force for HSIV closure.
The primary motive source was Instrument Air (IA), a non-safety system.
During the conduct of procedure 3-0SP-72.2,
07.1 each HSIVs N2 bottle was sequentially isolated to perform a
regulator check, as well as a low pressure control room annunciation test.
A note within the procedure stated that the N2 station was rendered inoperable; however, the note did not clearly state that the HSIV should be considered inoperable and logged.
Technical Specification 3.7. 1.5 requires each HSIV to be operable.
A 24-hour action statement is entered if an HSIV becomes inoperable.
The Technical Specification did not address the N2 backup system.
During the conduct of 3-0SP-072.2, the N2 backup supply is isolated to each HSIV for a duration of a few minutes which was much shorter than the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> TSAS.
Therefore, the inspector concluded that the TSAS was not exceeded.
Further, the inspector reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)
and noted that these documents did not discuss the N2 supply to the HSIVs in any significant detail.
The licensee initiated an On-The-Spot-Change (OTSC) to 3-0SP-072.2 requiring declaring the associated HSIV inoperable during the performance of procedure 3-0SP-072.2.
A night order was also initiated emphasizing the need to maintain a questioning attitude.
Further, the licensee initiated actions-to determine if any additional similar surveillances existed that potentially affected the operability of a safety related system.
The inspector reviewed the OSP and OTSC, TSAS, and discussed the issue with management.
The inspector concluded that not recognizing that the HSIV should be considered technically inoperable during the performance of 3-OSP-072.2 was a weakness.
However, upon identification by the inspector, the licensee was responsive and aggressive in initiating corrective actions.
guality Assurance in Operations Com an Nuclear Review Board CNRB 40500 The inspector attended a portion of CNRB meeting No.
432 held at Turkey Point on July 16, 1966.
The inspector verified that the meeting was conducted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.5.2, NP-803 (Nuclear Policy -
(CNRB),
and CNRB implementing procedures.
Generally, the CNRB meets monthly, rotating the location of the meeting among the three FPL sites (e.g.,
Turkey Point, St.
Lucie and Juno Beach).
Representatives from all three sites were present at this meeting.
The inspector noted that the Turkey Point Plant Hanager's report was very informative and it sparked a good exchange of questions and a healthy discussion.
The inspector also noted that the CNRB continued to address self-assessment issues and held a discussion
of early warning indicators in order to identify degrading performance.
Discussions were also held with CNRB chairman.
One issue that came from the Plant Manager's report was recent Turkey Point personnel losses, both to industry and to St.
Lucie and to the engineering reorganization.
Since the beginning of 1996, five Instrumentation and Control (I&C) supervisors have left Turkey Point.
Although these positions have been filled from within (e.g.,
I&C specialists and engineers),
a potential void exists at the lower levels.
07.2 The inspector concluded that the CNRB remained focused towards nuclear safety, effectively carried out their charter, and that members displayed a very good questioning attitude.
ualit Assurance A
and ualit Control C
Activities 40500
08.1 The inspector reviewed gA and gC related activities during the period.
This included gA independent assessments of plant events (sections 01.3 and M2. 1),
gA involvement in daily activities, and gA's quarterly trend report (96-067) for the second quarter of 1996.
gA noted strengths and weaknesses, and communicated them to senior plant and site management.
Some of the issues noted included procedure adherence concerns, condition report closure through the Plant Manager Action Item (PMAI) system, and non-safety-related installed gauge calibration.
The inspector reviewed selected gA reports, discussed the findings with gA management, and discussed managements reactions and corrective actions.
The inspector noted gA to be thorough and independent in their assessments of plant performance.
gA was a
positive contribution to nuclear safety.
Miscellaneous Operations Issues Closed Violation VIO 50-250 50-251 96-04-02 Failure to Follow Chemical and Volume Control S stem CVCS Procedure 92901 The inspector reviewed implementation and effectiveness of licensee corrective action described in licensee response (L-96-154) dated July 1, 1996 to the notice of violation.
The inspector had discussed the management actions to address operating issues, including the failure to follow the CVCS procedure, in NRC Inspection Report 50-250,251/96-04, section 07.2.
Specific corrective actions were verified to be performed.
The inspector also concluded that the corrective actions implemented by the licensee were satisfactory.
This VIO is considered close II. Naintenance Nl Conduct of Naintenance Hl. 1 General Comments a.
Inspection Scope (62703 and 61726)
The inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following maintenance activities in progress:
Unit 3 secondary plant maintenance during a scheduled load reduction (section 01. 1)
Unit 4 secondary plant maintenance during a
SNO (section 01.2)
Unit 3 HSIV backup N2 testing (section 03. 1)
The inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following test activities:
Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) routine testing AFW A periodic surveillance (section 01.3)
Hain turbine trip and valve testing (sections 01. 1 and 01.2)
b.
Observations and Findin s
For those maintenance activities observed, the inspectors determined that the activities were conducted in a satisfactory manner and that the work was properly performed in accordance with approved maintenance work orders.
h The inspectors determined that the above testing activities were performed in a satisfactory manner and met the requirements of the technical specifications.
However, a weakness was observed during the Unit 3 HSIV backup N2 test (section 03. 1).
cd Conclusions Haintenance and surveillance activities witnessed were well performed.
H1.2 Lost Time In'ur 62703 On June 25, 1996, during maintenance activities related to the installation to the 4A Intake Cooling Water ( ICW) pump motor, a
maintenance electricians'ittle finger on the right hand was pinched between the lifting cable and the lifting lug of the ICW
motor, causing amputation of the finger above the first joint.
The individual was taken to a nearby hospital and micro-surgery was performed in an to attempt to re-attach the finger tip.
This injury was deemed as a lost time injury.
The licensee initiated an investigation, and concluded that lack of attention during the motor lift, lack of a designated signal man, lack of tailboard meeting, and no work gloves worn during the activity contributed to the incident.
Licensee corrective actions included implementation of a tailboard surveillance program, training on rigging safety, heightened sensitivity to personnel safety on part of the supervisor, use of proper protective equipment, and use of designated signalman.
The inspector concluded that licensee efforts to minimize similar future injuries were aggressive.
N2 Haintenance and Haterial Condition of Facilities and Equipment H2. 1 Com onent Coolin Water CCW Flow Indicator FI-4-643 62203 On June 12, 1996, during a routine plant tour, the inspector noted that CCW FI-4-643, for pressurizer steam and liquid sample coolers, was isolated on clearance No. 4-95-08-064, and had been since August 12, 1995.
Since no work was in progress, and since the job was over ten months old, the inspector checked the control room clearance log.
The control room did not have any record of the clearance.
Therefore, operators immediately initiated a new clearance and condition report No.96-806.
The licensee concluded that a condition report was used to track a
deficient condition rather than a Plant Work Order (PWO).
Further, the clearance paperwork was apparently misplaced by operations.
Licensee corrective actions included:
audited the clearance program with no other deficiencies noted; gA independent assessment of the issue, informed maintenance and operations of this occurrence, including guidance to track issues with PWOs, and not with condition reports; initiated a monthly check of all clearances; and re-installed the FI restricting orifice, and returned it to service.
The inspector concluded that the licensee appropriately addressed this item.
The inspector considers this to be an observed weakness in the work control and clearance processes.
Further,
the inspector noted that this FI has no safety function and was properly isolated.
No issues with the CCW system or operability occurred.
The inspector also noted that gA was positively involved in the followup.
III.
En ineerin El El. 1 Conduct of Engineering En ineerin Reor anization 37550 E7 E7.1 The inspector reviewed the functions of the current technical and engineering organizations, and the anticipated consolidation changes.
The inspector discussed with engineering and technical management the current organization, the functions of each of the groups, and the approximate number of people in each group.
The licensee then discussed the changes in groups, functions and numbers that would take place on August 1, 1996.
Currently the Turkey Point site is Supported by an additional engineering organization located within Corporate Engineering at Juno Beach, Florida.
Host of these Corporate Engineering functions are being transferred to the Turkey Point site and Corporate Engineering is being downsized.
The NRC intends to follow and evaluate any effect of the downsizing on the engineering function at Turkey Point on a
periodic basis using Inspection Procedure 37550, Engineering.
The objectives of this procedure are to "Evaluate the licensee's engineering activities, particularly the effectiveness of the engineering organization to perform routine and reactive site activities including the identification and resolution of technical issues and problems".
As a basis for future monitoring, the inspector discussed current engineering work load, i.e.,
open Hodification Packages, Condition Reports,etc.
guality Assurance in Engineering Activities En ineerin Outa e Activities Self-Assessment 37551
The inspector reviewed the licensee's activities relative to engineering self-assessment following refueling outages.
The Unit 4 cycle 16 refueling outage ended in April 1996.
The engineering department performed a self-assessment review of their activities and involvement.
This was in addition to the overall site outage critique referenced during NRC Inspection Report 50-250,251/96-06.
Engineering identified the following strengths:
strong teamwork and attitude,
good schedule adherence, aggressive followup of emergent issues, good use of condition report system for problem identification and resolution, and improvements in snubber testing/maintenance.
Engineering also identified areas for improvement, including:
maintenance specification development and revision, and PC/M reviews and pre-implementation walkdowns in order to ease the change request notice (CRN) burden.
The inspector discussed this outage related self-assessment with engineering personnel and reviewed post-outage critique notebooks.
These self-assessment
'efforts have been ongoing during the current SALP period and began after the dual unit outage in 1991.
The inspector concluded that the engineering department demonstrated a
proactive self-assessment capability.
IV. Plant Su ort Rl Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RPSC) Controls Rl. 1 Trans ortation of Radioactive Material
'a ~
Ins ection Sco e
86750 TI 2515 133 The inspectors evaluated the licensee's transportation and radioactive materials programs for implementation of revised Department of Transportation (DOT) and NRC transportation regulations for shipment of radioactive materials as required by Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 71.5 and
CFR Parts 170 through 189.
The inspectors also reviewed the conditional disposal approval for cooling canal screened material issued by Environmental Resources Management Pollution Prevention Division of Metro Dade County, Florida dated February 26, 1996 and the State of Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services dated October 10, 1995, and the site handling of the canal material.
b.
Observations and Findin s
The inspectors selectively reviewed site transportation procedures and determined that they adequately addressed the loading, shoring and bracing of radioactive waste shipments to waste processors; placarding of radioactive material loads; marking, labeling and placarding for radioactive waste shipments to disposal facilities;
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radioactive material shipment documentation and radioactive waste surveys for shipment to disposal facilities.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's records for the four most recent shipments that were made in 1995.
No shipments had been made in 1996.
The inspectors determined that the licensee had maintained adequate records of shipments of licensed material for a period of three years after shipment as required by 10 CFR 71.91(a)
required.
The inspector also determined the shipping papers contained the required information.
The inspectors reviewed the approval letters and the stated conditions for canal material.
No canal screened material had been shipped and none was scheduled to be shipped for disposal.
The approval letters permit disposal of a maximum of six hundred cubic yards per year of the cooling canal screened material.
Conclusions The licensee had effectively implemented a program for shipping radioactive materials.
Rl.2 Personnel Contamination R2 The inspector reviewed the circumstances surrounding a personnel
'ontamination event that occurred on June 25, 1996 during scheduled maintenance activities on the post accident sampling system (PASS).
The contamination levels were approximately 5000 disintegration per minute (dpm)
and 2,000 dpm on the individual's shoes and pants, respectively.
A scan of the contaminated area did not indicate a hot particle.
Condition report No.96-849 was initiated to address corrective actions with a due date of July 27, 1996.
The inspector plans to monitor licensee corrective actions through the condition report process.
Licensee corrective actions to date appeared appropriate.
Status of RPSC Facilities and Equipment R2.1 Radiation Nonitors a.
Ins ection Sco e
84750 82701 The inspectors reviewed selected radiation monitors for calibration and alarm set points and an unplanned waste gas release on Hay 7, 1996, for corrective action.
b.
Observations and Findin s
The inspectors reviewed selected alarm set points and calibration data and determined that monitors were within their calibration
P
interval and alarm set points were correctly set.
Results of the unplanned waste gas release on May 7, 1996, were documented in Condition Report No.96-673 dated May 8, 1996.
The inspectors discussed the licensee's corrective action followup and tracking system to ensure that selected licensee identified weaknesses were properly tracked and closed out.
Conclusions No concerns with licensee's facilities or equipment or analysis were identified during the inspection.
The inspectors were also satisfied that identified weaknesses in Health Physics, Environmental, Chemistry Rad Waste and Emergency Planning and guality Assurance/guality Control findings and self critique items in theses areas were tracked, assigned for closure and closed.
The inspector's assessment of the unplanned gas release on May 7, 1996, did not identify any limits that were exceeded.
Tours of Licensee RCAs 83750 During tours of the licensee facilities, the inspectors selectively verified that radiological postings were appropriate for the radiological hazard.
The inspector observed an inoperable carbon dioxide monitor used as a personnel protection monitor in the decontamination hut located in the rad materials warehouse.
The licensee took immediate corrective action and tagged the unit out of service and opened Condition Report No.96-833 to track the problem and track the corrective actions.
The decontamination hut was not in use when the inoperable carbon dioxide monitor (CEA 244 SN 2V 1292112)
was identified.
Primar and Secondar Chemistr 86750 TI 2515 133 The inspectors reviewed and discussed the results of the licensee's primary and secondary chemistry program, including sludge lancing and tube plugging.
The inspectors toured the state of the art secondary water chemistry analysis lab.
The inspectors reviewed the chemistry results for the TS data associated with the Primary and Secondary Water Chemistry parameters for the period January 1,
1996 through June 10, 1996, and determined that all required TS chemistry results were maintained at small percentages of limits.
The licensee was aggressively sampling and monitoring the secondary chemistry parameter R3 RPSC Procedures and Documentation R3. 1 Radioactive Effluent a
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Ins ection Sco e
84750 b.
(TS) 6.9. 1.4 for both units required the licensee to establish, implement, and maintain a program for the control of radioactive effluents.
The program was required to include limitations on the annual and quarterly radiation doses from radioactive materials in liquid and gaseous effluents released to unrestricted areas.
TS 6.9. 1.3 for both units described the reporting schedule and content requirements for the Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports.
The reports were required to be submitted prior to May
of each year and to cover the operation of the facility during the previous calendar year.
Summaries of the quantities of radioactive materials in liquid and gaseous effluents released from the facility and an assessment of the radiation doses due to those releases were required to be included in the reports.
Observations and Findin s C.
The inspectors reviewed the effluent data compiled from the licensee's effluent release report for the year 1995.
The values used for 1995 annual dose estimates were taken from the licensee's 1995 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report.
The inspectors also reviewed the supporting data for the effluent release report covering the year 1995 and discussed the data presented in reports with the licensee.
The inspectors determined that no liquid or gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation was inoperable for a time greater than that allowed by TS 3.3.3.5 or 3.3.3.6.
No gas storage tanks exceeded the limits allowed by TS 3. 11.2.6 during the reporting period.
No changes were made to the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) during 1995.
There were no continuous liquid effluent releases above the lower limit of detection for either Turkey Point Unit 3 or 4 during this period.
Conclusions Based on the above reviews, it was concluded that the licensee had implemented and maintained an effective program to monitor and control liquid and gaseous radioactive effluents.
The projected offsite doses resulting from those effluents were well within the limits specified in the TSs, ODCM, and
CFR 19 R5 Staff Training and gualification'in RPEC R5.1 Radioactive Material Trainin 86750 TI 2515 133 The inspectors reviewed training for Health Physics (HP)
technicians and supervisors involved in transportation of radioactive material.
The inspectors determined that licensee training records were up to date.
Also, the inspectors verified personnel involved with radioactive material shipping maintained hazardous material (HAZMAT) training qualifications.
The inspectors also determined the lesson plans, handout material and the subject matter tests were appropriate for their purpose.
The inspectors concluded the training focused on good radiological control work practices and maintaining exposures As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA).
R8 Miscellaneous RPSC Issues R8.1 Closed Unresolved Item URI 50-250 50-251 96-02-05 Failure to Follow Procedural Re uirements to Post and Control a Hi h
Radiation Area On March 15, 1996, during core alterations, Health Physics (HP)
personnel noted higher than expected radiation levels on the Unit 4 auxiliary building roof in the vicinity of the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) transfer canal outer wall. An HP technician was in the area when the assigned alarming dosimeter alarmed on dose rate (e.g.
mrem/hr).
The individual contacted the Health Physics Shift Supervisor (HPSS),
and the high dose rates were confirmed.
Condition Report No.96-363 was written and the HP personnel confirmed that the high dose rates were caused by spent fuel being transferred from the SFP upender (through the transfer canal) to the SFP storage racks.
Subsequent fuel moves were monitored by HP, posted as high radiation areas and locked high radiation areas.
Dose rates observed were as high as 1500 mrem/hr on contact with the concrete wall and 900 mrem/hr at 12 inches.
The effected area was about
feet long and 15 feet high, and corresponded to an irradiated fuel bundle traversing the SFP transfer canal.
The inspectors reviewed Condition Report No. 96-0363, surveys, the UFSAR, and discussed the URI with HP and operations management.
The inspectors reviewed Procedure 0-HPS-025.
1 Titled General Postin Re uirements for Radiolo ical Hazards Dated March 30, 1994, Step 4.4. 1 which states
" An area, accessible to individuals, in which radiation levels could result in an individual receiving a dose equivalent in excess of 100 mrem in one (1) hour at 30 centimeters from the radiation source or from any surface that the radiation penetrates.
The area should be
posted at 80 mrem/hr, unless waived by the HPSS and documented in the HPSS Log" and Step 6.6 Each High Radiation Area in which the intensity of radiation is greater than 100 mrem per hour but less than or equal to 1000 mrem per hour shall be barricaded and posted as a High Radiation Area.
The area should be posted at 80 mrem per hour unless waived by the HPSS and documented in the HPSS log."
The licensee submitted responses to the NRC Circular 76-03 ( L-76-390 dated November 12, 1976)
and NRC Bulletin 78-08 (L-78-252 dated August 1, 1978) which concerned excessive radiation levels from fuel element transfer tubes.
Neither of the responses identified the potential for elevated radiation levels.
The inspectors determined that the licensee has taken or has scheduled the following corrective actions:
The north wall of the Unit 4 Spent Fuel Pool Building was posted in accordance with plant procedures, and a high radiation area guard was posted near the boundary during refueling.
Procedure 3/4-0P-40.2, Refueling Core Shuffle, was changed to include a requirement to notify Health Physics to post areas for fuel transfer.
Dose rate increases adjacent to the transfer canals will be monitored for the next Unit 3 de-fueling.
Responsible Department:
Health Physics and Operations.
Completion date:
November 4, 1997.
[PMAI-96-03-157].
Engineering will evaluate the adequacy of the shielding provided by the Spent Fuel Pool Buildings in the vicinity of the transfer canal and compare it to survey data collected by Health Physics.
Completion Date:
June 1,
1996 (Unit 4)
and June 1,
1997 (Unit 3).
[PMAI96-03-158] (Unit 4)
and
[PMAI-96-03-159] (Unit 3).
Health Physics will develop procedures, survey forms, checklists, and matrixes, as necessary, to ensure that areas affected by fuel movement within the plant are properly posted.
Completion Date:
November 30, 1996.
The licensee was informed that failure to follow the procedure to post and control a high radiation area was a
violation. However, this violation will not be subject to enforcement action because the licensee's efforts in identifying and correcting the violation met the criteria specified in Section VII.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy.
NCV 50-250,251/96-08-02:
Failure to Follow Procedural Requirements to Post and Control a High Radiation Area, is close Conduct of EP Activities EP Procedures and Documentation 71750 The inspector reviewed Procedures O-EPIP-20106, Natural Emergencies and O-ONOP-103.3, Severe Weather Preparations in light of Hurricane Bertha, which had the potential for affecting Turkey Point.
In anticipation of the Hurricane, the licensee commenced numerous activities described in these procedures.
The licensee performed a walkdown of the plant to secure equipment and materials that pose missile hazards, logistics, staging plan, and the initiation of round-the-clock shift director coverage.
The licensee also maintained routine communication with the state,'ocal, and National Hurricane Center authorities during the time that Hurricane Bertha posed a threat to Turkey Point.
Although Hurricane Bertha did not directly affect Turkey Point, the actions taken by the licensee in anticipation of the Hurricane were aggressive and indicative of good planning.
Further, the licensee has developed an outage-like hurricane schedule that is implemented two days prior to the anticipated arrival of the eye of the hurricane.
A critique was held related to hurricane preparedness which surfaced further enhancements that the licensee plans to capture in affected procedures.
The inspector noted that procedure O-EPIP-20106, dictated testing of the on-site diesel generators.
However, the procedure did not include the two Instrument Air Diesel compressors that were recently installed.
When brought to the attention of the licensee, the licensee immediately initiated actions to include testing and fuel verification of the two Instrument Air compressors.
The diesel generators that were included in procedure 0-EPIP-20106 were:
four Emergency Diesel Generators, one Standby Feedwater Pump, one CAT 400 Security Diesel, one Diesel Fire Pump, and one Service Water Pump As the threat of Hurricane Bertha affecting Turkey Point diminished, the licensee made a decision to not test the forementioned diesel generators.
The inspectors concluded that overall, licensee procedures, planning, and attitude towards Hurricane preparations were aggressive and conservative.
Fitness For Dut Related Issues 71750 On July 5, 1996, a temporary part-time employee at Turkey Point was searched and found to contain a suspected illegal substance,
initially believed to be Heroin.
The individual also admitted to using the substance earlier that day within the protected area.
He was serving in the position as a temporary fire watch at Turkey Point.
On July 5, 1995, at approximately 12: 15 p.m., the individual assumed post as a fire watch in the "Thermo-Lag" fire monitoring Television (TV) camera room located in the Turbine building within the protected area.
Some time later, at approximately 12:30 p.m.,
the individual was found on the floor in the T.V. camera room.
A first-aid team was called out and the individual was transported to the medical facility.
At this time, some abnormal marks were noted on the individual's arm.
Further, the individual was noted to have been asking for his
"Gym Bag".
A for-cause test was performed on the individual and the Miami Metro Dade Police was called out to the site as an inspection of the Gym Bag revealed suspected illegal substance.
The individual was arrested and a search of the individual revealed additional quantity of the suspected material as well. as a hypodermic needle.
The individual denied any additional personnel involvement in the drug use at Turkey Point.
The individual's access to Turkey Point and Saint Lucie has been revoked.
Further, the licensee is conducting a review of work performed by the individual during the past 90 days for any abnormalities.
The licensee immediately notified the NRC resident inspector as well as made a
CFR 26.73 notification (Event Number 30715) at 10:00 p.m.
on July 5, 1996.
The for-cause test performed on the individual confirmed positive for cocaine.
The individual's pre-access drug test had been conducted on January 29, 1996, and he was later badged at Turkey Point on February 22, 1996.
There were no subsequent drug tests performed on the individual; however, the individual was within the scope of the random drug testing program.
The inspector discussed and expressed concern to the licensee in that the potential abnormalities associated with this individual's drug habit were not detected by his supervisor.
Factors including the fact that the individual was a part-time/temporary employee as well as a relatively "invisible" job function may have hampered pre-identification of the individuals potential drug problem.
The inspector was informed by the licensee that abnormal behavior of the individual was noted by a co-worker earlier that day and was reported to the supervisor.
The supervisor was in the process of verifying this abnormal behavior, during which he noted the individual on the floor.
Notwithstanding, the licensee agreed to look into this matter to determine a method to minimizing probability of such an incident from recurring.
It should be noted that this is the first incident of known on-site drug use at
Turkey Point since
CFR 26 became effective, November 24, 1992.
NRC Inspection Report 50-250,251/96-09 will also review this issue.
The inspector also reviewed and discussed the circumstances associated with an access authorization related incident involving a maintenance department employee at Turkey Point.
The individual was involved in an off-site vehicle accident on June 22, 1996 which resulted in the fatality of the passenger, who was also an FPL employee.
Pending further police investigation, the maintenance individual is on administrative leave.
The accident received media interest, including an article in the local news paper.
F2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment F2. 1 Thermo-Lag Electrical Raceway Fire Barriers
'
~
b.
Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the status of the licensee's program to upgrade the Thermo-Lag fire barrier installations at Turkey Point to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.
A walkdown inspection of portions of the outdoor areas was performed to review the existing Thermo-Lag fire barrier installations and the current compensatory measures which were in place for the degraded Thermo-Lag fire barriers.
Observations and Findings The licensee was in the process of performing reevaluations of the original fire protection design and fire protection commitments made to the NRC.
Significant revision to the existing fire protection features were being considered.
The schedule for submitting the following revisions to the NRC was:
Resolution of combustibility of Thermo-Lag installed inside containment buildings, September 30, 1996.
~
Resolution of ampacity characteristics and derating of the cables installed within the Thermo-Lag enclosed raceways, June 28, 1996.
Fire protection features and fire barrier design for cable raceway enclosures using Thermo-Lag for indoor applications, September 30, 1996.
Fire protection features and fire barrier design for cable raceway enclosures using Thermo-Lag for outdoor applications, December 16, 199 The licensee's fire protection features and the fire protection design for separation of redundant essential electrical cables were submitted to the NRC in the early 1980's.
The design for separation of essential cable trains installed in outdoor locations included separation of redundant essential cables by a
distance of more than 20 feet or the provision of 1-hour fire rated cable raceway barriers where the 20 foot separation could not be maintained.
This arrangement did not meet the NRC requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section III.G.2 due to the lack of automatic fire detection and suppression systems being installed in these areas.
The licensee had identified these features and requested an exemption from the NRC.
The NRC reviewed and granted these exemptions by letters dated March 27, 1984 and August 12, 1987.
In 1991, the NRC found that the Thermo-Lag fire barrier material did not perform to the manufacturer's specifications.
In general, the installed Thermo-Lag barriers would actually provide approximately one half of the specified rating, i.e.
a 1-hour fire rated barrier would provide approximately 20 to 30 minutes of protection.
The NRC issued NRC Bulletin 92-01 and requested that licensees with Thermo-Lag fire barriers take the appropriate TS compensatory measures for the areas in which the Thermo-Lag materials were installed.
FPL implemented the TS compensatory measures for degraded fire barriers.
This consisted of a roving fire watch for all plant areas in which the Thermo-Lag was installed.
For areas without fire detection and suppression systems, the licensee installed a closed circuit television monitoring system.
These areas were monitored continuously, using the television monitors, and the areas were inspected once every 10 to 15 minutes by a roving fire watch:
These compensatory measures had previously been reviewed and found acceptable by the NRC.
During this inspection, the inspector performed a walkdown inspection of outdoor fire area Zones 84, 86, 89 and 143.
In general, the Train "B" raceways in these areas containing essential cables were enclosed by 1-hour Thermo-Lag fire rated assemblies.
These areas were not provided with fire detection and suppression systems but an exemption had been granted for all of these areas except for Fire Zone 143.
This fire zone was identified in 1991 following completion of the construction associated with the Unit 4 emergency diesel generators.
Fire Zone 143 Fire Zone 143 is the roof of the Unit 3 emergency diesel generator building and contains essential Unit 3 and 4 cables.
The raceways containing one redundant train of essential cables were enclosed by a degraded 1-hour Thermo-Lag fire rated barriers.
No automatic fire suppression and detection systems were provided for this area.
Fire Zone 143 was identified on FSAR Figure 9.6A-15 and the
cables installed in this area were described in the essential cable list and safe shutdown analysis.
However, a description of this area was not included in the FSAR.
The failure to revise the FSAR to provide a description of the fire protection and Appendix R features for this area is identified as another example of Unresolved Item 50-250, 251/96-02-03,
"Failure to Update FSAR."
The fire protection features for Fire Zone 143 did not meet the separation requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section III.G.2.
Essential Unit 3 and 4 redundant safe shutdown cables were installed in this area and were not separated either by a distance of at least 20 feet or one redundant train was not installed in a 1-hour fire rated enclosure and automatic fire suppression and detection systems were not provided for this area.
The licensee, during the Thermo-Lag reevaluation project currently in process had identified this condition on Hay 9, 1991, as not meeting the Appendix R separation requirements.
When the NRC identified that an ex0mption request had not been submitted for this area on June 20, 1996, the licensee issued Condition Report 96-840.
The licensee's evaluation concluded that the root cause of this problem was a failure to incorporate plant modifications following the construction of the Unit 4 emergency diesel generator into the licensing basis provided by the FSAR and the Appendix R review documents.
The corrective actions identified by this condition report included, revision of the Fire Hazards Analysis and FSAR by July 31, 1996, and submission of a revised exemption request to the NRC by December 16, 1996.
Pending further NRC evaluation, this issue is identified as one example of Unresolved Item 50-250, 251/96-08-03,
"Appendix R Cable Separation Issues."
The licensee had previously implemented appropriate compensatory actions for this fire area in response to NRC Bulletin 92-01 regarding degraded Thermo-Lag fire barriers.
These actions were sufficient to address these degraded fire protection features and the licensee would have been in compliance if an approved exemption had existed for Fire Zone 143.
Fire Zone
During the plant tour, the inspector noted that fire barrier enclosures had been installed for the cable raceways in Fire Zone 64:
This fire zone is a small room on the ground.floor between the turbine and control buildings and was the vestibule for the control building elevator.
This area was not provided with automatic fire suppression and detection systems.
The licensee provided design information to the inspector which indicated that the fire resistant rating of these cable raceway enclosures was installed as a 1-hour fire barrier which had subsequently been found to have a rating of. approximately
minutes.
The fire protection features for Fire Zone 64 did not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section III.G.2 in that, essential Unit 3 and 4 redundant safe shutdown cables were in the same fire area and were not separated by a distance of at least 20 feet or one redundant train was not installed within a 1-hour fire rated enclosure and automatic fire suppression and detection systems were not installed in this area.
To meet the Appendix R requirement without an installed fire suspension and detection system, the cable raceways were required to be enclosed in a 3-hour fire rated enclosure.
An exemption request had not been requested for this discrepancy.
Pending further NRC evaluation, this issue is identified as second example of Unresolved Item 50-250, 251/96-08-03,
"Appendix R Cable Separation Issues."
When the inspector identified this item, Condition Report 96-839 was issued.
The licensee's evaluation concluded that confusion must have existed during the design and construction phase for the Thermo-Lag fire barriers due to the unique construction features associated with this room.
The corrective action included revision of the Appendix R raceway drawings to indicate that the raceway fire barriers for Fire Zone 64 were required to have 3-hour fire rating.
The licensee plans to revise these documents by August 2, 1996 and include the schedule for this modification with the overall fire protection feature upgrade schedule to be submitted to the NRC on September 30, 1996.
The licensee had previously implemented appropriate compensatory actions for this fire area in response to NRC Bulletin 92-01 regarding degraded Thermo-Lag fire barriers.
These actions were sufficient to address the degraded fire protection features until the raceway fire barriers were upgraded to the required 3-hour fire rating.
S urious 0 eration of Solenoid Valves CV 3 4 -311 and SV 3 4 -311 Char in to Pressurizer S ra Auxiliar S ra Control Valves During the ongoing Appendix R reanalysis, the licensee identified that spurious operation had not been considered in the safe shutdown analysis for Valves CV 3(4)-311 and SV 3 (4)-311, charging to pressurizer spray auxiliary spray control valves, in the event of a fire in either the containment or 4160 V switchgear room for Units 3 and 4.
The licensee issued Condition Report 96-754, Spurious Operation of Solenoid Valves CV 3 (4)-311 and SV 3 (4)-311 (charging to pressurizer spray auxiliary spray control valves).
The licensee's evaluation concluded that the existing plant procedures were sufficient to troubleshoot this feature and take appropriate action for a safe plant shutdown.
The spurious opening of one of these valves was not considered a credible failure.
The licensee's corrective actions included:
Engineering was to revise the safe shutdown analysis and essential equipment list to include a spurious mode of
'ailure for valves CV-3 (4)-311.
The licensee plans on completing this action by December 31, 1996.
Engineering was to revise the engineering assessment of Fire Areas W-70 and U-67, Unit 3 and Unit 4 4160 V switchgear rooms, to include the spurious operation of these valves.
The licensee plans on completing this action by September 30, 1996.
Operations was to revise several procedures to address the spurious operation of these valves and to review other procedures to determine if they should also be revised.
The licensee plans on completing this action by April 1, 1997.
The inspectors reviewed the condition report and concurred in the proposed correction actions.
c.
Conclusion The inspector reviewed the separation for essential electrical cables installed in outdoor fire areas and identified two examples which did not appear to meet the separation requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.
This issue will be classified as an unresolved item.
During the review, the inspector identified one plant fire area which was not described by the FSAR.
This was identified as another example of a previously identified unresolved item.
F2.2 Fire Zone Exem tions 64704 The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action process relative to these two fire zones (64 and 143).
Licensee procedure O-ADM-518, Condition Reports, defines requirements for documenting conditions adverse to. quality.
Enclosure 1 to the ADM states that a condition report should be written for materials which are installed that are contrary to a specification or procedure.
However, a condition report is not required if a material discrepancy is to be reworked or replaced by another procedure (or tracking system).
This would include a
PWO, request engineering for action (REA) etc.
Since these fire zones did not comply with
CFR Appendix R requirements, the licensee initially documented and tracked this condition using engineering assessments, exemption requests and other engineering tracking systems.
PWOs would have been written prior to any repair activities.
Once these issues were brought to management's attention by the NRC, licensee management directed these conditions to be also
documented on condition reports.
The inspector did not identify any violations of procedure O-ADM-51 V.
Mana ement Meetin s Xl Exit Meetin Summar The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on July 25, 1996.
The licensee acknowledged the findings present.
The inspectors asked the'licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was identifie Partial List of Persons Contacted Licensee T.
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We Abbatiello, Site guality Manager Acosta, Company Nuclear Review Board Chairman Balaguero, Reactor Engineering Supervisor Banaszak, Electrical/I8C Engine Supervisor Bible, Site Engineering Manager Bohlke, Vice President, Engineering and Licensing Carter, Project Engineer Donis, BOP Engineer Supervisor Earl, gC Supervisor Franzone, Instrumentation and Controls Maintenance Supervisor Gianfrancesco.
Maintenance Planning Supervisor Goldberg, President, Nuclear Division uld, Staff Specialist, Juno Heisterman, Haihtenance Manager Hartzog, Business Systems Manager Higgins, Outage Manager Hollinger, Licensing Manager Hovey, Site Vice-President Huba, Procurement Supervisor Jernigan, Plant General Manager Johnson, Operations Manager Jurmain, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor Kaminskas, Services Manager Kirkpatrick, Fire Protection, EP, Safety Supervisor Knorr, Regulatory Compliance Analyst Kuhn, Procurement Engineering Supervisor Kundalkar, Engineering Manager Lacal, Training Manager Lindsay, Health Physics Supervisor ons, NSSS Engineer Supervisor Harcussen, Security Supervisor Marshall, Human Resources Manager Miller, Acting Projects Supervisor Paduano, Manager, Licensing and Special Projects Pearce, Projects Supervisor Petersen, Site Superintendent Plunkett, Assistant to the President Remington, System Performance Supervisor Rose, Nuclear Materials Manager Rossi, gA and Assessments Supervisor Singer, Operations Supervisor Steinke, Chemistry Supervisor Thompson, Project Engineer Tomaszewski, Component Specialist Supervisor Waldrep, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor Warriner, guality Surveillance Supervisor st, Technical Manager
,
Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, and electricians.
NRC B.
B. Desai, Resident Inspector T.
P. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector R.
C. Crouteau, NRR Project Manager F. J.
Hebdon, NRR Project Director G. T. Hopper, DRS Licensing Examiner L. C. Stratton, DRS Security Inspector L. A. Reyes, Deputy Regional Administrator Partial List of Opened, Closed, and Discussed Items 0 ened 50-250,251/96-08-03, Closed URI.;
Appendix R Cable Separation Issues (section F2. 1)
50-250,251/96-08-01 NCV Failure to Follow Clearance Procedure (section 01.3)
50-250,251/96-08-02 NCV Failure to Follow Procedural Requirements to Post and Control a High Radiation Area (section R8.1)
50-250,251/96-04-02 Item Discussed VIO Failure to Follow CVCS Procedure (section 08.1)
50-250, 251/96-02-03 URI Failure to Update FSAR (section F.2. 1)
List of Inspection Procedures Used IP 37550:
Engineering IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering IP 40500:
Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Prevent Problems IP 61726:
Surveillance Observations IP 62703:
Maintenance Observations IP 64704:
Fire Protection Program IP 71707:
Plant Operation
'
IP 71750:
IP 82701:
IP 83750:
IP 84750:
IP 86750:
IP 92901:
IP 92904:
Plant Support Activities Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program Occupational Exposure Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring Solid Radwaste Management and Transportation of Radioactive Materials Followup - Operations Followup - Plant Support List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ADM AFPD AFW ALARA a.m.
ANPS CAT CCW CFR CNRB CVCS dPIll DPR DRS EDG e.g.
EPIP etal oF FL FPL FI HAZMAT HP HPES HPS IA I&C ICW L
m MSIV NCV Administrative (Procedure)
AFW pump discharge (valve)
Auxiliary Feedwater As Low As Reasonably Achievable Ante Meridiem Assistant Nuclear Plant Supervisor Caterpillar (diesel)
Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulations Company Nuclear Review Board Chemical Volume Control System Disintegrations Per Minute Power Reactor License Division of Reactor Safety Emergency Diesel Generator
. For Example Emergency Plan.Implementing Procedure
"and the rest" Degrees Fahrenheit Florida Florida Power and Light Flow Indicator Hazardous Material Health Physics Human Performance Evaluation System Health Physics
- Surveillance Instrument Air Instrumentation and Control Intake Cooling Water Letter (licensing)
milli Main Steam Isolation Valve Non-Cited Violation
No.
NP NPS NRC NRR N2 ODCM ODI-CO ONOP OP OSP OTSC PASS PDR p.m.
PMAI PMT PSA PTN PWO gA gC QI rem SFP SNO TPCW TS TSAS TV UFSAR URI VIO
Number Nuclear Policy Nuclear Plant Supervisor Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Nitrogen Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Operations Department Instructions (Conduct Off-Normal Operating Procedure Operating Procedure Operations Surveillance Procedure On-the-Spot Change Post-Accident Sampling System Public Document Room Post Meridiem Plant Manager Action Item Post-Maintenance Test Probabilistic Safety Assessment Project Turkey Nuclear Plant Work Order guality Assurance guality Control guality Instruction Roentgen Equivalent Man Spent Fuel Pit (Pool)
Short Notice Outage Turbine Plant Cooling Water Technical Specification TS Action Statement Television Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Unresolved Item Violation of Operations)