IR 05000250/1995007
| ML17352B144 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/03/1995 |
| From: | Barr K, Gooden A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17352B143 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-95-07, 50-250-95-7, 50-251-95-07, 50-251-95-7, NUDOCS 9505110075 | |
| Download: ML17352B144 (31) | |
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+**~V UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 303234199 May 3, 1995 Report Nos,.:
50-250/95-07 and 50-251/95-07 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company Docket Nos.:
50-250 and 50-251 e
Facility Name:
Turkey Point 3 and
Inspection Conducted:
March 20-24, 1995 License Nos.:
Q.
A. Gooden DW Z D te S gned Accompanying Personnel:
K. Clark K. Erickson E.
Fox L. Trocine Approved by:
K.
arr, h'
te igned Emergency Preparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the annual emergency preparedness exercise conducted on March 22, 1995.
The inspection was conducted to assess the adequacy of:
(1) the licensee's emergency response program; (2) the implementation of the Emergency Plan; (3) the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures; and (4) the training program for emergency response personnel.
The emergency response organization's (ERO)
activation, notification, and response were evaluated from the following emergency response facilities (ERFs):
Simulator Control Room (SCR), Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC),
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF),
and the Emergency News Center (ENC).
This exercise included full participation by State and local response agencies.
The offsite participation was observed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
9505if0075 950503 PDR ADGCK 05000250
Results:
Within the areas reviewed, no violations, deviations, or exercise weaknesses were identified.
The licensee's exercise was considered fully successful in demonstrating that facilities were maintained in a state of readiness, and the ERO was adequately prepared to effectively respond and cope with the postulated emergency.
The licensee demonstrated an effective response capability to protect the health and safety of facility personnel and the general public.
Program strengths that were noted included:
Visual aids and props available during news briefings in the ENC.
Video monitoring capability to show real time actions occurring within the TSC Emergency Coordinator/management area (e.g.
TSC briefings, plant status boards, repair priorities, etc.).
Drill communications capability installed at the Control Room Simulator (e.g. plant page system, State Hot Ring Down telephone, and NRC Emergency Notification System).
Exercise critique was thorough and detailed.
The licensee's emergency preparedness program (training, facility maintenance, Plans and procedures)
was properly maintained and effectively implemented in t
response to the assumed acciden REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- T. Abbatiello, Manager, Site guality Assurance
- H. Bowskill, Reactor Engineer
- G. Hollinger, Manager, Training
- D. Jernigan, Plant Manager
- H. Johnson, Manager, Operations
- V. Kaminskos, Manager, Service
- F. King, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- V. Laudato, Fire Protection Coordinator
- D. Hothena, Manager, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
- T. Plunkett, Vice President
- R. Steinke, Supervisor, Chemistry
- A. Taylor, Emergency Preparedness Assistant
- E. Weinkam, Manager, Licensing Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- K. Barr, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section
- T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector
- J. King, Intern
- T. Peebles, Chief, Operations Branch
- Attended exit interview Abbreviations used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine whether provisions had been made to test the integrated emergency response capability and a major portion of the basic elements within the licensee's Emergency Plan, as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(14),
Section IV.F of Appendix E to
CFR Part 50, and the licensee's Emergency Preparedness Administrative Procedure Manual EP-AD-005.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the exercise and was discussed with licensee representatives prior to the exercise.
No major problems were identified during the review, but minor inconsistencies became apparent during the exercise.
The inconsistencies failed to detract from the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organization.
Scenario problems were discussed by the licensee during the exercise critique on March 24, 1995.
The scenario developed for this exercise
was adequate to test the capabilities of the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient emergency information to State and local government agencies for their full participation in the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's organization was observed during the exercise to determine whether the requirements of Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to
CFR Part 50 (as addressed in the Emergency Plan) were implemented with respect to descriptions, responsibilities, and assignment of the onsite emergency response organization.
The inspectors observed that specific emergency assignments had been made for the licensee's emergency response organization and there were adequate staff available to respond to the simulated emergency.
The inspectors observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the SCR, TSC, OSC, EOF, and the ENC.
The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives, and the capability for long-term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was demonstrated.
The inspector observed good coordination between the emergency response facilities during the transfer of responsibilities from the SCR-EC to the TSC-EC, and the EOF (RH).
Staffing at each of the ERFs appeared to be consistent with the licensee's implementing procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources were made, whether arrangements to accommodate State and local personnel in the EOF were adequate, and whether other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response were identified as specified by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),
Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to
CFR Part 50, and guidance promulgated in Section II.C of NUREG-0654 (Revision 1).
The licensee's Emergency Plan provided for additional support and resources that may be called upon to assist in an emergency.
Representatives of the State of Florida, as well as Dade and Honroe Counties, were accommodated at the EOF located in the FP8L General Office Building in Hiami.
On arrival, offsite authorities were briefed by the RH regarding current conditions associated with the simulated emergency.
Suitable space and equipment were available to support the additional emergency response resources.
No violations or deviations were identifie e 5.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to verify that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4)
and Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to
CFR Part 50, and to determine whether that scheme was adequately implemented.
The inspector reviewed Section 3.0 of the Emergency Plan, and EPIP 20101
"Duties of Emergency Coordinator,"
and determined that the licensee's classification system was adequate for the classification of the postulated accident; and the emergency procedures were used by the SCR shift for initial and continuing mitigating actions during the simulated emergency.
The EAL scheme was used to make a prompt and correct initial event declaration, and escalate to a more severe emergency class as postulated emergency conditions warrant.
The NOUE and Alert declarations were made by the Nuclear Plant Supervisor as the Emergency Coordinator from the SCR.
The SAE and General Emergency were declared by the Emergency Coordinator from the TSC following the transfer of responsibility for classification from the SCR to the TSC.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and the content of initial and follow-up messages to response organizations had been established; and a
means to provide early notification to the population within the plume exposure pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.E.
The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization.
Due to the time constraints of this exercise, some elements of the State response organization were pre-positioned in the area.
The licensee's initial and follow-up notifications were both timely and accurate.
The Alert Notification System (ANS) for alerting the public within the plume exposure pathway was in place and operational, but was not tested during this exercise.
No violations or deviations were identifie Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to verify that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(6),
CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.E, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
Communications among the licensee's emergency response facilities and emergency organization and between the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite authorities were good.
No significant communications related problems were identified during this exercise.
The inspector discussed as an area for communications improvement, plant page announcements (see Paragraph 9.a.).
No violations or deviations were identified.
Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(7),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.G.
An ENC was located on the second floor of the General Office Building located in Miami, and appeared to be effective in distributing the news releases that were prepared and approved in the EOF.
A rumor control program was also in place and included published telephone numbers for public inquiries.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Facility and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(8),
CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.E, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
The inspector observed the activation, staffing and operation of the emergency response facilities and evaluated equipment provided for emergency use during the exercise.
a.
Simulator Control Room - An inspector observed that SCR personnel acted promptly to initiate emergency response to the simulated emergency.
Operators were very knowledgeable of the emergency classification system as evidenced by the timeliness of event recognition and classification.
Personnel demonstrated familiarity and competence with emergency procedures and accident mitigation tactics in support of the TSC and OSC.
The inspector noted that the SCR communications capability for training purposes was enhanced by the installation of a SHRD phone, plant page capability for plant announcements, and an ENS phone.
As an area
for improvement considerations, the inspector discussed two examples where plant paging was inadequate:
1)
no announcement was made following the transfer of EC authority from the SCR to the TSC; and 2) the initial site evacuation message (1132 hrs) did not direct evacuees to use the alternate evacuation route (followup page announcement made at 1138 hrs).
The beforementioned actions did not result in any adverse impact to plant safety and/or the health and safety of plant personnel.
- The TSC was promptly activated and staffed following notification by the NPS (as the interim EC)
regarding the simulated emergency conditions leading to an Alert classification.
The TSC staff appeared to be knowledgeable concerning their emergency responsibilities, and TSC operations proceeded smoothly.
TSC equipment and supplies were adequate to support the licensee's response to the simulated emergency.
The tr ansfer of EC responsibility from the NPS (SCR) to the Plant Hanager (TSC)
was both timely and effective. Although frequent briefings (approximately 30 minutes intervals)
were conducted by the EC, noise levels during EC briefings were unacceptable due to TSC staff conversing with other staff members and/or phone conversations.
Although a lack of attention was observed during the EC briefings, command and control was acceptable.
The licensee evaluators also identified this item for corrective actions.
Operations Support Center
- The OSC was promptly staffed following the plant page announcement that all emergency response personnel report to assigned facilities. Following the General Emergency declaration (1233 hrs),
the inspector noted that an OSC briefing by the OSC Supervisor was delayed more than 90 minutes (1415 hrs).
Additionally, OSC status boards were not always maintained current.
The licensee discussed the aforementioned items during the critique for corrective actions.
Emergency Operations Facility - The EOF was located on the 5th floor of the General Office Building in Hiami. The facility was adequately designed, equipped and staffed to support the emergency response.
The minimum staffing requirements were filled by site personnel activated following the Alert declaration.
The inspector noted timely activation on the part of site personnel with the additional staffing from Juno Beach being pre-staged.
The Recovery Hanager provided good command and control, and was prompt in briefing the offsite authorities (State/counties)
regarding current plant conditions on arrival in the EOF.
As an area for improvement to avoid confusion, the inspector and licensee discussed coordination of site evacuation with the State of Florida, Dade and Honroe Counties.
Emergency News Center - The ENC was located on the 2nd floor of the General Office Building in Hiami. Facility activation was timely, with effective access control and badging by security personnel.
News briefings were conducted at timely intervals with
good visual aids employed by personnel who were cognizant of plant status and accident conditions.
One aspect of the ENC discussed by the inspector as an area for improvement involved the delay in confirming the General Emergency status.
The General Emergency was declared at 1233 hrs but unconfirmed by the ENC with the EOF until after 1300 hrs.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether methods, systems, and equipment For assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency conditions were in use as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(9),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the simulated accident.
During the exercise, the, Technical Assessment Team functioned effectively in analyzing the plant status so as to make recommendations to the EC concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant equipment, to prevent release of radioactive materials, and to terminate the emergency condition.
Onsite and offsite radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to assess the degree of radiological hazard in those areas of the simulated plume.
The field teams reported results to the dose assessment staff in the TSC rather than the EOF as discussed in EPIP-20129.
During ERF activation, responsibility for dose assessment was transferred to the EOF, but offsite monitoring was not assumed by the EOF.
The inspector observed close coordination between the EOF and TSC dose assessment staff regarding dose assessment, and control of the ERTs was closely coordinated with the State of Florida.
The TSC and EOF dose calculations were computed in parallel and periodically compared with each other and with the State of Florida.
However, following indications of a rad release, results from the TSC dose assessment staff were not posted on the dose projection status board for more than one hour.
As mentioned above in Paragraph 9.c.,
the licensee discussed during the critique the maintenance of facility status boards for corrective actions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Protective Response (82301)
This area was observed to verify that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel were implemented promptly as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(10),
and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed that radiological exposures were controlled throughout the exercise by issuing emergency workers supplemental dosimeters.
Additional actions included periodic habitability surveys (TSC and OSC)
and the evacuation (simulated) of non-essential personnel following the SAE declaration.
PARs were made to offsite authorities within fifteen minutes of the General Emergency declaration.
The PARs were based upon plant conditions, and were consistent with those in the Emergency Plan and procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12. Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine whether the deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise, and the weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization, were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The licensee conducted facility critiques with exercise players immediately following the exercise termination.
On Harch 24, 1995, a
formal critique of the exercise was held with exercise controllers, key players, licensee plant and corporate management, and NRC personnel.
Issues identified as a result of the exercise were presented during the critique.
Licensee actions on issues identified during the exercise will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on Harch 24, 1995, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the exercise observations.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Federal Evaluation Team Report The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (RAC and FEHA) concerning the activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by separate correspondence.
Index of Abbreviations Used in This Report CFR EAL EC ENC ENS Code of Federal Regulations Emergency Action Level Emergency Coordinator Emergency News Center Emergency Notification System
EOF Emergency Operations Facility EP Emergency Preparedness EPIP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure ERF Emergency Response Facility ERT Emergency Response Team FEMA federal Emergency Management Agency NOUE Notification of Unusual Event NPS Nuclear Plant Supervisor NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OSC Operations Support Center PAR Protective Action Recommendation RAC Regional Assistance Committee RM Recovery Manager SAE Site Area Emergency SCR Simulator Control Room SHRD State Hot Ring Down TSC Technical Support Center Attachment:
Exercise Scope, Objectives, Narrative Summary, t
and Scenario Timeline
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHTCOMPANY TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT 1995 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUALEXERCISE MARCH 22, 1995 2.1 SCOPE To assure that the health and safety ol'he general public is protected in the event of an accident at Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (PTN), Florida Power
&, Light Company (FPL) conducts an annual emergency preparedness exercise.
This exercise involves mobilization of FPL, State of Florida, and Dade and Monroe County personnel and resources to respond to a simulated accident scenario.
A Controller organization willcontrol, observe, evaluate and critique the exercise to assess the emergency response capabilities of the utility and government agencies.
An FPL Controller Organization will control, observe, evaluate, and critique the PTN portion of the Exercise.
The Turkey Point Emergency Response Organization and Controller Organization willbe evaluated by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) personnel.
The State of Florida, and Dade and Monroe County emergen<<y response or anizations will participate in the exercise, and will be evaluated by Federal Emergency Management Agency personnel.
Due to the compressed timeline of the exercise, some portions of the FPL Emergency Response Organization may be prepositioned.
All onsite Emergency Response Facilities will be activated in accordance with simulated conditions and appropriate emergency response procedures for the exercise.
Exercise participants ("players" ) will not have any prior knowledge of the simulated. accident events, operational sequence, radiological effluents or weather conditions.
The exercise incorporates the tollowing:
Radiological Monitoring Drill - both onsite and offsite teams will hc dispatched during th<<
exercise to obtain requir<<d air samples and measurcm<<nts associated with a simulated offsite release ot radioactivity and
<<ommunicat<<
these results to the appropriate Emergency Response Facility (ERF).
(Field monitoring t<<am protective clothing and respiratory protection will be simulated in the field.)
Health Physics Drill - involves the response to and analysis of simulated elevated activity airborne or liquid samples, radiation exposure control, emergency dosimetry and the use of protective equipment onsite.
Communications Drill - Actual usage and demonstration ol'h<< int<<grity ot'mergency response communications links and equipm<<nt.
The preceding sub-drills are incorporated into the exercise scenario and will be demonstrated concurrently in the course of the exercise.
The overall intent of the exercise is to demonstrate that the FPL staff assigned responsibilities in an emergency situation are adequately trained to perform in accordance with the Emergency Plan and its implementing procedures.
Additionally, the scenario assists the State and local government agencies in demonstrating to FEMA that they are adequately trained to perform in accordance with their emergency plans and procedures.
FPL/PEN 2.l-l 9S AE/kevVWVlI/.95
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT 1995 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUALEXERCISE MARCH 22, 1995 The Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (PTN) emergency preparedness exercise objectives are based upon Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements provided in 10 CFR 50:
a) 50.47, Emergency Plans; b)
Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparedness forS'roduction and Utilization Facilities; and NRC Inspection Manual, Inspection Procedure 82302, Review ofExercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power.
Reactors.
Additional guidance provided in NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Revision I, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation ofRadiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support ofNrclear Power Plants, was utilized in developing the objectives.
The exercise will be conducted and evaluated using a realistic basis for activities.
The following objectives are consistent with the ret'erenced planning documents:
A.
Exercise Plannine Conduct an exercise of the PTN Emergency Plan.
2.
Provide an opportunity for the State ol Florida and Dade and Monroe Counties to participate in an exercise.
Prepare an exercise information package to include:
a.
'he objectives ol the exercise and appropriate evaluation criteria.
b.
The date, time period, place, and a list of participating organizations c.
The simulated sequence ol events.
d.
The time schedule of real and simulated initiating events.
e.
The narrative summary.
4.
Conduct a critique of the exercise and prepare an evaluation report.
5.
Demonstrate that corrective actions are tracked until completion.
FPL/PTN 2.2-1 95.AE/Revoo/Ol 08 9S
~C lC Emereenc Oreanizations.
Su ort. and Resource Demonstrate the prompt activation, adequacy of the staffing and set up, as appropriate, of emergency response facilities as follows:
-Control Room-Technical Support Center (TSC)
-Operations Support Center (OSC)
-Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
-Emergency News Center (ENC)
Demonstrate the capability of the FPL Emergency Response Organization to implement their Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Response Facility Managers/Supervisors to provide overall direction, including "command and conuol" hy initiating, coordinating, and implementing timely and effective decisions during a radiological emer ency.
Demonstrate the ability to eft'ectively transfer command and
<<ontrol ol'mergency response functions from the Control Room to the TSC/E()F.
Demonstrate the provisions for continuous stat'fing ol'he emergency l'acilities.
Demonstrate the interface capability between the FPL Emergency Response Organization and the State of Florida and Dade and Monroe Counties l'or el'lective response coordination to a radiological emergency and adequate protection ol the health and safety of the public.
Demonstrate the ability to control access to emergcn<<y l'a<<iliti<<s.
Demonstrate the ability to provide a liaison at each parti<<ipating ol'fsite governmental emergency operations center (EOC).
Demonstrate adequacy of designated facilities and equipment to support emergency operations.
Demonstrate the availability of outside support agencies and organizations who may be requested to provide assistance in an emergency.
Demonstrate the ability of corporate personnel to augment the Emergency Response Organization and support the plant stal'l'.
Demonstrate the ability to notify emergency response personnel.
2.2-2 95 AE/Rev00$ l.08 95
(c C.
Accident Assessment and Classification 1.
Demonstrate the availability ol methods, equipment, and expertise to make rapid assessments of the consequences ol any radiological hazards, including the dispatch and coordination of Field Monitoring Teams.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to recognize emergency action levels (EALs) and properly classify
.emergencies in accordance with the Turkey Point Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
D.
Notification and Communication 1.
Demonstrate the ability to notify offsite emergency organizations within approximately 15 minutes of each emergency classificatio.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC of any emergency classificatio within approximately one hour of the declaration.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to notify FPL Emergency Response Organization personnel.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to develop and send timely inl'ormation to State and local authorities as required by the Emergency Plan.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to communicate among the Control Room, TSC. ()SC, E()F, and ENC, as appropriate.
6.
Demonstrate that adequate communication capabilities exist between FPL, and the State and local Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs).
7.
Demonstrate the adequacy of communications capabilities between the Emergency Response Facilities and the offsite radiation monitoring teams.
8.
Demonstrate the ability to communicate among the Control Room, TSC, EOF, and NRC Operations Center.
Radioloeical Conse uence Assessment 1.
Demonstrate methods and techniques for determining the source term of releases or potential releases of radioactive material.
2.
Demonstrate the adequacy of methods and techniques for determining the magnitude of the releases of radioactive materials based on plant system parameters and effluent monitors.
2.2-3 95-AE/RevOM l.0&-95
(C 3.,
Demonstrate the ability to estimate, integrated dose I'rom pnijected or actual dose rates and to formulate Protective Action Recommendations (PARs).
4.
Demonstrate the ability to monitor and control emergency worker radiation exposure and implement exposure guidelines, as appropriate.
5.
Demonstrate the availability of respiratory protection, and protective clothing for onsite emergency response personnel.
6.
Demonstrate the availability of a procedural mechanism to expeditiously evaluate risks and authorize emergency workers to receive doses in excess of 10 CFR 20 limits, as appropriate.
7.
Demonstrate the capability for onsite contamination control.
8.
Demonstrate the ability to decontaminate onsite personnel, as appropriate.
10.
Demonstrate the capability for onsite and offsite radiologi<<al monitoring, to include collection, and analysis of sample media (e.g. air) and provisions for communications and record keeping.
11.
Demonstrate the capability to collect and prepare l'or shipment simulated elevated airborne or liquid samples, as required.
12.
Demonstrate the capability to use the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) (walk-through/simulate).
13.
Demonstrate the capability to analyze simulated fiuid samples and provide the isotopic and chemical results of the analysis within three hours ol'he time the sample was ttrst requested.
F, Protective Action Demonstrate the ability to recommend protective actions to appropriate offsite authorities.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to advise individuals onsite or in owner controlled areas of emergency conditions.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct search and rescue procedures l'or persons identitted as missing during accountability procedures.
G.
Public Information 1.
Demonstrate the operations of the ENC and the availability of space for the media.
FPL/PIN 2.2-4 95.AE/RevOVIO I 08.95
~C (C H.
Recove 0 erations 1.
Demonstrate the availability ot procedures to support re-entry and recovery.
a.
De-escalation/termination from the emergency phase, and transition to recovery phase.
b.
Inform the State of the dppIIrtunity to reduce the need fIIr protective actions.
2.
Demonstrate the availability of corporate technical support for planning and reentry/recovery organizations.
~Exem cone Areas of the PTN Emergency Plan that will NOT be demonstrated during this exercise include:
1.
Site evacuation and relocation of non-essential personnel.
2.
Onsite personnel accountability.
Security willdemonstrate accountability through the use of simulated personnel rosters.
3.
Actual shift turnover (long term shift assignments will be demonstrated by rosters).
4.
Real time activation of the EOF.
5.
Actual drawing of a sample utilizing the Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS).
FFL/prN 2.2-5 9< AE/RevOO/OI.08.9S
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT 1995 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUALEXERCISE MARCH 22, 1995 3.1 NARRATIVESUMMARY 3.1.1 Initial Conditions Unit 3 is operating at 100% power sin<<e.
The core is at the End of Life with Boron concentration of 170 ppm.
Unit 4 is in Mode 5 preparing for refueling.
Normal refueling activities are in progress.
The following items are of interest:
3B Emergency Containment Cooler is OOS. Failed Survcillan<<e Test on Midnight shift; a work package i>> heing developed to trouhle>>hoot and repair the I'ailure.
3C Auxiliary Feed Wat<<r (AFW) Pump i>> ()()S I'or ovcrnor inodit'ication and repair.
The 3AI Steam Generator Steam Flow Channel i>> ()()S.
Tniubleshooting is currently in progress.
A Ctintainment entry i>> planned I'or l2:00 noon to investigate the transmitter.
Containment Purge is in-service on Unit 3 in pr<<paration I'or a Containment entry to investigate the Steam Flow Transmitter I iilur<<, and perlorm a
routine containment inspection.
Unit 4 Containment Purge i>>>>e<<ur<<d I'or maintenance.
"B" Standby Feedwater Pump i>> O()S for a Pl;int Chan ie Modillcation to install the "Diesel Driver."
System Operations:
Demand on the, System is mtiderate with anti<<ipated peak oI'
l,500 MWe.
Service area conditions are normal.
St Lucie Unit I is ol'lline I'or rel'ueling (expected return March 30); St. Lucie Unit 2 at 100% power in the Middle oI'ore Lite; Fort Lauderdale Units 1 and 2 are oflline I'or I'orced outage>>.
Meteorological Conditions:
Current temperature is 78"F, skies ar<<cl<<ar, winds are 3 to 5 miles per hour from the south.
A high pressure>>y>>t<<m i>>>>tation;iry over the lower, southeastern United States, and sluiuld r<<main>>tationary I'or the, next 3-4 days.
Forecast high temperature is in the mid to upper <<ighties and It)'/I <<h in<<c ol rain.
FPL/PFN 3.l-l 95.AE/Rev0liOI Il.95
'CONFIDENTIAL(Unu) 03 23.9S)
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT 1995 EMERGENC Y P REPA REDNESS ANNUALEXERCISE MARCH 22, 1995 3.2 SCENARIO TIMELINE TIME EVENT 0 EVENT Initial Conditions Unit 3 is on line operating at 100% power at the end of core life. The Unit has been on line for 190 days and at 100% power for 45 days. Containment Purge is in-service on Unit 3 in preparation for a Containment entry to investigate a
Steam Flow Transmitter failure and perform a
routine containment inspection.
The following equipment is out of service (OOS):
3B Emergency Containment Cooler is OOS.
Failed Surveillance Test on Midnight shift; a work package is being developed to troubleshoot and repair the failure.
3C Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) Pump is ()OS tor governor moditIcation and repair.
The 3A1 Steam Generat<)r Steam Fit)w Channel is OOS. Troubleshooting is currently in progress.
A Containment entry is planned for 12:00 noon to investigate the transmitter.
Unit 4 is in Mode 5 in a scheduled refueling outage.
Containment purge. is secured on Unit 4 for maintenance.
"B" Standby Feedwater Pump for a Plant Chang<<Modification to install the
"Diesel Driver."
0800 Shift personnel (Control Room and Field Operators, Health Physics (HP)
Radiation Protection Monitors (RPMs), Chemistry Technicians, etc.)
on station 0815 Start the Exercise.
Shift briefing accomplished in the Simulator and Operations Crew establishes steady-state operation.
0830 A Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak develops insid<<containment (indicated by increasing area radiation monitor channels R-l, R-2 and R-3).
0840 The RCS leak stabilizes at approximately l3 allons per minute (gpm).
The Operations crew begins to investigate the leakage, and performs 3-ONOP-41.3, Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage.
FFL/prN 3.2-1 CONFIDENTIALIvnul 03.23-9S)
9S.AE/Rev02NI ~I I 9S
'CONFIDENTIAL(unta 03-23-95)
3.2 SCENARIO TIMELINE(Continued)
Emergency Preparedness Exercise, March 22, 1995 TIME EVENT 4 EVENT 0845 The Containment Purge is secured, however POV-3-2603, Containment Purge Exhaust Isolation Valve inside containment tails to close, and indicates intermediate position in the Control Room.
All other Containment Purge Supply and Exhaust Valves indicate closed, and containment isolation is verified. There is no indication ef a radioactive release, at this time.
0845 The Control Room Crew performs 3-0SP-41.1, Reactor Coolant System Leakrate Calculation.
0900 The RCS leakrate should be determined to be unidentified and greater than I gpm.
0915 A Notification of Unusual Event should he made based on Unidentified RCS Leakage greater than I gpm.
0930 The 3A2 Steam Generator Level Instrument fails. The Steam Generator instrumentation malfunctions result in conditions requiring an Automatic Reactor Trip, but the Reactor Protection System f'ails to trip the reactor (ATWS).
The Control Room crew carries out immediate Actions in accordance with 3-FR-S. I, Response to Anticipated Trip Without Scram, and the reactor is manually tripped f'rom the RCO Console by the RCO.
When the reactor is tripped, the RCS leak increases and stabilizes at approximately 80 gpm.
Phase A Containment Isolation should have occurred due to increasing radiation levels on radiation monitors R-l l and R-12.
0945 An Alert should be declared in accordance with EPIP 201() l, Duties ol'he Emergency Coordinator due to failure ill'he Reactllr to trip on an automatic signal.
1000 RCS leakage is quantilied and meets the Alert Emergency Action Level (RCS leakage greater than 50 gpm and within Charging Pump capacity).
Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, should be completed, and operators should transition to procedure 3-GOP-305, Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown and commence cool-down and depressurization.
3.2-2 CONFIDENTIAL(until 03-23.95)
95 AE/Rcv02/0l ll 9S
CONFIDENTIAL(Un01 03-23 9$ )
3.2 SCENARIO TIMELINE(Continu<<d)
Emergency Preparedness Exercise, March 22, I')95 TIME EVENT¹ EVENT 1015 The Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (OSC)
should be activated by this time.
Unit 3 Component Cooling Water (CCW) Deluge System inadvertently actuates.
Fire alarm point 35 ( Unit 3 CCW Deluge Suppression System) is received in the Control Room.
1040 Due to the fire suppression system actuation in the CCW Room, an electrical ground develops on the 3A CCW Pump.
3A 4KV Bus Ground annunciator is received in the Control Room identifying the ground to the Control Room crew.
1045 The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) should he activated (in standby)
with initial stafting.
The followin Emer ency Response Teams (ERT) should be dispatched:
Evaluate the leakage trom the containment and release to the environment.
An Operator is dispatched to investittate the Fire alarm.
An Electrical Team to identify and isolate the 4KV bus ground.
1100 Upon investigation ol'he Fire alarm, the Operator identifies the suppression system actuation with no t'ire. The suppression system should be isolated.
1115 As RCS cooldown and depressurization proceed, the RCS leakage begins to increase.
1130 RCS leakage is greater than charging pump capacity. The Control Room crew should carry out the immediate actions ol'3-E()P-E-(), Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and manually initiate Safety Injection A fuel element defect l'uils on a fuel ass<<mhly in Unit 3 causing RCS activity to increase. Radiation monitors R-l, R-2, R-3 and CHRRMS detect increasing radiation levels in the Containment Building.
When the 3C Emergency Containment Cooler (ECC) starts due to the SI actuation, an electrical short in the motor causes the breaker to overload and trip.
An annunciator is received in the Control Room indicating the ECC breaker has tripped.
Fpl/prN 3.2-3 CONFIDENTIAL(Unul 03.23.933 93.AE/Rev02h) I ~I 3 9S
'
e
'CONFIDENTIAL(Un0l 03.23.953 3.2 SCENARIO TIMELINE(Continued)
Emergency Preparedness Exercise, March 22, 1995 TIME EVENT 4 EVENT 1145 The EC should declare a Site Area Emergency (SAE) in accordance with EPIP 20101, Duties of the Emergency Coordinator based upon the RCS leakage greater than charging pump capacity.
The following Emergency Response Teams (ERT) may be dispatched based on plant conditions:
Operations team to preform Post Accident Hydrogen Monitor (PAHM)
lineup.
Chemistry team to align Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) for on line monitoring and sample the Unit 3 Containment for activity.
An Electrical team to investigate the 3C ECC breaker.
An Owner Controlled Area (OCA) evacuation, and Site Accountability should be initiated (simulated).
1200 A failure on the B Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump governor causes a
mechanical overspeed trip ol'he B AFW pump, and loss of one train of AFW.
The second train ol'FW remains in service to provide secondary system makeup.
1215 An ERT is dispatched to investigate the, AFW pump malfunction.
Standby Steam Generator Feedwater may be placed in-service, it'irected.
Accountability should be complete, and Search and Rescue for un-accounted for personnel should be initiated.
1230
POV-3-2602, Containment Purge Exhaust lsolatilln Valve outside containment develops leakage resultin<
in a
loss of <<llntainment integrity, and an uncontrolled radioactive release to the environment.
The release is monitored by the Plant Vent radiation detectors PRMS R-l4 and Plant Vent SPING.
The RCS leakage stabilizes at approximately 600 gpm.
Chemistry samples and Health Physics surveys confirm the high RCS activity.
RCS activity continues to increase as the t'uel element defect continues to degrade.
FPL/Plà 3.2-4 CONFIDENTIAL(Unul 03.23.953 95 AE/Rcv028l ~ I l.95
CONFIDENTIAL(Vntil 03 23.95i 3.2 SCENARIO TIMELINE(Continued)
Emergency Preparedness Exercise. March 22, l~)<)S TIME EVENT¹ EVENT 1245 A General Emergency should be declared due to RCS leakage greater than charging pump capacity and loss ol'ontainment integrity.
The EOF should be fully operational at this time.
Onsite survey teams should be dispatched to evaluate inplant radiological conditions.
Field monitoring teams should be dispatched to locate and track the plume, and PARs should be upgraded based on offsite dose projections, as appropriate.
1300 Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) should he generated based on plant conditions.
Area Radiation Monitor (ARM) channel R-9, Auxiliary Building-Tank and Pump Room (4 foot elevation, Auxiliary Building Sump Area) fails high, and alarms in the Control Room.
An ERT is dispatched to investigate the alarm.
1315
The 3B ECC breaker may be repaired and returned to service.
1330 Identification of backshift personnel and logistical needs lor continued operation of Emergency Response Facilities (ERF) should be considered at this time.
1345 American Nuclear Insurers request information be provided for distribution of temporary housing funds. (i.e., distribution locations, approximate number of recipients, etc.)
1400
POV-2603, Containment Purge Exhaust Isolation valve inside containment closes as containment pressure decreases (continuous close signal present).
1415
"A" Standby Feedwater Pump trips due t<<over current on "B" phase.
1430 With the identification ol'ackshift personnel, recovery actions and possible de-escalation from the General Emergency should be discussed at this time.
1500 When all State and local government, and utility objectives have been evaluated, exercise play is terminated.
FPL/PIN 3.2-5 CONFIDENTIAL(unul 03.23.953 95.AE/Rev02/0l-I I 95
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