IR 05000321/1986040

Insp Repts 50-321/86-40 & 50-366/86-40 on 861122-1219. No Violations or Deviations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters & Operational Safety Verification

ML20207J414
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	12/30/1986
From:	Cantrell F, Holmesray P, Nejfelt G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207J399	List: IR 05000321/1986040 ML20207J395
References
50-321-86-40, 50-366-86-40, NUDOCS 8701080435
Download: ML20207J414 (7)

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UNITED STATES

/pn Ettgo- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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[ , REGION il y' j 101 MARIETTA STREET, * * ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Numbers: 50-321/86-40 and 50-366/86-40 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P.O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Numbers: 50-321 and 50-366

License Numbers: OPR-57 and NPF-5

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Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2 Inspection Dates: November 22 - December 19, 1986 Inspection at Hatch site n, ear Baxley, Georgia Inspectors: M/f /2 Peter Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector 0~ ate Sign d fl(Ah' ff W'- l N GregoYy'M. Nejfelt, Resident Inspector Da'te Signed Approved by: IN4otbtk Floyd S. Cantrell,'Chtief Project Section 2B

/MkM Da'te Signed Division of Reactor'Proje, cts SUMMARY Scope: This routine inspection was conductea at the site in the areas of Licensee Action on Previous Enfoicement Matters, Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Observation, Plant Modification and Surveillance Observation, Startup from Refueling and Reportable Occurrences. An in office review of routine radioacitve effluent release reports was also performe Results: No violations or deviations were identifie .

0701090435 861231 PDR ADOCK 05000321 0 PDR

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• T. Beckham, Vice President, Plant Hatch H. C. Nix, Plant Manager

• D. Read, Plant Support Manager H. L. Sumner, Operations Manager B. McLeod, Maintenance Manager T. R. Powers, Engineering Manager R. W. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager C. Coggin, General Support Manager M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager

• 0. M. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance (QA) Manager (Acting)

C. T. Moore, Training Manager S. B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and office personne * Attended exit interview Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 19, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not identify Is proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

Licensee's action on previous enforcement matters that have been taken were determined to be acceptable by the inspector verifying the licensee's response with no discrepancies noted for the following:

(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-321/86-20-01 - Evaluation of Seismic Adequacy of Unit 1 Hydraulic Control Units (HCU's) in the As Found Condition. General Electric letter G-GPC-6-340 of September 16, 1986, states that the HCU's were found to be seismically qualified for the 40 year plant life with all the flat washers missing from the mounting bolt (Closed) Violation 50-321/86-20-02 - Hydraulic Control Units (HCU's) not installed in accordance with design drawings. GPC letter of September 19, 1986 and NRC response of November 20, 1986 were reviewed. The flat washers that were required by the design drawing are now installed even though the corrective action stated by GPC letter of September 19, 1986, was to delete the requirement for the flat washers from the drawin _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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2 Unresolved Item *

An unresolved item (URI) was opened concerning the apparent failure to verify the Unit-2 hydrogen recombiner instrumentation and control setpoint The URI is addressed in paragraph 8 of this repor . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operation Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on equipment, controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to limiting conditions for opera-tion, temporary alterations in effect, daily journals and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access control This inspection activity included. numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisors. Weekly, when on site, selected Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) systems were confirmed operable. The confirmation was made by verifying the following: accessible valve flow path alignment, power supply breaker and fuse status, instrumentation, major component leakage, lubrica-tion, cooling, and general conditio General plant tours were conducted on at least a biweekly basis. Portions of the control building, turbine building, reactor building, and outside areas were visited. Observations included safety related tagout verifica-tions, shif t turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general plant conditions, fire protection equipment, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security, problem identification systems, and containment isolatio Overall, the general housekeeping of the units was excellent. However, on December 18, 1986, an isolated case of poor housekeeping was found on the Unit-2 reactor building 185' elevation near valve 2G31-F091A. Equipment that was left from maintenance work (e.g., pipe stands, pipes, and band saw blades) was piled in the area corner on radwaste piping and on a sensing line for the reactor water cleanup system. Also, the maintenance utiliza-tion tag (MUT) to control the removal of equipment from this area (e.g.,

pipe stands, band saw blades, and ladder) had expired on December 5, 198 * An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.

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In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital access controls, searching of personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols and compensatory post From December 8 to December 12, 1986, the Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER) team was on site. The progress of that assessment was followed by the resident inspector staf The results of that assessment were discussed by the RER team in an exit interview with the licensee on December 12, 198 No violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance Observation (62703)

During the report per'od, the inspectors observed selected maintenance activities. The observations included a review of the work documents for adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and adherence to the appropriate quality control No violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance Testing Observations (61726)

The inspectors observed the performance of selected surveillance The observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, conformance to Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances, removal from service and return to service of the system or components affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteri On December 18, 1986, the inspector observed that the core spray (CS)

monthly surveillance procedure, 2E21-SUV-001-2, Revision 2, was being performed with an expired senior reactor operator (SRO) change. This SR0 change, #86-309, which had raised the lower acceptance criterion for the CS discharge pressure from 40 psig to greater than or equal 45 psig in Attachment 1, Step 7.8, had expired on December 5, 1986. The inspector informed the operator, who was performing the surveillance in the control room, of this discrepanc The operator stopped and submitted this procedure for a SR0 review. No regulatory action was taken because the step change had not yet been performe No violations or deviations were identifie ( .

8. ESF System Walkdown (71710) i The inspectors routinely conduct partial walkdowns of ESF systems. Valve and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions are randomly verified both locally and in the control room to verify that the lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment material conditions were satisfactory. The Unit-2 hydrogen recombiner system was walked down in detail and resulted in the following unresolved items: There appeared to be no procedurally established verification of the hydrogen recombiner high temperature trouble alarm setpoints for the heater wall and for the reactor chamber shell. Other setpoints were unable to be verified within the inspection perio These setpoint verifications are required by Technical Specifica-tion 4.6.6.2. Of the 17 temperature switches, pressure switches, millivolt to current (MV/I) transmitters, and current to current (I/I)

transmitters (e.g. , 2T49-K604A, -K604B, etc.) for each hydrogen recombiner train, only one train "A" temperature switch, 2T49-K603A, was within its 5 year calibration frequenc The other 33 switches and transmitters were last calibrated in 197 The primary containment hydrogen recombiner system functional test heatup to 1,200 F, procedure 57CP-T49-001-2, Revision 0, did not establish:

(1) a setpoint criterion for the switches referenced in Step G.12; and (2) an expected output tolerance criterion for MV/Is in the data package on page 3 of The Unit-2 hydrogen recombiner items that are discussed above are considered as an unresolved item (50-366/86-40-01).

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700)

A number of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriat Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical Specifications were being met and the public health and safety were of utmost considera-tion. The following LERs are closed:

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Unit-1: 86-17 (This event was cited as violation 86-12-01 and the corrective action is being tracked under that violation.), 86-24, 86-27, 86-28, 86-33, 86-34 and 86-37 Unit-2: 86-03, 86-05, 86-08, 86-12, 86-17, 86-18, 86-21, 86-26, 86-27, 86-29, 86-30 and 86-3 . Spill From Refueling Pool On December 3, 1986 an augmented inspection team (AIT), including the Hatch resident inspectors, was dispatched to the site in response to a leak from the fuel storage pool (s) to the environment. The details of this team inspection are the subject of Inspection Report 50-321, 366/86-4 . Report of an Unanalyzed Condition (93702)

On December 16, 1986, at 8:44 (EST), the licensee made a 10 CFR 50.72(b)(ii)(A) one hour red telephone call to report an unanalyzed condi-tion concerning the fuel pool draining that would significantly compromise plant safety. It was found by the licensee that there was no analysis for the highly radioactive spent control rod blades stored under water in the fuel pool above the top of the fuel rack The 17 spent control blades currently stored on short, approximately 8 ft., hangers along the sides of the Unit-1 and Unit-2 spent fuel pools would have their guide rollers exposed, if the fuel pool water level dropped approximately 8' below its typical level (226' elevation). The guide rollers on the top of each spent control rod blade were estimated to have a contact dose rate of between 8,000 and 10,000 Rem /hr, because of cobalt-6 The situation of draining the fuel pool water level through the transfer canal to expose the spent control rod guide rolls is presently not a credible accident, because both fuel transfer gates from the spent fuel pools to the transfer canal are in place and the inner and outer gate seals are supplied from different air sources. Also, the transfer canal seals are now supplied such that a single failure will not cause deflatio The licensee is currently reviewing the effects of uncovering the stored control rods to determine if this condition does constitute an unanalyzed condition or if this condition is bounded by a more severe analysis. The resolution of this question will be addressed in the report of the AIT inspection (Report 50-321,366/86-41).

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12. Reactor Startup After Refueling Outage (61707 and 71711)

During this reporting interval, the inspector verified that the Unit-2 shutdown margin demonstration for the unit startup was performed in accord-ance with procedure, 42FH-ENG-019-2S, Revision Also, inspector witnessed the performance of individual rod scram testing. The strip chart recordings that were obtained from this testing were reviewed using procedure 42FH-ENG-020-2S, Revision 1, to ensure Unit-2 Technical Specifications 3.1.3.2, 3.1.3.3, and 3.1.3.4 scram insertion time complianc . Effluents (84723, 84724)

Technical Specification 6.9.1.8 requires the licensee to submit within 60 days after January 1 and July 1 of each year, routine radioactive effluent release reports covering the operation of the unit during the previous six months of operation. The inspector reviewed the Semiannual Radiological Effluent Release Report for the period January 1, 1986 through June 30, 1986. The effluent release data summarized in the table below was obtained from current and previous Semiannual Effluent Release Reports:

Table - Effluent Release Summary of Hatch Units 1 and 2 Liquids (Curies)

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Year Activation Products Tritium 1984 1.33 E O 1.02 E+2 1985 7.44 E-1 5.74 E+1 1986 (1st half) 2.88 E-1 1.32 E+1 Gases (Curies)

Calendar Fission and Year Activation products Iodines Tritium 1984 1.26 E+4 1.01 E-1 3.32 E+1 1985 1.26 E+4 5.99 E-3 2.67 E+1 1986 (1st half) 1.33 E+4 1.22 E-2 1.15 E+1 In reviewing the report the inspector noted that zero values for nuclides were defined as "no radioactivity was present above detectable levels" and a reference table for typical lower limit of detection valves had been provide No violations or deviations identified.