ML20151L945
| ML20151L945 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 07/21/1988 |
| From: | Holmesray P, Menning J, Rogge J, Sinkule M, Trocine L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151L928 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-88-17, 50-366-88-17, NUDOCS 8808040195 | |
| Download: ML20151L945 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000321/1988017
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UNITED STATES
[. Sa EtG
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
'+9 *.* . . 4o
Report Nos.: 50-321/88-17 and 50-366/88-17
License'e:
Georgia Power Company
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P.O. Box 4545
Atlanta, GA 30302
Docket Nos.:
50-321 and 50-366
License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5
Facility Name: Hatch I and 2
Inspection Dates: May 21 - June 24, 1988
Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia
Inspectors:
M
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7-/4-ff
PeterHolmes-Ray, Senionesident Inspector
Date Signed
WZ CA L
7-20-rf
dokfrE. Menning, Senio M esident Inspector
Date Signed
WA 4
7-AA*W
Jo W Rogge Senior Res4Went Inspector
Date Signed
Plant Vogtle
W b
V*AC-Pf
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Letyh Trocine, Projest Engineer
Date Signed
Reactor Projects Section 3B
Accompanying Personnel:
RandallpMusser
Approved by:
d, h. o
a[I
PW-88
Marvin V. Sinkule, Chief, Project Section 3B
Date Signed
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas of
Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Observations, Surveillance Testing
Observations, ESF System Walkdowns, Radiological Protection, Physical Security,
Reportable Occurrences, Operating Reactor Events, and Licensee Action on
Previous Enforcement Matters.
Results: Two violations and one deviation were identified. Ona violation was
for failure to adequately establish and implement diesel generator building
ventilation system procedures, paragraph 2.
The second violation was for
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deficient operating procedures, paragraphs 9 and 10.
The deviation was. for
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failure to periodically test diesel generator building ventilation system
thermostats and dampers, paragraph 2.
esoso40195 880721
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ADOCK 0500
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
T. Beckham, Vice President-Plant Hatch
- C. Coggin, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
- D. Davis, Manager General Support
J. Fitzsimmons, Nuclear Security Manager
- P. Fornel, Maintenance Manager
- 0. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance Manager
- M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager
- H. Nix, Plant Manager
T. Powers, Engineering Manager
- D. Read, Plant Support Manager
- H. Sumner, Operations Manager
- S. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager
R. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
mechanics, security force members and office personnel.
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NRC Resident Inspectors
P. Holmes-Ray
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- J. Menning
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- R. Musser
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NRC management on site during inspection period:
V. Brownlee, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3, Region 11
M. Ernst, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region II
C. Julian, Chief, Operations Branch, Region II
G. Lainas, Assistant Director for Region II Reactors, NRR
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M. Shymlock, Chief, Operational Programs Section, Region II
M. Sinkule, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B, Region II
- Attended exit interview on June 10, 1988
- Attended exit interview on June 27, 1988
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- Attended both exit interviews
2.
Operational Safety Verification (71707) Units 1 and 2
The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall
plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant
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operations.
Daily discussions were held with plant management and various
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members of the plant operating staff.
The inspectors made frequent visits
to the control room, Observations included instrument readings, setpoints
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and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on
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equipment, controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to
limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily
journals and data sheet entries, control -room manning, and access
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controls. This inspection activity included numerous inforaal discussions
with operators and their supervisors.
Weekly, when on site, selected
Engineering Safety Feature -(ESF) systems were confirmed opercble.
The
confirmation was made by verifying the following:
accessible valve flow
path alignment, power supply breaker and fuse status, instrumentation,
major component leakage, lubrication, cooling, and general condition.
General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basis. Portions
of the control. building, turbine building, reactor building, and outside
areas were visited.
Observations included general plant / equipment
conditions, safety related tagout verifications, shift turnover, sampling
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program, housekeeping and general plant conditions, fire protection
equipment, control of activities in progress, radiation protection
controls, physical security, problem identification systems, missile
hazards,. instrumentation and alarms in the control room, and containment
isolation,
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At start of this reporting period, Unit I remained shutdown pending the
repair of a crack in the discharge piping of Reactor Water Cleanup System
pump
"A".
Restart of Unit 1 commenced at 1125 on May 25,1988.
Criticality was attained at 1214 and the reactor mode switch was placed in
RUN at 2345 on that day.
The Unit 1 turbine generator was synchronized
with to the grid at 0812 on May 26,1988.
Rated power was attained at
1600 on May 28, 1988.
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At the start of this reporting period, Unit 2 was being maintained
critical with reactor vessel pressure at 350 psig pending the completion
of repairs to feedwater injection valve 2N21-F0068.
The repairs were
completed and reactor heatup via control rod withdrawals started at 1030
on May 22, 1988.
The reactor mode switch was placed in RUN at 2135 on
that day.
The Unit 2 turbine generator was synchronized with the grid at
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1137 on May 23, 1988.
A turbine trip subsequently occurred at-1159.
The
Unit was operating at 22 percent power at that time.
Since the Unit was
operating below 30 percent power, the turbine trip did not cause a reactor
The turbine trip resulted from a Moisture Separator Reheater
"A"
hotwell high level condition.
Subsequent investigation by the licensee
did not conclusively reveal the cause of the hotwell high level condition.
The Unit 2 turbine generator was retied with the grid at 1458 on May 23,
1988.
At 0504 on May 27, 1988, Unit 2 automatically scrammed from approximately
98 percent power while the
"B" condensate pump was being filled and
vented.
This scram is discussed in paragraph 9.
Reactor startup
commenced at 0330 on May 28, 1988, and criticality was achieved at 0845 on
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that day.
During the subsequent approach to rated power, Unit 2
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automatically scrammed from approximately 47 percent power.
This scram
occurred at 1102 on May 29, 1988, during the performance of -turbine control
valve surveillance testing.
This scram is also discussed in paragraph 9.
Reactor startup commenced at 2146 on May 29, 1988, and the Unit 2 reactor
was again critical at 0009 on May 30, 1988. At 0622 on May 31,-1988, the
turbine- generator was synchronized with the grid.
Synchronization
occurred with the No. -3 main turbine stop valve closed.
Personnel were
then unable to open this valve - or identify the cause of .the
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malfunctioning.
The turbine generator was disconnected from the grid at
1545 on that day for trouble shooting.
The reactor remained critical
during the trouble shooting period._ The licensee subsequently found that
the'No. 3 main turbine stop valve would not open due to a flow blockage.
A metal particle was removed from an -inlet orifice to the solenoid
operated test valve for-the main- turbine stop valve.
At 1131 on June 1,
1988, the Unit 2 moda switch was placed in RUN.
The turbine generator was
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synchronized with the grid at 1928 on that day.
Unit 2 achieved rated
power at 0140 on June 3, 1988.
As reported previously in Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/88-14 and
50-366/88-14, the licensee began their effort to determine the source of
the Unit 1 spent fuel pool liner leak.
The licensee has performed
underwater video camera inspections of a portion of the accessible
surfaces of the pool liner, vacuumed various areas on the liner bottom
surface, and injected dye over possible leak . locations.
Additionally, a
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flow meter has been installed to provide a positive means of monitoring
fuel pool leakage.
The leakage flow rate has been determined to be
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4.7 gallons per minute.
At this point in time, the licensee has been
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unable to determine the source of the spent fuel pool liner leak.
The
licensee plans to continue efforts to locate the leak with the use of
acoustic monitoring, further vacuuming, and visual ' inspection.
The
inspector will continue to monitor the licensee's progress in locating and
repairing the source of the spent fuel pool liner leakage.
During a routine t'our of the diesel generator building on June 8,1988,
the inspector identified several differences between rooms in air-intake
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louver positions, exhaust fan switch positions, and thermostat settings
associated with the building ventilation system.
The diesel' generator
building ventilation system contains the following subsystems in separate
rooms:
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Rooms IC, 1B, 1A, 2C, and 2A
Diesel generator rooms heating and ventilating systems
Battery rooms ventilation systems
011 storage rooms ventilation systems
Rotms 1G, 1F, IE, 2G, 2F, and 2E
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Switchgear rooms heatina and ventilation systems
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These systems are described in Section 9.4.5 of the Unit 2 Final Safety
Analysis Report (FSAR).
The diesel generator building heating and
ventilation is designed:
to be operable from either normal or emergency power supply systems.
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to perform the intended functions before, during, and after a design
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basis earthquake, and
to provide temperature and air movement control to support optimum
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diesel generator operation.
The inspector conducted a compliance based inspection of the diesel
building ventilation system.
The problems identified are detailed in the
paragraphs that follow.
A.
Diesel generator building tour.
The following items were identified in the tour of the building:
(1) Loose nuts on air louver linkage arms for louvers X41-C005C,
X41-C0058, X41-C005A, X41-C013B, and X41-C013A.
(2) Different thermostat settings for the diesel generator room
exhaust fans.
These thermostats were labeled with a caution
stating,
"Char,ging the setpoint of thermostat' will effect
diesel generator operability."
Two different types of
thermostats were used.
One type has a single setting and the
other a high and low setting.
The settings found are listed
below:
X41-N004C
High - 78 F
Low - 48 F
X41 N004B
High - 78'F
Low - 78'F
X41-N004A
High - 78 F
Low - 70*F
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X41-N011B
Single Setting
66*F
X41-N011A
Single Setting
78'F
Likewise, the room heaters thermostat settings are listed:
X41-N007H
High - 78*F
Low - Offscale
X41-N007E
High - 75 F
Low - Offscale
X41-N007B
High - 80 F
Low - 50*F
X41-N009E
Single Setting
41"F
X41-N009B
Single Setting
75 F
The design data on plant drawing H-12619, Rev. 5,
listed
figure 9.4-7 in the FSAR which gave the following settings:
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Exhaust fans
On - 87'F
Off - 83*F
Heaters
On - 43'F
Off - 47 F
There appeared to be no correlation for the various settings.
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(3) Failed or partially failed air-inlet louvers.
in each switchgear room is a two-section, wall-mounted,
air-inlet damper which operates with the exhaust fan for cooling
the room.
In rooms 1E (louver X41-C007A) and 2F (louver
X41-C015B), one section of the louvers was found to be failed
shut.
In room 2E (louver X41-C015A), one section was partially
shut.
(4) Missing junction box cover
A missing junction box cover was found in switchgear room 2G at
room penetration 2T43-H509B. The licensee replaced the missing
Cover.
(5) Drawing discrepancy
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram H-12619, Rev
5, "Diesel
Generator Building Ventilation System," showed two thermostat
switches in switchgear rooms 1E, 2G, 2F, and 2E for the exhaust
fans but only one switch was actually in the room. The licensee
initiated a drawing change to correct this item.
The inspectors
will verify completion of this corrective action.
(6) Exhaust Fan Alignment
Each of the rooms has two exhaust fans with the hand switch
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aligned for one fan in the RUN or PRIMARY position and the
other fan in the STANDBY position.
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Roth of the 1B diesel generator oil storage rooms fans were
found aligned to RUN and both to the 2C fans in STANDBY. Also,
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both of the 2C battery room exhaust fan hand switches were found
aligned to PRIMARY.
B.
Procedure review
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The inspector reviewed the diesel generator building ventilation
system procedures for Unit 1 (34S0-41-001-1N, Rev. 1, dated 5/16/88)
and Unit 2 (34S0-X41-001-2, Rev. 2, deted 9/6/85).
The inspector
noted the Unit 2 procedure was designated as safety-related and the
Unit 1 procedure was not.
Also, the exhaust fan alignment in the procedures required the fans
switch alignment with one in RUN or PRIMARY and the other in STANDBY.
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The lineup of the IB diesel generator was covered in both procedures
since it is a swing diesel. The exhaust fan thermostat settings were
different. For the' Unit 2 procedure, the settings were:
X41-N004B
87 F
X41-N005B
85'F
but for the Unit 1 procedure, the settings were:
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X41-N004B
55'F
X41-N005B
55'F
Furthermore, none of the Unit 1 settings were in agreement with
design data referenced on drawing H-12619. Rev 5.
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Although the Unit 1 procedure was revised 5/16/88 and a change was in
typing for Unit 2,
none of the above procedure problems were
identified.
Accordingly, a violation will be issued against Technical Specifica-
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tion 6.8.1.a for not adequately establishing and implementing
procedures per Regulatory Guide 1.33 (321,366/88-17-01).
Three
examples will be given involving failure to have the Unit 1 procedure
classified as safety-related, procedure inadequacy, and failure to
have exhaust fan switches aligned per procedure .
The licensee initiated procedure changes to make both procedures
safety-related, did a switch alignment of the_ fans, and reviewed tae
thermostat settings.
C.
Testing Review
The inspector reviewed the testing requirements and found that the
Unit 2 FSAR Section 9.4.5.4, Tests and Inspections, states that all
components of the diesel generator building heating and ventilation
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system were preoperationally tested before placing the system in
service and have been periodically tested thereafter.
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Table 9.4-10, Diesel Generator Building Heating and Ventilation
System Failure Analysis, lists exhaust fans, heaters, and louvers as
components of the system and describes malfunctions of the system as
failure of the louver, heater or controls, and fans or controls.
However, on June 8,1988, the inspector found various thermostat
settings for like controls for the diesel generator room exhaust fans
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and heaters and switchgear room exhaust fans.
One section of a
two-section, wall-mounted, air-inlet louver to switchgear rooms 2G
and 2F was found to have failed in the shut position and one louver
section for room 2E was partially shut.
A review of the instrument
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calibration and surveillance test tracking master listing found that
the thermostat controls are not periodically tested. No instruction
could be found that checks the dampers ability to open. Accordingly,
a deviation will be issued against the FSAR Section 9.4.5.4.
(321,366/88-17-02).
The licensee initiated maintenance work to correct the failed
The thermostat . settings were reviewed, but due to
limitations of the thermostat, only a setting of 85'F could be
achieved when the design data required 87*F.
Likewise, where 43*F
was required.only 45'F could be achieved.- The licensee initiated a
review to change the settings to within the range of the thermostats,
possibly at 80 F and 50*F.
One violation with three examples and one deviation were identified.
3.
Maintenance Observations (62703) Units 1 and 2
During the report period, the inspectors observed selected maintenance
activities.
The observations included a review of the work documents for.
adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical
specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the
actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements,
and adherence to the appropriate quality controls.
The primary
maintenance observations during this month are summarized below:
Maintenance Activity
Date
1.
Investigation of erroneous high
06/01/88
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radiation alarms on reactor building
equipment drain sump discharge monitor
2D11-K626 per Maintenance Work Order
(MWO) 2-88-2733 (Unit 2)
2.
CheckofHighPressureCoolantInjection(HPCI)
06/10/88
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turbine stop valve hydraulic cylinder for
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leakage. Check of the HPCI auxiliary oil
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pump discharge pressure and inspection
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for oil leaks, pump cavitation, and vibration
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per 52PM-E41-003-2S and MWO 2-88-1945
(Unit 2)
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Installation of turbine flow indication and
06/10/88
totalization meter per MWO 1-88-2801 to
provide a means of monitoring the flow rate
of the fuel pool liner leak (Unit 1)
4.
Inspection and lubrication of the Reactor
06/24/88
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Building Exhaust System per 52PM-T41-001-0S
and MWO 1-88-1514 (Unit 1)
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During a review of MWO 1-88-1561, the inspectors observed that the HPCI
torus level transmitter (1E41-N0620) was noted to have a response time of
approximately 15-20 minutes.
(This level transmitter swaps the suction of
the HPCI pump from the condensate storage tank to the torus in the event
of high torus water level.)
The licensee replaced the transmitter,
calibrated it, but did not perform a time response test.
The inspector
questioned the licensee on this matter and the licensee has indicated that
.a time response test would be performed on the transmitter in order to
determine if the transmitter is capable of performing its intended
function in a timely manner.
The inspector will continue to monitor the
progress on the above manner.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Surveillance Testing Observations (61726) Units 1 and 2
The inspector observed the performance of selected surveillances.
The
observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy,
conformance to technical specifications, verification of test instrument
calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances,
removal from service and return to service of the system or components
affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the
acceptance criteria. The primary surveillance testing observations during
this month are suuriarized below:
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Surveillance Testina Activity
Da t_e_
1.
Turbine control valve fast closure
05/31/38
instrument functional test
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Procedure 34SV-C71-005-25 (perUnit2)
2.
06/08/88
operability test per Procedure
345V-E11-001-2S (Unit 2)
3.
ReactorCoreIsolationCooling(RCIC)
06/10/88
valve operability per Procedures
34SV-E51-001-IS and 42SP-050187-
OR-1-OS (Unit 1)
4.
High scram discharge volume instrument
06/24/88
functional test and calibration per
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Procedure 575V-C11-001-15 (Unit 1)
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
ESF System Walkdown (71710) Unit 1.
The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF systems. Valve
and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified
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both locally and in the control room to ensure that lineups were in
accordance with operability requirements and that equipment material
conditions were satisfactory.
The Unit 1 RCIC system was walked down in
detail.
During this walk down on June 3,1988, the -inspectors noted. that
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Master Parts List labels were missing from valves 1E51-F519 and F520 ' The
inspectors also noted that a pan under the barometric condenser was filled-
with parts from a flashlight and other debris.
These discrepancies were
brought to the attention of the Unit 1. shift supervisor.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Radiological Protection (71709) Units 1 and 2
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The resident inspectors reviewed aspects of the licensee's radiological
protection program in the ccurse of the monthly activities.
The
performance of health physics and'other personnel was observed on various
shifts to include:
involvement of health physics supervision, use of
radiation work permits, use of personnel monitoring equipment, control of
high radiation areas, use of friskers and personal contamination monitors,
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and posting and labeling.
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No violations or deviations were noted.
7.
Physical Security (71881) Units 1 and 2
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In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors included-
a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of
various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily
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activities to include: availability of supervision; availability of armed
response personnel; protected and vital access controls; ' searching of
personnel, packages, and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting
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of visitors; patrols; and compensatory posts.
No violations or deviations were noted.
8.
Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700) Units 1 and 2
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A number of Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed for potential
generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective
actions appeared appropriate.
Events which were reported immediately were
also reviewed as they occurred to determine that technical specifications
were being met and the public health and safety were of utmost
consideration.
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Unit 1: 86-22
Reactor Water Cleanup Primary Containment Isolations
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on High Temperature
This LER addresses a design deficiency ~ where the
Reactor Water Cleanup system isolates on'high room
temperature.
This isolation feature was-intended to-
sense a steam leak from the system and prevent a small-
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break loss of coolant accident.
In practice however',
tho room ambient temperature during the summer rises
to the setpoint level and unnecessary actuations -
occur. As a long term. corrective action, the licensee
proposed a higher actuation setpoint of 150 F.
Technical Specification Amendment #144.for Unit 1 and
- 89 for Unit 2 was issued.on August 10, 1987.
This
completes the required corrective action.
Review of
this LER is closed.
86-31
Fire Hose Station Surveillance Not Performed Oue to
Personnel Error
On July 28, 1986, the licensee determined that the
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monthly surveillance for fire hose stations was not
performed on July 8,1986, as required.
The missed
surveillance was performed satisfactorily on July 29,
1986.
Corrective action included a change of -
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scheduling
maintenance
technical- specification
surveillances. . These schedule changes were reviewed'
and discussed with personnel in maintenance planning.
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The inspector has no further questions regarding this
event. Review of this LER is closed.
86-39
Blown Fuses Make Control Room Environniental System
Inoperable For Automatic Functions
This LER describes an event where two fuses were found
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blown which would prevent the Main Control Room
Environmental Control system from switching to the
pressurization or isolation mode upon receipt of
chlorine gas detection.
Extensive engineering review
of the circuitry failed to identify a cause for-the
fuse failures.
As a result of industry experience
with inadvertent chlorine detection actuations, the
plant has removed the sour:e of chlorine gas from the
site.
A temporary system to inject liquid chlorine
has been installed.
By letter dated June 20, 1988,
the licensee requested a change to the Unit 1 and 2
technical specifications to eliminate the detectors
and actuation circuitry.
The inspector reviewed the
circuit drawings with the system engineer and
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determined that the configuration does not provide for
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power supply monitoring.
To compensate for this type
of. failure, operators would have to implement manual
actuation per annunciator response procedures.
Annunciator Response Procedure, 34AR-601-904-IS,
Rev.1, was verified to include steps directing '
verification that the proper alignment is achieved.
Review of this LER is closed.
87-04
Design Deficiency Could Affect Control
Room
Environmental Control System
On March 26, 1987, personnel discovered during a
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procedure review that if certain fuses were to fail,
then the respective dampers would fail open by design'
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This position is acceptable except for a chlorine gas
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release.
As discussed above (LER 50-321/86-22),the
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licensee has elected to remove chlorine gas from the
site. The inspector had no further questions.
Review
of this LER is closed.
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87-16
Procedure Inadequacy Results in False Chlorine Signal
Causing Control Room Isolation
On December 14, 1987, the Main Control Room
Environmental Control system went into the isolation
mode of operation as a result of a sensed high
chlorine signal.
Root Cause determination revealed
that the electolyte reservoir ran dry and a false high
signal
was
generated.
Procedure
57SV-241-003-1S, Rev. 2, was verified to ensure that
specific guidance on filling the reservoir has been
provided. Review of this LER is closed.
88-09
Lack of Procedural Clarification Results in Reactor
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The events of this LER have been cited as part of
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violation 321,366/88-17-03.
Since this matter will be
tracked with the violation, this LER is closed.
Unit 2: 88-17
Deficient Procedure Causes Loss of Feedwater Resulting
in Reactor Scram
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The events of this LER have been cited as part of
violation 321,366/88-17-03.
This matter will be
tracked with the violation, and the LER is closed.
88-18
Main Turbine Electohydraulic Control Fluid Pressure
Transient Results in Reactor Scram
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The events of this LER and the licensee's corrective
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action are discussed in paragraph 9.
Review of this
LER is closed.
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9.
Operating Reactor Events (93702) Unit 2
The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the below listed
reactor events.
The review included determination of cause, safety
significance, performance of personnel and systems, and corrective action.
The inspectors examined instrument recordings, computer printouts,
operations journal entries, and scram reports and also had discussions
with operations, maintenance, and engineering support personnel as
appropriate.
On May 27, 1988, Unit 2 automatically scrammed from approximately
98 percent of rated power.
At the time of this event, operations
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personnel were in the process of filling and venting condensate pump
An air bubble was apparently released into the condensate
system, and the condensate booster pumps and reactor feed pumps tripped on
low suction pressure.
The reactor scramed on low water level.
Reactor
vessel water level decreased to approximately 66 inches below instrument
zero during the transient.
Vessel water level was subsequently restored
due to injection via HPCI and Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) "B."
Although RCIC
initiated at reactor vessel water Level 2, it failed in inject into the
,
vessel.
Investigation revealed that the limit switch on RCIC valve
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2E51-F045 failed to function properly. The limit switch failed to pickup
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the relay that provides the ramp switch signal to the RCIC Woodward
Centroller.
This resulted in the Woodward Controller not responding to
speed demands.
The limit switch was subsequently replaced.
As previously mentioned, the Unit 2 scram on May 27, 1988, occurred as
operations personnel were filling and venting condensate pump 2N21-C001B
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prior to placing the pump in service. Low pressure condensate vent valve
2N21-F021B was initially opened to vent the suction side of the pump.
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Condensate pump suction valve 2N21-F001B was then partially opened to
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allow the piping and pump well to fill with water. When valve 2N21-F001B
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was opened, air inside the pump well and piping entered the comon suction
pipe for the three condensate pumps.
This event appears to have been
caused by a deficient condensate and feedwater system operating procedure.
Mere specifically, Procedure 3450-N21-007-25
"Condensate and Feedwater
System," did not provide instructions for filling and venting a condensate
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pump with the unit at power.
Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires
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that procedures recomended in Regulatory Guide 1.33
Rev.
2,
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February 1978, be established.
Section 4 of Regulatory Guide 1.33,
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Appendix A recomends procedures for operatier
v,
t:.e cundensate system.
This matter is considered a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a
and will be tracked as part of violation 321,366/88-17-03 - Deficient
Operating Procedures.
On May 29, 1988
Unit 2 automatically scrammed from approximately
.
47 percent of rated power.
At the time of this event, operations
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personnel were performing routine Turbine Control Valve (TCV)
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surveillances.
The No. 2 TCV had been closed, and the anticipated
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trip of Reactor Protection System (RPS) channel
"A" had been received.
Concurrently, RPS channel "B" tripped for nn apparent reason, resulting in
,
a full reactor scram.
The lowest reactor vessel water level reached
during the transient was approximately 8 inches below instrument zero.
Reactor vessel level was restored automatically via operation of RFP "B".
Investigation into this event revealed that a pressure transient in the
Electrohydraulic Control (EHC) system oil manifold most likely caused the
RPS to sense a false TCV closure in the "B" channel. More specifically,
the disc dump valve for TCV No. 2 probably did not reseat properly
resulting in a pressure fluctuation in the EHC supply manifold.
The
licensee has subsequently installed orifices on the relayed hydraulic
fluid trip system inlet to the fast acting solenoid valves in an effort to
reduce pressure transients in the EHC oil manifold header.
The licensee
has also scheduled repair work on the TCV disc dump valves during the next
refueling outage.
One violation was idencified.
10. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
(Closed) Unresolved Item * (URI) 321/88-14-03, Improper drywell pneumatic
system valve lineup which resulted in the automatic scram of Unit 1 on May
20, 1988.
Investigation has shown that this event was caused by a
deficiency in Procedure 34G0-0PS-001-1S, "Plant Startup." The startup
procedure did not specifically require that the swapping of drywell
pneumatic supply from instrument air to backup nitrogen be done in
accordance with Data Package 5 of Procedure 34S0-P70-001-IS, "Drywell
Pneumatic System." This matter is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a and will be tracked as part of violation 321,366/88-17-03 -
Deficient Operating Procedures.
11. Exit Interview (30703)
H
The inspection scope and findings were sumarized on June 10 and June 27,
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1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors
described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the findings listed
below.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material
provided to or reviewed by the inspector (s) during this inspection.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Item Number
Status
pescription/ReferenceParagraph
321,366/88-17-01
Opened
VIOLATION - Failure to Adequately
Establish and Implement Diesel
Generator Building Ventilation
System Procedures (paragraph 2)
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- An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required to
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determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
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4
VIOLATION 1 - Deficient Operatin
321,366/88-17-03
Opened
Procedures (paragraphs 9 and 10)g
321,366/88-17-02
0pened
DEVIATION - Failure to Periodi-
.cally Test Diesel
Generator
Building
Ventilation
System
Thermostats and Dampers (paragraph
2)
321/88-14-03
Closed
URI - Improper Drywell Pneumatic
System Valve Lineup (par 69raph 10)
Licensee management was- also informed that the LERs discussed in
pcragraph '
onsidered to be closed.
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