IR 05000321/1986025
| ML20215B116 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 09/19/1986 |
| From: | Holmesray P, Ignatonis A, Nejfelt G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215B079 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-86-25, 50-366-86-25, NUDOCS 8610060369 | |
| Download: ML20215B116 (5) | |
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ATL ANTA, CEORGI A 30323
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Report Numbers:
50-321/86-25 and 50-366/86-25 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P.O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Numbers:
50-321 and 50-366 License Numbers: OPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name:
Hatch 1 and 2 Inspection Dates: August 1-29, 1986 Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia Inspectors:
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<n4 M6 9// 9/M Peter Holmes" Ray, Senjor Resident Inspector Da~te Signed
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d'O.c/L,dmL q hv/T4 Gregory M. N6] felt, Resident Inspector Date Signed Accompanied by:
George W. Rivenbark, Licensing Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Approved by:
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,,w a A. J. Ignatchis, Chief /,j' Project Section 38, Date Si'gned
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Division of Reactor Pro ects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas of licensee action on previous enforcement matters, operational safety verification, maintenance observation, plant modification and surveillance observation, reportable occurrences, and general employee training.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees H.C. Nix, Site General Manager
- T. Greene, Deputy Site General Manager
- H.L. Sumner, Operations Manager
- T. Seitz, Maintenance Manager
- T.R. Powers, Engineering Manager R.W. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
- 0.M. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance (QA) Marager (Acting)
C.T. Moore, Training Manager
- S.B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 2, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. An Unresolved Item * (URI) was opened concerning the incorrect positioning of the Unit 1 Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system dampers that take a suction from the refueling floor.
The actual and indicated positions for these SBGT dampers were opposite.
The UR1 is addressed in paragraph 4 of this report.
The licensee acknowledged the finding and took no exception.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-321/85-25-01 Improper assembly of refueling floor to Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System suction valves.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
(0 pen) Violation 50-366/86-15-02, Failure to recognize an inoperable hydraulic snubber.
The corrective actions for this violation in the licensee's response of July 30, 1986, were found to be inconsistent by the inspector. The procedures that were stated to be revised, as the result of the violation, were not revised (i.e., 40AC-REG-001-0S, Revision 2, and 43RC-CPL-001-0S, 'Revi sion 0).
It was determined by the licensee that a sentence was omitted in the violation response, which would have connected the revisions cited to a previously completed licensee's QA audit finding,
- An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviatio _ _ _ _
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85-SURV-1/90, rather than to the violation.
The corrective action of revising the visual inspection of hydraulic snubber procedure, 52SV-SUV-001-2S, Revision 0, has not been completed, but its revision was verified as being in process, in accordance with 10AC-MGR-005-0S, Revision 1.
The licensee has committed to forward a revised response to correct their initial response. This item remains open pending receipt and acceptance of the revised response.
4.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.
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Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits to the control i
room. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on equipment, controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily journals and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access controls.
This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisors.
Weekly, when on site, selected Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) systems were confirmed operable.
The confirmation was made by verify *ng the following: accessible valve flow path alignment, power supply
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breaker and fuse status, instrumentation, major component leakage, lubrication, cooling, and general condition of equipment.
On August 26, 1986, the Unit I drywell was being vented and the refueling floor to SBGT system damper (IT41-F040A or B) was repositioned from
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indicated open to indicated shut to determine if sufficient system air flow j
could be maintained with the damper shut. The expected reduction in flow did j
not occur. Further investigation found that the indication for the dampers
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was reversed from the actual damper position.
It also appears that the dampers would respond in reverse to automatic signals. During the finding, the floor hatches were installed on the refueling floor, thereby separating the reactor building from the refueling area and no longer maintaining a common volume; however, these hatches are normally removed and are allowed
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by the Technical Specifications to be in that status.
The technical significance of this configuration (hatches in, Unit 1 dampers closed) is unresolved in that it is not known if adequate negative pressure could be attained in the refueling area by the Unit 2 SGTS following a postulated LOCA in either unit or a fuel handlino accident in the refueling area. The licensee needs to perform the evaluation. Secondly, the length of time that Unit I was operated *in this configuration is also unresolved. This item is an Unresolved Item 50-321/86-25-01.
General plant tours were conducted on at least a biweekly basis. Portions of the control building, turbine building, reactor building, and outside areas were visited.
Observations included safety related tagout
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verifications, shift turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general plant conditions, fire protection equipment, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security, problem
identification systems, and containment isolation.
In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program.
The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital access controls, searching of personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols and compensatory posts.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
i During the report period, the inspectors observed selected maintenance activities. The observations included a review of the work documents for adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to Technical Specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the
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actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and adherence to the appropriate quality controls.
Unit 2 main circulating pump 2B suffered a bearing failure which required
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the unit to be operated at reduced power until repairs could be completed.
The cause of the bearing failure was loss of oil due to a small diameter
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pipe break between the sight glass and the bearing cap. There had been a leak requiring addition of oil for two days prior to the pipe failure.
Damage to the equipment included the bearing, the bearing cap and the pump shaft. Upon reassembly and initial run of the pump the lower guide bearing
of the motor failed.
The licensee had taken oil samples from this bearing and analysis had shown no abnormalities. Total down time for the pump was l
from 7-23-86 to 8-29-86. The senior resident inspector followed the repair of this pump.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Plant Modification and Surveillance Testing Observations (37700-& 61726)
i The inspectors observed the performance of selected surveillances and plant modification Design Change Requests (DCRs).
The observation included a review of the procedure and/or DCR for technical adequacy, conformance to Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances, removal from service and return to service of the system or components affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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ESF System Walkdown (71710)
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The inspectors routinely conduct partial walkdowns of ESF systems. Valve and i
breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both j
locally and in the control room to verify that the lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment material conditions were satisfactory.
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Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
General Employee Training i
i The licensee's two and half day general employee training (GET) was attended
by the Licensing Project Manager. He found that the level of detail and time allocated for instruction on each of the major topics - plant
emergency, security, and radiological safety - was appropriate.
l The instructor's presentation for each subject was well prepared, forceful, and interesting. Each of the major areas of instruction was followed by a written examination requiring a minimum grade of 70 percent to pass.
The GET was recently accredited by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
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(INPO).
No violations or deviations were identified.
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