IR 05000321/1986029
| ML20214P776 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 11/21/1986 |
| From: | Cunningham A, Decker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214P768 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-86-29, 50-366-86-29, NUDOCS 8612040359 | |
| Download: ML20214P776 (21) | |
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UNITE'J STATES i
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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N0y 2 51986 i
Report Nos.: 50-321/86-29 and 50-366/86-29 Licensee:' Georgia Power Company P. 0.. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.: NPF-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name: Hatcl.
Inspection Ccnduct d:
tober 21-24,1986 -
Inspector:-
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/ B4 A. L. Cunningham
'Date' Signed
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Accompanying Personnel: :A. Gooden
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Approved by: b
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T.x R. Decker, Section Chief
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' Division of Radiation: Safety and Safeguards
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SUMMARY-
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Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved evaluation of the licensee's annual radiological emergency preparedness exercise.
Results: Of the areas evaluated, no violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. T. Beckham, Vice President-Nuclear
- H. Nix, Plant Manager
- A. Fraser, Acting QA Site Manager
- L. Hill, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness lianager
- T. Moore, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager (Site)
- E. Collins, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- S. Tripp, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance
- D. F. Moore, Nuclear Training Coordinator (Corporate)
- R. Reddick, Senior Emergency Preparedness Methods / Training Specialist
- J. C. Lewis, Operations Superintendent
- R. W. Zavadoski, Manager, Health Physics and Chemistry
- D. S. Read, Plant Support Manager
- C. L. McDaniel, Administrative Manager
- T. Powers, Manager - Engineering
- R. K. Moxley, Acting Quality Assurance Audit Supervisor
- T. L. Elton, Plant Engineering Supervisor Other Organizations
- C. S. Anderson, Emergency Preparedness Consultant (Paragon Technical)
- J. W. Huffham, Emergency Preparedness Consultant (Impell)
NRC Resident Inspectors
- P. Holmes-Ray
- G.
Nejfelt
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 24, 1986, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas evaluated, and discussed in detail the inspection findings defined herein.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Closed) Violation 50-321/85-23-02, 50-366/85-23-02:
On-Shift Operations Supervisors not adequately trained in making protective action recommenda-tions. Review and detailed discussion of site quality assurance records and
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respective training histories of Shift Operations Supervisors regarding.the
' subject item confirmed adequacy of required training.
'(Closed) Violation 50-321/85-23-04,~50-366/85-23-04:
Failure to conduct an independent audit of Emergency Preparedness Program to include evaluation of
' interface with State and local governments.
Review of the licensee's Quality Assurance - Audit Report 86-24, dated September 15,-1986, verified that the above cited item was evaluated as required.
(0 pen) Violation 50-321/86-07-02, 50-366/86-07-02:
Emergency Plan.Imple-menting Procedure 63-EP-EIP-078-05 not implemented as required.
Inspection of qua'ity assurance records disclosed that final QA review of the subject violation was not yet completed.
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Unresolved Items
(Closed) 50-321/85-23-06,50-366/85-23-06: Radiation monitoring instruments at offsite medical support facility overdue for calibration.
Review of site qualdty assurance records verified that the subject instruments were calibrated as required.
Scheduled calibrations have ;been projected to assure that-the instruments will be available for use when necessary.
5.
ExerciseScenario(82301)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements defined in the licensee's emergency plan and organiza-tion pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E 'to 10 CFR 50,'and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise-date and discussed in detail with licensee representatives on several occasions.
While no major scenario problems were identified, several inconsistencies became apparent during the exercise.
The inconsistencies, however, failed to detract from the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organization.
The scenario developed for this exercise was detailed, and fully exercised the onsite emergency organization.
The scenario provided sufficient information to the State, counties, local government and federal agencies consistent with their participation in the exercise.
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The' licensee demonstrated a significant commitment to training and personnel through the use of controllers, evaluators, and specialists participating in the exercise.
The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the exercise.
The inspectors observed neither prompting nor undue interaction between controllers and players.
The scope and objectives of the exercise were fully satisfied.
No violations or deviations were identifie _-
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Drill Scenario (82301)
The scenario for the medical emergency drill was reviewed to assure that
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provisions were made to-test specific functions in the licensee's emergency
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plan pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to j-10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.
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The scenario developed for the medical emergency drill was explicit, and
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adequately exercised the participating licensee organization and offsite i
support agencies. The scenario provided sufficient information to the. local
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support agencies consistent with the scope of their participation in the
drill.
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The licensee and offsite support organizations demonstrated a significant
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commitment to training and personnel by use of controllers, evaluators, and
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specialists participating in the drill.
The controllers provided adequate i
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i guidance throughout the drill.
Neither prompting nor undue interaction between controllers and players was observed.
NRC evaluation of the medical drill was confined to the onsite phase,
including observation of the offsite support ambulance staff's preparation i
of the injured person for transport to the receiving hospital.
Acceptable medical, health physics, and contamination control practices were observed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency
response by the licensee were specifically established, and that adequate staff was available to ' respond to an emergency pursuant to
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10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific
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guidance promulgated in Section II.A of NUREG-0654.
I The-inspectors observed that specific emergency assignments were made for i
the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff was i
available to respond to the simulated emergency.
The initial response
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organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives; however, c
l because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not required.
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sions with licensee representatives and detailed review of the site
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Radiological Emergency Plan indicated that a sufficient number of trained technical personnel was available for continuous staffing of the augmented
emergency organization, if needed, i
The inspectors also observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the Technical Support Center ((TSC), Operations
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Support Center (OSC), and Emergency Operations Facility EOF).
Required
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i staffing and assignment of responsibility were consistent with the
licensee's Emergency Plan and approved Implementing Procedures.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's site emergency organization was observed to assure that-the following requirements were implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),
Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654:
(1) unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response; (2) provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times; (3) specification of onsite and offsite support organizational interactions.
The inspectors observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined and that staff was available to fill key functional positions within the organization.
Augmentation of the initial emergency response organization was accomplished through use of on-shif t personnel.
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An assigned Shift Supervisor assumed the duties of Emergency Coordinator promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by the Station Manager.
Required interactions between the licensee's emergency response organization and State and local support agencies were considered adequate and consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to assure that the following arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources were made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3); Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and guidance promulgated in Section II.C of NUREG-0654, namely:
(1) accommodation of selected State emergency response representatives at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility; and (2) identification of organizations capable of augmenting the planned response.
Licensee contact with offsite organizations was prompt, effective, and consistent with the scope of the exercise.
Assistance resources from offsite support organizations were limited to ambulance services and hospital facilities.
Response of the subject organizations was prompt and indicative of effective emergency response training.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Eraergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, specific
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guidance promulgated in Section I.D of NUREG-0654, and guidance recommended in IE Information Notice 83-28.
An Emergency Action Level matrix was used to promptly identify and properly classify an emergency and escalate same to more severe emergency classifica-tions as the simulated accident sequence progressed.
Licensee actions in this area were timely and effective.
Observations confirmed that the emergency classification system. was effectively used and was consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan and approved Implementing Procedures.
The system was observed to be adequate for classification of the simulated accident sequences.
The emergency procedures provided for initial and continuing mitigating actions throughout the simulated emergency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. NotificationMethodsandProcedures(82301)
This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations were established. This area was further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-0654.
An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were established and available fcr use in providing information regarding the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organizations, if required. Notification of the State of Georgia, and other designated offsite response organizations was completed within 15 minutes following declaration of each emergency classification.
Telephone notification of the State of Georgia, and local response organi-zations was promptly followed by transmission of hard copies of the respective notification.
Such copies included prevailing meteorological information, average release rate (source terms in uCi/sec) where appli-cable, site boundary integrated dose projections, and recommended protective actions when necessary.
Offsite organizations were periodically updated in a manner consistent with the plan and approved implementing procedures.
12. Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt communica-tions among principal response organizations and emergency personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.F of NUREG-065 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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The inspector observed communications within and between the licensee's emergency response facilities (Control Room, TSC, OSC, and EOF), the licensee and offsite agencies, and the offsite environmental monitoring teams and the E0F.
The inspectors also observed information flow among the various groups within the licensee's emergency organization.
Emergency comunications were adequate and consistent with the scope of the exercise and emergency response requirements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13. Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
These areas were observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.H of NUREG-0654.
The inspector observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency response facilities, and observed the use of equipment therein.
Emergency response facilities used by the licensee during the exercise included the Control Room (CR) Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (E0F).
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Control Room - Use of Unit 1 Control Room was supplemented by the near-site reactor simulator throughout the exercise.
The inspector observed that following review and analysis of the accident sequence, Control Room operations personnel acted promptly to initiate required responses to the simulated emergency.
Emergency procedures were readily available, routinely followed, and factored into accident assessment and mitigation exercises.
Control Room personnel involvement was essentially limited to those
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personnel assigned routine and special operational duties.
Effective management of personnel gaining access to the Control Room precluded overcrowding, and maintained an ambient noise level required for orderly conduct of operations under emergency conditions.
The Shift Supervisor and the Control Room operators were cognizant of their duties, responsibilities, and authorities.
These personnel demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification system and the proficient use of specific procedures to determine and declare the proper emergency classification.
It was observed that data and information provided during the course of the exercise sequence were readily accommodated by the Shift Supervisor and the Control Room staff in implementing appropriate responses in a timely manner.
The Control Room staff demonstrated the capability to effectively assess the initial conditions and implement required mitigating actions.
It was noted that a bound log of the facility Emergency Coordinator's activities was maintained during the exercis.
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Tecnnical Support Center (TSC) - The TSC was activated and promptly staffed following notification by the Shift Supervisor of the simulated emergency conditions leading to the Alert classification. The facility staff appeared to be cognizant of their duties, authorities, and responsibilities.
Required operation of the facility proceeded in an orderly manner.
The TSC was provided with adequate equipment for support of the assigned staff.
TSC security was promptly established and maintained.
Security maintained a log or otherwise accounted for all personnel entering and exiting the facility.
During operation of the TSC, radiological habitability was routinely monitored and documented, and personnel dosimetry was distributed as required.
Status boards and related visual aids were strategically located to facilitate viewing by the TSC staff.
Dedicated communi-cators were assigned to the facility and all requirad notifications were promptly implemented.
Inspection disclosed the following additional findings, namely:
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engineering, maintenance, and other technical support functions were readily implemented and factored into problem solving exercises; (2)
assumption of duties by the Emergency Director was definite and firm; (3) transfer of certain emergency responsibilities from the TSC to the
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EOF was firmly declared and announced to the TSC staff; (4) briefings of the TSC staff were frequent, and consistent with changes in plant status and related emergency conditions; (5) accountability, including identifying missing personnel, was readily implemented within the accepted time regime and was consistent with the scenario scope.
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Operations Support Center (OSC) - The OSC was promptly staffed following activation of the emergency plan by the Emergency Coordi-nator.
An inspector observed that teams were promptly assembled,
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briefed, an1 dispatched.
A health physics technician accompanied each team.
The OSC Supervisor appeared to be cognizant of his duties and responsibilities.
During operation of this facility, radiological habitability was routinely monitored and documented.
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Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) - The EOF is located in the licensee's Simulator Building immediately outside the protected area of the plant.
The facility was adequately staffed and equipped to support the required emergency response consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise.
EOF security was promptly established and was included as a routine requirement for preparation and activation of the facility.
Status boards and other related visual aids were strategically located and readily accessible for viewing by the EOF staff.
Dedicated communicators were assigned to the facility, and all required notifications were promptly made.
J The Emergency Director frequently consulted the E0F technical support staff.
l The Emergency Director frequently updated the staff on plant status and
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planned mitigating actions.
An acceptable ambient noise level was main-tained throughout the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
14. AccidentAssessment(82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systeias, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequ-er.ces of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.I of NUREG-0654.
The accident assessment program, included an engineering assessment of plant status, and an assessment of radiological hazards to onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident. During the exercise, the engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing plant status to provide recommendations to the Emergency Director concerning mitigating actions required to reduce damage to plant systems and equipment, prevention and/or control of radioactive releases, and prompt tern.ination of the emergency condition.
Radiological assessment activities involved several groups.
An inplant group was effective in projecting the radiological impact within the plant based upon inplant monitoring and onsite measurements. Offsite radiological raonitoring teams were dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the plume.
Radiological effluent data was received in the E0F.
The EOF dose calculations were computed and compared on a timely basis with results received from the TSC and offsite monitoring groups.
The licensee's dose assessment group was prepared to freely interact with assigned State dose assessment specialists if required.
Accordingly dose assessments and projections would be compared with State da ta.
The scope of the exercise, however, did not include State participa-tion.
Field monitoring teams were not evaluated by the NRC; however, EOF coninunications with and coordination of field teams were evaluated.
Inter-communications between these entities was effective. E0F coordination of the team regarding projected path of the postulated plume was effective.
No violations or deviations were identified.
15. ProtectiveResponse(82301)
This area was observed to determine that guidelines established for protective actions consistent with federal guidance, were developed and in place, and that protective actions for emergency workers including evacua-tion of non-essential personnel, are promptly impicmented pursuant to 10CFR50.47(b)(10) and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654,Section II.J.
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The protective measures decision making process -was observed by the inspectors.
For each emergency classification defined, appropriate inplant and offsite protective measures were reviewed.
Protective measures recommendations were consistent with the limited scale and scope of the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
16. Radiological Exposure Control (82301)
This area was observed to determine that methods for contn lling radiolo-gical exposures in an emergency were established and implemented for emergency workers, and that these methods included exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11), and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.K of NUREG-0654.
An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled throughout the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergen:y workers, and conducting periodic radiological surveys in the emergency response facili-ties. Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of emergency actions.
Adequate protective clothing and respiratory protection was available for use as required.
Health Physics control of radiation exposure, contamination control, and radiation area access appeared adequate.
Health Physics Supervisors were observed to thoroughly brief survey teams prior to their deployment.
Dosimetry was available and was used.
High range dosimeters were also available in case they were needed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
17. Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13),
Paragraph IV.H of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and the specific guidance promulgated in Section II.M of NUREG-0654.
Information, consistent with the scale and scope of tne exercise, was provided to the nedia and the public in advance of the exercise.
The infonnation included details on how the public would be notified and the initial actions which should be taken in the event of an emergency.
No vioiations or deviations were identified.
18.
Recovery Planing (82301)
This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements.o 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13),
Paragraph IV.H of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and the :.pecific guidance promulgated in Section II.M of NUREG-065 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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The licensee conducted a recovery planning meeting prior to termination of
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Licensee planners discussed and established the following:
administrative and. logistical support, manpower and engineering services; radiological surveillance; deve'opment and assignment of a recovery organization consistent with the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures.
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A comprehensive review of reentry plans and status was conducted.
No violations or deviations were identified.
19. Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that shortcomings identified as part of the exercise, were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.
The inspectors observed the licensee's Controller / Evaluator critique-following tennination of the exercise.
The subject critique involved a detailed discussion and analysis of required improvements and weaknesses identified during the exercise.
The licent,ee identified a total of 16 such findings. All findings were documented for review and correction. Positive and negative findings were discussed and recorded for. presentation during the formal NRC/ Licensee Critique.
The critique was effectively managed, controlled, and directed to identification / documentation of substantive findings and indicated improvements.
The conduct and content of the cited critiques were consistent with regulatory requirements and guidance cited above.
No violations or deviations were identified.
20.
InspectorFollowup(92701)
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-321/85-23-01, 50-366/85-25-01:
Failure to properly classify exercise simulated emergencies. Evaluation of the subject exercise confirmed that the licensee demonstrated the ability to promptly and correctly classify the emergencies consistent with the scenario.
(Closed)
IFI 50-321/85-25-02, 50-366/85-25-02:
Failure to comunicate pertinent emergency information among the emergency response facilities.
Inter-emergency response facilities comunications was effective throughout the exercise.
All pertinent emergency information was communicated between the facilities as required.
(0 pen) IFI 50-321/85-25-03, 50-366/85-25-03:
Improvements to public information program to be demonstrated in 1986 Hatch Exercise. The licensee was granted an extension of the subject demonstration to 198.
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(Closed) IFI 50-321/85-25-04, 50-366/85-25-04:
Use of uncontrolled emergency procedures.
Evaluation of the subject exercise disclosed that controlled procedures were used in the Control Room and all emergency response facilities.
n (Closed)IFI 50-321/85-25-05, 50-366/85-25-05:
TSC exhibited difficulty in communicating initiating conditions and EALs to offsite authorities and appeared to do same without release approval. During the subject exercise, particular emphasis was directed toward evaluation of communications with offsite organizations regarding alert and Site Area Emergency classifications and initial and followup communications consistent with the exercise scenario.
Evaluation findings disclosed that licensee communications with offsite organizations were consistent with the emergency plan and implementing procedures.
(Closed)IFI 50-321/86-07-01,50-366/86-07-01:
Emergency response staff was not trained in accordance with the Emergency Plan.
This item was also identified during a licensee audit.
Detailed review of the audit file disclosed that the required training consistent with the cited criteria, was completed as required.
Attachment:
Hatch Exercise Scope and Objectives and Narrative Suninary l
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2.1 SCOPE Georgia Power Company (GPC) conducts an annual emergency preparedness exercise to demonstrate its capabilities to assure that the health and safety of the general public are protected in the event of an accident and that the protective measures outlined in 10CFR50.47 can be met.
Pursuant to current regulations, State and local agencies are not required to participate.on an annual basis.
The role of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in such an exercise is normally to
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evaluate the capabilities of the utility to respond adequately in the event of an accident at the facility.
However, the NRC may
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elect to participate in the exercise in accordance with its own protocol for emergency preparedness training and exercise.
The 1986 emergency exercise conducted at Plant Hatch will be
"small scale" in nature,.because the participation by the State and local agencies will be limited..The exercise will include limited mobilization of GPC personnel and resources to respond to
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a simulated accident..
Dua to the compressed timline, some portions of the emergency organization will be propositioned.
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Exercise " players" will have no prior knowledge of the simulated
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accident operational sequence, radiological release information
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(i.e., time, content, and size), weather patterns and conditions
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to be simulated under postulated accident conditions.
A separte " medical emergency" will be integrated into the operational and radiological exerciae scenario in order to evaluate the ability of the GPC plant staff to respond
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effectively to a radiation medical emergency occurring within the plant.
The medical emergency will also test the ability of the primary hospital and hopital emergency medical services to handle a contaminated injured patient.
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The overall intent of the emergency exercise is to demonstrate that the individuals and agencies assigned responsibilities in a radiological emergency are adequately trained and can competently perform their respective duties in accordance with emergency preparedness plans and procedures.
In addition, the exercise will attempt to focus on both the subparts of GPC's emergency preparedness program which were not previously evaluated and on the incidents which are.more plausible to real-life situations
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rather than " worst-case" and highly unrealistic operational and radiological events.
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2.2 OBJECTIVES
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2.2 OBJECTIVES I
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The objectives which will be demonstrated during the 1986 Plant Hatch emergency exercise were designed to assure that all areas required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, and NUREG-0654 were tested.
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The exercise will be initiated in the control room.
Control Room
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operations will subsequently be transferred to the simulator later in the scencrio.
A.
Accident Assessment and Classification Demonstrate the ability to identify initiating conditions, determine EAL parameters, and correctly classify the emergency throughout the exercise.
B.
Notification i
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. Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify, and mobilize
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station and corporate. emergency response personnel.
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2.
Demonstrate the ability to notify state and local authorities (within 15 minutes) and the NRC (within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />).
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Demonstrate the ability to warn or advise onsite i
(owner-controlled) individuals (including employees, visitors, and contractor personnel) of an emergency condition.
C.
Emeroency ResDonse 1.
Demonstrate that an individual is assigned responsibility for, and is in charge of, the emergency response.
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Demonstrate planning and emergency response capabilities for l
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24-hours per day.
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Demonctrate the line of succession for the Emergency Director.
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Demonstrate timely response of station and corporate management, and administrative and technical staff.
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Demonstrate that the ERF's (TSC, OSC, and EOF) can be
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activated in a timely manner.
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Verify that the Tsc provides plant management and
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technical support to operations personnel during emergency conditions.
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Verify that the OSC provides adequate support of
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emercency operations.
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Verify that the EOF acts as the command post for the overall management of the emergency response, including the coordination of radiological assessments and the management of the emergency response.
D.
Radiological Assissment and Control 1.
Demonstrate the coordinated gathering of radiological and
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.non-radiological (MET) data necessary for emergency response.. This includes collection and analysis of inplant
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surveys and samples, and environmental surveys (including
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samples).
Demonstrate that the EOF is the central point for receipt and assessment of all field-monitoring data.
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Demonstrate.the ability to develop dose projections, compare
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the projections to Protective Action Guides (PAGS), and determine and recommend the appropriate protective acitons.
3.
Demonstrate onsite contamination control measures, including area access control.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to take and analyze a post-accident sample.
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Demonstrate on-site evacuation plans, including evacuation routes, for a select number of plant personnel.
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Evaluate the decision-making aspects for authorizing emergency workers to receive doses in excess of 10 CFR Part
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20 limits.
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E.
Re-Entry and Recovery 1.
Demonstrate the initiation of the re-entry and recovery operations and the establishment of a recovery organization.
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State.and local organizations should be notified that recovery has commenced.
Further implementation of the recovery operation is not necessary.
F.
Medical Emergency 1.
Demonstrate the ability of E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant personnel to respond to a radiation medical emergency as per procedure.
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2.
Demonstrate communications bet'aen E.
I. Hatch Nuclear Plant and off-site response agencies (Appling General Hospital and local ambulance service).
3.
Demonstrate E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant's radiological
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evaluation of the acciden.
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4.
Demonstrate the rescue team's first aid and contamination control techniques.
5.
Demonstrate the interface between plant and offsite personnel (Appling General Hospital and local ambulance service.
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6.
Demonstrate Appling General Hospital's ability to treat and
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decontaminate an injured and contaminated patient.
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l 3.0 SCENARIO
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SCENARIO This section contains the following information:
Section 3.1 Narrative Summary - Describes the major activities and. events which. occur during the scenario along with approximate start and end times.
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Section 3.2 Scenario Timeline - Gives a relationship between scenario time, clock time, message number and information given with the message.
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Section 3.3 Sequence of Events Timeline - Gives a relationship between scenario activities and expected actions from the emergency response organization.
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GEORGIA POWER COMPANY EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT 1986 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE 3.1 Narrative Sununary The exercise scenario begins with the plant in the Emergency Classification, NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT.
Initiating Events are provided which lead to the declaration of an ALERT and subsequently SITE AREA EMERGENCY classifications.
The major events revolve around an electrical problem which leads to a scram.
The scram is not fully completed as some control rods fail to insert.
A turbine trip and a subsequent pipe break in the Reactor Building complete the major scenario events.
The scenario begins at 0730 CDT, in the simulator control room, with the initial conditions that both units are at 100%
power.
The plant is already in an NOUE based on River Water Level of < 61.9 feet MSL.
This condition has existed for two
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days with river level expected to rise by 1000 CDT.
The anticipated rise in water level is due to water being released from a reservoir up river.
The scenario continues with an ALERT classification based on River Level dropping to 1 61.7 feet MSL.
Offsite notifications are made to State, local, General Office and the NRC.
Also, the onsite emergency organization is activated.
At 0810 CDT, the medical portion of the scenario will start with a worker in the hot machine shop being injured.
The simulator control room will be contacted and an ambulance will be requested.
The ambulance should arrive in approximately 25 minutes after notification is made to the simulator control room.
The ambulance should depart the site around 0900 CDT.
At approximately 0900 CDT the 2A Diesel Generator is paralleled with the feed to Bus 2E in compliance with a required Diesel Genere. tor surveillance.
The Unit 2 Vital AC Static Inverter is out of service.
At 0915 CDT an electrical logic fault trips the 2A Diesel Generator output breaker and the normal feeder breaker to Bus 2E.
The alternate feeder breaker closes onto Bus 2E.
The resulting electrical disturbance causes a phase to phase ground fault on 600V Bus 2C.
Loss of the
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feedwater control system results in a Reactor Scram on Low Reactor Water Level.
Partial blockage in the scram discharge l
volume piping inhibits approximately 75 control rods from inserting.
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When the Reactor Water level decreases to -50.3 inches the
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HPCI system auto starts and injects', maintaining water level.
A Group V Isolation signal occurs (at this level), however, the Inboard Reactor Water Cleanup Suction Valve, 2G31-F001 fails to close (no power to the motor).
A crack develops in the Reactor Water Cleanup Suction Piping between 2G31-F001 and 2G31-F004, resulting in steam on the 158. foot elevation of the reactor building.
At approximately 0921 CDT the Main Stack Normal Range Monitor Hi-Hi alarm annunciates and the Kaman system starts.
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0930 CDT the Vital AC Static Inverter is returned to service and approximately 35 control rods are recognized to be out.
Tbe 63EP-EIP-053-0 procedure is completed and site boundary dose rates are greater than 50 mR/hr.
Criteria for a SITE AREA EMERGENCY are exceeded.
After all control rods are inserted, operators commence operations to place the plant in a cold shutdown condition.
At 1030 CDT, the exercise timeclock is set forward 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and recovery operations are discussed.
The exerciso is terminated at approximately 1130 CDT hours.
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