IR 05000321/1986038

Insp Repts 50-321/86-38 & 50-366/86-38 on 861216-19.No Deviations or Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Fire Protection & Licensee Actions Re Implementation of Requirements of 10CFR50,App R,Sections Iii.G,Iii.J & Iii.L

ML20210V084
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	02/02/1987
From:	Bernhard R, Hunt M, Madden P, Menning J, Miller W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20210V008	List: IR 05000321/1986038 ML20210V004
References
50-321-86-38, 50-366-86-38, NUDOCS 8702180684
Download: ML20210V084 (41)

Text

. .

4 UNITED STATES

[f 88 g o

NUCLEAR RE2ULATORY COMZlSSl!N REGION il I g 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SulTE 2000

• *

o, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 s,

+..../

Report Nos.: 50-321/86-38 and 50-366/86-38 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: Decemberk6-19, 6 Inspectors: I~ 2' o W. H., Miller, V~ Date Signed

/

^

'_ e 2 2-27 P. M Madd rr ( Date Signed l'A lF-O '

j n ],  ?->~Z7 M . D . H u n t Date Signed

'. \ n ng '2 2 l?

Date Signed

} ..,

7 H~.

l6bl Bernhard t b .2 - L M 7 Date Signed Approved /M5 / 8 ' [2- D T. E.Wnlon, Section Chief Date Signed Plant Systems Section

. Division of Reactor Safety

'

SUMMARY Scope: This special, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of fire protection and the licensee's actions regarding the implementation of the requirements of 10 CFR Appendix R, Sections III.G, III.J. and II Results: No violations or deviations were identifie $[3g21ggyQ738$ 3 O

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ - _ __. _. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

-

. .

..

REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• J. T. Beckham, Jr., Vice President - Plant Hatch H. C. Nix, General Manager - Plant Hatch

• P. E. Fornel, Project General Manager - Appendix R

• S. C. Hart, Jr., Project Engineering Manager

• J. L. Wilkes, Special Project Manager C. Doutt, Implementation Engineer

• K. A. Fry, Senior Nuclear Engineer (Detection System Project Supervisor)

• J. D. Heidt, Licensing Engineer

• C Hicks, Implementation Coordinator

• D. E. McAfee, Senior Plant Engineer (Fire Protection)

W. Mcdonald, Implementation Coordinator D. Midlik, Lead Implementation Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne Other Organizations Southern Company Services

• J. Blackburn, Analysis Engineer

• R. Bunt, Unit 1 Analysis Supervisor

• P. D. Grissom, Licensing Engineer

• G. D. McGaha, AIE Engineering Supervisor

• J. G. Sterchi, Fire Protection Engineer

• R. V. Walker, Fire Protection Engineer E. C. Leanard, Electrical Engineer Bechtel

• G.M. Cooper,AnalysisEngineer(Electrical)

• D. E. Dismukes, Mechanical Group Supervisor

• D. P. Jenner, Electrical Engineer Hayes Tool & Engineering

• R. Klein, Implementation Supervisor NRC Resident Inspectors

• P. Holmes-Ray

• G. Nejfelt

• Attended exit interview

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____ _ ____-________- ____________________ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

. .

e4

[

t 2

' Exit Interview  ;

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 19, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding No

, dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The following new item was identified during this inspection:

1 Inspector Followup Item (321/86-38-01 and 366/86-38-01), Licensee to Develop Procedures to Control the Change-out and Replacement of Safe Shutdown Appendix R - Fuses - paragraph 5.b(1).

The licensee (J. T.Beckham, Jr.) committed in the exit interview to initiate ,

the corrective action on this item.

>

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided j to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

' Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Closed) Unresolved Item (366/82-10-03) Requirements for Fire Barrier Between Unit 2 HPCI and RHR Pump Room NRC memorandum for T. A. Ippolito from W. V. Johnston of August 17, 1982 indicated that this wall was not-

. required to have a 3-hour fire rating. This inspection verified that the i

HPCI pump and RHR system Pump B are in the same fire area. This item is closed, i Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during the inspectio . Compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G and II An inspection was conducted to determine if the fire protection features provided for structures, systems and components important to safe shutdown at Hatch Units 1 and 2 were in compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G. and III.L. The scope of this inspection determined if the

,

i fire protection features provided for reactivity control, reactor coolant

'

makeup function, reactor heat removal function, process monitoring function

.

'

and safe shutdown system support function were capable of limiting potential fire damage so that one train or safe shutdown pathway of systems essential to achieving and maintaining hot and cold shutdown from either the Control Room or Emergency Control Stations are free from fire damage.

i.

h

_ _ _ . _ _ . , _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ . . . . _ _ __ _. __ __.., _ __,._ _ ,.. _ , -, _ ___ _ _ _ _. _ . _ - _ _ .

. .

'

..

3 Safe Shutdown Capabilities The licensee performed an analysis to determine the shutdown pathways utilizing the minimum required equipment to bring Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 to cold shutdown for a design basis fir The major systems and equipment required, were defined by general electric and further refined in the licensee's Safe Shutdown Appendix R analyse The licensee's analyses assumed the minimum performance requirements, as defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix R for any specific fire area to be:

- The Reactor shall be able to achieve and maintain subcritical condition The Reactor shall be able to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after the initiating even There shall be no fuel clad damage experienced during the shutdow Reactor pressure shall be maintained within design limit Containment pressure shall be maintained within design limit The shutdown systems shall be capable of achieving their functions independent of the availability of normal off-site powe All systems and components not affected by the fire are assumed to be available and function normall The licensee's analysis assumed the reactor to be operating at 100%

power when a fire occurs in a fire are The fire condition is accompanied by a reactor scram, closure of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) and a loss of off site power. The licensee's analysis assumes that only those systems equipped with emergency power are used to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. Therefore, isolation of the reactor results in reactor pressurization, reactor inventory loss and suppression pool heatup. Thus the reactor vessel, fuel clad and containment integrity are threatened as isolation occur For fires which occur in plant areas outside the Control Room / Cable Spreading Room Complex, the licensee after a reactor scram has the option of achieving and maintaining cold shutdown conditions utilizing either shutdown pathway 1 or 2 equipment. For fires which occur within the control room / cable spreading room complex, pathway 3 equipment, which is controlled from the remote shutdown panel, is utilize Pathways 1, 2, and 3 equipment required for safe shutdown is capable of performing the following functions:

. .

..

- Prevention of excessive reactor Pressurizatio Providing adequate reactor makeup inventor Capable of Depressurizing the reacto Removal of decay heat from the reacto Pathway 1 shutdown which is controlled from the control room utilizes reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) and the safety / relief valves (S/RVs) to provide reactor protection via inventory makeup, decay heat removal and depressurization. The licensee utilizes one S/RV to control reactor vessel pressure and RCIC for inventory makeup. Reactor depressurization the event which attothe below time135 low psig occurs pressure approximately(4 core injection hours intoLPCI) will b available. Therefore, prior to placing the plant in the shutdown cooling mode of operation LPCI will be available to makeup any reactor inventory los The following systems, utilizing primarily Division 1 equipment, are required for pathway 1 shutdown:

- Residual lleat Removal System (RHR)

- Residual Heat Removal Service Water System (RHRSW)

-

RCIC

-

S/RVs

-

Plant Service Water (PSW)

- Reactor Vessel Level and Pressure

- Suppression Chamber Temperature

- Suppression Chamber Level

- Reactor Recirculation

- Drywell Air

- Diesel Generator and Support Equipment

- MSIVs The primary electrical loads for Unit I will be supplied by diesel generators IA and 18 and for Unit 2 the electrical loads will be supplied by Diesel Generator 2 . .

A

Pathway 2 shutdown which is also controlled from the control room utilizes High Pressure Core Injection (HPCI) and S/RVs to provide reactor protection via inventory makeup, decay heat removal and depressurization. The licensee utilizes one S/RV to control reactor vessel pressure and HPCI for inventory makeup and control. Reactor depressurization to below 265 psig occurs approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> into the event which at that time low pressure core spray (LPCS) will be available. Therefore, prior to placing the plant in the alternate shutdown cooling mode of operation, LPCS will be available to makeup any reactor inventory los The following systems utilizing primarily Division 2 equipment are required for pathway 2 shutdown:

- RHR

- RHRSW

- HPCI

-

S/RV

- PSW

- Reactor Vessel Level and Pressure

- Suppression Chamber Temperature

- Suppression Chamber Level

-

LPCS

- Drywell Air

- Diesel Generator And Support Equipment

-

MSIVs The primary electrical loads for Unit 1 will be supplied using diesel generators 18 and 1C and for Unit 2 the electrical loads will be supplied by Diesel Generator 2 Pathway 3 is used to shutdown both units in the event of a fire in the main control room, the cable spreading room and the computer roo This shutdown pathway utilizes RCIC and two S/RVs on Unit 1 and three S/RVs on Unit 2 to provide reactor protection via inventory makeup, decay heat removal and depressurizatio The following systems are utilized for a Pathway 3 shutdown:

- RHR

- RHRSW

- RCIC

-

S/RVs

- PSW

- Reactor Vessel Level and Pressure

- Suppression Chamber Temperature

- Suppression Chamber Level

- Reactor Recirculation

_- -- - - .- .-. -

. .

.

-

Drywell Air

-

Diesel Generator and Support Equipment

-

MSIVs

-

Condensate Storage Tank Level

-

Control Rod Drive

-

Primary Containment Coolin In order to ensure safe shutdown capabilities, where cables or equip-ment of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions are located within the same fire area outside the primary containment, 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III. requires that one train of hot shutdown systems be maintained free of fire damage by providing fire protection features which meet the

requirements of either III.G.2.a, III.G.2.b., or III.G. ,

On the basis of the above Appendix R criteria, the inspectors made an inspection of cabling and components associated with the Residual Heat Removal System, Residual Heat Removal Service Water System, High i

Pressure Core Injection, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, Safety Relief Valves, Low Pressure Core Spray System, Low Pressure Core Injection Systems and Onsite Power Distribution Syste (1) Fire Protection for Safe Shutdown Systems / Component An inspection was made to determine if redundant cabling for the Units 1 and 2 safe shutdown system, required to achieve and maintain hot and cold shutdown conditions have been provided with i adequate separation or protected in accordance with Appendix R,

Section III.G.2.

, Included in the review was an evaluation of the acceptability of

the barrier or enclosure construction configuration as a fire rated barrier as used in the plant. Also, the review verified the adequacy of the installed penetration sealing systems, and fire

, dampers / fire doors with respect to installation completeness, i

physical condition, and fire test documentation.

'

The following cabling and components associated with safe shutdown pathway 1 and 2 systems were reviewed for compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G. 2:

(a) Unit 1 - Fire Protection pathway 1 and 2 safe shutdown system )

- .-

. . . . . - - .- -- . , _ . . . _ . - . , , , , . , - _ . , . - _ . . - . - - _ . . , . , - . - - - . - - . - -

_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ .

. .

..

i

.

Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features

'

R24-5012-ES4-M71 1205 Path 1 2 Power - Core

,

Spray Inlet Valve -

, Path 2-R25-5001-ES7-M24 0014 Path 2 9 Control Power -

Core Spray Inlet Valve - Path 2 R25-S001-ES7-M22 1020 Path 1 2

, Control Power - 1104 Path 1 2

! Core Spray Inlet i

Valve - Path 2 R24-5012-ES8-C71A 1205 Path 1 2

! Control - Core 1104 Path 1 2

'

Spray Inlet Valve -

,

Path 2 i

R24-5012-ES8-C71C 1205 Path 1 2 Control - Core 1104 Path 1 2

Spray Inlet Valve -

, Path 2 i

'

R24-5012-ES4-M69 1205 Path 1 2 Power - Core Spray Outboard j Valve - Path 2

'

l R25-S001-ES7-M24 0014 Path 2 9

! Control Power - Core

'

Spray Outboard j Valve - Path 2 l I l R25-S002-ES8-M22 1020 Path 1 2 l Control Power - Core 1104 Path 1 2 Spray Outboard Valve - l Path 2

'

r

!

l

. . , . . . - . - . - . . _ - - - . , - . _ . , - , , - . - - - . _ _ . -_

. - - - _ - _ - - - - . .

. - - - . . .---.

. .

..

Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features R24-5012-ES8-C69 Path 1

'

1205 2 '

Control - Core Spray Outboard

,

Valve - Path 2 R24-5012-ES8-C69A 1205 Path 1 2 Control - Core 1104 Path 1 2 Spray Outboard Valve - Path 2

,

R24-S012-ES8-69B 1205 Path 1 2

'

Control - Core 1104 Path 1 2 Spray Outboard

Valve - Path 2 R24-5011-ES3-M42 1203 Path 2 2

Power - RHR LPCI *1205 Path 1 8 Discharge Valve -

,

Path 1 R24-5011-ES3-M42A 1203 Path 2 2 Power - RHR LPCI Discharge Valve -

Path 1 R24-5018-ES3-M34A 1203 Path 2 2

'

Power - RHR LPCI *1205 Path 1 8 Discharge Valve -

'

Path 1 H11-P627-ES8-C007 1104 Path 1 9 i Control - RHR LPCI Discharge Valve -

Path 1

! H11-P627-ES8-C008 1104 Path 1 9

!

Control - RHR LPCI 1205 Path 1 9 Discharge Valve -

Path 1 R24-5018-ES7-C34 1203 Path 2 2 Control - RHR LPCI

'

Discharge Valve -

Path 1 '

!

!

!

a

_ - , - . , - . -

r-- . - c .. . - , - -r-~ -, , --, --- - , , . - - , - - , . _

,, ,. .m, , _ . - . _ _ . . , _ . _m.p- ,_.-.,, .__.-,,,-,.,,,ya, .-

'

. c

..

0 9 Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features R24-S018-ES7-C34A 1703 Path 2 2 Control - RHR LPCI *1205 Path 1 8 Discharge Valve -

Path 1 R24-5018-ES7-C34D 1203 Path 2 2 i Control - RHR LPCI *1205 Path 1 8 Discharge Valve -

Path 1 R24-5018-ES3-M25 1203 Path 2 ,2 Power - RHR LPCI *1205 Path 1 8 Discharge Valve -

Path 1 R25-S004-ES7-M35 1015 Path 2 2 Control Power - RHR 0040 Path 2 2 LPCI Discharge Valve - 0014 Path 2 2 Path 1 H11-P602-ES7-C070 *1104 Path 1 3,4,5 Control - RHR LPCI .1203 Path 2 2 Discharge Valve - *1205 Path 1 8 Path 1 < ,

'

H11-P602-ES7-C073 *1104 Path 1 3,4,5 Control - RHR LPCI 1203 Path 2 2 Discharge Valve - *1205 Path 1 8 Path 1 H11-P617-ES7-C052 1203 Path 2 Control - RHR LPCI *1205 Path 1 8 Discharge Valve,- '

Path 1 '

/

H11-P618-ES8-C001 '1104 Path 1 9 Control -J RHR LPCI 1403 Path 1 9 Discharge Valve - 1205 Path 1 9 Path 1 A H11-P622-ES7-C039 *1104 Path 1 3,4,5 Control - RHR LPCI 1203 Path 2 2 Discharge Valve - *1205 Path 1 8 Path 1 l'

.

,- . , , - , . _ .,----e- - , - - - - - ~..p- - , - - ,

. .

..

,

Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features H11-P622-ES7-C041 *1104 Path 1 3,4,5 ,

Control - RHR LPCI 1203 Path 2 2 Discharge Valve - *1205 Path 1 8 Path 1 H11-P627-ES8-C007 1104 Path 1 9 Control - RHR LPCI 1205 Path 1 9 Discharge Valve -

Path 1 R24-5018-ES7-C25 1203 Path 2 Control - RHR LPCI *1205 Path 1 8 Discharge Valve -

Path 1 R24-S018-ES7-C25A 1203 Path 2 2 Control - RHR LPCI *1205 Path 1 8 Discharge Valve -

Path 1 R24-S018-ES7-C250 1203 Path 2 2 Control - RHR LPCI *1205 Path 1 8 Discharge Valve -

Path 1 R24-S011-ES2-M57 1203 Path 2 2 Power - RHR Heat Exchanger "A" Bypass Valve - Path 1 R24-S011-ES7-C57 1203 Path 2 2 Control - RHR Heat Exchanger "A" Bypass Valve - Path 1 R24-5011-ES7-C57A 1203 Path 2 2 Control - RHR Heat Exchanger "/" Bypass Valve - Path 1 R24-S012-ES4-M26 1205 Path 1 2 Power - RHR LPCI Dischange Valve -

Path 2

. _ - ._ _ -. _ . _ - - - _ - -. -._ __ . - - _ _ _ ..

. .

,

..

Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection '

,

Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features R24-5012-ES4-M26A 1205 Path 1 2 -

-

Power - RHR LPCI Discharge Valve -

Path 2 R24-5018-ES4-M04A 1205 Path 1 2 Power - RHR LPCI Discharge Valve -

, Path 2 H11-P626-ES7-C006 1203 Path 2 9 Control - RHR LPCI Discharge Valve -

,

Path 2 H11-P627-ES8-C007 1104 Path 1 1 Control - RHR LPCI Discharge Valve -

Path 2 H11-P627-ES8-C008 1104 Path 1 2

Control - RHR LPCI 1205 Path 1 2 Discharge Valve - ,

Path 2 R24-S018-ES8-C04 *1203 Path 2 8 Control - RHR LPCI 1205 Path 1 2 Discharge Valve -

Path 2 R24-5018-ES8-C04A 1205 Path 1 2 Control - RHR LPCI 1104 Path 1 2 Discharge Valve -

,

Path 2 i

R24-S018-ES8-C040 1205 Path 1 2 Control - RHR LPCI 1104 Path 1 2 Discharge Valve - '

Path 2 R24-5012-ES4-M51 1205 Path 1 2 Power - Suppression

, Pool Spray Valve -

j Path 2

,

>

a:----. ,.m. .--w~ --

y- - , - - -- , , , ~i~ -< , - ~ ,, - . c--, . - ,- , - , - , - - , .

- - - - _ , ---4-, +y- m- -- .

. .

..

Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features H11-P618-ES8-C004 1104 Path 1 2 Control - Suppression 1205 Path 1 2 Pool Spray Valve -

Path 2 R24-5012-ES8-C51 1205 Path 1 2 Control - Suppression Pool Spray Valve -

,

Path 2 R24-S012-ES8-C51A 1205 Path 1 2 Control - Suppression 1104 Path 1 2 Pool Spray Valve -

Path 2 R24-5012-ES8-C51C,D,&E 1205 Path 1 2 Control - Suppression Pool Spray Valve -

Path 2 R24-5012-ES4-M53 1205 Path 1 2 Power - RHR Inlet To Suppression Pool Valve - Path 2 H11-P618-ES8-C004 1104 Path 1 2 Control - RHR Inlet 1205 Path 1 2

To Suppression Pool Valve - Path 2 R24-5012-ES8-C53 1205 Path 1 2 Control - RHR 1203 Path 2 8 Inlet to Suppression Pool Valve - Path 2 I R24-S012-ES8-C53A 1104 Path 1 2 l

'

Control - RHR Inlet 1205 Path 1 2 To Suppression Pool Valve - Path 2 R24-S012-ES8-C53C,D,&E 1205 Path 1 2 Control - RHR Inlet

To Suppression Pool Valve - Path 2 l

. -

- - . . .. --. -_ . - . . .-. . . _ - . -

-_- -

. .

'

>

Appendix R

. Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features R24-S012-ES4-M40 1205 Path 1 2 Power - Containment Spray Discharge Valve - Path 2 H11-P618-ES8-C004 1104 Path 1 2 Contral - Containment 1205 Path 1 2 Spray Discharge Valve - Path 2 R24-5012-ES8-C40 1205 Path 1 2 Control - Containment *1203 Path 2 8 Spray Discharge Valve - Path 2 R24-5012-ES8-C40A 1205 Path 1 2 Control - Containment 1104 Path 1 2 Spray Discharge Valve -

Path 2 R24-S011-ES3-M88 1203 Path 2 2 Power - Containment Spray Dischange Valve -

Path 1 H11-P617-ES7-C005 1203 Path 2 2 Control - Containment Spray Discharge Valve -

Path 1 R24-5011-ES7-C88 & A 1203 Path 2 2 Control - Containment Spray Discharge Valve -

Path 1 R24-5011-ES3-M51 1203 Path 2 2 Power - RHR Inlet To Suppression Pool Valve - Path 1 H11-P617-ES7-C005 1203 Path 2 2 Control - RHR Inlet 1205 Path 1 9 To Suppression Pool Valve - Path 1

. .

~

r

, Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features R24-5011-ES7-C51 1203 Path 2 2 Control - RHR Inlet To Suppression Pool Valve - Path 1

'

P24-S011-ES7-C51 1203 Path 2 2 Control - RHR Inlet 1104 Path 2 2

'

To Suppression Pool Valve - Path 1 R22-5007-ES2-M02 1404 Path 1 2 Power - RHR Service Water Pump ID -

Path 2 H11-P618-ES8-C009 1104 Path 1 2 Control - RHR 1205 Path 1 2 Service Water Pump ID - Path 2 H11-P618-ES8-C010 1104 Path 1 2 Control - RHR 1205 Path 1 2 Pump 1D - Path 2 R22-5007-ES8-C02B,G,&H 1104 Path 1 2

, Control - RHR Service Water Pump ID - Path 2 R24-S011-ES3-M19 1203 Path 2 2 Power - RHR Pump 2A Suchation Valve -

Path 1 H11-P601-ES7-C109 1203 Path 2 2 Control - RHR Pump 2A Suction Valve -

Path 1 i

R24-S011-ES7-C19 1203 Path 2 2

, Control - RHR l Pump 2A Suction i

Valve - Path 1

!

\

l

-- - - _ _ _ . _ _ . ,-- - _

, . _ _ . - _ _ , . _ .

. .

'

<

Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features R24-S011-ES7-C19A 1203 Path 2 Control - RHR Pump 2A Suction Valve -

Path 1 R22-S006-ES1-M05 1205 Path 1 2 Power - RHR Pump *1203 Path 2 8 20 - Path 2 H11-P617-ES7-C036 *1203 Path 2 8 Control - RHR Pump 2D - Path 2

-

H11-P617-ES7-C036A 1205 Path 1 2 Control - RHR Pump . *1203 Path 2 8 2D - Path 2 H11-P617-ES7-C037 *1203 Path 2 8 Control - RHR Pump 2D - Path 2 H11-P617-ES7-C037A 1205 Path 1 2 Control - RHR Pump *1203 Path 2 8 2D - Path 2 H11-P617-ES7-C071 & Co72 1408 Path 2 9 Control - RHR Pump 1412 Path 2 9 2D - Path 2 0014 Path 2 9 R22-S006-ES7-C05 *1412 Path 2 6 Control - RHR Pump *0014 Path 2 3,4,5 20 - Path 2 R22-5006-ES7-C05J *1203 Path 2 8 Control RHR Pump 1205 Path 1 2 2D - Path 2 R24-S012-ES4-M57 1205 Path 1 2 Power - RHR Heat Exchanger "B" Bypass Valve - Path 2

'

. .

..

Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features R24-5012-ES8-C57A 1205 Path 1 2 Control - RHR Heat 1104 Path 1 2 Exchanger "B" Bypass Valve - Path 2 R24-5012 ES8-C57C, D&E 1205 Path 1 2 Control - RHR Heat Exchanger "B" Bypass Valve - Path 2 R22-5005-ES1-M05 1412 Path 2 2 Power - RHR system 1203 Path 2 2 Pump 2A - Path 1 R22-5005-ES7-C05 *1104 Path 1 3,4,5 Control - RHR System 1412 Path 2 2 Pump 2A - Path 1 0014 Path 2 2 R22-S005-ES7-C058 & M 1412 Path 2 2 Control RHR System Pump 2A - Path 1 R22-5006-ES1-M02 1408 Path 2 2 Power - RHR Service Water Pump 1C -

Path 1 R22-5006-ES1-M02A 0501 Path 1 & 2 8 Power - RHR Service Water Pump 1C - Path 1 R22-S006-ES7-C02 1408 Path 2 2 Control - RHR 1412 Path 2 2 Servic Water Pump 1C - Path 1 R22-5006-ES7-C02B 1408 Path 2 2 Control - RHR Service Water Pump 1C - Path 1 R22-5006-ES7-C02F 1408 Path 2 2 Control - RHR 1412 Path 2 2 Service Water Pump 1C - Path 1

. .

..

.

Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features R22-5007-ES2-M01 1404 Path 1 2 Power - RHR Service Water Pump 1B -

Path 2 R22-S007-ES2-M01A 0501 Path 1 & 2 8 Power - RHR Service Water Pump 18 -

Path 2 R22-S007-ES8-C01 1404 Path 1 2 Control - RHR Service *0014 Path 2 3,4,5 Water Pump 1B -

Path 2 R22-5007-ES8-C01B, G&H 1404 Path 1 2 Control - RHR Service Water Pump 1B - Path 2 R22-S007-ES2-M06 1205 Path 1 2 Power - Core 1404 Path 1 2 Spray Pump - Path 2 H11-P626-ES7-C001 1203 Path 2 9 Control - Core 1205 Path 1 2 Spray Pump - Path 2 H11-P626-Es7-C002 1205 Path 1 2 Control - Core 1203 Path 2 9 Spray Pump - Path 2 H11-P627-ES8-C026 *0014 Path 2 3,4,5 Control - Core 1402 Path 1 2 Spray Pump - Path 2 1404 Path 1 2 H11-P627-ES8-C027 *0014 Path 2 3,4,5 Control - Core 1402 Path 1 2 Spray Pump - Path 2 1404 Path 1 2 R22-5007-ES8-C06 1404 Path 1 2 Control - Core *0014 Path 2 3,4,5 Spray Pump - Path 2

~~

. .

..

.-

Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features R22-S007-ES8-C068, H&J 1404 , Path 1 2 Control - Core Spray Pump - Path 2 R22-5007-ES8-C06K *0014 Path 2 3,4,5 Control - Core Spray Pump - Path 2 R24-S012-ES4-M67 1205 Path 1 2 Power - Suppression Chamber Suction Valve - Path 2 R24-5012-ES8-C67 1205 Path 1 2 Control - Suppression Chamber Suction Valve - Path 2 R24-5012-ES8-C67A 1205 Path 1 2 Control Suppression 1104 Path 1 2 Chamber Suction Valve - Path 2 R24-5011-ES3-M75A & B 1205 Path 1 2 Power - HPCI Steam Support Inboard Isolation Valve - Path 2 R24-S011-ES7-C75N & D *1203 Path 2 8 Control - HPCI 1205 Path 1 2 Steam Supply Inboard Isolation Valve -

Path 2 R24-S022-ES6-M05 & A 1205 Path 1 2 Power - HPCI Steam Supply Outboard Isolation Valve - Path 2 R24-5022-ES8-C05 1205 Path 1 2 Control - HPCI *1203 Path 2 8 Steam Supply

'

Outboard Isolation Valve - Path 2

- _- -- . _ . - _ -

. _ . . _

. _ , - _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ ._

-

. .

..

.-

Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway ~ Features R24-5022-ES8-C05A 1205 Path 1 2 Control - HPCI 1104 Path 1 2 Steam Supply Outboard Isolation Valve - Path 2 R24-S022-ES6-M11, A & G 1205 Path 1 2 Power - HPCI Pump Outboard Discharge Valve - Path 2 R24-S022-ES8-C11 1205 Path 1 2 Control - HPCI Pump Outboard Discharge Valve - Path 2 R24-S022-ES8-C11A 1205 Path 1 2 Control - HPCI Pump Outboard Discharge Valve - Path 2 R24-S022-ES8-C11C 1205 Path 1 2 Control - HPCI Pump Outboard Discharge Valve - Path 2 R24-5022-ES6-M07C, D & E 1205 Path 1 2 Power - HPCI Pump Inboard Discharge Valve - Path 2 R24-S022-ES8-C07A 1205 Path 1 2 Control - HPCI 1104 Path 2 Pump Inboard Discharge Valve - Path 2 R24-S022-ES8-C070 1205 Path 1 2 Control - HPCI Pump *1203 Path 2 8 Inboard Discharge Valve - Path 2 R24-S022-ES8-C07E 1205 Path 1 2 Control - HPCI Pump

, Inboard Discharge Valve - Path 2

- -. __ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ . - _ _ - . ._ _

. .

"

.

Appendix R Fire ' Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features R25-S001-ES7-M24 0014 Path 2 9 Power - HPCI Pump -

Path 2 R25-S002-ES8-M06 1020 Path 1 2 Power - HPCI Pump - 1104 Path 1 2 Path 2 R25-5002-ES8-M10 1020 Path 1 2 Power - HPCI Pump -

Path 2 R25-5002-ES8-M22 1020 Path 1 2 Power - HPCI Pump - 1104 Path 1 2 ,

Path 2 R25-S002-ES8-M25 1020 Path 1 2 Power - HPCI Pump - 1104 Path 1 2 Path 2 R25-5064-ES7-M22 1015 Path 2 9 Power - HPCI Pump - 0014 Path 2 9 Path 2 0040 Path 2 9 R25-5065-ES8-M04 1013 Path 1 2 Power - HPCI *0014 Path 2 3,4,5 Pump - Path 2 R25-5065-ES8-M21 1013 Path 1 2

! Power - HPCI *0014 Path 2 3,4,5 Pump - Path 2 R25-5065-ES8-M35 1013 Path 1 2 Power - HPCI *0014 Path 2 3,4,5 Pump - Path 2 R24-5022-ES8-M15 1205 Path 1 2 Power - HPCI Pump Suction From Suppression Pool Valve - Path 1

.

'

R24-5022-ES8-C15 1205 Path 1 2 Control - HPCI Pump Suction from Suppression Pool Valve - Path 2 l

. . . _

. . _ . _ _ _ _ _ __ - . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . - _ . _

_

. --

. .

'

.

Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features R24-5022-ES8-C15A 1205 Path 1 2 Control - HPCI Pump 1104 Path 1 Suction from Suppression Pool Valve - Path 2 R24-5022-ES6-M16 1205 Path 1 2 Power - HPCI Pump Suction from Suppression Pool Valve - Path 2 R24-5022-ES8-C16 1205 Path 1 2 Control - HPCI Pump Suction from Suppression Pool Valve - Path 2 R24-5022-ES8-C16A 1205 Path 1 2 Control - HPCI Pump 1104 Path 1 2 Suction from Suppression Pool Valve - Path 2 R25-5002-ES8-M10 1020 Path 1 2 Power - Suppression 1104 Path 1 2 Pool Suction Isolation Valve - Path 2 H11-P601-ES8-C039 1104 Path 1 2 Control - Suppression 1205 Path 1 2 Pool Suction Isolation Valve - Path 2 R24-5022-ES6-M06 & A 1205 Path 1 2 Power - HPCI Suction Valve from CST - Path 2 i

R24-5022-ES8-C06 1205 Path 1 2 Control - HPCI Suction Valve from CST - Path 2 R24-5022-ES6-C06A 1205 Path 1 2 Control - HPCI Suction 1104 Path 1 2 Valve from CST - Path 2 R24-5018-ES4-M16 1203 Path 2 2 Power - RCIC Steam Inboard Isolation Valve - Path 1

<

-

- . , . - - . - . _ - . . , , . . _ _ _ - . . . , . _ . _ , _ _ . . _ , , _ .

_

. , ~ _ _ - , , , -

. .

- -

. .

'

.

, Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features R24-5018-ES8-C16 & A 1203 Path 2 2 s Control - RCIC Steam *1205 Path 1 8 Inboard Isolation Vale - Path 1 R24-5018-ES8-C16C 1203 Path 2 2 Control - RCIC Steam Inboard Isolation Valve - Path 1 R24-5021A-ES7-M01 1203 Path 2 2 Power - RCIC Steam Outboard Isolation Valve - Path 1 R24-5021A-ES7-C01 1203 Path 2 2 Control - RCIC Steam Outboard Isolation Valve - Path 1 R24-5021A-ES7-C02 *1104 Path 1 3,4,5 Control - RCIC Steam 1203 Path 2 2 Outboard Isolation Valve - Path 1 R24-5021A-ES7-C05, C06, & C07 1203 Path 2 2 Control - RCIC Steam Outboard Isolation Valve - Path 1 R24-5021-ES5-M09 1203 Path 2 2 Power - RCIC Outboard Discharge Valve - Path 1 R24-5021-ESS-C09 & C09A 1203 Path 2 2 Control - RCIC Outboard *1104 Path 1 3,4,5 Discharge Valve - Path 1 R24-5021A-ESS-M02 1203 Path 2 2 Power - RCIC Pump Inboard Discharge Valve - Path 1 R24-5021A-ES7-C08 1203 Path 2 2 Control - RCIC Pump *1205 Path 1 8 Inboard Discharge Valve - Path 1

--

. .

.

Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features R24-5021A-ES7-C09 1203 Path 2 2 Control - RCIC Pump *1104 Path 1 3,4,5 Inboard Dis;harge Valve - Path 1 R24-5021A-ES7-C11, C12, & C13 1203 Path 2 2 Control - RCIC Pump Inboard Discharge Valve - Path 1 R24-5021-E55-M21 1203 Path 2 2 Power - RCIC Turbine - Path 1 R24-5021-ES7-C21 1203 Path 2 2 Control - RCIC Turbine - Path 1 R24-5021-ES7-C21A 1203 Path 2 2 Control - RCIC *1104 Path 1 3,4,5 Turbine - Path 1 R24-5021-ES7-C21B, C21C, 1203 Path 2 2 C21D & C21E Control - RCIC Turbine - Path 1 R24-5021-ES5-M17 1203 Path 2 2 Power - RCIC Pump Suction Valve from Suppression Pool - Path 1 R24-5021-ES7-C17 1203 Path 2 2 Control - RCIC Pump Suction Valve from Suppression Pool - Path 1 R24-5021-ES7-C17A 1203 Path 2 2 Control - RCIC Pump *1104 Path 1 3,4,5 Section Valve from Suppression Pool - Path 1

_

. .

.

,

Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features R25-5001-ES7-M14 0014 Path 2 2 Power - Suppression Pool Suction Valve - Path 1 H11-P602-ES7-C033 *1104 Path 1 3,4,5 Control - Suppression Pool 1203 Path 2 2 Suction Valve - Path 1 *1205 Path 1 8 R24-5021-ES5-M12 1203 Path 2 2 Power - RCIC Pump Suction Valve from Suppression Pool - Path 1 R24-5021-ES7-C12 & C12A 1203 Path 2 2 Control - RCIC Pump Suction Valve from Suppression Pool - Path 1 R24-5021-ESS-M03 1203 Path 2 2 Power - RCIC Pump Suction Valve from Condensate Storage Tank - Path 1 R24-5021-ES7-C03 1203 Path 2 2 Control - RCIC Pump Suction Valve from Condensate Storage Tank - Path 1 R24-5021-ES7-C03A 1203 Path 2 2 Control - RCIC Pump *1104 Path 1 3,4,5 Suction Valve from Condensate Storage Tank - Path 1 R25-5064-ES7-M19 1015 Path 2 2 Power - Plant Service Water 0014 Path 2 2 Inlet Valve - Path 1 0040 Path 2 2 R22-5005-ES7-C05K 0014 Path 2 2 Control - Plant Service 1412 Path 2 2 Water Inlet Valve - Path 1

<

- - . - . - - - - - - , .e --- ,, . - g - - _-.

. .

.

Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features R22-5005-ES7-C05I, C05J, & C05L1203 Path 2 2 Control - Plant Service 1412 Path 2 2 Water Inlet Valve - Path 1 R25-5065-ES8-M15 1013 Path 1 2 Power - Plant Service Water *0014 Path 2 3,4,5 Inlet Valve - Path 2 R22-5006-ES8-C07L 1104 Path 1 2 Control - Plant Service 1205 Path 1 2 Water Inlet Valve - Path 2 R22-5006-ES8-C07M 1205 Path 1 2 Control - Plant Service Water Inlet Valve - Path 2 R22-5006-ES8-C05I 1205 Path 1 2 Control - Plant Service Water Inlet Valve - Path 2 R24-5025-ES7-M50 1412 Path 2 2 Power - Service Water 1601 Path 2 2 Isolation Valve to Diesel Generators - Path 1 R24-5025-ES7-C50 1412 Path 2 2 Control - Service Water Isolation Valve to Diesel

. Generators - Path 1

!

.

R24-5027-ES8-M50 1404 Path 1 2

! Power - Service Water 1602 Path 1 2 Isolation Valve to Diesel j Generators - Path 2 R24-5027-ES8-C50 1404 Path 1 2 l Control - Service Water Isolation Valve to Diesel Generators - Path 2 NOTES: 1) Cables identified with "*" intrude into a fire area that contains cables of the redundant shutdown path.

l

.- -

_ _ . _

.,.

S e

.

2) Cables for redundant shutdown path' are located in a separate fire are ) Area contains fire detection syste ) Area contains automatic fire suppression syste ,

5) Cable enclosed within a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> fire rated barrie ) Cable enclosed within a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated barrie ) Operator actions required for plant shutdow ) Exemption submitte i 9) Analyzed not to affect safe shutdown capabilit (b) Unit 2 - Fire Protection for Pathway 1 and 2 Safe Shutdown Systems Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features ABE701M01 & ABE701M02 0001 1 or 2 2,9

Power - Division 1 0040 1 or 2 2,9 ECCS Cabinet 2H11-P925 2004 1 or 2 2,9

'

Path 1 and 2 2016 1 or 2 2,9 2018 1 or 2 2,9 ABE703M01 & 0001 1 or 2 2,9 ABE703M02 0040 1 or 2 2,9 l Power - Division I 2004 1 or 2 2,9 l ECCS Cabinet 2H11-P925 2616 1 or 2 2,9

Path 1 and 2 2018 1 or 2 2,9 ABE802M01 & 2104 1 or 2 2,9 ABE802M02 2014 1 or 2 2,9 Power - Division Il 2020 1 or 2 2,9

ECCS Cabinet 2H11-P926 Path 1 and 2 l

ABE911C01 & 2203F 1 or 2 7,9 ABE915C04 2203K 1 or 2 7,9 Control - Pressure 2205S 1 or 2 7,9

,

Transmitters 2B21-N120C 2203K 1 or 2 7,9 l & 2821-N122C l Path 1 l

!

t

- - - - .- - . _ _ - - - - - . . .

~

.

Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features EAE183M02 0501 1 or 2 8 Power - RHR Service Water Pump "A" Path 1 EAE187M01 2203 2 2 Power - RHR Duct 2 2 Pump "A" 2494 2 2 Path 1 EAE888C07 Control - RHR Pump "B" *0014K 2 3,4,5 Path 2 2409 1 2 EAE318M01 Power - RHR Pump "A" 2203B 2 2 Torus Suction Valve 2203A 2 2 Path 1 2203F 2 2 EAE718C01 *2104 1 3,4,5 Power - RHR Pump "A" 2203F 2 2 Torus Suction Valve

.

Path 1 EAE718C02 22038 2 2 Power - RHR Pump "A" 2203A 2 2 Torus Suction Valve 2203F 2 2 Path 1 EAE718C03 2203B 2 2 Power - RHR Pump "A" 2203A 2 2 Torus Suction Valve 2203F 2 2 Path 1 *2104 1 3,4,5 EAE444M01 2205B 1 2 Control - RHR Pump "B" 2205A 1 2 Torus Suction Valve 2205F 1 2 Path 2

.

EAE844C05 *2203F 2 3,4,5 Control - RHR Pump "B" 2205F 1 2 Torus Suction Valve 220dC 1 2 Path 2 2205A 1 2 l

',

, _ _ _ . _ _., ,_ ,_ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . , _ _ _ _ . . - _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . . .

. _ _ _ . _ _ _

. .

.

Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features EAE844M02 *2203F 2 3,4,5 Power - RHR Pump "B" 2205N 1 2 Torus Suction Valve 2205F 1 2 Path 2 EAE720C02 2203B 2 2 Control - RHR Pump "A" 2203A 2 2 SDC Suction Valve 2203F 2 2 Path 1 EAE720C04 2203B 2 2 Control - RHR Pump "A" 2203A 2 2 SDC Suction Valve 2203F 2 2 Path 1 *2104 1 3,4,5 AAE823C04 2203F 1 or 2 7,9 Control - RHR SDC 2205N 1 or 2 7,9 Suction Isolation Valve 2205F 1 or 2 7,9 Path 1 225E 1 or 2 7,9 AAE317M01 2203F 1 7 Power - RHR SCD Suction Isolation Valve Path 1 EAE334M01 2203F 2 2 Power - RHR LPCI *223E 1 or 2 8 Injection Valve Path 1 EAE734C05 223E 1 or 2 8 Control - RHR LPCI 2203F 2 2 Injection Valve Path 1 l

EBE701M01 2004 2 2 Power - RHR LPCI 2016 2 2 Outboard Valve 0014K 2 2

'

Path 1 *2014 1 3,4,5 2016 2 2 ABE915C04 2203F 2 2

Control - RHR LPCI 2203K 2 2 Outboard Valve 2205S 2 2 Path 1 2203K 2 2

!

. .

'

.

Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features EAE861005 2205F 1 2 Control - RHR 225E 1 or 2 8 LPCI Outboard Valve 2205N 1 2 Path 2 EAE461M01 2205F 1 2 Power - RHR LPCI 225E 1 or 2 8 Outboard Valve 2205N 1 2 Path 2 EAE721C01 2203F 2 2 Control - RHR SDC Suction Valve Path 1 EAE721C04 2203B 2 2 Control - RHR SDC 2203A 2 2 Suction Valve 2203F 2 2 Path 1 *2104 1 3,4,5 EAE727C02 *2104 1 3,4,5 Control - RHR Test 2203F 2 2 Line Valve Path 1 EAE853C02 *2203F 2 3,4,5 Control - RHR Containment 2205N 1 2 Spray Valve 2104 1 2 Path 2 EAE853M02 *2203F 2 3,4,5 Power - RHR Containment 2205N 1 2 Spray Valve 2205F 1 2 Path 2 EAE732002 *2104 1 3,4,5 Control - RHR Heat 2203F 2 2 Exchanger "A" Bypass Shell Side Valve Path 1 EAE856C04 *2203F 2 3,4,5 Control - RHR Heat 2205N 1 2 Exchanger "B" Bypass 2205F 1 2 Shell Side Valve Path 2

. .

'

.

Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features EAE338M01 '22038 2 .2 -

Power - RHR Heat 2203A 2 2 Exchanger "A" Service 2203F 2 2 Water Flow Control Valve Path 1 EAE738C01 *2104 1 3,4,5 Control - RHR Heat 2203F 2 '2 Exchanger "A" Service Water Flow Control Valve Path 1 EAE865C02 Control - RHR Heat 2104 1 2

' Exchanger "B" Service 2205F 1 2 Water Flow Control Valve Path 2 EAE807M01 *014G 2 3,4,5 Power - RHR Heat 2014 1 2 Exchanger "B" Service 2017 1 2 Water Flow Control Valve Path 2 EDE821C03 2205Z 1 2 Control - HPCI Pump 2205A 1 2 Suction Valve 2205F 1 2 from Torus Path 1 EDE622M02 2205Z 1 2 Power - HPCI Pump 2205A 1 2 Suction Valve 2205F 1 2 from Torus Path 2 EDE613M02 2205Z 1 2 Power - HPCI Turbine 2205A 1 2 Stop Valve 2205F 1 2 Path 2 EDE815C02 2205Z 1 2 Control - HPCI Pump 2205A 1 2 Suction Valve 2205F 1 2 from CST Path 2

. .

.

Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features EDE616M05 & 2205A 1 2 -

EDE616M06 *225W 1 or 2 8 Power - HPCI Pump 2205F 1 2 Injection Valve Path 2 EEE918C26 2203C 2 2 Control - RCIC Turbine 2203F 2 2 and Turbine Trip and *2104 1 3,4,5 Governing Valves 0014K 2 2 Path 1 2016 2 2018 2 EEE703C05 2203C 2 2 Control - RCIC Turbine 2203A 2 2 and Turbine Trip and 2203F 2 2 Governing Valves *2104 1 3,4,5 Path 1 EEE708C02 2203F 2 2 Control - RCIC Pump Suction Valve from CST Path 1 EEE708M02 2203F 2 2 Power - RCIC Pump Suction Valve from CST Path 1 EEE710C03 2203A 2 2 Control - RCIC Pump *223W 1 or 2 8 Injection Valve 2203 2 2

,

Path 1

,

EEE510M01 2203A 2 2 Power - RCIC Pump *223W 1 or 2 8 l

Injection Valve 2203C 2 2 Path 1 2203F 2 2 EEE714C03 Control - RCIC Pump 2203F 2 2

,

Suction Valve from l Suppression Pool Path 1

. ._ . . _ _

. .

'

.

Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features

'

EEE711C01 2203F 2 2 Control - RCIC Pump Suction Valve from Suppression Pool

'

Path 1 EBE221M01 2205B 1 2 Power - Core Spray 2409 1 2 Pump "B" Path 2 EBE802M01 *0014G 2 3,4,5 Power - Core Spray 2014 1 2 Injection Valve 2017 1 2 Path 2 ABE018C05 21G4 1 2 Control - Core Spray 2205F 1 2 Injection Valve 2205I 1 2 Path 2 EBE415M01 2205B 1 2 Power - Core Spray Pump 2205F 1 2 Min. Flow Bypass Valve Path 2 PUE135M02 0501 1 or 8 Power - Division I Service 2404 2 i Water Pump "A" l Path 1 PUE735C06 Control - Division I 0014K 2 2 Service Water Pump "A" j

Path 1 PUE305C02 Control - Turbine Bld or 2 7,9 Div. II Header Isolation Valve 2409 1 or 2 7,9 Path 2 I

! .

'

- _ _ _ . _. -- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ - _ . _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _ _ _ . _ _

m

. .

'

.

Appendix R Fire Assured Fire Cable No. Function Area Cable Shutdown Protection Shutdown Path Routes Pathway Features PUE805M01 2602 1 or 2 7,9 Power - Turbine Bld or 2 7,9 Division II Header Isolation Valve Path 2 RSE725C01 2404 2 2 Control - Diesel 2403 2 2 Diesel Generator 2A 2401 2 2 Div. I Fuel Oil Transfer Pump

.

Path 1 RUE 835M01 2409 1 2 Power - Diesel 2609 1 2 Generator 2C Div. II Fuel Oil Transfer Pump

>

Path 2 NOTES: Notes for Unit 1, paragraph Section 5.a.(1)(a), are also applicable to Unit Based on the review of the licensee's safe shutdown analysis, the routing of the above sample Units 1 and 2 safe shutdown cables, and the available plant fire protection features for protection of safe shutdown capabilities, it appears that sufficient protection is available to maintain one shutdown pathway free from fire damag Thus, the plant is in compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R Section III.G.

, Associated Circuits of Concern i

'

The separation and protection requirements to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, apply not only to safe shutdown circuits but also to associated l circuits that could prevent operation or cause maloperation of safe ( shutdown systems and equipment. The identification of these associated circuits of concern was performed for Hatch Nuclear Plant (HNP) Units 1 l and 2 in accordance with NRC Generic Letter 81-12 and subsequent NRC i

'

clarification. Associated circuits of concern are defined as those circuits that have a physical separation less than that required by Section III.G.2 of Appendix R, and have one of the following:

4

+

.. - - - .- = .-

. .

.

- A common power source (common bus) where the shutdown equipment and the power source is not electrically protected from the circuit of concern by coordinated breakers, fuses, or similar devices; or

- A connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious operation (spurious signal) would adversely affect the shutdown capability; or

- A common enclosure with the shutdown cables, and Type (1) are not electrically protected by circuit breakers, fuses of similar devices, or Type (2) will allow propagation of the fire into the enclosur (1) Associated Circuits by Common Power Supply (Common Bus)

Circuits and cables associated by common power supply are simply nonsafe shutdown cables whose fire-induced failure will cause the loss of a power source (bus, distribution panel, or MCC) that is

>

necessary to support safe shutdown. This problem could exist for power, control or instrumentation circuit The problem of associated circuits of concern by common power supply is resolved by ensuring adequate electrical coordination between the safe shutdown power source supply breaker and the component feeder breakers or fuse For the audit of this concern at HNP Units 1 and 2 sample selections of the electrical equipment which supply / control the power to various pieces of electrically powered equipment which must function in shutdown pathways 1 and 2 were examined. Where equipment is common to two of the three shutdown pathways, the fuse / breaker coordination was examined to provide assurance that power would be available if required. Due to the similarity of Units 1 and 2, various components were selected from each uni Review of the breaker coordination curves, developed for the

,

component which should it fault could cause the greatest challenge

to the supply breaker for that particular power supply board, were reviewed. Discussions with knowledgeable licensee representatives were held to insure adequate understanding on the part of the NRC inspector relating to various actions and adjustments required to meet the coordination criteri The licensee's analysis determined that several breakers in the 600V switchgear (SWGR) did not exhibit the coordination require-ments in certain instances of current / time conditions when plotted on a coordination curve. This condition was corrected by two methods

-- -. - _ . -- ._ . - - -. .

. .

'

.

(a) The over current trip devices (electro-mechanical) were replaced with solid state devices that could be adjusted to meet the time / current requirements of the downstream load The solid state devices were used mainly on the 600V ac buses IC, 2C, 10, and 2D where the feed was to a 600V motor control center (MCC). ,.

(b) Where molded case circuit breakers had been used in certain distribution panels, it was determined that no adjustments could be made on these breakers that would meet coordination of the upstream feeder breakers. In this case, the molded case circuit breakers were replaced with molded case switches and fuses that have the required characteristics. The fuses that provide the required characteristics will be installed in series with each molded case switch. Design changes to power circuits from the 600V ac motor control centers which supply power to essential distribution panels have been implemented for Units 1 and There are approximately 280 circuits which will require modificatio These circuits have been identified on Design Change Requests (DCR) 239, 233 and 23 During the review, it was noted that the fuses to be added have special characteristics. These characteristics are required to meet the circuit coordination requirements. It was noted that there did not appear to be any program in place to insure that these fuses would be replaced with the same type should replace-ment be required. It is important to control these fuses in that two fuses with the same amperage rating could have different type elements which determine the length of time needed to open on overcurren Therefore, type for type fuse replacement is required to meet the design intent of the circuit protection schem The licensee committed to initiate procedures for fuse control during installation and maintenanc This item is identified as Inspector Followup Item (321/86-38-01 and 366/86-38-01), Licensee to Develop Procedures to Control the Change-out and Replacement of Safe Shutdown / Appendix R Fuse The examination of the breaker / fuse coordination was performed during this inspection for the power distribution boards and equipment identified below:

RHR Pumps 1A and IB (2A and 28)

RHR Service Water Pumps IA and 1B (2A and 28)

Plant Service Water Pump 1B Core Spray Pump 1B 4160V Bus IE (2E) . .

,

~

.

4160V Bus IF (2F)

4160V Bus 1G (2G)

600 Volt Load Centers 1C and ID 600 Volt Motor Control Centers R24-5011, R24-5012, R24-5018A, R24-5018B DC load centers IA and IB NOTE: Unit 2 equipment shown in parenthese (2) Associated Circuits Causing Spurious Operation (Spurious Signals)

Circuits assuciated because of spurious operation are those that can, by fire-induced failures cause safe shutdown equipment or nonsafe shutdown equipment to maloperate in a way that defeats the function of safe shutdown systems or equipment. Examples include the uncontrolled opening or closing of valves, or of circuit breakers, due to fire-induced damage to nonsafe shutdown instru-ment and control circuits that affect the control circuit inter-locks of the safe shutdown component The analysis of spurious operations considered equipment (safe shutdown and nonsafe shutdown) that could affect safe shutdown of the plan The potential effects of associated circuits of concern were considered in the spurious operations analysi The licensee advised the inspectors that their review of the effect of spurious signals revealed that the shutdown pathways 1 and 2 are separated such that the safe shutdown capability would not be adversely affected by any one spurious actuation in any one plant area. To preclude any possibility of spurious operation at a high-low interface valve, the circuits (cables and conduits)

were wrappe In addition, the inspectors noted several areas where the cable trays had been wrapped to provide a conservative approach. It was noted that in each case the heavy steel support for the cable trays had been wrapped to provide protection to the supports from local area fires.

!

The licensee further advised that the shutdown paths required personnel actions, if required, such that a spurious action of a component could be halted by removal of its power sourc (3) Associated Circuits by Common Enclosure The common enclosure concern is found when redundant trains are

! routed together with a nonsafety circuit which crosses from one raceway or enclosure to another, and the nonsafety circuit is not electrically protected or fire can destroy both redundant trains due to inadequate fire protection.

i

{

!

[

. . _ . . . . - - . -. __

- - - . - - . . .

- _ _- _ . - _ ..

.,

. . . t

• {

., .

t

-

37-

$

'

The licensee advised that the removal of power from equipment to

, prevent spurious signal operations also supports part of the protection .provided for the common enclosure concer The power interruption is accomplished either by breakers, fuses, or opening 4 supply breakers. Power and control cables are sized and rated for 600 volts, in which case a fault should trip the protective device prior to jacket overheating or self-ignition. A study was made by the licensee to assure that faults along any length of a cable would activate the trip device prior to self-ignitio Additionally, cable wrapping was installed in any area that presented a challenge to the concept of common enclosure i

separatio ; Alternative Shutdown Capabilities The inspectors reviewed operating personnel training, shift staffing and the licensee's -use of plant procedures, as these activities relate to alternative shutdown capabilities. These areas were reviewed to determine if the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.L. were met.

'

(1) Personnel Training and Shift Staffing i

The inspectors reviewed' the licensee's program for conducting

, training specifically on the procedures used for safe shutdown and L alternative shutdown in case of fire. It was noted that classroom

training was given to licensed and non-licensed operators during the third quarter of 198 The inspectors reviewed training lesson plans, attendance records, and held discussions with shift

< operating personnel' to verify that the above training was properly

implemented.

.

The licensee's normal shift staffing was reviewed to verify that

sufficient personnel were available to operate equipment and systems described in the procedures for remote shutdown. The shift personnel provided for such procedures are separate from the l operating personnel assigned to the fire brigade. Adequate shift staffing was further demonstrated during a walk-through drill of the procedures for remote shutdown which began in the control room

! followed by canning the remote shutdown panels and other stations I in the plan (2) Procedures >

l The inspectors reviewed the licensee's plant procedures to verify l that Appendix R,Section III.L. , requirements as given below have

been incorporated into applicable procedures.

l

-

Achieve and maintain subcritical reactivity coriditions in the j reactor

'

(

.--.-_--___-_,m.-. - _ . _ . . _ - . _ - _ _ - _ _ . , ~ . . _ . . - . - , . . _ _ , , _ . _ . . .----_ -,

.

.

-

Provide decay heat removal capabilities

-

Maintain reactor coolant inventory

-

Achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions

-

Achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions

-

Provide direct readings of process variables necessary to control the above condition The following procedures were reviewed:

Procedure Number for Unit 1(2) Re Title 34AB-FPX-053-15 (2S) 0 Fire Procedure 31E0-E0P-001-1S (2S) 0 Flow Chart Emergency Operating Procedure (E0P)

for Shutdown From Inside Control Room 31E0-E0P-002-15 (25) 0 Flow Chart (E0P) for Shutdown From Outside Control Room The abnormal operating procedure for fire is used for a scram or when in hot or cold shutdown to provide the operator with required manual actions for each fire zone. This procedure also informs the operator of what protected equipment provides the redundancy required by Appendix R for each fire zone. The flow chart E0Ps are used following any scram and provide guidance to the operator from a condition of full system availability to the minimum shutdown capability. One flow chart E0P provides for shutdown from insida the control room, and another provides for shutdown from outside the control room. In order to address the require-ments of Appendix R, the flow chart E0Ps are supplemented with required manual actions that were developed from the Appendix R analysis. The flow chart E0Ps are also supplemented by End Path Manuals that contain instructions for proceeding to cold shutdow (3) Walk-Through of Procedures for Remote Shutdown The inspectors conducted a walk-through of the flow chart E0P for shutdown outside the control room, 31E0-E0P-002-1S, Rev. 0. The scenario for this exercise involved a fire in the cable spreading room requiring subsequent evacuation of the control room, and loss i

- -. .. -

m _

. ,,

'

.

of offsite power when the reactor was manually scrammed. This walk-through was conducted with the minimum required shift manning

-

as delineated in Table 6.2.2-1 of the Technical Specification The purpose of the walk-through was to verify that:

-

Communications between various stations are adequate and operable

-

Identification plates installed on valves and instrumentation agree with that called for in the procedure steps

-

Lighting at shutdown stations and along operator paths to shutdown stations is adequate

-

Equipment and valves to be operated can be reached and are not obstructed

-

Sound power phone headsets are available and procedures to be used are available and contain the latest revision

-

Steps of procedures are clear and can be accomplished

-

Instrumentation identified in IEN 84-09 is available to monitor system process variables Although the walk-through demonstrated all of the above, the inspectors identified several instances where procedures could be improve These improvements were discussed with the licensee and related procedure change requests were initiated during this inspection. The inspectors indicated that the revised procedures would be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspectio No violations or deviations were identifie . Compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.J., Emergency Lighting Section III.J. requires emergency lighting units with at least 8-hour battery power supply to be provided in all areas needed for operation of

safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes theret A total of approximately 463 battery powered emergency lighting units have been provided in plant areas needed for operation of shutdown equipment and components and in the access and egress routes to these areas. These units are rated by the manufacturer to provide in excess of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> illuminatio The installation and arrangement of a random sample of the installed lighting units were reviewed by the inspectors and found to meet Appendix R,Section II . -. -.-. - - - _ , - __ , -

r

.. .

.

All lighting units are inspected monthly to verify operability, and to check battery supply and position of lamp heads. Each unit is also operated annually for 8-hours to verify that the units will operate for the required tim These tests and inspections are conducted using surveillance procedure 42SV-FPX-003-0S, Emergency Lighting Surveillanc This procedure was reviewed by the inspectors and found to include all of the required inspection and test requirement Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identifie . Inspector Followup Items (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 321/85-28-01 and 366/85-28-01, Review of Appendix R Fire Barrier Upgrade Program. The inspectors performed a walk-down of various diesel generator and auxiliary building fire barrier wall assemblies required to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 and verified that the sampled fire barrier assemblies were fully functional. Therefore, this item is closed.

.

f i

,