ML20199F541
| ML20199F541 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 01/23/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20199F462 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-97-11, 50-366-97-11, NUDOCS 9802040036 | |
| Download: ML20199F541 (52) | |
See also: IR 05000321/1997011
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION 11
Docket Nos:
50 321 and 50 366
License Nos:
OPR 57 and NPF-5
Report No:
50-321/97-11. 50 366/97 11
Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company. Inc. (SNC)
Facility:
E. 1. Hatch Units 1 & 2
Location:
P. O. Box 2010
Baxley, Georgia 31515
Dates:
November 16
December 27, 1997
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Inspectors:
B. Holbrook. Senior Resident inspector
J; CLnady. Resident inspector
L. Stratton Safeguards inspector (Sections S1,
S2.1 S3. S7. and S8)
G. Kuzo. Senior Radiation Specialist (Sections
R1.1 R1.2 R1.3. R5. R7. and R8)
K, O'Donohue. Resident Inspector (Section 01.3)
Accompanying Inspectors:
T. Fredette. Resident inspector
S. Rohrer, Radiation Specialist
Approved by:
P. Skinner. Chief. Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure 2
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Plant Hatch. Units 1 and 2
NRC Inspection Report 50 321/97-11, 50 366/97-11
This integrated inspection included asp? cts of licensee operations,
engineering. maintenance, and plant support.
The report covers a 6 week
period of resident inspection and region based specialist inspection.
Doerations
0)erator response to the transient and manuci scram resulting from
e
t1e Unit 2 Condensate Booster pump check vilve problems were good.
Performance during the subsequent unit sta' tup was excellent
(Section 01.2).
Maintenance and engineering provided excellent support to
o
operations for the Unit 2 system and component damage assessment
and re3 air activities resulting from the Unit 2 condensate booster
pump cleck valve problems.
Management was actively involved in
the activities and provided excellent oversight and diret. tion
(Section 01.2).
Plant operators' observation and attention to the Unit 2
condensate booster pump system response resulted in excellent
control of the problem (Section 01.2),
Operations personnel were knowledgeable and generally
e
professional.
Interaction with other grou
minimize distractions in the control room.ps was controlled to
However, inconsistent
three-part communications by the operators was observed
(Section 01.3).
Operator performance during the Unit 1 startup following the
e
refueling outage was good.
Systems and components observed
operated as expected.
Technical Specification and regulatory
requirements were met for the startup (Section 01.4).
e
Non-Cited Violat,an (NCV) 50-321/97 11-01. Failure to Follow
Procedure and inadequate Procedure Results in Group 1 Isolation,
was identified (Section 03.1).
Violation 60-321/97-11-02. Late 10 CFR 50.72 Notification for
Unit 1 Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Actuation, was identified.
Operators failed to make the req'.iired 4-hour report that the
drywell pneumatic system had isolated (Section 04.1).
e
Violation 50-321, 366/97-11-03. Inadequate Corrective Actions for
Late 10 CFR 50.72 Notifications, was identified.
The previous
corrective actions failed to prevent four late 10 CFR 4 hour
required reports that occurreo within the past two years
(Section 04.1).
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2
Operator actions were appropriate and timely for the power
o
excursion due to the 2A recirculation pump spurious speed increase
on Unit 2. Engineering and maintenance support was good
(Sectinn 04.2).
Maintenance
Maintenance activities were generally completed in a thorough and
e
professional manner (Section M1.1).
e
The decision by licensee management to shutdown Unit 1 for
corrective maintenance following the restart problems was
appropriate.
Poor maintenance work practices contributed to the
unit shutdown. Maintenance response and support of the work
activities were good (Section M1.2).
Poor work practices and a lack of attention to detail by craft
e
personnel during the work activity on the Unit 1 extraction relay
dump valve during the Fall 1997 Refueling Outage contributed to
the unit being shutdown for corrective maintenance (Section M1.2).
e
A poor maintenance work practice resulted in a leak from the
nitrogen supply line to the Unit 1 "B" inboard main steam
isolation valve (Section M1.2),
The licensee's preparation for cold weather was good.
The
e
procedures for performing equipment operability checks were
appropriate and maintenance corrected the identified cold weather
preparation deficiencies in a timely manner (Section M2.2).
Plant Modification and Maintenance Su) port response to removed
insulation on Unit 1 was prompt.
Wea<nesses were identified in
site supervisory ovarsight of loaned personnel for this work
activity performed during the Unit I refueling outage
(Section M2.3).
e
For the surveillances observed, all data met the required
acceptance criteria and the equipment performed satisfactorily.
The performance of the operators and crews conducting the
surveillances was generally professional and competent
(Section M3.1).
e
The overall performance of the Main Control Room Pressurization
System test activity was excellent
Personnel performing the test
were knowledgaable of the systems and test requirements.
Procedures were correctly used.
Tie systems responded as expected
and all test acceptance criteria vere met.
The 10 CFR 50.59
evaluation for procedure changes was satisfactory (Section M4.1).
Enclosure 2
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e
Non cited violation 50 321/97-11-04 Failure to Meet Unit 1
Technical Specification Actions for Primary System Pressure
Boundary leakage, was identified.
Corrective actions were
appropriate for the leaking Transversing incore Probe tubing.
Licensee Event Report 50-321/97-06, was detailed and thorough
(Section M8.1).
Enoineerina
The Hatch Unit 2 torus-to-reactor building vacuum breaker design
e
does not meet General Design Criteria 56 for acceptability of a
single passive component to meet containment isolation
requirements.
This issue was identified as Unresolved item (URI)
50-366/97 11-08. Unit 2 Failure to Meet General Design Criteria 56
for Proper Automatic Containment Isolation Valve Outside
Containment, periing additional NRC review (Section E2.1).
e
Maintenance and engineering actions in response to the 2C
Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) start failure were appropriate
and thorough.
Maintenance and engineering recommendations
reflected a good interface with the vendor (Section E2.2).
The Maintenance Rule periormance criteria for the EDGs were being
e
met and performance data was being tracked and updated
periodically (Section E2.2).
Plant Suonort
e
Radiological controls, area postings and container labels
associated with radwaste processing storage and transportation
activities were maintained in accordance with Technical
Specifications: 10 CFR Parts 20 and 71: and 49 CFR Parts 100-179
requirements (Section R1.1).
Improvements were noted in the radwaste facility housekeeping and
e
cleanliness (Section Rl.1).
o
Proficiency of chemistry technicians and radwaste operators during
the conduct of a Unit 2 (U2) liquid Floor Drain Sample Tank
effluent release was demonstrated (Section Rl.2).
e
Excluding source check requirement concerns. liquid effluent
procedures were satisfactory and im)1emented effectively in
accordance with 10 CFR Part 20. Tec1nical Specification and
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual requirements (Section Rl.2).
Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-321. 366/97-11-05 was identified.
e
Review Adequacy of Revised Liquid Effluent Release Procedures to
Meet Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (0DCM) Monitor Check Source
Requirements (Section Rl.2).
Enclosure 2
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Licensee program guidance for processing,l site met 10 CFR
packaging, and
e
transporting radwaste to a licensed buria
Parts 20, 61. 71: and 49 CFR Parts 100-179 requirements
(Section RI.3).
Radwaste processing. packaging and transportation activities were
e
implemented effectively (Section Rl.3).
General Health Physics activities observed during the report
e
period included locked high radiation area doors, proper
radiological posting and personnel frisking upon exiting the
Radiological Controlled Area.
Minor deficiencies were discussed
with licensee management (Section Rl.4).
Hazardous material training for personnel processing, handling,
o
and shipping Condensate Phase Separator resins was conducted in
accordance with 49 CFR 172.702 requirements (Section R5.1).
Counting room gamma spectroscopy Quality Control activities were
implemented appropriately (Section R7.1).
,
A lack of attention to detail by responsible personnel for
e
<
selected laboratory Ouality Control activities was identified
(Section R7.1),
o
Licensee initiatives to manage exposure and reduce worker
contamination events during the Unit 1 Refueling Outage 17
activities were effective (Section R8.1),
o
Excluding a November 14. 1997 personnel contamination event,
controls for minimizing exposure from intakes of radionuclides
were effective and potential radionuclide into ws were evaluated
properly (Section R8.1).
e
Violation 50 321, 366/97-11-06 was identified for failure to
follow procedures for radiation and contamination control and for
personnel decontamination in accordance with Technical Specification 5.4.1.a (Section R8.1),
o
Violation 50 321, 366/97-11-07 was identified for failure to
follow procedures for Radiation Work Permit system implementation
in accordance with TS 5.4.1.a (Section R8.3).
Licensee root cause analyses to identify causes of an increasing
e
trend in worker contaminations and corrective action
recommendations were appropriate (Section R8.4).
The licensee adecuately addressed, through procedures and training
of the EAP provicers, the process and conditions in which a
mandatory EAP referral will be utilized (Section S1.3).
Enclosure 2
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The licensee's practice of utilizing designated vehicles for
e
offsite use, as proposed in their December 1996 PSP change, was
discussed.
The licensee agreed to evaluate the difference between
the December 1996 plan change and 10 CFR 73.55(d)(4)
(Section S2,1).
Protected and vital area access controls met the requirements of
e
the Physical Security Plan (Section S2.1).
Physical Security Plan changes submitted by the licensee under the
e
provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p) did not decrease the effectiveness
of the PSP.
The licensee agreed to clarify the inconsistent
issues identified in the December 1996 plan change (Section S3.1).
e
Security audits were being conducted in accordance with the
licensee's Physical Security Plan (Section S7.1).
Enclosure 2
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RepfrtDetaih
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 began the report period in day 37 of a scheduled 37 day refueling
outage.
On November 18, unit power was increased to about 20% Rated
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Thermal Power (RTP).
However, the unit was manually scrammed the same
day to implement corrective maintenance for equipment problems
identified during the startup. On November 21, the unit was taken
critical and tied to the grid.
The unit achieved 100% RTP on November
24.
The unit o
report period, perated at this power level for the remainder of the
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except during routine testing activities.
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Unit 2 began the report period at 100% RTP.
On November 20. the unit
was manually scrammed from about 70% RTP due to a condensate booster
pump check valve failure. The unit was taken critical on November 26.
tied to the grid on November 27 and achieved 100% RTP on November 29.
On December 2 the unit experienced a power increase transient due to a
reactor recirculation pump controller problem.
Power increased to about
107% RTP for a short period of time and was immediately restored to 100%
RTP.
The pump speed controller was repaired.
The unit operated at 100%
RTP for the remainder of the report period, except during routine
testing activities.
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I. Operations
01
Conduct of Operations
01.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant
operations.
In general, the conduct of operations was
professional and safety-conscious; specific events and observation
are detailed below.
01.2 Unit 2 Transient and Manual Scram Due to a Condensate Booster Pumo
(CBP) Check Valve Failure
a.
Inspection Scone (71707) (93702)
The inspectors reviewed operator and unit response following a
plant transient and manual scram.
The inspectors assessed system
and com
damage,ponent damage, reviewed the licensees assessment of the
observed corrective maintenance, and obrerved operator
performance during unit startup activities.
b.
Observations and Findinas
On November 20. Unit 2 o>erators placed the 2B CBP in service in
order to remove the 2A C3P from service to investigate and repair
a previously identified lobe oil problem,
immediately after the
2A CBP was removed from service, the-low suction pressure alarm
Enclosure 2
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for the reactor feed
room. The operators' pumps (RFPs) actuated in the main control
attempt to restart the 2A CBP failed.
The 2A
RFP tripped on low suction pressure and initiated a reactor
recirculation pump runback (both
Reactor
power decreased to about 70% RTP, pumps), as designed.
Operators locally at the 2A CBP reported that the pump was
rotating backwards.
When the 2A CBP was removed from service, the pump discharge check
valve failed to seat pro)erly.
The flow from the 2B and 2C CBP
passed through the 2A CB) discharge check valve and caused the
pump to rotate backwards.
This pressurized the CBP discharge,
pump casing and pump suction line to about 500-550 psig.
A
flexible metal bellows, designed to allow pipe movement. in the
,
pump suction line just before each booster pump was misaligned by
about 2 to 3 inches.
The inspectors walked down the booster aump piping and components
and assessed the leakage and damage.
T1e inspectors observed that
the bellows was intact and there was no leakage.
However, a
bolted flange on the suction _ side of the pump appeared to be
stressed and was leaking slightly. Operations. maintenance and
engineering personnel viewed the piping and components and began
discussing actions to shutdown the unit.
A portable camera was setup to monitor the bellows and the area
was barricaded to prevent personnel entry.
Site management
contacted corporate engineering and discussed the problem.
Management decided to develop a shutdown plan repair plan, and
conduct a controlled unit shutdown to implement repairs.
0)erators began decreasing reactor power at about 8:30 p.m. for
tie planned unit shutdown.
When a reactor feedpump was removed
from service at about 75% RTP. the CBP header pressure
significantly increased.. Due to the difficulty in preventing
increased CBP pressure. the operators manually scrammed the
reactor at 8:52 p.m.
A subsequent licensee walkdown of the )iping following the reactor
scram revealed that additional damage lad occurred to the piping
- and components.
The licensee suspected damage to the pump suction
valve, pump discharge check valve, and possibly the pump discharge
isolation valve.
Additionally, the licensee planned to inspect
the minimum flow valve and re) lace the suction bellows that had
ruptured.
The booster pump t1 rust bearing was suspected to be
severely damaged.
During additional walkdowns, the inspectors observed that the
metal bellows had ruptured and was leaking-slightly (the
Enclosure 2
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condensate system was shutdown), the piping and bellows were
significantly misaligned (by about 1 foot), and the CBP piping had
come in contact with one fire protection line.
Some hangers (two,
as observed from the floor) for the fire protection )iping were
bent and two valves were leaking slightly.
Two or t1ree hangers
on the CBP piping were also bent or stressed.
The ins)ectors
verified that operations management was aware of the o] served
damage.
An event review team was assigned to review and assess
the response to the scram.
Corporate engineers were being dispatched to the site the
following day to assess the damage and make recommendations for
repairs.
Operations began actions to bring the unit to hot
shutdown.
,
The licensee and the NRC held a conference call on November 21 and
discussed the unit's response, system and component damage, and
planned actions to further assess the problems. A followup
conference call was made on November 25 to discuss the results of
the licensees walkdown and assessment of the damage and proposed
actions to correct the problems.
Maintenance completed repairs on the 2A CBP suction valve,
discharge valve, minimum flow valve, and pump discharge check
valve.
A new manual isolation valve was installed in the CBP
minimum flow line.
Following the maintenance activities,
operations verified a clearance boundary for the damaged booster
pump.
The condensate system was placed in service and a unit
startup began.
The remaining repairs were scheduled to be
completed while the unit is operating.
The inspectors observed
parts of the maintenance work and later verified that there was no
system or component leakage,
The licensee identified that the valve hinge pin and a retaining
lug for the valve disc spring assembly were broken. All parts of
the damaged valve were located and collected.
Maintenance also
disassembled, inspected and replaced the spring and hinge pin for
the 2B CBP.
The spring was broken and some slight wear was
observed on the hinge pin.
The 2C pump discharge check valve was
replaced during the spring 1997 refueling outage and was not
inspected at that time.
Operations personnel had previously
reported a strange noise in the vicinity of the failed check valve
several days before the failure.
This problem was documented and
was being tracked for future maintenance.
The licensee reviewed other systems and determined that similar
check valves were used only in the condensate system of both
units.
The licensee also reviewed the routine preventive
maintenance (PM) for the check valve inspection to determine if
the inspection frequency should be changed.
The inspectors were
Enclosure 2
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later informed by maintenance management that a recommendation was
made to significantly reduce the existing ins)ection frequency
specified in the Inservice Testing Program.
Engineering and
corporate personnel were to review the recommendation.
0)erations began unit startup on November 26.
The inspectors
o) served parts of the unit startup on November 26 and 27 and did
not observe any deficiencies.
Management personnel were observed
in the control room providing oversight and direction.
The unit
achieved 100% RTP on November 29.
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors. concluded that operator response to the transient
and manual scram was good.
Performance during the unit startup
was excellent.
Maintenance and engineering provided excellent
support to operations during the system and component damage
assessment and repair and replacement activities.
Management was
actively involved in the activities and provided excellent
oversight and direction.
0)erators' observation and attention to
system response when the CB) was removed from service resulted in
excellent control of the problem.
01.3 Observations of On-Shift Doerations Performance
a.
Inspection Scone-(71707)
The inspectors observed control room activities plant operator
rounds, and shift turnovers.
The inspectors interviewed plant
operators, reactor operators, and senior reactor operators.
The
procedures reviewed included AG MGR-54-0592N. " Plant
Communications." Revision (Rev.) 1. 30AC-0PS-003-05. ' Plant
Operations.' Rev. 18. AG MGR 21-0386N. ' Evolution Pre-Test Brief
Requirements.' Rev. 0, and 34AB-C71-001-1S. " Scram Procedure."
Rev. 7.
The inspectors also reviewed portions of the job
performance manuals.
b.
Qbservations and Findinal
The inspectors observed on-going plant operations during the
5,tartup phase of the Unit 1 refueling outage,
in general, the-
observations indicated that the conduct of o)erations was safety-
conscious and actions were in accordance wit 1 the technical
specifications (TS) and plant procedures.
Evolution pre-briefings were observed to be performed per
procedure with the attendees actively participating.
Actions.for.
unex)ected situations and plant conditions were discussed as part
of t1e pre-briefing.
Enclosure 2
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The inspectors observed that the plant operators were
knowledgeable and well-informed of activities in the plant.
During plant walkthroughs with plant equipment operators, random
sampling of knowledge and performance items indicated that they
were familiar with actions required in the plant during emergency
conditions.
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Items identMied during the 31 ant walkthroughs included poor
housekeeping, such as trash )ehind control panels unused hoses
left taped to the ceilings ladders not stored correctly, and
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ladders in use not tied off correctly.
The housekeeping
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observations were discussed with plant management.
The inspectors reviewed the status of deficiency cards attached to
or located near equipment controls and indications on the Unit 1
control board. The small number and recent date of the deficient
items presented no major safety or inspector concerns.
Controi room operators were observed acknowledging annunciator
alarms without verbally announcing the alarms.
Occasionally, when
an annunciator alarm was called out, there was no formal response
from another operator acknowledging the announced alarm.
When
asked about management expectation of annunciator alarm response,
licensee management stated that if the alarm is ex)ected and
verified to be of a known cause, such as a test. tie senior
reactor operator could allow the reactor cperators to acknowledge
the alarms without oral response. The inspectors stated that
these alarms were not called out since the relief of the previous
shift.
The Senior Reactor Operator stated that he did not think
operator performance was appropriate and he would address the
matter with the operators involved. Also, some annunciator alarms
were left without acknowledgment for longer periods of time than
usual. Although two way communications were observed, the final
acknowledgment by the first comunicator was often dropped.
Some
operators called out information, received no &sponse, and did
not repeat the information.
The inspectors observed that some
communications did not meet management's expectations for three-
part communications.
Control room noise level was generally good; individuals near the
control boards were there for specific work.
Most conversations
held at the control boards were discussions addressing the work at
that board.
The inspectors observed that the unit supervisor took
action to remove the personnel when the operators manipulating
controls would be distracted.
An example of this was the removal
of all extra reactor operators during control rod manipulations.
Operator response to a manual reactor scram was observed.
The
operators were well-prepared and familiar with the required scram
Enclosure 2
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actions.
Procedures were used and overall performance was
satisfactory.
c
CQuplusions
The inspectors concluded that operations personnel were
knowledgeable and generally professional.
Interaction with other
groups was controlled to minimize distractions in the control
room.
The operators' communications style, inconsistent three-
part communications, was not consistent with management
expectations.
01.4 Observations of Unit 1 Startuo Activities Followina Refuelina
a.
insoection Secoe (37828) (60710) (71707)
The inspectors observed operator and system performance from the
control room during startup activities.
The inspectors observed
systems and components that had corrective maintenance or design
change work performed during the refueling outage.
The inspectors
reviewed the following procedures and observed selected portions
of ongoing activities.
345V-SUV-018-15. "ECCS Status Checks."
Rev. 6. 34G0 0PS-003 15. "Startup System Status Checklist." Rev.
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9, 3450 E11-010-15. "RHR System." Rev. 24, 3450 N30-001-15. " Main
Turbine Operation," Pov. 19, 34SV-N30 001-15. "Hain Turbine Weekly
Surveillance Test." Rev. O, 3450 N21-003-1S, " Condensate Polishing
Demineralizer System," Rev. 11, and 3450 N21-007-1S, " Condensate
and Feedwater System." Rev. 27. Additionally, the inspectors
reviewed completed procedures which verified that TS requirements
were met.
b.
Observations and Findings-
The inspectors observed that pre evolution briefings were
routinely held and the activities met the requirements of the
procedure.
The activities were gencrally well controlled and
supervisory oversight was evident.
Operators monitored the
control board and were well aware of plant system configuration
and status.
Communications were generally three part
communications but at times only two-part communications were
observed.
The inspectors observed operators roll the main turbine to rated
speed, place the RHR system in the torus cooling mode, place
condensate and feedwater components in service, and place
feedpumps in service.
The inspectors reviewed completed system valve lineups and system
status checks associated with these evolutions.
No deficiencies
were observed and TS requirements were met,
t
Enclosure 2
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c.
Conclusions
,
The inspectors concluded that operator performance during the
Unit 1 startup following the refueling outage was good.
Systems
4
arvi components observed operated and responded as expected. TS
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and regulatory requirements were met for the unit startup.
03
Operations Proceciures and Documentation
03.1
Failure to Follow Procedure and inadeouate Procedure Results in
Groun 1 isolation Sianal on Unit 1 Due to Low Condenser Vacuum
a.
Insoection Scone (717021
The inspectors reviewed general operating )ev,edure
roc
34G0-0PS-013-IS " Normal Plant Shutdown,
t
23 and abnormal
.
procedure 34AB C71-001 lS " Scram Procedure " Rev. 7.
These
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arocedures were used on November 18 during the normal shutdown of
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Jnit 1 for corrective maintenance.
Discussions were also
conducted with licensee personnel.
b.
Observations and Findinns
Unit I was manually scrammed on November 18 to perform corrective
maintenance for problems encountered during startup following the
17th refueling outage. The operating crew performed the scram
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actions of procedure 34AB C71-001-1S,
The inboard and outboard
main steam isolation valves (MSIV's) in the 'A' main steam line
(MSL) were manually closed following the scram to isolate a leak
on valve 1B21-F025A MSIV LLRT Test Connection valve.
This
problem is discussed in Section M1.2 of this report.
Due to low
decay heat, the operating crew closed the remaining inboard MSIVs
(B. C. and D) to reduce the cooldown rate in accordance with step
7.5.6.5 of piocedure 34G0 0PS-013-15.
The o)erating crew was performing th( 3ctions of procedure
34G0 0PS-013-15 concurrently with pr m are 34AB-C71 001-15 when a
Group 1 isolation occurred.
The ink
tors determined from a
review of procedure 34AB-C71-001-15. ,aat step 4.14.3 provided
instructions to the o)erator for opening the main condenser vacuum
breaker valves when tie MSIVs are closed for reasons other than
high radiation.
The inspectors did not identify any procedural
guidance for placing the Condenser Low Vacuum Trip Bypass switches
to the " Bypass"
yosition.
This was the correct action and would
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have prevented tie Group 1 isolation.
Procedure 34GO-0PS 013-15.
step 7.6.8. instructed the operator to place the low vacuum bypass
switches in the " Bypass" position when reactor pressure is
approximately 500 psig.
Enclosure 2
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The inspectors discussed this issue with operations management and
were informed that the operators should know from training and
experience that the condenser low vacuum trip by) ass switches are
to be placed in the " Bypass" position prior to t1e o)ening of the
condenser vacuum breakers.
Placing the switches in )ypass had
been discussed earlier during the pre job briefing.
For corrective actions. the licensee counseled the personnel
involved regarding their oversight and stated that procedures
34AB C71 001-15 and 34AB-C71-001-25 would be revised.
These
procedures had not been revised as of the end of this report
,
period.
(cnclusiorn
.
Operator error and procedural inadequacy resulted in the receipt
of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Group 1 1 solation signal.
This violation constitutes a violation of minor safety
significance and is identified as Non Cited Violation (NCV) 50-
'
321/97 11-01, failure to follow Procedure and inadequate Procedure
Results in Group 1 Isolation.
04.0 Operator Knowledge and Performance
04.1 Late 10 CFR 50.72 Report for a Valid Enoineered Safetv Feature
Actuation on Unit 1
a.
insoection Stone (71707) (92901)
,
The inspectors reviewed procedure 00AC-REG 001-05. " Federal and
State Reporting Requirements." Rev. 5. and discussed their
observations with operators and o)erations management concerning
the Unit 1 ESF actuation on Novem)er 18 and the operators' failure
to make the required NRC 4-hour report.
b.
Observations and Findinas
On November 18. Unit 1 was being started up following a refueling
outage. The reactor was at about 20% RTP when equipment problems
required the unit to be shutdown to implement corrective
maintenance.
This issue is discussed in Sections 03.1 and M1.2 of
this Inspection Report (IR).
The unit was manually scrammed at
about 4:20 p.m.
At about 4:55 p.m.. operators received a control
room alarm for a Group 1 isolation and an isolation of the drywell
aneumatic system.
The isolation signal could not be reset.
Operators initiated a deficiency card.
The inspectors' review indicated that the Operations
Superintendent on Shift (SOS) and the Shift Supervisor (SS) were
aware that the-drywell pneumatics supply had isolated.
Each had
Enclosure 2
-
-
--
__
_
_
_
._ _
_
.
.
9
made log entries to document that the system had isolated on high
flow. Nuclear Safety and Compliance (NSAC) personnel later
reviewed the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) tapes to
verify valves that may have closed and identified that the drywell
-
pneumatic system had isolated and had not been reported as an ESF.
The inspectors determined that the identification of this
deficiency was good performance.
Procedure 00AC REG 001 05, item 53 of Attachment 1. Reporting
Requirements - Four Hour Reports, specifically identified the
reporting requirements for an automatic actuation of an ESF and
further identified that the containment isolation system was an
ESF system. The procedure identified that the SOS as one of the
individuals responsible for making the re) ort. . In this case,
o)erations supervision failed to ensure t1at the ESF actuation for
t1e containment isolation was re)orted within the required 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />
4
time period. As a result, the 4-lour NRC notification was made at
12:58 p.m. on November 19, which was about 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> late.
This is
identified as Violation 50 321/97-11 02 Late 10 CFR 50.72
Notification for Unit 1 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation.
The inspectors reviewed licensee performance with respect to late -
NRC notifications during the last two years.
The ins)ectors
documented an NCV for a late 10 CFR 50.72 report in 11 50-321,
366/96 06,
The inspectors concluded that the reason for this late
notification was due to deficiencies in operations personnel
interpretation and understanding of the reporting requirements. A
second late notification was identified and a violation was issued
on August 30, 1996. in IR 50 321, 366/96 10.
A third late
notification was identified and a violation was issued on May 5.
1997.
This problem is documented in IR 50-321, 366/97-02.
Appendix B of 10 CFR 50 requires in part, ccrrective actions to
preclude repetition of significant conditions adverse to quality.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's correctivo actions to
prevent late 10 CFR 50.72 notifications were not adequate to
prevent recurrence.
This is identified as VIO 50-321,
366/97-11-03. Inadequate Corrective Actions for late 10 CFR 50.72
Notifications,
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors identified VIO 50-321/97 11-02. Late 10 CFR 50.72
Notification for Unit 1 Engineered Safe.y Feature Actuation.
Also, the inspectors concluded that ,.evious corrective actions to
prevent recurrence of late 4-hour reports to the NRC were not
adequate to meet the requirement of 10 CFR 50. Appendix B.
Criterion XVI. Corrective Action.
The failure to implement
adequate corrective actions was identified as V10 50-321. 366/97-
Enclosure 2
l
-.
.
10
1103. Inadequate Corrective Actions for Late 10 CFR 50.72
Notifications.
04.2 Unit 2 Power Excursion be to Sourious Soeed increase of the 2A
Reactor Recirculation ( N) Pumo
a.
Insnection Scone (71707) (62707)
The inspectors reviewed Unit 2 TS 3.4.1. " Recirculation Loops
Operating" and 3.4.2. " Jet Pumps." and procedures 34AB B31 001-25.
" Trip of Or.e or Both Reactor Recirculation Pumps, or Recirc l. oops
Flow Mismatch." Rev. 5. 34G0 0PS 022 05. " Maintaining Rated
Thermal Power." Rev. 7.- and 34S0 B31-001-2S. " Reactor
Recirculation System." Rev 23.
Maintenance Ucrk Orders (MW0s)
associated with the troubleshooting and repair activities of
Instrumentation and Control (l&C) personnel were also reviewed.
These reviews were associated with the spurious increase of the
2A RR pump to the high spced stop.
The inspectors also discussed
the event with reactor engineering. 1&C. and operations personnel.
b.
Observations and Findinas
On December 2. the s)eed of the 2A RR pump on Unit 2 spuriously
increased to the hig1 speed stop (105% of rated speed).
Reactor
power increased from 100% RTP to 107% RTP and subsequently
stabilized at 104%.
Upon discovery of the cause of the power
excursion, the shift operating team placed the 2A ) ump controller
in manual and reduced the speed to match that of t1e 'B'
RR pump
per the direction of the Shift Supervisor.
Reactor power was
a) proximately 96% with the RR pump speeds matched.
The unit was
a)ove 100% RTP for approximately two minutes.
The "immediate exit
region" of the power to-flo+ map was entered for this length of
time.
The inspectors were informed by operations and reactor engineering-
personnel that a thermal limits review indicated that no thermal
limits had been exceeded. -Operations personnel also informed the
inspectors that no TS entry conditions existed during the event.
The inspectors verified no TS entry conditions existed through an
independent TS review.
- Deficiency Cards '(DCs) were written for I&C technicians to
investigate the cause of the controller's speed ramp to the high
s)eed stop.
The inspectors reviewed MW0s 2 97-3343 and 2-97-3344.
T1e inspectors observed from the MWO review that I&C personnel
discovered that the speed bias button was stuck with a slight
increase signal.
The I&C technicians cleaned and lubricated the
bias button per instructions provided in MWO 2-97-3343.
c
Enclosure 2
.
.
11
The inspectors discussed the adjustment of the bias button with
the operators and operation supervision.
The inspectors were
informed that the bias had not been recently adjusted prior to the
speed excursion of the 2A RR pump.
It was further stated by
operations personnel that bias adjustmentt on the RR speed
controller were performed on an infrequent basis for maintaining
100% RTP.
Bias manipulation allows for precise control of the RR
pumps' speed.
The inspectors reviewed procedure 3450 831-001 2S
for the RR system and did not find instructions for using the bic;
buttons.
This nas discussed with operations management who stated
that the procedure would be revised to include the necessary
instructions for adjusting the pump bias.
The inspectors were informed by 1&C supervision that a similar
button sticking problem had been observed with the older
controllers on at least one occasion but that this was the first
time that this type of speed control problem had occrred with the
new Yokogawa controller
The inspectors were aware that similar controller button sticking
problems had occurred on the feedwater system controllers. The
inspectors had observed that deficiencies were written and caution
tags were placed to remind operators of the problem,
The problems
were discussed at shift meetings and the caution tags were later
removed.
The inspectors discussed the button sticking problem
with operations personnel.
Each operator questioned was aware of
the problem.
The inspectors concluded that the button sticking
problem was common knowledge.
1&C personnel had changed the type
of lubricant used and believed the problem was corrected.
Following 1&C troubleshooting and repair activities, the unit was
returned to 100% aower and the 2A controller was returned to the
automatic mode.
10 further problems were observed.
c.
Conclusions
The actions of operations personnel were appropriate for the power
exursion due to the 2A RR pump spurious speed increase to the
high speed stop.
Reactor engineering and I&C personnel provided
good support to operations.
08
Hiscellaneous Operations Issues (92700) (92901) (92904)
08.1
(Closed) LER 50-366/97-10:
Manual Reactor Shutdown Results in
Water Level Decrease and Group 2 and 5 PCIS Actuations.
The licensee issued this Licensee Event Report (LER) dated
December 8. 1997.
This issue is documented in Section 01.2 of
this IR.
The LER presented no new information. Based upon the
inspectors' review of licensee actions, this LER is closed.
Enclosure 2
_- - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
I
12-
08.2 (Closedi LER 50 321/97 08:
Personnel Error and Inadeauate
Procedure Results in Groun 1 lsolation on Low Condenser Vacuut
-
The licensee issued this LER dated December 8. 1997. This issue
is discussed in Section 03.1 of this IR.
The LER presented na new
information.
The inspectors verified that the procedures were
-revised on December 30.
Based upon the inspectors' review of
licensee actions and the issuance of a NCV. this LER is closed.
08.3 (Closed) URI 50-321.366/96 13 02:
RC/P-3.
,
This Unresolved item is discussed in IR 50 321, 366/96 13.
Section 03.2.
The NRC staff reviewed this issue under Task
Interface Agreement (TIA) 96 020 and concluded that an E0P
deviation from the Emergency Procedure Guidelines did not exist.
Based upon the additional review, this Unresolved item is closed.
08.4 (Closed) VIO 50-321. 366/97-02-02:
Failure to Follow Procedure -
Multinle Examnles.
The licensee res)onded to this violation in documentation dated
May 30, 1997,
11e first of the four examples dealt with the
failure to follow a procedure which resulted in the automatic
start of an emergency diesel generator. The licensee identified
the cause as personnel error and less-than adequate procedural
guidance.
For corrective actions, the licensee counseled the
individusls involved and revised procedures for better clarity.
The inspectors observed that the procedures for both units were
revised as stated in the licensee's response to the violation.
The second example dealt with maintenance activities being
performed on equipment with an inadequate clearance boundary.
The
cause was personnel error. As corrective actions the licensee
counseled the personnel involved and the issue was discussed in
Maintenance tool box meetings.
The third example dealt with the failure to recognize that the
removal of bolts during a design change resulted in a degraded
The cause was )ersonnel error and a less-than-
adequate fire protection checclist.
For corrective actions.-the
personnel involved were counseled and the fire protection
checklist was revised to aid personnel in identifying a breach of
The inspectors observed that the procedures were
revised as stated in the licensee's response.
Additionally, a
departmental directive was issued reinforcing management's
expectations for reviewing fire protection checklists.
The fourth example dealt with maintenance work being performed
that was outside the scope of the approved maintenance work order.
Enclosure 2
l-
- n
n, - , - -
- -.
-
-,,,--,---mmn-
-
..n
., , - - .
-
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,-
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. . _ _ .
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
__ _
_ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _
.
1
-
i
13
.
t
The cause was personnel error. The foreman involved was
disciplined in accordance with the Positive Discipline Program
regardirg his fbilure to provide adequate supervision of the
workert inv0lved.
The involved worker was coached concerning
'
restrictin9 their work activities to those explicitly described on
the MWO.
Bardd upon the inspectors review of licensee actions,
,
i
this violation is closed.
08.5 Mlpeg Q.J1Q p 366/97 02-03:
Late 10 CFR 50.72 Notification For
!
a
]
$1G/g(Agdafety Feature Actuation for Containment Jsolation.
1
The licensce res)onded to this violation in documentation dated
May 30. 1997.
T u cause of the violation was personnel error.
For corrective actions the licensee counseled the Shift Supervisor
involved.
The operations manager issued a policy letter on
-
'
A)ril 3.1997 specifying how such actuations are to be handled in
tle future.
Based upon the inspectors' review of licensee
actions, this violation is closed.
08.6 1 Closed) VT,50-321. 366/97-05-02:
Failure to Follow Procedure;.
Multiole Ex moles.
'
The licensee responded to this violation in documentation dated
'
August 22. 1997.
This violation contained four examples of
failure to follow procedure.
The first example dealt with a
failure to correctly identify a clearance boundary. The cause was
personnel error.
As corrective actions, the licensee counseled
,
the personnel involved.
The problem was also discussed at
beginning of shift meetings.
An inadequate system drawing
contributed to the problem.
The inspectors verified that the
drawing had been revised as indicated in the licensee's response.
>
1
The second example was caused by inadecuate procedure.
Fire
protection personnel.did not perform acditional surveillances for
rejected fire penetrations.
The inspectors verified that the
f
procedures for both units were revised as stated in the violation
response.
The third example was caused by personnel error. Workers failed
to inform Health Physics (HP) personnel when work conditions were
>
i
not as previously identified.
This resulted in personnel
,
unnecessary contaminations. As corrective actions, the licensee
made personnel aware of the event. its consequences, and causes.
Proper communication and a questioning attitude were stressed.
The fourth example was caused by personnel error.
Poor
communications resulted in personnel contaminations when workers
'
disassembled a contaminated structure without proper HP oversight.
A multi-disciplined Problem Solving Team was formed to
investigatethis and other similar problems and make
c
Enclosure 2
't
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,
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_ . - -
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_
.
.
14
recommendations for further actions and improvement.
Based upon
the inspectors' review of licensee actions, this violation is
closed.
II. Maintenanc.g
M1
Conduct of Haintenance
M1.1 General Comments
a.
Inspection Stone (62707)
The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the
following work activities:
MWO 1 97-2533:
repair leak on valve IB21-F025A
.
.
MWO l-97-3297:
tighten valve packing on valve 1821-F025A
MWO 1 97-3299:
repack main turbine stop valves 1N30 F006
.
and F007
MWO 1-97-0585:
repair air relay dump valve IN32-F021
.
.
MWO l-97-3320:
disassemble air relay dump valve IN32-F021
and investigate for air leakage
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors found that the work was performed with the work
packages present and being actively used,
c.
Conclusions on Conduct of Maintenance
Maintenance activities were generally completed in a thorough and
professional manner.
However, two examples of poor work practices
during maintenance activities were identified.
M1.2 Restart Problems on Unit 1 FolkMn.gfall 97 Refuelino Outaae
n
a.
Insoection Scone (62707)
The inspectors reviewed ap)licable procedures. Technical
Specifications (TSs), and iaintenance Work Orders (MW0s)
associated with problems encountered during the Unit I restart and
subsequent shutdown following the Fall 1997 refueling outage.
Discussions were also held with various licensee personnel,
b.
Observations and Findinas
The Unit I reactor was brought critical on November 16.
Power was
increased to approximately 20% RTP with the main turbine at 1800
RPM before the unit was manually scrammed on November 18 due to
equipment problems.
The following equipment problems were
Enclosure 2
.
.
15
encountered during the startup and subsequent shutdown of the
unit.
The extraction relay dump valve (IN32-F021) was disassembled
.
end inspec'.ed during the Fall 1997 Refueling Outage.
The
four piston rings in the valve were found to be worn during
'
the inspection. The valve was cleaned and the four worn
piston rings along with 0-rings were replaced.
The valve
was assembled following the maintenance activity.
Durit'g unit startup on November 18. prior to turbine-
generator synchronization to the grid, air was discovered
leakir.g from the valve.
A decision was made to shutdown the
reacto? to support repair o' this valve, in addition to the
main st0p valves (IN30 F006 and 1N30 F007), and the MSIV
drain lire valve (IB21-F025A) discussed above.
The extraction relay dump valve was disassembled and
inspected during the unit shutdown. The inspectors were
informed by the responsible performance team leader that one
of the four piston rings replaced during the refueling
outage was found to be installed with the improper
orientation (upside down).
This problem allowed air to leak
by the piston.
The orientation of the piston ring was
corrected and the valve was reassembled.
The inspectors
reviewed MWO's 1-97-0585 and 1-97-3320 for the work
activities associated with the original repair of valve
!N32-F021.
This problem was attributed to poor workmanship.
The inspectors were further informed by maintenance
personnel that the oiston ring replacement was still of the
craft with General
Electric (GE) guidance.
A deficiency
card was written for the improperly placed piston ring upon
its discovery.
For additional corrective actions, the use
of GE's guidance and work activity monitoring for these
valves in the future will be enhanced.
Following the manual scram for the plant shutdown and the
closing of the inboard MSIV for pressure control, a nitrogen
supply line isolation valve to t1e drywell closed.
The
drywell pneumatic header isolation solenoid valve IP70-F004
closed on high nitrogen flow after a ten-minute time delay.
Operators suspected that something came loose during the
closing of the inboard MSIVs. The subsequent investigation
determined that the nitrogen supply line to the 'B' inboard
MSIV was leaking.
The nitrogen leak was caused by an
impro)er seal between the pneumatic manifold and actuator
for t1e 'B' inboard MSIV.
This was caused by a poor work
practice for tightening the bolts.
Bolts were not randomly
selected for tightening.
This resulted in some bolts on one
Enclosure 2
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -
,
.
16
side of the manifold reaching the bottom of the bolt hole
while other bolts reached their torque limit prior to
ensuring the 0 ring seal was properly compressed.
The licensee made a 10 CFR 50.72 notification to the NRC and
submitted LER 50-321/97 007. " Pneumatic Leak Results in Closure of
Primary Containment isolation Valve." This LER is discussed in
Section M8.2 of this Inspection Report (IR).
The inspectors reviewed TS Section 3.4.3. " Safety / Relief Valves."
and the a)plicable section of the Unit 1 Updated Final Safety
.
Analysis Report (UFSAR).
No discrepancies were identified.
i
Additionally, the inspectc?s reviewed MWO 1-97-3330 and MWO
'
l-97-3342, associated with the repairs performed on the nitrogen
supply line to MSIV IB21 F0228.
c.
Conclusions
l
The decision by licensee management to shutdown Unit 1 for
corrective maintenance following the restart problems was
appropriate.
Poor maintenance work practices contributed to the
unit shutdown.
Maintenance response and support of the work
activities were good.
M2
Maintenance and Materiel Condition of Facility and Equipment
M2.2 Cold Weather Prenarations
a.
Inspection Stone (71714)
The inspectors reviewed maintenance procedure 52PM MEL-005-05.
" Cold Weather Checks." Rev. 9. 0)erations Department Instruction
Dl-0PS 36-0989N. " Cold Weather C1ecks." Rev. 9. and the associated
data package for procedure 52PM-MEL-005 05. _The inspectors
performed system and component walkdowns, and reviewed documents
associated with cold weather preparations.
b.
Observations and Findinas
Among the areas observed and reviewed were the following:
Review of procedures used to calibrate and test equipment
.
a ociated with heat tracing, space heaters, and thermostats
System walkdowns to observe heat tracing, space heaters and
insulation installed on systems susceptible to cold weather
conditions. Walkdowns were also performed to observe the
material condition of automatic and manual louvers
Enclosure 2
j
.
.
17
Review of instructions and checklists used to implement
.
responses to actual cold weather conditions
Review of defici m cies and corrective maintenance associated
with the licen
most recent cold weather checks.
The procedure and inst, action provided for testing and repair of
equi) ment associated with cold weather protection as well as a
chectlist to ensure that exposed equipment was adequately
protected during cold weather conditions.
The data package was
the
,mpleted checklist.
This checklist was the cold weather
check for operability of the listed space heaters, heat traced
components, and insulation.
The inspectors performed walkdowns of the emergency diesel
generator (EDG) building, intake structure, fire pum) building,
service water valve pit. fire water storage tanks, t1e condensate
storage tanks and transfer pump pits, the circulating water pumas,
and above ground piping systems.
These areas contain systems tlat
are important to safety and/or could cause a plant transient.
During the walkdowns on December 8 the inspectors observed that
several heat trace indicating light lens were missing on the fire
pump house storage tanks and the EDG building areas.
T*
inspectors also observed that about one third of the
trace
indicating lights in the service water valve pit areu ..ere not
illuminated during a walkdown when the ambient temperature was at
or below freezing.
These deficiencies were discussed with
licensee personnel.
The inspectors reviewed a representative sampling of MW0s
associated with the Deficiency Cards (DCs) identified in the data
Jackage review,
The inspectors observed from this review that the
)Cs were concerned mostly with heat trace problems.
The
inspectors also observed that once identified, these items were
promptly corrected.
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the cold weather preparation program
was good.
The procedures for performing equipment operability
checks were appropriate and maintenance corrected the identified
cold weather preparation deficiencies in a timely manner.
.
M2.3 Jnsulation Removal Durina Snubber Work Activity
a.
In.nectionStone(62707)(92902)
The inspectors reviewed procedure 52GM-MNT-019-05. " Removal,
Storage and Installation of Thermal Insulation." Rev. 1. and
departmental instruction DI-MMS-01-0292N. " Plant Modification and
Encicsure 2
- --
. - . - - . - - - -
. . - _
. -
- -
- - -
- -
,
.
a
w
i
18
Maintenance Support (PMMS) Em)loyee Orientation and Procedure
Awareness Program." Rev. 7.
iW0s 1 97-0900 and 1 97 1676 were
also. reviewed. Worksheet S 97 020 M003 was reviewed in
-
conjunction with MWO l-97-1676.
Additionally, the removal of the
i
insulation was discussed with licensee personnel.
b.
Observations and Findinas
During a routine plant tour on December 5. the inspectors
observed insulation on the floor of the Unit I reactor
4
building at the 118 foot (ft) elevation.
The insulation had
been removed from around a snubber lower support that was
welded to the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) heat exchanger
bypass piping.
The snubber at this location had been
removed.
A tag attached to the snubber lower support
indicated that the support was " retired" in place per the
design change associated with the licensee's snubber
reduction program.
The small amount of insulation that was
removed did not affect the operability of the system or area
coolers.
'
The routine plant tour by the inspectors was performed following a
plant-wide housekeeping inspection and cleaning tour by plant
personnel / management.
The inspectors observed that the insulation
was on the floor during a followup inspection several days later.
The inspectors at this time informed PMMS supervision of the
removed insulation.
The inspectors observed from their review
that the insulation was removed on about November 4 and had not
been replaced as of December 5.
The inspectors discussed this
problem with PMMS and maintenance personnel.
Personnel in neither
department were aware that the insulation had been removed and
needed to be replaced. PMMS personnel promptly replaced the
removed insulation.
.
From a review of MWO 1-97-1676 and Worksheet S-97-020 M003 the
inspectors observed that neither document provided instructions
for the removal or installaticn of the insulation.
This issue was
discussed with PMMS supervision.
The inspectors were informed
that the insulation work for the outage was performed on blanket
MWO 1-97-0900.
The ins)ectors reviewed this MWO and observed that
the work activity for t1e removal and replacement of the
insulation on the RHR heat exchanger bypass piping for snubber
IEll H227 was not documented until af ter the inspectors informed
personnel of the insulation removal.
The inspectors were informed by the PMMS supervisor that the
insulation was removed by a loaned craftsman.
The loaned
craftsman vas from another electric utility within the Southern
Company organization.
The craftsman that was tasked with the
removal of snubber lEll-H227 also removed the insulation. A
Enclosure 2
-
---
,
.--
- .-...--....%.
. . . - -
_ - - . , _ _ - - - , . - - - , .
~
,
. ~ , - - ,
.
. . . . -
. ~
- - - - - . -
. - - ,
-
-_
_ - -
.
.
19
Southern Com)any supervisor was 3roviding oversight of the loaned
craftsman. 17e craftsman should lave checked with the su)ervisor
prior to the removal of the insulation. The supervisor s1ould have
completed an insulation removal and Installation request. As a
result of the documented request the insulation would have been
entered into a computer tracking data base for replacement. Since
this was not done, there was no record to indicate that the
insulation had been removed.
The inspectors reviewed training records for loaned personnel and
observed that, in this case, the loaned person did not receive
training on the procedure for insulation removal or installation.
This procedure explained the site process for insulation work
activities,
c.
Conclusions
PMMS response to the staff's notification of the removed
insulation was prompt. Weaknesses were identified in supervisor
oversight of loaned personnel work activities for this problem. y
H3
Maintenance Procedures and Documentav an
M3.1 Surveillance Observations (61726)
Insnection Scooe and Conclusions
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following Unit 1
and Unit 2 surveillance activities:
MSIV Closure Instrument Functional Test.
Rev. 6
RCIC Turbine Speed Control Test. Rev. 3
Operation of RCIC From the Remote Shutdown
Panel. Rev. O
RCIC Pump Operability. Rev. 18
RCIC Valve Operability. Rev. 16
575V Gll-005 2S:
Drywell Floor Drain Sump Level FT&C, Rev.
4
ITT Barton Model 764 Differential Pressure
Transmitter. Rev. 16
345V R43 003-2S:
Diesel Generator 2C Monthly Test. Rev.19
For the surveillances observed, all data met the required
acceptance criteria and the equipment nerformed satisfactorily.
The performance of the operators and crews conducting the
surveillances was generally professional and competent.
No
deficiencies were identified.
Enclosure 2
-..
. -
- _ -
...
.- - - .
- -
_ - - -
.
.
20
M4
Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance
M4.1 Observation of Online Loaic System Functional Test of Main Control
r
loom Pressurization System
a.
Insoection Stone (92902) (92902).
The inspectors reviewed procedure 42SV-Z41-001 05, " Main Control
Room Pressurization LSFT," Rev. 8. the applicable 10 CFR 50,59
evaluation for a recent procedure change. Unit 1 and Unit 2 TSs 3.7.4.3 and 3.3.7.1.4, Unit 1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
(UFSAR) section 10.17. and Unit 2 UFSAR sections 6.4. 7.3.5, and
9.4.
The inspectors also reviewed procedure AG MGR-21-0386N.
" Evolution Pre Test Briefing Requirements," Rev. O Department
Instruction DI 0PS-0596N " General Guidelines for Use of Jumpers
and Links," Rev. 0, and observed selected portions of the testing
activities to verify that actions were completed in accordance
with procedure and regulatory requirements.
b.
Observations and Findinns
The inspectors attended the pre-job briefing for the testing
activiues.
The test affected bott units and required manual
manipulation of system components.
The test also required
automatic system actuation and realignment.
The briefing was
conducted by engineering personnel responsible for the test.
The
inspectors observed that the procedural recuirements for the
pre-job briefing were met.
Engineering anc operations personnel
were knowledgeable of the system and test requirements.
The inspectors observed that the retrieval, placement, and removal
of required jumpers were well-controlled.
Procedure steps
completed were initialed, second person verifications were
correctly performed, and peer checks were implemented. The test
was completed with no deficiencies. The systems responded as
expected and all test acceptance criteria wera met,
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the overall performance of the test
activity was excellent.
Engineering and operations personnel were
knowledgeable of the system and test requirements.
The retrieval.
31acement, and removal of required jumpers were well-controlled,
3rocedures were correctly used.
The systems responded as expected
and all test acceptance criteria were met.
The 10 CFR 50.59
+
evaluation was appropriate.
Enclosure 2
_
.
.
21
M8
Hiscellaneous Maintenance Issues (92700) (92902)
M8.1
(Closed) LER 50 321/97-06: ansarent LPRM TIP Calibration Tube
f ailure Results in >rimary System Pressure Boundry Leakace
The inspectors reviewed licensee actions to replace the TIP tubing
and the TIP post maintenance and operability test.
No
deficiencies were identifled.
The inspectors observed that the
licensee's corrective actions were appropriate.
This licensee-
identified violation constitutes a violation of minor safety
significance and is being identified as Non-Cited Violation
50 321/97-11-04. Failure to Meet Unit 1 Technical Specification
Actions for Primary Systen Pressure Boundary Leakage.
The LER was
detailed and thorough. Based upon the ins)ectors review of
licensee actions and the issuance of the 1CV. this LER is closed.
M8.2 (Closed) LER 50-321/97-07:
Pneumatic Leak Results in Closure of
Primary Containment Isolation Valve
The licensee issued this LER dated December 10, 1997. following a
manual scram of Unit 1 to complete corrective maintenance. The
unit was just exiting a refueling outage.
This problem is
discussed in Sections 04.1 and M1.2 of this inspection Report.
The LER presented no new information.
Based upon the inspectors
review of licensee's actions, this LER is closed.
M8.3 (Closed) IFl 50 321/97-10-01:
Review of Unit 1 RCIC Testina
Artivities from the Remote Shutdown Panej.
This IFl wa, identified following a failure of the Unit 1 Reactor
Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system to operate from the Remote
Shutdown Panel (PSP).
The system failed to meet the required
testing acceptance criteria during a routine surveillance test
conducted just before the regularly scheduled refueling outage.
This problem is discussed in Section 02.1 of IR 50 321. 366/97-10.
The inspectors reviewed the results of the tests completed during
the unit startup and verified that the system operated properly
from the RSP.
All test results met the acceptance iequirements.
Based upon the inspectors' review of licensee activities for RCIC
corrective maintenance and the results of the required RCIC
testing activities, this IFI is closed.
III. Enoineerina
El
Conduct of Engineering
On-site engineering activities were reviewed to determine their
effectiveness in preventing, identifying, and resolving safety
issues._ events, and problems.
In general, engineering support to
operations and maintenance was excellent.
Enclosure 2
_ - _____
_
-_.
.
22
E2
Engineering Support of Facilities ard Equipment
E2.1 Review of Unit 2 Torus-to-Reactor Building Vacuum Bre2ker Design,
a.
In mection Scone (37551)
The inspectors reviewed Unit 2 Torus-to-Reactor Building Vacuum
Breaker des 4gn for acceptability of a single passive component to
meet containment isolation requirements. This had been identified
,
'
as a potential problem at other Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) sites.
The inspectors reviewed Unit 2 drawing H26084. " Primary
Containment Purge and Inerting System." and discussed the issue
with site management personnel,
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors reviewed this design issue as to whether the torus-
to-reactor building vacuum breaker design problem identified at
another facility was applicable for Hatch. The concern was whether
or not a single check valve could be relied upon to provide
containment isclation during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA).
The design at the other facility and at Hatch consist of two
redundant vacuum relief lines from the reactor building to the
torus, each containing two valves in series: an air-operated
butterfly valve and a check valve. The lines are normally 20
inches in diameter. The purpose of these lines and associated
vacuum breakers is to limit a vacuum in the containment.
Because
the lines penetrate primary containment, the vacuum breaker serve
a dual function:
vacuum relief and containment isolation.
The
air-operated butterfly valves are normally closed and are designed
to open upon a diffarential of 0.5 pounds per square inch gage
(psig) between the reactor building and the torus.
The
air-operated valves have been designed to fail open upon a loss of
air or electrical power.
Other post-accident conditions may also
cause the valves to open as designed.
Open is the safe position
for the vacuum relief function.
Therefore, given an event during
which the air supply or the electrical power cannot be assumed to
be operable, or accident conditions call for the valves to be
open, the single check valve in each line must perform the
containment isolation safety function.
This does not meet the
General Design Criteria (GDC) 56 requirements of 10 CFR 50
Appendix A.
The NRC reviewed several other BWRs with Mark I containments that
employ a similar design.
Part of the conclusions from the review
was that the safety risk from this design is low; therefore, the
staff concluded that a safety enhancement backfit would not be
cost-beneficial .
The conclusion was also based upon the fact that
most sites did meet their current licensing basis. This position
Enclosure 2
1
..
-
, - .
. - -
. .
-
--
-
-
.
.
23
,
also applied to other BWRs with Mark I containments-with the
exception of Hatch Unit 2.
Hatch Unit 2 is desianed similar to
the other design configurations reviewed, however, the
construction permit for Hatch Unit 2 was issued after May 21,
1971, and is required to explicitly comply with the GDC of
Appendix A of 10 CFR part 50.
Hatch Unit I was not affected based
upon the-date of the construction permit.
The inspectors reviewed the problem with licensee management.
The
inspectors were informed that the problem would be reviewed to
determine what actions were appropriate.
The inspectors were
later informed that the licensee was developing an exemption
request for the GDC 56 requirements for Hatch Unit 2.
-
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the Hatch Unit 2 torus-to-reactor
building vacuum breaker design does not meet General Design
Criteria 56 for acceptability of a single passive component to
meet containment isolation requirements. The corrent design.
under certain conditions, relies upon a simple check valve as an
automatic containment isolation valve outside containment for a
line which is directly connected to the containment atmosphere.
This problem was identified as Unresolved Item 50-366/97-11-08.
Unit 2 Failure to Meet General Design Criteria 56 for Proper
Automatic Containment Isolation Valve Outside Containment. pending
additional review.
'
E2.2 Emeroency Diesel Generator (EDG) 2C Failure to St?rt
_
a.
Inspection Scoce (37551) (92902) (92903)
The inspectors reviewed maintenance trouble shooting and
corrective maintenance activities associated with a failure to
start on the 2C EDG on November 24.
The inspectors observed part
of-the post-maintenance testing and verified test acceptance
criteria.
The inspectors discussed this failure and other EDG
issues with maintenance and engineering personnel.
b.
Observations and Findinas
On November 24. the 2C EDG was tagged out for maintenance
er.tivitics to calibrate a cooling water temperature control valve.
Following the maintenance activity, surveillance procedure
345V-R43-003-25. " Diesel Generator 2C Monthly Test." Rev. 19, was
being aerformed by operations personnel.
The EDG failed to start
when t1e local start push button was depressed.
This was the
second EDG failure to start within the past three months. The
licensee experienced a failure of the 1A EDG to start in
September,1997. due to a suspected fuel oil check valve failure.
Enclosure 2
. _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ __
_ - _ _ _
_
_
.
,
24
Maintenance personnel were assigned to trouble shoot and correct
the 2C EDG problem.
Following maintenance trouble shooting a new
governor booster servomotor was installed.
The EDG performed
satisfactorily during a subsequent post-maintenance run.
The inspectors observed ongoin
EDG operability surveillance g work activities and parts of the
and verified that the test
acceptance criteria were met. The inspectors verified that
a)plicable TS required action was being tracked for the inoperable
EE.
The inspectors reviewed MWO 2-97-2435 used to trouble shoot
and repair the EDG.
.
l
The licensee issued Significant Occurrence Report (SOR) C9706228
documenting the 2C EDG start failure and subsequent failure
l
t
analysis. The inspectors reviewed the SOR for appropriate
l
corrective action recommendations. All EDG booster servomotors
had been replaced in 1990-1991 as part of a then 5-year preventive
maintenance program for governors and associated equipment.
Plant
Hatch has no history of failed booster servomotors, and the
. licensee concluded that this was an isolated failure.
After
discussions with the vendor, maintenance and engineering personnel
recommended that the booster servomotors be placed on a 6-10 year
replacement schedule, based on service history.
Implementation
was scheduled for January.1998.
Based on the 1A and 2C EDG start failures, the inspectors examined
actions implemented by systems engineering with regard to
Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) requirements for the EDGs.
The
inspectors found that reliability and availability data for each
EDG is currently compiled and updated monthly.
Performance
criteria for each EDG had been established as required by
The availability and reliability aerformance
criteria for each EDG is 98% and 95%. respectively.
T1e
inspectors verified that the updated performance data reflected a
1A EDG availability of 99.92% and a reliability of 98.39%.
The
2C EDG performance data was verified to be 99,85% and 98.28%.
respectively. The recent start failures represented the only
start failures for these engines over the past three years.
The
licensee determined that no additional testing was necessary.
c.
Conclusions
Licensee maintenance and engineering actions in response to the
2C EDG start failure were appropriate and thorough.
Maintenance
and engineering recommendations reflected a good interface with
the vendor. The inspectors verified that Maintenance Rule
performance criteria for the EDGs were being met, and that
performance data was being tracked and updated periodically.
Enclosure 2
]
-
-
_
_
_
_
.
.
25
E8
Hiscellaneous Engineering Issues (92700) (92903)
E8.1
(Closed) LER 50-366/97-04:
Inaccurate List of Primary Containment
Isolation Valves Results in Missed Surveillance
The licensee reported this problem in correspondence dated
April 29,1997. The cause cf the problem was that two valves were
not listed in a Unit 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
(UFSAR) table as primary containment isolation Vahe positions
that were considered qualified post-accident monitoring
instruments.
The list was carried forward to the Technical
Requirements Manual (TRM) and surveillance procedures were
developed using the TRM as the basis. The licensee corrected the
UFSAR and TRM table and verified they were all-inclusive.
The
missed surveillance were completed prior to the unit startup.
Based upon the inspectors review of licensee actions, this LER is
closed
IV Plant Suor, ort
R1
Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
Rl.1 Conduct of Radioloaical Protection Controls
a.
Insoection Scoce (83750. 85750)
Radiological controls associated with on-going routine Unit 1 (U1)
and Unit 2 (U2) operations were reviewed and evaluated by the
inspectors.
Reviewed program areas included area postings and
radioactive waste (radwaste) and material container labels high
and locked-high radiation area controls, and procedural and
radiation work permit (RWP) implementation.
The inspectors made frequent tours of Radiological Control Areas
(RCAs) and observed work activities in orogress.
In particular,
radiation control
3ractices and Health physics (HP) staff
proficiency were o) served. Where applicable, results of ongoing
radiation and contamination survey results were verified.
Radiological controls and housekeeping practices in selected U1
turbine building areas. U1 resin processing building. U2 liquid
radioactive waste (radwaste) tank rooms. and in the C1 and U2
spent fuel pools (SFPs) were observed and discussed. On December
9.1997, the inspectors directly observed and evaluated the final
processing
Jackaging and subsequent shipping preparations for U1
condensate plase separator (CPS) System resins conducted in
accordance with Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 097-0017.
Procedural guidance and established radiological controls were
compared against applicable sections of the Updated Final Safety
Enclosure 2
.
_
_.
__.
-- . . -
-
.
--.
.
--
.
-
. . -
.
.
'
.
26
Analysis Report (UFSAR) and the applicable requiremeats specified
in Technical Specifications (TSs): 10 CFR Parts 20 and 71: and
.49 CFR Parts 100-179.
b.
Observations and Findinas
j
'
All area postings and container labels were dettrmined to be
adequate for the associated radiological conditions.
Controls for
high and locked high-radiation area doors were implemented
effectively. Observed controls for irradiated / contaminate (1
materials suspended in the U1 and U2 SFPs were appropriate with
lanyards labeled and positive controls established to prevent
inadvertent removal of materials from the pools.
For the
December 9, 1997, radwaste processing and shipping activities
observed, appropriate radiological controls were established and
dose rate and contamination survey results were conducted with
appropriate calibrated instrumentation. Survey and contamination
results met procedural and regulatory requirements.
The
inspectors noted continued improvement in housekeeping ar
'
cleanliness within observed work areas and the U2 radwaste tank
rooms relative to previous inspections.
c.
Conclusions
Radiological controls, area postings, and container labels
associated with radwaste processing storage, and transportation
activities were maintained in accordance with TSs: 10 CFR Parts 20
and 71: and 49 CFR Parts 100-179 requirements.
Improvements were noted in the radwaste facility housekeeping and
cleanliness.
R1.2 Liauid Radwaste Effluent Processina. Analysis and Release
-a.
Insoection Scooe (84750)
Ongoing liquid effluent release program activities were evaluated.
Licensee actions for liquid effluent releases made subsequent to
the U1 liquid radiation monitor being declared out of service
(DOS) were reviewed and discussed.
Liquid effluent release data
were reviewed and evaluated for two U1 chemical waste sample tank
(CWST) releases made on December 8 and 9, 1997. respectively.
Also, the inspectors directly observed and evaluated sampling,
quantitative radionuclide an61yses, processing, valve line-uas,
and U2 radwaste control room operator activities for a Decem]er
11, 1997 U2 floor drain sample tank (FDST) release.
The effluent release program review included equipment
operability, procedural adequacy and staff proficiency.
Detailed
reviews were conducted of the pre-release sample collection and
Enclosure 2
.
.
27
radiological analyses. liquid effluent monitor setpoints, and
valve line u) operations associated with a subsequent liquid
release to t1e environment.
The following procedures were reviewed and evaluated during direct
observation of the U2 FDST radwaste sampling. processing and
release:
64CH-RPT-006-OS. Liquid Effluent Reports. Rev. 2. effective
.
October 3, 1996.
64CH-SAM-024-05 Liquid Radwaste Sampling and Analysis.
.
Rev. O, effective December 11, 1997.
3450-G11-021-25. Radwaste Sample Tank Operating Procedure,
.
effective July 31. 1997.
Personnel observed and interviewed regarding the FDST liquid
radwaste processing and release included radwaste operators and
chemistry technicians.
License program guidance, actions and results were evaluated
against applicable sections of 10 CFR Part 20. TSs 5.4.1 and
5.5.1: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM): and approved
procedural requirements.
b.
Observations and Findinas
Both chemistry laboratory technicians and raJwaste operators
demonstrated appropriate knowledge of arocedural requirements, and
proficiency in completing assigned tascs.
Technicians conducting
pre-release sampling and radionuclide analyses were knowledgeable
of equipment and procedures.
Radwaste operators demonstrated
appropriate knowledge of required valve line-ups, system
capabilities. U2 radwaste control room operations, expected
effluent release rates, dilution flows, and tank capacities.
All sampling and quantitative radionuclide analyses were conducted
in accordance with the approved procedur es.
For U1 CWST releases
made subsequent to the U1 liquid effluent monitor being declared
00S. the pre-release samples were collected and analyzed in
duplicate in accordance with the approved procedure and ODCM
requirements.
For the December ll. 1997. U2 FDST release. tank
recirculation times. radionuclide 6nalyses, and sample compositing
and preservation were conducted in accordance with procedural
requirements and accepted industry practices.
During observation and review of data collected during the
December 11.1997. U1 FDST release, the inspectors identified a
concern regarding the procedural adequacy of the source check used
Enclosure 2
. .
_
_
_
__
.
. .
.
_._
___
._.
_ _ . _
.
.
28
,
to demonstrate monitor operability. The inspectors noted that
+
liquid effluents discharge 3ermit. Form HPX-0149. Rev.12,
completed in accordance witi 64CH-RPT-006-OS and 3450-G11-021-25
used the background count rate to complete the release instrument
source check, prior to each liquid batch release.
Licensee
representatives stated that the procedure implemented "footnate e'
to ODCM Table 2-2 which specifies that the " Source check shall
consist of verifying that the instrument is reading onscale." The
inspectors noted that although the instrument reading was onscale.
-
the intent of the source check was to verify monitor operability
<
immediately prior to making an actual effluent release and that
.
ODCM Section 10.2 defined the source check as the qualitative
assessment of channel response when the channel sensor is exposed
to a source of increased radioactivity.
During the December 11.
1997. U2 FDST liquid effluent release, the inspectors noted that
the effluent monitor count rate remained relatively constant,
ap3roximately 800 counts per second (cps), prior to, during and
.
su) sequent to the release.
Thus the detector response to a
source of increased radioactivith immediately preceeding the
'
release was not readily observable.
Following review and
discussion of applicable licensing documents, licensee
,
re]resentatives stated that procedural changes would be made to
-
enlance demonstration of the detector source check response prior
to each liquid effluent release.
This issue was identified as
inspector followup item (IFI) 50-321. 366/97-11-05. Review
Adequacy of Revised Liquid Effluent Release Procedures to Meet
'
i
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (00CM) Monitor Check Source
i
Requirements,
c.
Conclusiom
Proficiency of chemistry technicians and radwaste operators during
conduct of a December 11. 1997. U2 FDST release was demonstrated.
.
Excluding source check requirement concerns for liquid effluent
releases, procedural guidance was adequate and implemented
effectively in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20. TSs and ODCM
requirements.
Inspector followup item was opened: 50-321.-366/97-11-05 Review
Adequacy of Revised Liquid Effluent Release Procedures to Meet
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Monitor Check Source
'
Requirements.
,
Rl.3 Radioactive Waste and Material Transoortation Activities
a.
Insoection Scoce (86750)
,
The-inspectors reviewed radiation protection (RP) and
transportation program activities associated with radioactive
4
~
Enclosure 2
4
.
.
29
waste (radwaste) characterization, packaging, transportation, and
subsequent burial of licensed material.
The following radwaste processing and characterization, and
radioactive material shipping procedures were reviewed and
discussed with cognizant licensee representatives:
62RP-RAD-011-0S Shipment of Radioactive Material . Rev.10.
.
effective June 23. 1997.
62RP-RAD-040-05. Pacific Nuclear Resin Drying System.
.
Rev. 5. effective July 31, 1989.
62RP-RAD-042-05. Solid Radwaste Scaling Factor
.
Determination. Rev
3. effective March 26. 1996.
On December 9, 1997, the inspectors directly observed packaging,
loading, and preparation of condensate phase separator (CPS)
resins for shipment to a licensed burial facility.
In addition,
processing records, shipping papers, and supporting documentation
were reviewed and evaluated for accuracy and completeness.
The
following shipments made between July 1 and December 9. 1997, were
reviewed and discussed:
Shipment No. 97-1024. Radioactive material. Low Specific
.
Activity (LSA). n.o.s.
7. UN 2912. Fissile Excepted.
Dewatered Resins. Solid Metal 0xides, shipped on October 15,
1997.
Shipment No. 97-1027 Radioactive material. LSA
n.o.s., 7
.
UN 2912. Fissile Excepted. - Radionuclides. Dry Aqueous
Filters. Solid Metal 0xides, shipped on November 6.1997.
Shipment No. 97-4004 Radioactive material. LSA, n.o.s.
7
.
UN 2912. Fissile Excepted. Five Metal Boxes of Uncompacted
DAW Solid Metal 0xides, shipped on November 4,1997.
Shipment No. 97-1031. Radioactive material . LSA. n.o.s.
7.
.
UN 2912. Fissile Excepted Reportable Quantities (RO) -
Radionuclides. Dewatered Resins. Solid Metal 0xides, shipped
on December 9. 1997.
Program guidance and implementation were evaluated against 10 CFR Parts 20 and 61. and the recently revised 10 CFR Part 71 and
Department of Transportation (DOT) 49 CFR Parts 100-179
regulations.
Enclosure 2
- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
.
.
l
30
b.
Observations and Findinas
I
!
1The licensee's )rocedural guidance met a)plicable regulatory
l
requirements.
Recent revisions to 10 CFR Part 71 and 49 CFR
Parts 100-179 regulations were incorporated into approved
procedural revisions.
The processing, packaging, and preparation of the CPS resins for
trans)ortation and subsequent burial were implemented effectively.
For tle December 9. 1997. CPS resin shipment, the inspectors
verified that resin drying process memorandum results. Part 61
scaling factor analyses, shipping paper data and supporting
!
documents, were completed in accordance with established
procedures.
From direct observation of shipping activities and
discussions with contractor and licensee personnel involved in-
radwaste o)erations, the inspectors noted that staff members were
knowledgeaale and proficient in completing selected job
evolutions.
Shipping paper documentation for the consignments
reviewed were accurate and complete,
c.
Conclusions
Licensee program guidance for processing, packaging, and
transporting radwaste for subsequent burial met 10 CFR Parts 20.
61. and 71: and 49 CFR Parts 100-179 requirements, as applicable.
Radwaste processing, packaging and transportation activities were
implemented effectively.
R1.4 Ob ervation of Routine Radioloaical Controls
a.
Insoection Scoce (71750)
General HP activities were observed during the report period.
This included locked high radiation area doors, proper
radiological posting, and personnel frisking upon exiting the RCA.
The inspectors made frequent tours of the RCA and discussed
radiological controls with HP technicians and HP management.
Minor deficiencies were discussed with licensee management.
R5
Staff Training in Radiation Protection and Chemistry
R5.1 Hazardous Material Trainina
a.
Insoection Scooe (86750)
Hazardous material (Hazmat) training was evaluated and discussed
for selected personnel involved in the December 9. 1997. CPS resin
shipment processing, packaging, and consignment activities. The
evaluation included verification of training and testing
Enclosure 2
_ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ .
4
.
31
frequency, and a review and discussions of selected topics
presented in General Em)loyee Training, and in Function Specific
and Safety training.
T1e ins)ectors reviewed and discussed the
current General Employee Hand)ook dated July 28, 1997, and ME-
61800 Radwaste Shipment, Rev. 2, dated March 1, 1989.
Hazmat training guidance and frequency were compared against
requirements of 49 CFR 172.702.
b.
Observations and Findinos
For the selected Hazmat workers reviewed, the training topics
presented met the general awareness, function specific, and safety
training requirements and were conducted at the required
frequency, During review of training topics provided to selected
workers, the inspectors noted difficulties in verifying testing
for all required training topics explicitly required by
'
49 CFR 172.702.
Licensee representatives stated that this issue
would be reviewed and actions implemented to consolidate or
refererue training and testing documents needed to meet the
explicit requirements of 49 CFR 172.702.
c.
Conclusions
f
Hazmat training for personnel processing, handling, and shipping
CPS resins was conducted in accordance with 49 CFR 172.702
requirements.
R7
Quality Assurance in RP & C Activities
R7.1 Countina Room Ouality Control (OC) Activities
a.
Insoection Scone (83750) (84750)
The inspectors reviewed implementation of selected counting room
effluent measurement quality control (OC) 3rogram activities and
associated results achieved from June 1 t1 rough December 12,
1997. In particular. OC activities for the gamma spectrosco)y
systems were reviewed and discussed.
The review included t1e most
recent 1997 semiannual inter-laboratory cross-check analyses,
selected daily control chart parameters, and weekly background
check data.
Program implementation was evaluated against 10 CFR Part 20. TSs
and procedural requirements specified in procedure
64CH-0CX-001-OS, " Quality Control for Laboratory Analysis."
Rev. 3.
Enclosure 2
.
32
b.
Observations and Findinas
For the in-service gamma spectroscopy cystems, no significant
concerns or negative trends were ident1fied from review of the
counting room QC parameter and background check data.
However,
during review of the 1997 second half inter-laboratory cross-check
program results for liquid gamma isotopics, the inspectors noted a
Cerium (Ce)-141 comparison ratio. i .e. , licensee radionuclide
concentration results to the vendor's laboratory's known value of
7.36, which was identified as ' agreement" on the vendor's
comparison sheet. The inspectors noted that based on the expected
standard deviations normally associated with radionuclide
concentrations in the vendor's ligtid sample, the documented ratio
most likely identified disagreement between the licensee and
vendor values and required supplemental licensee investigation of
the noted differences.
From subsequent review of licensee data, a
significant transcription error in the Ce-141 results originally
supplied to the vendor was identified.
Further, upon receipt of
the comparison results in October 1997, responsible licensee
.
representatives did not identify that the vendor had incorrectly
l
identified the Ce-lal comparison ratio as being in " agreement ~
Followup of the identified issue using the proper licensee Ce-141
concentration data determined that the results were in agreement.
The inspectors noted that the identified errors, including the
improper transcription of gamma spectroscopy cross-check data and
inadequate licensee review of vendor analysis comparison results
upon their receipt, resulted from a lack of attention to detail by
responsible personnel,
c.
Conclusions
In general, counting room gamma spectroscopy OC activities were
implemented appropriately. A lack of attention to detail by
responsible personnel for selected laboratory DC activities was
identi fied.
R8
Miscellaneous RP&C Issues (83750) (84750)
R8.1 Unit 1 Outaae Radiation Control Performance Indicators
a.
Insoection Scoce
The inspectors reviewed and discussed selected performance
indicators regarding the recently completed U1 refueling outage
(RFO) 17 activities.
Performance indicators reviewed and
discussed included person-rem exposure, skin dose assessments. and
internal exposure evaluaticos.
As applicable, results were reviewed against TS and 10 CFR Part 20
requirements.
Enclosure 2
1
9
-
.-
..
-
~ ~ .
--
-
_
- .
.
.
33
b,
Observations and Findinos
For completion of the October 11 through November 21. 1997. U1
.
RF0 17 activities, the preliminary dose ex)enditure of 311 person-
rem was slightly above the 300 person-rem Judgeted.
The
inspectors noted a significant decline in worker contaminations.
For the outage period, a total of 58 Personnel Contamination
Events (PCEs), i.e., contamination less than 10,000
disintegrations per minute per probe area, and 39 Personnel
Contamination Reports (PCRs), i.e., any facial, or skin or
_
clothing contamination levels equal to, or greater than 10,000 dpm
3er probe area, were reported.
The results were significantly
Jelow the 698 PCEs and 85 PCRs reported for U2 RF0 13 activities.
Further, from discussion with cognizant licensee representatives
and review of contamination reports, the inspectors verified that
no skin dose ex)osures from discrete particles were recuired,
For
licensee whole-Jody counting (WBC) analyses conducted curing the
U1 RF0 17 activities, 32 instances of potential radionuclide
'
intakes were identified by routine or investigative WBC analyses.
Excluding two individuals involved in a November 14, 1997,
contamination event, evaluations for the potential intakes were
,
completed in accordance with the approved procedures,
Intake
>
estimates were less than 0.2 percent of the annual limit of intake
(All), procedurally requiring the internal exposure to be added to
an individual's official exposure records in accordance with
approved licensee procedures,
From review of selected results and discussion of deficiency card
commitment tracking system number C09705936 issued on November 15.
1997, the inspectors noted that responsible HP technicians failed
to Jerform nasal swipes and conduct WBC analyses in accordance
wit 1 RP procedures 62RP-RAD-004-OS, " Personnel Decontamination "
Rev. 8, and 60AC-HPX-004-OS, " Radiation and Contamination
Control," Rev.15. following identification of facial
contamination on two laborers on November 14, 1997.
At that time,
extensive personnel decontamination activities and hand frisking
were required to allow the subject individuals to exit the RCA.
No additional evaluations were conducted to evaluate intake or to
identify the possible source of contamination.
The deficiency
card was initiated when one of the individuals again alarmed a
Jersonnel contamination monitor (PCM) early in the shift on
lovember 15, 1997.
Following additional WBC analyses, one
individual was estimated to have a maximum total intake of
approximately 617 nanocuries (nC1) including radionuclides of
Manganese-54 (91 nCi). Iron-59 (104 nCi). Co-60 (241 nCi) and
Zinc-65 (181 nC1). Assuming inhalation as the mode of intake,
licensee representatives estimated a committed effective dose
equivalent (CEDE) of 95 mrem and a committed dose equivalent (CDE)
to the lung of 534 mrem.
Based on available data, the doses were
based on conservative assumptions and were within regulatory
Enclosure 2
-
.
_-_ ___ _
_ ______ _ -.
.
.
.
.
.
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34
limits.
The inspectors noted that if nasal swipes and immediate
whole-body analyses were conducted following identification of
facial contamination, a more probable mode of radionuclide intake
-
and accurate assessment of intake and potential internal exposure
for the involved workers could have been made.
Further, the
inspectors noted that immediately preceding identification of the
facial contamination, the workers were conducting decontamination
!
activities in the U1 torus bay 87-foot (ft) elevation but were not
expected to encounter any significant contamination.
Followup
surveys of the U1 torus 87-ft elevation identified unexpected
contamination levels, up to 140 millrad Jer hour per 100
centimeters square, resulting from a leac in a pipe draining a
highly contaminated area in the steam chase above the torus. The
inspector noted that the failure to identify the source of the
unexpected contamination in a timely manner could have resulted in
additional and unnecessary worker exposure.
The failure to follow
licensee RP procedures for radiation and contamination control and
for personnel decontaminat hn in accordance with TS 5.4.1.a was
identified as VIO 50-321, 366/97-11-06, Failure to Follow
Procedures for Radiation and Contamination Control and for
Personnel Decontamination Activities.
c.
Conclusions
Licensee initiatives to manage exposure and reduce worker
contamination events during the U1 RF017 activities were
effective.
Excluding a November 14, 1997, personnel contamination event.
-controls for minimizing exposure from intakes of radionuclides
,
were effective and potential radionuclide intakes were evaluated
'
properly.
The failure to follow RP procedures fnr radiation and
contamination control and for personnel decontamination in
accordance with TS 5.4.1.a was identified as VIO 50-321, 366/97-
11-06. Failure to Follow Procedures for Radiation and
Contamination Control und for Personnel Decontamination
Activities.
R8.2 LClosed) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-321. 366/96-10-09:
Review
Licensee Evaluation of Samole Line Particulate Samolina Adeauacy
and Main Stack Accident Monitor Environmental 00eratina
Soecifications.
Completion of this item involved verification that the current
fission product monitor (FPM) sam) ling line configurations met
vendor design specificatiens and JFSAR commitments regarding
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.45 leak rate requirements.
Enclosure 2
i
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
..
.
35
On October 13. 1997. licensee representatives provided
documentation indicating that both of the FPMs and sample lines
(011-P010 and 011-P011) for both units were consistent with the
current Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&lDs) H 16274 and
H-26016, respectively; and also met the ap)licable guidance
provided in the Radiation Monitor System (RMS) vendor manuals.
Subsecuently.- the inspectors requested licensee representatives to
provice data demonstrating that the monitors would respond to a
minimum unidentified leakage of approximately one gallon )er
minute within one hour.
Detailed information regarding c1anges in
the identified (equipment drain) and unidentified (floor drain)
leak rates and corresponding particulate, iodine, and noble gas
detector readouts were reviewed and discussed for both the U1 and
U2.FPM systems. Although changes in leak rate and monitor
respcnses were not available to demonstrate significant changes in
detector responses during a discrete one hour interval, the-
inspectors noted that discernible changes in detector response
rates were observed for unidentified leak rates less than one
,
l
gallon per minute.
Based on the verification of the installed
l
systems' configurations and the presentation of detailed U1 and U2
FPM data to demonstrate qualitative monitor responses to
unidentified drywell leak rates of one gallon per minute or less,
this item is closed.
!
R8.3 (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-321. 366/97-02-07:
Review-
Licensee Followun and Results of Staff Radiation Work Permit (RWP)
Adherence.
This item was opened to review results of expanded licensee
followup subsequent to the identification that several individuals
rigned in to the RCA on improper RWPs during the March 15 through
April 20.1997. U2 RF013 activities.
The issue originally was
identified when ins)ectors noted an individual signed in to the
RCA on an improper RWP to conduct U2 outage condensate
demineralizer valve maintenance activities.
The root cause analysis summary, dated June 25, 1997, was reviewed
and discussed with responsible licensee representatives.
Ap)licable outage quality checks. outage and non-outage RWPs, and
RW) access control reports.were reviewed and analyzed to determine
the extent of condition and identify appropriate corrective
actions.
The review identified numerous examples specifically
between March 31 and April 7,1997, of workers impro)erly signed
in on non-outage RWPs to perform work ecu1 valent to t7e proper
outage RWP. The licensee review also icentified three separate
instances where workers entered radiation areas exceeding 100
millirem per hour (mrem /hr) on RWPs not intended for use in high
radiation areas, i.e., areas having dose rates equal to or
exceeding 100 mrem /hr.
The inspectors r.oted that Administrative
Control (AC) Health Physics procedure 60AC-HPX-004-OS " Radiation
Enclosure 2
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. .. .
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..
.
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.
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.
36
and Contamination Control." Rev. 14. Section 4.6. requires plant
personnel to read and comply with the requirements of the RWP
whenever their duties require such authorization.
The inspectors
identified the failure to follow procedures for RWP system
implementation in accordance with TS 5.4.1.a as VIO 50 321,
366/97-11-07 Failure to Follow Procedures for RWP System
Implementation.
Licensee initial corrective actions included continuation of
numerous quality checks during the outage and notification to
appropriate departments to address access control issues.
In
addition, for upcoming outages, several outage RWPs were to be
initiated before contractors begin in-processing and
reinstallation of access control
detection of improper RWP usage. printers and check-in to promote
R8.4 (Closed) Inspector Followuo item (IFI) 50-321. 366/97-05-03:
Review Licensee's Root Cause Determination and Corrective Actions
for Personnel Contamination.
This item was opened to review results of licensee root cause
analyses and corrective actions for several recent contamination
events and a noted overall increase in personnel contaminations.
The inspectors reviewed and discussed Significant Occurrence
Report (SOR) Number C09703158, dated August 7. 1997. A problem
solving team (PST) reviewed and analyzed personnel contamination
event (PCE) and personnel contamination report (PCR) data bases to
investigate and determine trends regarding worker contaminations.
The report concluded that personnel contaminations were increasing
during both outage and non-outage periods,
Causes were attributed
to the recent implementation of performance teams, each of which
included a HP technician reporting directly to the performance
team leader.
The PST determined that the performance team
structure blurred responsibility for radiation and contamination
control programs, diluted worker accountability, and created a
false sense of security among team workers. Workers were not
required to report to a Health Physics (HP) technician prior to
beginning RCA work, and work planning and assignments were
sometimes inadecuate.
Lack of a permanent decontamination team
also contributec to " walk around' contamination events.
Corrective actions included the reassignment of performance team
HP technicians reporting to the HP department organization.
increasing personnel accountability for avoidable contamination
events requiring workers to re3 ort to HP office prior to
beginning RCA work, requiring t1e HP department to provide RWP
selection and contamination control input for maintenance work
orders prior to work being performed, emphasizing multidiscipline
and timely investigation of PCRs separately from the deficiency
control system, improving nerformance team communications.
Enclosure 2
1
9
.
.
37
establishing and communicating a goal of "zero" unplanned PCRs.
and reinforcing performance team supervision responsibilities
concerning work prioritization for multiple jobs requiring HP
coverage.
The inspectors noted that the root cause determinations
and proposed corrective actions wer. appropriate.
Further, the
inspectors verified by direct obser.ation of worker practices and
from discussions with workers, supervisors, and HP technicians
that licensee corrective actions were being implemented,
Based on
completion of the SOR root cause analysis and implementation of
corrective actions, this item is closed.
S.
General Comments
The inspectors discussed future security requirements with licensee
representatives and the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) for
the proposed independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).
The
licensee was planning to construct this facility outside the protected
area, beginning late 1998.
The discussion included all facets of
security under the provisions of 10 CFR 72.
S1
Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
S1.3 Fitness for Duty
a.
Insoection Scooe (81502)
t-
The inspectors reviewed corrective actions at the licensee's corporate
offices on November 17, 1997, to Violation 50-321, 50-366/97-04-01 with
respect to their failure to establish policies and procedures to
adequately implement the Employee Assistance Program (EAP).
This lack
of procedural guidance was a contributing factor in which information
was released without written permission from an employee, due to
utilization of a mandatory Fitness for Duty (FFD) referral,
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the following newly established
procedures to determine if the mandatory FFD evaluation process was
adequately addressed:
Corporate Guideline 720-035. "The Employee Assistance Program."
-
dated November 19. 1997
Corporate Guideline 720-036. " Mandatory Fitness for Duty
-
Evaluations." dated November 19. 1997
The referenced procedures clearly described the process and
circumstances under which a mandatory FFD evaluation would be in done:
thereby, limiting an employee's right of confidentiality.
Information
concerning an employee's counseling through the EAP would be protected
Enclosure 2
)
-_______- - - _ _ _ _
.
,
38
in accordance with federal and state law, and would not be revealed to
anyone outside the LAP program except under the following circumstances-:
If disclosure was required by law.
-
If the EAP 3rofessional determined that the emplo
threat to t1emselves or to the safety of others. yee was a serious
-
If the EAP professional determined that the employee's condition
-
was such that the employee should not be allowed access to
protected and vital areas. access to safeguards information, or to
perform certain safety-related job duties.
-
If the employee authorized the release of the inform 6. ion to
another party or individual.
The role of supervisors with respect to referral of employees for
mandatory FFD evaluations was also clearly documented in the procedures,
along with a form to document the circumstances that resulted in the
referral.
The inspectors reviewed the following FFD procedures currently in place
to determine if information regarding mandatory FFD evaluations was
incorporated:
-
Corporate Policy 720. " Fitness for Duty," dated November 19, 1997
Corporate Guideline 720-001, " Fitness for Duty." dated
'
-
November 19. 1997
-
Corporate Procedure 727, " Employee Assistance Program," dated
November-19, 1997
Fitness for Duty Procedure SH-FFD-005. " Medical Review Officer,"
-
dated November 26. 1997
Fitness for Duty Procedure SH-FFD-013. " Mandatory Fitness for Duty
-
Evaluations," dated November 26, 1997.
,
All procedures reviewed adequately described the mandatory FFD
evaluation as pact of the licensee's EAP.
Prior to Violation 50-321, 50-366/97-04-01, it appeared that a mandatory
FFD evaluation /EAP process was utilized: however, employees were unaware
of _the program, because distribution of the procedures and guidelines
was limited, The licensee has now informed employees and their
supervisors of the conditions, process, and expectations with respect to
mandatory FFD evaluations by revising the Supervisory Annual Behavioral
Observation Trair,ing Handouts and EAP brochures.
Employees also will
receive this information during annual FFD refresher training.
The
licensee met with the vendor EAP providers on October 29, 1997 and
discussed the process and circumstances surrounding mandatory FFD
evaluations.
During further discussion with licensee representatives, the inspectors
determined that the role of the FFD onsite staff regarding the mandatory
FFD evaluation process was minimal. The inspectors noted that training
Enclosure 2
J
.
_ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _
.
.
39
and keeping the FFD onsite staff informed about the mandatory FFD
evaluation process would be beneficial.
c.
Conclusions
The inspector determined that the licensee adequately addressed, through
procedures and training of the EAP providers, the process and conditions
in which a mandatory FFD evaluation /EAP referral will be utilized.
52
Status of Security Facilities and Equipment
S2.1 P_rotected Area / Vital Area Access Controls
a.
Inspection Scone (8170Q1
The inspectors reviewed and observed protected and vital area access
controls to determine if the provisions of the licensee's Physical
Security Plan (PSP) were being met. Additionally, the inspector
discussed the licensee's proposed implementation of biometrics to
,
!
control protected area access,
b.
Observations and Findinas
l
10 CFR 73.55(d)(4) allows licensee vehicles to be limited in their use
to onsite plant functions and shall remain in the protected area except
1or operational, maintenance. repair, security, and emergency purposes.
,
The inspectors reviewed Section 5.4.3 of the licensee's PSP. which
specified the re
protected area. quirements for the control of vehicles inside the
Section 5.4.3 of the PSP stated in part. " designated
vehicles are generally operated within the protected area but may also
be used outside the protected area and/or owner controlled area." The
licensee's December 1996 PSP change allowed the use of designated
vehicles outside the owner controlled area. The inspectnrs discussed
with licensee representatives the use of designated vehicles outside of
the owner controlled area and the limited use of vehicles as stated in
The licensee agreed to evaluate the need for a
clarification of this section of the PSP.
Discussions were held during the course of this inspection with res]ect
to the proposed implementation of biometrics to control access-to t7e
licensee s protected area. The licensee had submitted a revision to the
PSP to incorporate the use of biometrics.
The planned implementation
date is April 1998.
The inspectors reviewed the 31-day access lists for the periods of
September. October, amJ November 1997, and determined that the
recuirements of Section 5.1.1 of the PSP were being followed.
Incividuals who are favorably terminated are entered in the Training and
Qualification System (TRA05) by the appropriate department.
Termination
Enclosure 2
.
____
____ _ __ ___ _ -___ _
-
.
.
40
reports are run daily from TRAQS. which are used to remove badges from
the Access Control System (ACS). The inspectors determined that if a
failure to take the badge out of the ACS occurred and the indiviuual
takes the badge offsite, a " twilight report" will apprise Security that
a missing badge did r.ot card out of the protected area. Additionally.
contractor badges are deleted from the security computer system after 30
days of non-use.
c.
Conclusions
The licensee's practice of utilizing designated vehicles for offsite
use, as proposed in their December 1996 PSP change, was discussed.
The
licensee agreed to evaluate the difference between the December 1996
plan change and 10 CFR 73.55(d)(4).
Th-e implementation of biometrics
was discussed and is scheduled to begin in April 1998.
Protected and
vital area access controls met the requirements of the PSP.
S3
Security and Safeguards Procedure:: and Documentation
,
S3.1 Security Procram Plans
a.
Insoection Stone (81700)
The inspector reviewed the last three PSP changes submitted under
10 CFR 50.54(p) to determine if the requirements were met,
b.
Observations and Findinos
l
During a review of the PSP changes, the inspectors noted the following:
-
An inconsistency in one chapter of the PSP allowed for the use of
a posted officer or a roving patrol for a partial security system
degradation, whereas another chapter of the plan required using a
posted officer.
Upon further discussion, the inspector learned
that the licensee's intention for the use of a roving patrol for
the pur30se of compensatory measures was within a degraded area
where t1e entire degradation was in full view of the officer,
rather than a patrol of two or more areas that were not in sight.
In the event of a total security system failure, an effort to call
-
in more officers to iully compensate for the failure would be
required. The licensre would use the available officers onsite as
a temporary measure to compensate for the system failure, until
the required number of officers could be called. These actions
were not clearly specified in the PSP.
The licensee informed the inspector that a letter of clarification to
the NRC would be forthcoming to clarify these issues identified in the
December 1996 PSP change.
Enclosure 2
I
o
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..
..
41
c.
Conclusioni
The ins)ector determined that the PSP changes submitted by the licensee
under t1e provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p) did not decrease the
effectiveness of the PSP.
The licensee agreed to clarify the
inconsistent issues identified in the December 1996 plan change.
S7
Quality Assucance in Security and Safeguards Activities
,
S7.1 Sgcuritv,Procram Audits
a.
Insoection Scone (81700)
'
The inspector reviewed 1997 required annual security audits conducted by
the Safety Audit and Engineering Review (SAER) group,
b.
Observations and Findinos
Security Audit 97-SP-1 was conducted during the period of January-
February 1997, and Security Audit 97-SP-2 was conducted June-July,
1997.
The following findings and recommendations were documented:
Unannounced drills, as required by the PSP, were not being
-
conducted.
The SAER recommended that a change to the plan be
,
L
submitted; however, security made a determination to continue the
'
practice of conducting unannounced drills.
An administrative non-com)liance was identified. When a procedure
-
needed revision, rather tlan stop and revise the procedure.
Security would 'line out" the portion that was inadequate and
continue to use the procedure.
-
Four examples of. procedural non-compliance were noted, to include
an example of a failure to test the walk-through metal detectors
once per shift as required by the PSP.
The inspector determined that audit reports were appropriately
documented and distributed to upper management for review.
Findings
were adequately addressed for closure.
The inspector noted that the licensee had a Continuous Improvement
Suggestion Program, which tracked suggestions from the security staff.
As of November 20, 1997, 31 suggestions had been implemented year-to-
date.
c.
Conclusions
Security audits were detailed, findings were adequately addressed, and
the level of management review was appropriate.
The inspectors
Enclosure 2
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_ ______ _ .___
.
.
42
determined that security audits were being conducted in accordance with
the-licensee's PSP.
-S.8
Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards Issues (92904)
'
58.1- (Closed). VIO 50-321. 50-366/97-04-01: Failure to Maintain
Confidentiality of Pers_ anal Information
The licensee responded -to the violation in correspondence dated June 20.
1997; The licensee adequately addressed, through procedures and
training of- the EAP providers, the process and conditions in which a
.
mandatory EAP referral will~be utilized.
(See Paragraph S1.3 for
-additionally-information). The corrective action is considered adequate
to close tnis violation.
V. Manaaement Meetinas
X.2
Review of UFSAR Commitments
A recent discovery of a 1icensee operating its facility-in a
manner contrary to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
(UFSAR) description highlighted the-need for a special focused
review that compares plant practices, procedures and/or parameters
to the UFSAR description. -While performing the ins)ections
discussed in this re] ort, the inspectors reviewed t1e applicable
portions of the UFSAl that : elated to the areas inspected. The
inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording'was consistent with the
-observed plant practices._ procedures, and/or parameters.
X.3~
Exit Meeting Summary-
-The inspectors presented the= inspection results to members of the
--licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on-
'
January 8. 1998.
The_ license acknowledged the findings presented.
Interim exits were conducted on November 21 and December 12. 1997.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined
during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
No
proprietary information was identified.
X.'2-
Other NRC Personnel On Site
'On November 18-19. Mr. P.H. Skinner. Chief. Reactor Projects
Branch 2. Division of Reactor Projects, visited the site. He met
with the resident inspector staff to discuss licensee performance,
and regulatory issues. He toured the facilities to observe
equipment in operation and general plant conditions.
He attended
the morning management meeting for plant status and later met with
Enclosure 2
_
_ __ _ ___-__ - _ __.
.
.
43
the plant general manager to discuss plant performance and other
regulatory issues.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
Anderson, J.
Unit Superintendent
Betsill, J., Assistant General Manager - Operations
Breitenbich, K., Engineering Support Manager - Acting
Curtis, S,, Unit Superintendent
Davis
D., Plant Administration Manager
Fornel
P., Performance Team Manager
Fraser
O,, Safety Audit and Engineering Review Supervisor
Hammonds, J. , Operations Support Superintendent
Kirkley, W,, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
Lewis, J . Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
Madison, D., Operations Manager
l
Moore, C.. Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
'
Reddick, R., Site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
Roberts, P., Outages and Planning Manager
Thompson, J., Nuclear Security Manager
Tipps
S., Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager
j
Wells, P., General Manager - Nuclear Plant
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering
IP 37828:
Installation and Testing of Modifications
IP 60710:
Refueling Activities
IP 61726:
Surveillance Observations
IP 62707: Maintenance Observations
IP 71707: Plant Operations
IP 71714:
Cold Weather Preparations
IP 71750:
Plant Support Activities
IP 81700:
Physical Security Program for Power Reactors
IP 81502:
Fitness for Duty for Power Reactors
IP 83750: Occupational Radiation Exposure
IP 84750:
Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and
Environmental Monitoring
IP 86750:
Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation
of Radioactive Materials
IP 92700: Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine
Events at Power Reactor Facilities
IP 92804: Action on Previous Inspection Items
IP 92901:
Followup - Operations
IP 92902:
Followup - Maintenance / Surveillance
IP 92903:
Followup - Followup Engineering
IP 92904:
Followup - Plant Support
Enclosure 2
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. -. -
-
.
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._
.-
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__ - . - ..
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44
'
IP 93702:
Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power
Reactors
ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
Opened
50-321/97-11-01
Failure to Follow Procedure
1
and Inadequate Procedure
Results in Group 1 Isolation
'
(Section 03.1).
50-321/97-11-02
Late 10 CFR 50.72 Notification
for Unit 1 Engineered Safety
Feature Actuation (Section
l
04.1).
50-321, 366/97-11-03
Inadequate Corrective Actions
,
!
for Late 10 CFR 50.72
Notifications (Section 04.1).
4
50 321/97-11-04
Failure to Meet Unit 1
Technical Specification
Actions for Primary System
(Section M8.1).
50-321, 366/97-11-05
IFI
Review Adequacy of Revised
Liquid Effluent Reiease
Procedures to Meet Offsite
Dose Calculation Manual.(00CM)
Monitor Check Source.
Requirements (Section R1.2).
50-321. 366/97-11-06
Failure to Follow Procedures
for Radiation and
Contamination Control and
Personnel Decontamination
Activities (Section R8.1).
50-321, 366/97-11-67
Failure to Follow Procedures
for RWP System Implementation
(Section R8.3).
"
50-366/97-11-08
Unit 2 Failure to Meet General
Design Criteria 56 for Proper
Automatic Containment
Isolation Valve Outside
Containment (Section E2.1).
Enclosure 2
.
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.-
45
Closed
50-321/97-11 01
Failure to Follow Procedure
and Inadequate Procedure
Results in Group 1 Isolation
(Section 03.1).
50-366/97-10
LER
Manual Reactor Shutdown
Results in Water Level
Decrease and Group 2 and 5
<
PCIS Actuations
(Section 08.1).
50-321/97-08
LER
Personnel. Error and Inadequate
Procedure Results in Group 1
Isolation on Lvr. Condenser
Vacuum (Section 08.2).
50-321. 366/96-13-02
E0P Deviation From EPG Step
RC/P-3 (Section 08.3).
50-321, 366/97-02-02
Failure to Follow Procedure -
Multiple Examples (Section
08.4)
50-366/97-02-03
Late 10 CFR 50.72 Notification.
For An Engineered Safety
Feature Actuation for
Containment Isolation (Section
08.5).
50-321, 366/97-05-02
Failure to Follow Procedure -
Multiple Examples (Section
08.6).
50-321/97-06
LER
Tube Failure Results in
Primary System Pressure
Boundary Leakage (Section
M8.1).
50-321/97-11-04
Failure to Meet Unit 1
Technical Specification
Actions for Primary System
(Section M8.1).
Enclosure 2
1
o
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.
46
2
50-321/97 07
LER
Pneumatic Leak Results in
'
Closure of Primary Containment
Isolation Valve (Section
M8.2).
50 321/97-10-01
IFI
Review of Unit 1 RCIC Testing
Activities from the Remote
Shutdown Panel (Section M8.3).
50-366/97-04
LER
Inaccurate List of Primary
Containment Isolation Valves
Results in Missed Surveillance
(Section E8.1).
(
50-321, 366/96-10-09
Review Licensee Evaluation of
'
Sample Line Particulate
3
Sampling Adequacy and Main
i
Stack Accident Monitor
'
Environmental Operating
Specifications (Section R8.2).
e
[
50-321. 366/97-02-07
Review Licensee Followup and
Results of Staff Radiation
Work Permit Adherence (Section
R8.3).
50-321. 366/97-05-03
IFI
Review Licensee's Root Cause
Determination and Corrective
Actions for Personnel
Contaminations (Section R8.4).
50-321, 366/97-04-01
Failure to Maintain
Confidentiality of Personal
.Information (Section S8.1).
Enclosure 2
,