ML20155A212

Insp Repts 50-321/88-24 & 50-366/88-24 on 880723-0819 & 0822-24.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Maint Observations,Plant Mods,Esf Sys Walkdowns & Review of Licensee Operational Upgrade Efforts

ML20155A212
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	09/22/1988
From:	Menning J, Randy Musser, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20155A203	List: ML20155A198 ML20155A206 ML20155A212
References
50-321-88-24, 50-366-88-24, NUDOCS 8810050246
Download: ML20155A212 (15)

See also: IR 05000321/1988024

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? t UNITED STATES

i g  ; NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

, e- REGION ll

101 MARIETTA ST., N.W.

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\ e , , , , j[ ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30323

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Report Numbers: 50-321/88-24 and 50-366/88-24

. Lic9n see: ' Georgia Power Company

P.O.-Box'4545

Atlanta, GA 30302

pf Docket Numbers: 50-321 and 50-366

License Numbers: DPR-57 and NPF-5 l

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Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2

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'Inspution Dates: July 23 - August 19 and August 22-24, 1988

Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia ,

! . Inspectors: [ m d OM'M

Joh G . Menning, Senior Resident Inspector Oate Signed

Ey/ / . 5 ~- w n ,4 f- 22-W

RaFidall A. Musser, Residerit -Inspector Date Signed

Accompanying Personnel: ,MichaJ7E.Ernstes

Approved by:]]'{'fl _ 1 i1 L$G Y - &Z ~WW '

Marvin W '$fnKL1'e,"Cnief, Project Section 3B 'Date Signed

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Division of Reactor Projects

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SUMMARY

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Scope: A routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas of

Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Observations, Plant  ;

Modifications, Surveillance Testing Observations, ESF System

Walkdowns, Radiological Protection, Physical Security, Reportable

i Occurrences, Operating Reactor Events, Three Mile Island Items, '

! and Review of t.icensee Operational Upgrade Ef forts. A reactive

inspertion was also conducted at the site to investigate a facility

4 identified problem associated with Certification of Medical Records.

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Results: Two violations were identified. One violation involved an inadequate

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EHC system drawing, and the other violation involved for an inadequate

turbine bearing oil system procedure, i

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

C. Coggin, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager

D. Davis, Manager General Support

1. K. Oyar, Senior Quality Assurance Field Representative

J. Fitzsimmons, Nuclear Security Manager

• P. Fornel, Maintenance Manager

• 1. 0. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance Manager

• M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager

1. R. Granthum, Operating Training Superintendent / Acting Manager

• J. Lewis, Acting Operations Manager

1. 0. Moore, Nuclear Training Coordinator - Corporate

• 1. H. Nix, General Manager

1. J. Payne, Senior Plant Engineer

T. Powers, Engineering Manager

0. Read, Plant Support Manager

• 1. H. Sumner, Plant Manager

1. S. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager

R. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,

mechanics, security force members and office personnel.

NRC Resident Inspectors

• 1. J. Monning

R. Musser

Other NRC Inspectors

1. M. Ernstes

• Attended exit interview on August 22, 1988

1. Attended exit interview on August 24, 1988

• 1. Attended both exit interviews

Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the

last paragraph,

2. Operational Safety Verification (71707) Units 1 and 2

The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall

plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant

operations. Daily discussions were held with plant management and various

members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits

to the control room. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints

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and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on

equipment, control s and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to

limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily

journals and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access

controls. This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions

with operators and their supervisors. Weekly, when on site, selected ESF

systems were confirmed operable. The confirmation was made by verifying

the following: accessible valve flow path alignment, power supply breaker

and fuse status, instrumentation, major component leakage, lubrication,

cooling, and general condition.

General plant tours were conducted on at letst a weekly basis. Portions

of the control building, turbine building, reactor building, and outside

areas were visited. Observations includeo general plant / equipment

conditions, safety related tagout verifications, shift turnover, sampling

program, housekeeping and general plant conditions, fire protection

equipment, control of activities in progress, radiation protection

controls, physical security, problem identification systems, missile

hazards, instrumentation and alarms in the control room, and containment

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isolation.

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In the area of housekeeping the following discrepancie: were observed by

the inspector and brought to the attention of licensee pecsonnel:

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On August 1, 1938, empty boxes and other trash were observed in the

vicinity of Unit 2 RWCU precoat pump 2G31-C003. This pump is located

on elevation 185 in the Unit 2 reactor building,

On August 2, 1988, various items of equipment were observed under and

around control room ventilation condensing unit 1Z41-B008B. These

items had apparently not been removed after maintenance on this unit.

On July 25, 1988, the licensee informed the inspector that medical records

were found to be incomplete for 24 licensed individuals. More

specifically, it was determined that blood testing and urinalysis had not

been performed on these individuals as required by ANSI Standard 3.4. On

August 12, 1988, the inspector was informed that additional checking

, revealed that the medical records for 62 licensed individuals were

incomplete. Pulmonary function testing had not been performed on 24

individuals. Blood testing, urinalysis, and pulmcnary function testing

had not been performed on the remaining 33 individuals. The licensee

informed the inspector on August 12, 1988, that they planned to have most

of the required testing performed within a two-week period. This

licensee-identified matter was followed by the regional inspection staf f

(paragraph 13).

, At 1647 on August 5, 1983, Unit 2 automatically scrammed from

approximately 100 percent of rated power. This scram was caused by trips

of the condensate booster and reactor feed pumps. The loss of condensate

and feedwater flow resulted in a low reactor vessel water level condition.

The events of this scram are discussed in paragraph 10. Following the

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completion of necessary corrective actions, the Unit 2 reactor was again

critical at 2239 on August 6. Unit 2 entered the RUN mode at 0420, and

the main generator was synchronized with the grid at 1125 on August 7,

1988. Rated power was achieved at 2300 on August 8, 1988.

At 2004 on August 9, 1988, the Unit 2 low pressure turbine intercept

valves were inadvertently closed while operations personnel were placing

an equipment clearance on the EHC system. Unit 2 was operating at

approximately 100 percent of rated power at the time of this event.

Clearance No. 2-88-1336 was being placed to support replacement of the "B"

EHC pump. The clearance required the closing of valve 2N32-FV20. When

the FV20 valve was closed, low pressure turbine intercept valves Nos. 3

and 4 went fully closed, and intercept valves Nos. 1 and 2 went

approximately 60 percent closed. Control room personnel observed the

closing of the intercept valves and immediately reduced power to

approximately 50 percent of rated. The FV20 valve was reopened, and all

four intercept valves responded by opening fully. The licensae

subsequently conducted an inspection of the condenser bay area of the

turbine building and ensured that plant conditions had stabilized prior to

increasing power. Rated power was again achieved at 0037 on August 10,

1988.

Investigation showed that the event on August 9,1988, was caused by a

deficient drawing. Drawing H-21243 was used by operations personnel when

the equipment clearance was prepared. This drawing indicated that valve

FV20 could be closed without isclating EHC fluid from the low pressure

turbine intercept valves. A review of the as-built configuration showed

that the print did not accurately reflect the EHC pump discharge piping.

Regulatory requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V,

"Instructions, Procedures, and Orawings," specify that activities

affecting quality are to be prescribed and accomplished with documented

instructions, procedures, or drawings. The inadequate drawing is

considered to be a violation of this regulatory requirement. This matter

will be tracked as violation 366/88-24-01, Inadequate EHC Drawing.

Ore violation was identified.

3. Mai nteriance 'Aservations (62703) Units 1 and 2

During ti port period, the insoectors observed selected maintenance

activities ihe observations included a review of the work documents for

adequacy, adherence to procedures, proper tagouts, adherence to technical

specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the

actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements.

and adherence to the appropriate quality controls. The primary

maintenance observations during this month are sumnarized below:

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Maintenance Activity Date

a. Replacement of Fire Pump Controller 07/27/88

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Piping on Diesel Fire Pump No. 3 per

MWO 1-88-2607 and DCR 87-81. (Unit 1)

b. Replacement of the RHRSW Air Release 08/02/88

Valve (1E11-F904A) per MWO 1-88-1016.

(Unit 1)

c. Repair of Post LOCA Radiation Monitor 08/12/88

1011-K622C per MWO 1-88-4672. (Unit 1)

d. Troubleshooting of LPCI Inverter 08/19/88

1R44-S002 per MWO 1-88-4855 (Unit 1)

As discussed in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/88-22 and 50-366/88-22,

problems were experienced with Unit 1 LPCI inverter 1R44-5002 during the

previous reporting period. Additional LPCI inverter problems were

experienced in Unit 1 during this reporting period. On August 1, 1988,

LPCI inverter 1R44-5002 tripped. On August 2, 1988, operations personnel

received a trouble alarm for Unit 1 LPCI inverter 1R44-5003.

Investigation revealed that fuses had been blown. On August 11, 1988,

operations personnel again received a trouble alarm for 1R44-S003.

Investigation revealed that fuses had blown again. Inverter 1R44-S003

experienced an apparently identical problem on August 12, 1988. It

appeared to the inspector that the licensee's maintenance efforts had been

ineffective in identifying and correcting the basic caucc(3) of the LPCI

inverter problems. In discussing these concerns with licensee personnel,

the inspector learned that the licensee had formed an event review team to

'nvestigate these events.

Additionally, a vendor representative was sent to the site to inspect the

inverters. As noted above, the inspector observed some of the vendor

representative's activities on August 19, 1988. The inspector will review

this team's report and any corrective actions that result from the

investigation.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Plant Modifications (37700) Units 1 and 2

The inspector reviewed documentation packages for selected DCRs that had

been implemented and closed by the licensee. The review included

verification that the design changes had been reviewed and approved in

accordance with the technical specifications and 10 CFR 50.59, controlled

by approved procedures, and verified by appropriate post installation

testing and/or inspections. The review also included verification that

plant procedures, operator training programs, as built drawings,

preventive mai ;enance programs, and the ISI/IST programs were revised, as

appropriate, prior to the modification being declared operable.

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The DCRs involved in this review were identified by the licensee as

Nos.86-218 and 86-219.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Surveillance Testing Observations (61726) Units 1 and 2

The inspectors observed the performance of selected surveillances. The

observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy,

conformance to technical specifications, verification of test instrument

calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances,

removal from service and return to service of the system or components

affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the

acceptance criteria. The primary surveillance testing observations during

this month are summarized below:

Surveillance Testing Activity Date

a. Channel Functional Test and Calibration 07/26/88

for ATTS Panel 1H11-P926 per procedure

57SV-SUV-012-15 (Unit 1)

b. RCIC Pump operability test per 08/02/88

procedure 345V-E51-002-15 (Unit 1)

c. Core Spray Pump IST per procedure 08/05/88

34SV-E21-001-2S (Unit 2)

On August 2, 1988, while observing the Unit 1 RCIC pump operability test,

the inspector noted that the "RCIC Barometric Condenser High Pressure"

annunciator came in. The operator performing the test responded by

entering the appropriate ARP. All items identified by the ARP as

probable causes for the alarm were checked and all were found to be

satisfactory. The pressure in the condenser was holding steady at

3 inches of Hg Vacuum, the alarm setpoint. Since the above condition did

not affect the operability of the system, the test was successfully

completed. Discussions with the system engineer confirmed that the

purpose of the RCIC barometric condenser is to ensure proper gland sealing

capability of the RCIC turbine. Additionally, the engineer stated that

the high pressure condition was caused by ar improperly set cooling water

flow control valve. This condition will be corrected during the next

surveillance of the Unit 1 RCIC system.

On August 5, 1988, while observing the Core Spray Pump 2B IST, the

inspector noted some problems with the procedure in use, 345V-E21-001-25.

These items were brought to the attention of the Unit 2 Shift Supervisor.

The following is a summation of the problems noted. (1) Step 7.2.10

states, "THROTTLE OPEN Core Spray Test Valve, 2E21-F015B, to obtain a flow

on Flos *dicator 2E21-R601B, exactly equal to the reference flow

recorded....d It is not possible to obtain a flow rate exactly equal to

the reference flow as the Flow Indicator reads in divisions of 100 gpm

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(between 4000-5000 gpm). (2) Step 7.2.11 states, "WHEN Core Spray flow is

greater than 950 GPM, confirm that Core Spray Minimum Flow Valve,

2E21-F0318, CLOSES." This step is difficult to perform due to the coarse

scale on flow indicator 2E21-R6018. (3) Step 7.2.22 states, "WHEN Core

Spray Flow decreases to less than 700 GPM, confirm that Core Spray Minimum

Flow Valve, 2E21-F0318, OPENS." This step is also difficult to perform

due to the coarse scale on flow indicator 2E21-R601B. The reading of this

flow indicator at low flow ranges is a problem with all four loops of core

spray, loop A and B for each unit.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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6. ESF System Walkdowns (71710) Unit 1

The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF systems. Valve

and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified

both locally and in the control room to ensure that lineups were in ,

accordance with operability requirements and that equipment material

conditions were satisfactory. The MCREC system was walked down in detail

on August 2, 1988. As noted in paragraph 3, a housekeeping discrepancy

was observed at that time and brought to the attention of the Unit 1 Shift

Supervisor.

No violations or deviations were noted.

7. Radiological Protection (71709) Units 1 and 2

The resident inspectors reviewed aspects of the licensee's radiological

protection orogram in the course of the monthly activities. The

performance of health physics and other personnel was observed on various

shif ts to include: involvement of health physics supervision, use of

radiation work permits, use of personnel monitoring equipment, control of

high radiation areas, use of friskers and personal contamination fronitors,

and posting and labeling.

No violations or deviations were noted.

8. Physical Security (71881) Units 1 and 2

In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors included

a review of the licensee's rhysical secu-ity program. The performance of

various shifts of the secur force was coserved in the conduct of daily

activities to include: aya it y of t.,pervnsion, availability of armed

response personnel, protectt vital access controls, searching of

personnel, packages and vehicle, vadge issuance and retrieval, escorting

of visitors, patrols and compensatory posts.

No violations or deviations were noted.

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9. Reportable Occurrences (90712 and 92700) Units 1 and 2

A number of Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed for potential

generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective

actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately were

also reviewed as they occurred to determine that technical specifications

were being met and the public health and safety were of utmost

consideration.

Unit 1: 88-05 Personnel Error Causes Air Introduction Into Turbine

Lube Oil Coolers Resulting in Scram

The events of this LER concern an improper exchange of

main turbine lube oil coolers that resulted in a

turbine trip and reactor scram. 1he scram occurred on

April 19, 1988, and was discussed in NRC Inspection

Report Nos. 50-321/88-11 and 50-366/88-11.

Investigation revealed that the turbine bearing oil

system operating procedure (3450-N34-008-1N) did not

address the exchange of these coolers. Personnel ,

performed the exchange operation without procedural t

guidance and inadvertently introduced air into the

turbine lube oil system. Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures be

estabitshed, implemented, and maintained covering the

activities referenced in Appendix "A" of Regulatory

Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Section 4 of

Appendix "A" of Regul6 tory Guide 1.33 recommends

procedures for the operatior, of the turbine generator

system. This matter is considered a violation of

Technical Specification 6.8.1.a and will be tracked as

i violation 321/88-24-02, Inadequate Turbine Bearing 011 l

System Procedure.

88-07 Lack of Administrative Control Causes Potential Diesel

Generator Inoperability

This LER concerns the closing of rollup fire door

IL48-D143 for D/G 1R43-50018 room without adequate

consideration of the affect on D/G operability. The 1

fire door was initially found to be stuck at mid l

position and then closed to comply with requirements

of the Fire Hazard Analysis. The licensee

subsequently questioned whether the rollup fire door's

closed position could adversely affect the operability

of 0/G 1R43-50018. An engineering study and special

testing have established that the D/G room maximum

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design temperature (122*F) would be exceeded af ter

approximately 19 minutes of operation at 2800 KW

on a 95'F day. The licensee's corrective actions were

reviewed by the inspector. This matter appears to be

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a violation of Technical Specification 0/G operability

requirements. However, since all the requirements

specified in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section V,

were satisfied, this licensee-identified violation is

not being cited. Additionally, review of the LER is

closed.

88-10 Deficient Procedure Allows Configuration Where

Monitors Do Not Meet Operability Requirements

This LER concerns a configuration of the Recombiner

Building Ventilation Radiation Noble Gas Monitors that

would preclude annunciation of an inoperable or

downscale condition in the main control room. The

Recombiner Building Ventilation Radiation Noble Gas

Detection System consists of two separate monitors.

These monitors were being maintained with one in

service while the other monitor was in a standby mode.

The licensee determined that under these conditions

failure of the monitor in service due to an inoperable

or downscale condition would not be annunciated in the

control room. Table 4.14.2-1, Item 3.a, of the

technical specification requires that main control

room annunciation on inoperable or downscale

conditions be demonstrated during quarterly functional

testing. Correctite action involved doactivating the

redundant nonitor and initiating procedure changes to

ensure that the redundant monitor is maintained in

either a deactivated or fully operable condition.

This matter appears to be a violation of the

previously cited technical specification requirements.

However, since all the requirements spectfied ir

10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section V, were satisf1ed,

this licensee-identified violation is not being cited.

Review of the LER is closed.

Unit 2: 87-10 Failed Instrument Line Leakage Exceeds Allowable

Limits Resulting in Reactor Shutdown

This LER was previously discussed in NRC Inspection

Report Nos. 50-321/88-22 and 50-366/88-22. Review of

the LER remained open pending the receipt of a

revision to the LER providing the results of a

metallurgical analysis of the failed instrument line.

Revision 1 of ti.e LER was issued on August 12, 1988.

The licensee has determined that the failure mode was

high cycle f atigue. The licensee intends to perform

an engineering evaluation of this instrument line and

its supports to determine if additional modifications

are needed to prevent additional high cycle fatigue

failures. Review of this LER is closed.

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09-01 Inadequate Procedure Causes Mis-Assembly of Valve

Resulting in ESF System Inoperability

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This LER concerns the mis-assembly of the Unit 2 HPCI

turbine stop valve. The problem was initially

identified when operations personnel noted a double

position indication, indicating that the valve was

between the open and closed position. During

subsequent troubleshooting involving stroking of the

valve, the valve stuck at approximately 50 percent

closed and a metal-to-metal binding noise was heard.

Disassembly of the valve revealed that the split

coupling connecting the valve stem to the hydraulic

actuator piston rod had a clearance of 5/8 of an inch

between the stem and piston rod. The clearance should

have been no greater than 1/16 of an inch.

Investigation showed that the stop valve was last

disassembled and reassembled in June of 1983. Review

of the procedure used at that time revealed that it

failed to provide step-by-step instructions for

reassembly of the valve. It was concluded that

procedural inadequacies resulted in the improper

adjustment of the clearance between the stem and th2

piston rod. Correcti/e actions involved initiating

procedure changes to provide better valve reassembly

instructions and ensuring that the Unit 1 HPCI turbine

stop valve was properly assembled. Technical

Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures

be established, implemented, and maintained covering

the activities referenced in Appendix "A" of

Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978.

Section 9 of Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33

states that maintenance that can affect the

performance of safety-related equipment should be

performed in accordance with written procedures,

documented ins ructions, or appropriate drawings. The

inadequate maintenance procedure appears to constitute

a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a.

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However, since all the requirements specified in

10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section V, were satisfied,

this lice.isee-identified violation is not being cited.

Review of the LER is closed.

88-08 Calibration Procedural Deficiency for Feedwater

Controller Causes Low Water Level Scram

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The events of this LER concern the Unit 2 reactor

scram on March 21, 1988. Prior to the scram, control

room personnel were in the process of trans/ erring the

FCS from startup control to single element control as

part of normal unit startup operations. Fluctuations

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in reactor vessel water level were observed and the

"2A" RFP subsequently tripped on low suction pressure.

The FCS instability was attributed to improper

settings on the master controller module (2C32-K636).

The licensee could not establish when the controller

settings had been changed to the incorrect values.

However, the involved calibration procedure

(57CP-CAL-048-2) was found to be deficient in that it

did not require the recording of as-found and as-lef t

settings for the controller (2C32-K636) and the

control amplifier (2C32-K637). The inspector reviewed

the l icerisee 's corrective actions which included

development of a more comprehensive procedure for

calibration of the FCS master control loop. Review of

this LER is closed.

88-19 Personnel Error Results in Missed Reactor Protection

System Functional Test

This LER concerns a failure to perform main turbine

stop valve RPS surveillance within the interval

specified in the technical specifications. More

soecifically, the functional testing requirements of

Technical Specification Table 4.3.1-1, Item 9, were

not performed on time. Upon discovery of this

situation, the licensee entered the appropriate LCO

and initiated the required testing. Testing per

procedure 345V-C71-001-25, "Turbine Stop Valve

Instrument Functional Test," was satisfactorily

completed and the LC0 was terminated. This matter is

considered a violation of the technical specification

surveillance requirement. However, since all the

requirements specified in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C,

Section V, were satisfied, this licensee-identified

violation is not being cited. Review of the LER is

closed.

One violation was identified.

10. Operating Reactor Events (93702) Unit 2

The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the below listed

reactor event. The review included determination of cause, safety

significance, performance of personnel and systems, and corrective action.

The inspectors examined instrument recordings, computer printouts,

operations journal entries, and scram reports and also had discussions

with operations, maintenance, and engineering support personnel as

appropriate.

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Unit 2 automatically scrammed from approximately 100 percent of rated

power at 1647 on August 5, 1988. Prior to this event, I&C personnel were

installing RFP "2A" minimum flow controller 2N21-R3846 in control room

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panel 2H11-P662. At that time a 3 amp fuse supplying power to the minimum

flow controllers for the condensate pumps, condensate booster pumps, and

RFPs blew. (This fuse is identified as fuse F7 on licensee print H

23840.) Since the air operated minimum flow valves for these pumps are

designed to fail open, the valves all opened when power to the controllers

was lost. The condensate booster and RFPs subsequently tripped on low

suction pressure. Reactor vessel water level decreased to approximately

minus 65 inches indicated during the transient. Both HPCI and RCIC auto

initiated as expected, returning vessel water level to its normal band.

Reactor pressure was controlled by EHC to less than 920 psig. No SRVs

were actuated. However, operations personnel noted that RWCU inboard

isolation valve 2G31-F001 did not close as expected at the vessel level

setpoint for Group V isolation of minus 35 inches. Investigation revealed

that the vessel water level transmitter (2B21-N081B) providing the

isolation signal to 2G31-E001 did not respond to level changes. The

defective transmitter was replaced. This transmitter was identified as

Rosemount Part No. 11540P5RJ with Serial No. 411213. Licensee personnel

indicated to the inspector that the defective transmitter would be

returned to the vendor for a failure analysis.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

11. Three Mile Island Items (item numbers from NUREG 0737)

Item II.F.2.3.B concerns the covering of reactor pressure vessel water

level reference legs B21-0003A and B with insulation to prevent flashing

due to high drywell temperatures. This item remained open pending the

completion of work and review of packages for DCRs86-218 and 86-219 for

Units 1 and 2, respectively. DCR 86-218 was closed on October 10, 1987,

and was subsequently reviewed by the inspector. DCR 86-219 was closed on

April 8,1988, and was subsequently reviewed by the inspector. This item

is closed for Units 1 and 2.

No violations or deviations were identified.

12. Review of Licensee's Operational Upgrade Efforts - Units 1 and 2

As discussed in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/88-14 and 50-366/88-14,

the licensee voluntarily initiated a program in April of 1988 to upgrade

certain aspects of operational performance. The referenced report

mentioned that the resident inspectors would review longer term

operational upgrade efforts as related activities were completed. The

area discussed below was reviewed during the current reporting period.

Emergency Diesel Generator Testing: The licensee has completed actions to

reduce the number of emergency diesel generator fast starts in an effort

to prolong engine life and improve reliability. More specifically, the

methodology for conducting monthly operability testing has been changed.

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In the past, the diesel generators were fast started; i.e, synchronous

speed was achieved in a maximum of 12 seconds. The licensee has revised

the monthly operability test procedures to provide for slow starting of

the diesels and for barring of the engines following operation. The

inspector reviewed the following surveillance procedures:

Procedure No. Rev. Effective Date Diesel Generator

345V-R43-001-IS 6 06/27/88 1A

34SV-R43-001-2S 7 06/27/88 2A

34SV-R43-002-15 3 06/27/88 IB

345V-R43-002-2S 3 06/27/88 IB

345V-R43-003-IS 2 06/27/88 1C

345V-R43-003-25 4 07/19/88 2C

Review of the licensee's upgrade efforts in the emergency diesel generator

testing area is closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

13. Certification of Medical Records (71707) Units 1 and 2

A reactive inspection was conducted on August 22-24. 1988, by

Michael E. Ernstes to investigate a facility identifiec problem associated

with the certification of the physical examinations required by

10 CFR 55.23 for operatcr license applications. Interviews were concucted

with training department personnel responsible for submitting NkC Form 396

with license app 11 cations and with the physicians conducting the physical

examinations.

On June 16, 1988, a renewal application was submitted by Plant Hatch for

an operator who heid a no-solo operators license. The restriction was due

to the operator being a diabetic. The NRC requested a copy of his medical

evaluation to be reviewed by the NRC doctor. The Hatch training

department discovered at this time that there were no blood tests

conducted for his evaluation, Further investigation showed that all

examinations conducted by Dr. DeJarnette of Vidalia, Georgia, after

June 1987 did not have blood, urine, or plumonary tests. In addition, the

examinations conducted by Dr. Poblete of Baxley, Georgia, did rot have

pulmonary tests included.

Effective May 26, 1987, NRC Form 396 was enanged such that the physician

signed a single statement stating that the individual met the guidance

provided in ANSI /ANS 3.4-1983. In July 1987, Georgia Power Company held a

meeting with the doctors to discuss these changes in documentation. At

this meeting, discussion was given to the possibility of comoining some of

the testing on the various types of physicals. In order to meet the

standards established in ANSI /ANS 3.4-1983, Dr. DeJarnette had been taking

credit for the blood. urine, and pulmonary tests conducted through the

Employee Health Plan. These physical examinations are performed on-site

annually to all licensed personnel. Dr. Poblete had also been using the

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pulmonary tests from the same program as part of their evaluations.

Although all aspects of ANSI /ANS 3.4-1983 had been met, it could not be

readily verified from the records of medical examinations. This prompted

the training department to establish corrective actions to better ensure

that all parts of the standard are met prior to signing NRC Form 396.

In order to verify that the guidance contained in ANSI /ANS 3.4-1933 was

followed, all licensed operators who were examined subsequent to &Jne 1987

were reexamined in the areas which had not been performed as part of the

physical. This consisted of 38 individuals getting blood, urine, and

pulmonary tests from Dr. DeJarnette and 24 individuals receiving pulmonary

tests from Dr. Poblete. All tests were completed for these 62 individuals

on August 23, 1988. None of these test results indicated disqualifying

conditions.

To prevent recurrence of this problem, a new medical examination form

was developed to be used by the doctors. This form includes all of the

specifics of ANSI /ANS 3.4-1983. In addition, Dan Moore, Nuclear Training

Coordinator, Georgia Power Company, will be reviewing all certificates of

medical evaluation for completeness prior to signing and submitting

NRC Form 396. In the future, licensing physical examinations will be

conducted independently of all other physical examinations.

Dan Moore will also be performing a check of the medical evaluation

records at Plant Vogtle to ensure compliance with the previously mentioned

standards.

14. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 22 and

August 24, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The

licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to

or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. Dissenting comments

were not received from the licensee.

Item Number Status Description / Reference Paragraph

366/88-24-01 Opened VIOLATION - Inadequate EHC Drawing

(paragraph 2)

321/88-24-02 Opened VIOLATION - Inadequate Turbine

Bearing 011 System Procedure

(paragraph 9)

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15. Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABN -

As-Built Notice

ANSI -

American National Standards Institute

ARP -

Annunciator Response Procedure

DCR -

Design Change Request

D/G -

Diesel Generator

EHC -

Electrohydraulic Control System

ESF -

Engineered Safety Feature

FCS -

Feedwater Control System

GPM -

Gallons Per Minute

HPCI -

High Pressure Coolant Injection

I&C -

Instrumentation and Controls

ISI -

Inservice Inspection

IST -

Inservice Testing

LCO -

Limiting Condition for Operations '

LOCA -

Loss of Coolant Accident

LPCI -

Low Pressure Coolant Injection

MCREC - Main Control Room Environmental Control

MWO -

Maintenance Work Order

RCIC -

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling

RFP -

Reactor Feed Pump

RHRSW - Residual Heat Removal Service Water i

RPS -

Reactor Protection System

RWCU -

Reactor Water Cleanup System

SRV -

Safety Relief Valve

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