ML20155A212
| ML20155A212 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 09/22/1988 |
| From: | Menning J, Randy Musser, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20155A203 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-88-24, 50-366-88-24, NUDOCS 8810050246 | |
| Download: ML20155A212 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000321/1988024
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION ll
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W.
ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30323
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Report Numbers:
50-321/88-24 and 50-366/88-24
. Lic9n see: ' Georgia Power Company
P.O.-Box'4545
Atlanta, GA 30302
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Docket Numbers:
50-321 and 50-366
License Numbers:
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Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2
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'Inspution Dates: July 23 - August 19 and August 22-24, 1988
Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia
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. Inspectors:
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Joh G . Menning, Senior Resident Inspector
Oate Signed
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RaFidall A. Musser, Residerit -Inspector
Date Signed
Accompanying Personnel: ,MichaJ7E.Ernstes
Approved by:]]'{'fl _
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L$G
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Marvin W '$fnKL1'e,"Cnief, Project Section 3B
'Date Signed
Division of Reactor Projects
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SUMMARY
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Scope:
A routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas of
Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Observations, Plant
Modifications,
Surveillance
Testing
Observations,
System
Walkdowns, Radiological Protection, Physical Security, Reportable
Occurrences, Operating Reactor Events, Three Mile Island Items,
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and Review of
t.icensee Operational Upgrade Ef forts.
A reactive
inspertion was also conducted at the site to investigate a facility
identified problem associated with Certification of Medical Records.
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Results:
Two violations were identified. One violation involved an inadequate
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EHC system drawing, and the other violation involved for an inadequate
turbine bearing oil system procedure,
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
C. Coggin, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
D. Davis, Manager General Support
- K. Oyar, Senior Quality Assurance Field Representative
J. Fitzsimmons, Nuclear Security Manager
- P. Fornel, Maintenance Manager
- 0. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance Manager
- M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager
- R. Granthum, Operating Training Superintendent / Acting Manager
- J. Lewis, Acting Operations Manager
- 0. Moore, Nuclear Training Coordinator - Corporate
- H. Nix, General Manager
- J. Payne, Senior Plant Engineer
T. Powers, Engineering Manager
0. Read, Plant Support Manager
- H. Sumner, Plant Manager
- S. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager
R. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
mechanics, security force members and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- J. Monning
R. Musser
Other NRC Inspectors
- M. Ernstes
- Attended exit interview on August 22, 1988
- Attended exit interview on August 24, 1988
- Attended both exit interviews
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph,
2.
Operational Safety Verification (71707) Units 1 and 2
The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall
plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant
operations. Daily discussions were held with plant management and various
members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits
to the control room. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints
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and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on
equipment, control s and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to
limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily
journals and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access
controls. This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions
with operators and their supervisors. Weekly, when on site, selected ESF
systems were confirmed operable.
The confirmation was made by verifying
the following: accessible valve flow path alignment, power supply breaker
and fuse status, instrumentation, major component leakage, lubrication,
cooling, and general condition.
General plant tours were conducted on at letst a weekly basis. Portions
of the control building, turbine building, reactor building, and outside
areas were visited.
Observations includeo general
plant / equipment
conditions, safety related tagout verifications, shift turnover, sampling
program, housekeeping and general plant conditions, fire protection
equipment, control of activities in progress, radiation protection
controls, physical security, problem identification systems, missile
hazards, instrumentation and alarms in the control room, and containment
isolation.
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In the area of housekeeping the following discrepancie: were observed by
the inspector and brought to the attention of licensee pecsonnel:
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On August 1, 1938, empty boxes and other trash were observed in the
vicinity of Unit 2 RWCU precoat pump 2G31-C003.
This pump is located
on elevation 185 in the Unit 2 reactor building,
On August 2, 1988, various items of equipment were observed under and
around control room ventilation condensing unit 1Z41-B008B.
These
items had apparently not been removed after maintenance on this unit.
On July 25, 1988, the licensee informed the inspector that medical records
were found to be incomplete for 24
licensed
individuals.
More
specifically, it was determined that blood testing and urinalysis had not
been performed on these individuals as required by ANSI Standard 3.4.
On
August 12, 1988, the inspector was informed that additional checking
revealed that the medical records for 62 licensed individuals were
,
incomplete.
Pulmonary function testing had not been performed on 24
individuals.
Blood testing, urinalysis, and pulmcnary function testing
had not been performed on the remaining 33 individuals.
The licensee
informed the inspector on August 12, 1988, that they planned to have most
of the required testing performed within a two-week period.
This
licensee-identified matter was followed by the regional inspection staf f
(paragraph 13).
At 1647 on August
5,
1983, Unit 2 automatically scrammed from
,
approximately 100 percent of rated power. This scram was caused by trips
of the condensate booster and reactor feed pumps. The loss of condensate
and feedwater flow resulted in a low reactor vessel water level condition.
The events of this scram are discussed in paragraph 10.
Following the
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completion of necessary corrective actions, the Unit 2 reactor was again
critical at 2239 on August 6.
Unit 2 entered the RUN mode at 0420, and
the main generator was synchronized with the grid at 1125 on August 7,
1988.
Rated power was achieved at 2300 on August 8, 1988.
At 2004 on August 9,
1988, the Unit 2 low pressure turbine intercept
valves were inadvertently closed while operations personnel were placing
an equipment clearance on the EHC system.
Unit 2 was operating at
approximately 100 percent of rated power at the time of this event.
Clearance No. 2-88-1336 was being placed to support replacement of the "B"
EHC pump. The clearance required the closing of valve 2N32-FV20. When
the FV20 valve was closed, low pressure turbine intercept valves Nos. 3
and 4 went fully closed, and intercept valves Nos. 1 and 2 went
approximately 60 percent closed.
Control room personnel observed the
closing of the intercept valves and immediately reduced power to
approximately 50 percent of rated. The FV20 valve was reopened, and all
four intercept valves responded by opening fully.
The licensae
subsequently conducted an inspection of the condenser bay area of the
turbine building and ensured that plant conditions had stabilized prior to
increasing power.
Rated power was again achieved at 0037 on August 10,
1988.
Investigation showed that the event on August 9,1988, was caused by a
deficient drawing. Drawing H-21243 was used by operations personnel when
the equipment clearance was prepared.
This drawing indicated that valve
FV20 could be closed without isclating EHC fluid from the low pressure
turbine intercept valves.
A review of the as-built configuration showed
that the print did not accurately reflect the EHC pump discharge piping.
Regulatory requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V,
"Instructions,
Procedures,
and Orawings," specify that activities
affecting quality are to be prescribed and accomplished with documented
instructions,
procedures,
or drawings.
The inadequate drawing is
considered to be a violation of this regulatory requirement. This matter
will be tracked as violation 366/88-24-01, Inadequate EHC Drawing.
Ore violation was identified.
3.
Mai nteriance 'Aservations (62703) Units 1 and 2
During ti
port period, the insoectors observed selected maintenance
activities
ihe observations included a review of the work documents for
adequacy, adherence to procedures, proper tagouts, adherence to technical
specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the
actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements.
and adherence to the appropriate quality controls.
The primary
maintenance observations during this month are sumnarized below:
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Maintenance Activity
Date
a.
Replacement of Fire Pump Controller
07/27/88
Piping on Diesel Fire Pump No. 3 per
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MWO 1-88-2607 and DCR 87-81.
(Unit 1)
b.
Replacement of the RHRSW Air Release
08/02/88
Valve (1E11-F904A) per MWO 1-88-1016.
(Unit 1)
c.
Repair of Post LOCA Radiation Monitor
08/12/88
1011-K622C per MWO 1-88-4672. (Unit 1)
d.
Troubleshooting of LPCI Inverter
08/19/88
1R44-S002 per MWO 1-88-4855 (Unit 1)
As discussed in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/88-22 and 50-366/88-22,
problems were experienced with Unit 1 LPCI inverter 1R44-5002 during the
previous reporting period.
Additional LPCI inverter problems were
experienced in Unit 1 during this reporting period. On August 1, 1988,
LPCI inverter 1R44-5002 tripped. On August 2, 1988, operations personnel
received
a trouble alarm for Unit 1 LPCI
inverter 1R44-5003.
Investigation revealed that fuses had been blown. On August 11, 1988,
operations personnel again received a trouble alarm for 1R44-S003.
Investigation revealed that fuses had blown again.
Inverter 1R44-S003
experienced an apparently identical problem on August 12, 1988.
It
appeared to the inspector that the licensee's maintenance efforts had been
ineffective in identifying and correcting the basic caucc(3) of the LPCI
inverter problems. In discussing these concerns with licensee personnel,
the inspector learned that the licensee had formed an event review team to
'nvestigate these events.
Additionally, a vendor representative was sent to the site to inspect the
inverters.
As noted above, the inspector observed some of the vendor
representative's activities on August 19, 1988. The inspector will review
this team's report and any corrective actions that result from the
investigation.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Plant Modifications (37700) Units 1 and 2
The inspector reviewed documentation packages for selected DCRs that had
been implemented and closed by the licensee.
The review included
verification that the design changes had been reviewed and approved in
accordance with the technical specifications and 10 CFR 50.59, controlled
by approved procedures, and verified by appropriate post installation
testing and/or inspections. The review also included verification that
plant procedures,
operator training programs,
as built drawings,
preventive mai ;enance programs, and the ISI/IST programs were revised, as
appropriate, prior to the modification being declared operable.
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The DCRs involved in this review were identified by the licensee as
Nos.86-218 and 86-219.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Testing Observations (61726) Units 1 and 2
The inspectors observed the performance of selected surveillances.
The
observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy,
conformance to technical specifications, verification of test instrument
calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances,
removal from service and return to service of the system or components
affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the
acceptance criteria. The primary surveillance testing observations during
this month are summarized below:
Surveillance Testing Activity
Date
a.
Channel Functional Test and Calibration
07/26/88
for ATTS Panel 1H11-P926 per procedure
57SV-SUV-012-15 (Unit 1)
b.
RCIC Pump operability test per
08/02/88
procedure 345V-E51-002-15 (Unit 1)
c.
Core Spray Pump IST per procedure
08/05/88
34SV-E21-001-2S (Unit 2)
On August 2, 1988, while observing the Unit 1 RCIC pump operability test,
the inspector noted that the "RCIC Barometric Condenser High Pressure"
annunciator came in.
The operator performing the test responded by
entering the appropriate ARP.
All items identified by the ARP as
probable causes for the alarm were checked and all were found to be
satisfactory.
The pressure in the condenser was holding steady at
3 inches of Hg Vacuum, the alarm setpoint. Since the above condition did
not affect the operability of the system, the test was successfully
completed.
Discussions with the system engineer confirmed that the
purpose of the RCIC barometric condenser is to ensure proper gland sealing
capability of the RCIC turbine. Additionally, the engineer stated that
the high pressure condition was caused by ar improperly set cooling water
flow control valve.
This condition will be corrected during the next
surveillance of the Unit 1 RCIC system.
On August 5,
1988, while observing the Core Spray Pump 2B IST, the
inspector noted some problems with the procedure in use, 345V-E21-001-25.
These items were brought to the attention of the Unit 2 Shift Supervisor.
The following is a summation of the problems noted.
(1) Step 7.2.10
states, "THROTTLE OPEN Core Spray Test Valve, 2E21-F015B, to obtain a flow
on Flos
- dicator 2E21-R601B, exactly equal to the reference flow
recorded....d It is not possible to obtain a flow rate exactly equal to
the reference flow as the Flow Indicator reads in divisions of 100 gpm
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(between 4000-5000 gpm). (2) Step 7.2.11 states, "WHEN Core Spray flow is
greater than 950 GPM, confirm that Core Spray Minimum Flow Valve,
2E21-F0318, CLOSES." This step is difficult to perform due to the coarse
scale on flow indicator 2E21-R6018.
(3) Step 7.2.22 states, "WHEN Core
Spray Flow decreases to less than 700 GPM, confirm that Core Spray Minimum
Flow Valve, 2E21-F0318, OPENS." This step is also difficult to perform
due to the coarse scale on flow indicator 2E21-R601B. The reading of this
flow indicator at low flow ranges is a problem with all four loops of core
spray, loop A and B for each unit.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
ESF System Walkdowns (71710) Unit 1
The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF systems. Valve
and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified
both locally and in the control room to ensure that lineups were in
,
accordance with operability requirements and that equipment material
conditions were satisfactory. The MCREC system was walked down in detail
on August 2, 1988.
As noted in paragraph 3, a housekeeping discrepancy
was observed at that time and brought to the attention of the Unit 1 Shift
Supervisor.
No violations or deviations were noted.
7.
Radiological Protection (71709) Units 1 and 2
The resident inspectors reviewed aspects of the licensee's radiological
protection orogram in the course of the monthly activities.
The
performance of health physics and other personnel was observed on various
shif ts to include:
involvement of health physics supervision, use of
radiation work permits, use of personnel monitoring equipment, control of
high radiation areas, use of friskers and personal contamination fronitors,
and posting and labeling.
No violations or deviations were noted.
8.
Physical Security (71881) Units 1 and 2
In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors included
a review of the licensee's rhysical secu-ity program. The performance of
various shifts of the secur
force was coserved in the conduct of daily
i y of t.,pervnsion, availability of armed
activities to include: aya
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response personnel, protectt
vital access controls, searching of
personnel, packages and vehicle, vadge issuance and retrieval, escorting
of visitors, patrols and compensatory posts.
No violations or deviations were noted.
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9.
Reportable Occurrences (90712 and 92700) Units 1 and 2
A number of Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed for potential
generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective
actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately were
also reviewed as they occurred to determine that technical specifications
were being met and the public health and safety were of utmost
consideration.
Unit 1:
88-05
Personnel Error Causes Air Introduction Into Turbine
Lube Oil Coolers Resulting in Scram
The events of this LER concern an improper exchange of
main turbine lube oil coolers that resulted in a
turbine trip and reactor scram. 1he scram occurred on
April 19, 1988, and was discussed in NRC Inspection
Report
Nos. 50-321/88-11
and
50-366/88-11.
Investigation revealed that the turbine bearing oil
system operating procedure (3450-N34-008-1N) did not
address the exchange of these coolers.
Personnel
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performed the exchange operation without procedural
guidance and inadvertently introduced air into the
turbine lube oil system.
Technical Specification 6.8.1.a
requires
that
written
procedures
be
estabitshed, implemented, and maintained covering the
activities referenced in Appendix "A" of Regulatory
Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978.
Section 4 of
Appendix
"A"
of Regul6 tory Guide 1.33 recommends
procedures for the operatior, of the turbine generator
system.
This matter is considered a violation of
Technical Specification 6.8.1.a and will be tracked as
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violation 321/88-24-02, Inadequate Turbine Bearing 011
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System Procedure.
88-07
Lack of Administrative Control Causes Potential Diesel
Generator Inoperability
This LER concerns the closing of rollup fire door
IL48-D143 for D/G 1R43-50018 room without adequate
consideration of the affect on D/G operability. The
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fire door was initially found to be stuck at mid
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position and then closed to comply with requirements
of
the
Fire
Hazard
Analysis.
The
licensee
subsequently questioned whether the rollup fire door's
closed position could adversely affect the operability
of 0/G 1R43-50018.
An engineering study and special
testing have established that the D/G room maximum
,
design temperature (122*F) would be exceeded af ter
approximately 19 minutes of operation at 2800 KW
on a 95'F day. The licensee's corrective actions were
reviewed by the inspector. This matter appears to be
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a violation of Technical Specification 0/G operability
requirements.
However, since all the requirements
specified in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C,
Section V,
were satisfied, this licensee-identified violation is
not being cited. Additionally, review of the LER is
closed.
88-10
Deficient Procedure Allows Configuration Where
Monitors Do Not Meet Operability Requirements
This LER concerns a configuration of the Recombiner
Building Ventilation Radiation Noble Gas Monitors that
would preclude annunciation of an inoperable or
downscale condition in the main control room.
The
Recombiner Building Ventilation Radiation Noble Gas
Detection System consists of two separate monitors.
These monitors were being maintained with one in
service while the other monitor was in a standby mode.
The licensee determined that under these conditions
failure of the monitor in service due to an inoperable
or downscale condition would not be annunciated in the
control room.
Table
4.14.2-1,
Item 3.a,
of the
technical specification requires that main control
room
annunciation
on
or
downscale
conditions be demonstrated during quarterly functional
testing.
Correctite action involved doactivating the
redundant nonitor and initiating procedure changes to
ensure that the redundant monitor is maintained in
either a deactivated or fully operable condition.
This matter appears to be a violation of the
previously cited technical specification requirements.
However, since all the requirements spectfied ir
10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section V, were satisf1ed,
this licensee-identified violation is not being cited.
Review of the LER is closed.
Unit 2:
87-10
Failed Instrument Line Leakage Exceeds Allowable
Limits Resulting in Reactor Shutdown
This LER was previously discussed in NRC Inspection
Report Nos. 50-321/88-22 and 50-366/88-22. Review of
the LER remained open pending the receipt of a
revision to the LER providing the results of a
metallurgical analysis of the failed instrument line.
Revision 1 of ti.e LER was issued on August 12, 1988.
The licensee has determined that the failure mode was
high cycle f atigue.
The licensee intends to perform
an engineering evaluation of this instrument line and
its supports to determine if additional modifications
are needed to prevent additional high cycle fatigue
failures.
Review of this LER is closed.
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09-01
Inadequate Procedure Causes Mis-Assembly of Valve
Resulting in ESF System Inoperability
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This LER concerns the mis-assembly of the Unit 2 HPCI
turbine stop valve.
The problem was
initially
identified when operations personnel noted a double
position indication, indicating that the valve was
between the open and closed position.
During
subsequent troubleshooting involving stroking of the
valve, the valve stuck at approximately 50 percent
closed and a metal-to-metal binding noise was heard.
Disassembly of the valve revealed that the split
coupling connecting the valve stem to the hydraulic
actuator piston rod had a clearance of 5/8 of an inch
between the stem and piston rod. The clearance should
have been no greater than
1/16 of an inch.
Investigation showed that the stop valve was last
disassembled and reassembled in June of 1983. Review
of the procedure used at that time revealed that it
failed to provide step-by-step
instructions for
reassembly of the valve.
It was concluded that
procedural inadequacies resulted in the improper
adjustment of the clearance between the stem and th2
piston rod.
Correcti/e actions involved initiating
procedure changes to provide better valve reassembly
instructions and ensuring that the Unit 1 HPCI turbine
stop valve was
properly
assembled.
Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures
be established, implemented, and maintained covering
the
activities
referenced
in Appendix
"A"
of
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision
2,
February 1978.
Section 9 of Appendix
"A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33
states
that maintenance
that
can
affect
the
performance of safety-related equipment should be
performed in accordance with written procedures,
documented ins ructions, or appropriate drawings. The
inadequate maintenance procedure appears to constitute
a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a.
However, since all the requirements specified in
,
10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section V, were satisfied,
this lice.isee-identified violation is not being cited.
Review of the LER is closed.
88-08
Calibration Procedural Deficiency for Feedwater
Controller Causes Low Water Level Scram
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The events of this LER concern the Unit 2 reactor
scram on March 21, 1988. Prior to the scram, control
room personnel were in the process of trans/ erring the
FCS from startup control to single element control as
part of normal unit startup operations. Fluctuations
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in reactor vessel water level were observed and the
"2A" RFP subsequently tripped on low suction pressure.
The FCS instability was attributed to improper
settings on the master controller module (2C32-K636).
The licensee could not establish when the controller
settings had been changed to the incorrect values.
However,
the
involved
calibration
procedure
(57CP-CAL-048-2) was found to be deficient in that it
did not require the recording of as-found and as-lef t
settings for the controller (2C32-K636) and the
control amplifier (2C32-K637). The inspector reviewed
the l icerisee 's
corrective actions which included
development of a more comprehensive procedure for
calibration of the FCS master control loop. Review of
this LER is closed.
88-19
Personnel Error Results in Missed Reactor Protection
System Functional Test
This LER concerns a failure to perform main turbine
stop valve RPS surveillance within the interval
specified in the technical specifications.
More
soecifically, the functional testing requirements of
Technical Specification Table 4.3.1-1,
Item 9, were
not performed on time.
Upon discovery of this
situation, the licensee entered the appropriate LCO
and initiated the required testing.
Testing per
procedure
"Turbine
Stop
Valve
Instrument
Functional
Test,"
was satisfactorily
completed and the LC0 was terminated. This matter is
considered a violation of the technical specification
surveillance requirement.
However, since all the
requirements specified in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C,
Section V, were satisfied, this licensee-identified
violation is not being cited.
Review of the LER is
closed.
One violation was identified.
10.
Operating Reactor Events (93702) Unit 2
The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the below listed
reactor event.
The review included determination of cause, safety
significance, performance of personnel and systems, and corrective action.
The inspectors examined instrument recordings, computer printouts,
operations journal entries, and scram reports and also had discussions
with operations, maintenance, and engineering support personnel as
appropriate.
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Unit 2 automatically scrammed from approximately 100 percent of rated
power at 1647 on August 5, 1988. Prior to this event, I&C personnel were
installing RFP "2A" minimum flow controller 2N21-R3846 in control room
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panel 2H11-P662. At that time a 3 amp fuse supplying power to the minimum
flow controllers for the condensate pumps, condensate booster pumps, and
RFPs blew.
(This fuse is identified as fuse F7 on licensee print H
23840.) Since the air operated minimum flow valves for these pumps are
designed to fail open, the valves all opened when power to the controllers
was lost.
The condensate booster and RFPs subsequently tripped on low
suction pressure.
Reactor vessel water level decreased to approximately
minus 65 inches indicated during the transient.
initiated as expected, returning vessel water level to its normal band.
Reactor pressure was controlled by EHC to less than 920 psig.
No SRVs
were actuated.
However, operations personnel noted that RWCU inboard
isolation valve 2G31-F001 did not close as expected at the vessel level
setpoint for Group V isolation of minus 35 inches.
Investigation revealed
that the vessel water level transmitter (2B21-N081B) providing the
isolation signal to 2G31-E001 did not respond to level changes.
The
defective transmitter was replaced. This transmitter was identified as
Rosemount Part No. 11540P5RJ with Serial No. 411213. Licensee personnel
indicated to the inspector that the defective transmitter would be
returned to the vendor for a failure analysis.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Three Mile Island Items (item numbers from NUREG 0737)
Item II.F.2.3.B concerns the covering of reactor pressure vessel water
level reference legs B21-0003A and B with insulation to prevent flashing
due to high drywell temperatures. This item remained open pending the
completion of work and review of packages for DCRs86-218 and 86-219 for
Units 1 and 2, respectively.
DCR 86-218 was closed on October 10, 1987,
and was subsequently reviewed by the inspector. DCR 86-219 was closed on
April 8,1988, and was subsequently reviewed by the inspector. This item
is closed for Units 1 and 2.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Review of Licensee's Operational Upgrade Efforts - Units 1 and 2
As discussed in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/88-14 and 50-366/88-14,
the licensee voluntarily initiated a program in April of 1988 to upgrade
certain aspects of operational performance.
The referenced report
mentioned that the resident inspectors would review longer term
operational upgrade efforts as related activities were completed.
The
area discussed below was reviewed during the current reporting period.
Emergency Diesel Generator Testing: The licensee has completed actions to
reduce the number of emergency diesel generator fast starts in an effort
to prolong engine life and improve reliability.
More specifically, the
methodology for conducting monthly operability testing has been changed.
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In the past, the diesel generators were fast started; i.e, synchronous
speed was achieved in a maximum of 12 seconds.
The licensee has revised
the monthly operability test procedures to provide for slow starting of
the diesels and for barring of the engines following operation.
The
inspector reviewed the following surveillance procedures:
Procedure No.
Rev.
Effective Date
Diesel Generator
6
06/27/88
1A
7
06/27/88
2A
3
06/27/88
IB
3
06/27/88
IB
2
06/27/88
1C
4
07/19/88
2C
Review of the licensee's upgrade efforts in the emergency diesel generator
testing area is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Certification of Medical Records (71707) Units 1 and 2
A
reactive
inspection was conducted on August 22-24.
1988, by
Michael E. Ernstes to investigate a facility identifiec problem associated
with the certification of the physical
examinations required by
10 CFR 55.23 for operatcr license applications.
Interviews were concucted
with training department personnel responsible for submitting NkC Form 396
with license app 11 cations and with the physicians conducting the physical
examinations.
On June 16, 1988, a renewal application was submitted by Plant Hatch for
an operator who heid a no-solo operators license. The restriction was due
to the operator being a diabetic. The NRC requested a copy of his medical
evaluation to be reviewed by the NRC doctor.
The Hatch training
department discovered at this time that there were no blood tests
conducted for his evaluation,
Further investigation showed that all
examinations conducted by Dr. DeJarnette of Vidalia, Georgia, after
June 1987 did not have blood, urine, or plumonary tests.
In addition, the
examinations conducted by Dr. Poblete of Baxley, Georgia, did rot have
pulmonary tests included.
Effective May 26, 1987, NRC Form 396 was enanged such that the physician
signed a single statement stating that the individual met the guidance
provided in ANSI /ANS 3.4-1983.
In July 1987, Georgia Power Company held a
meeting with the doctors to discuss these changes in documentation.
At
this meeting, discussion was given to the possibility of comoining some of
the testing on the various types of physicals.
In order to meet the
standards established in ANSI /ANS 3.4-1983, Dr. DeJarnette had been taking
credit for the blood. urine, and pulmonary tests conducted through the
Employee Health Plan.
These physical examinations are performed on-site
annually to all licensed personnel.
Dr. Poblete had also been using the
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pulmonary tests from the same program as part of their evaluations.
Although all aspects of ANSI /ANS 3.4-1983 had been met, it could not be
readily verified from the records of medical examinations. This prompted
the training department to establish corrective actions to better ensure
that all parts of the standard are met prior to signing NRC Form 396.
In order to verify that the guidance contained in ANSI /ANS 3.4-1933 was
followed, all licensed operators who were examined subsequent to &Jne 1987
were reexamined in the areas which had not been performed as part of the
physical.
This consisted of 38 individuals getting blood, urine, and
pulmonary tests from Dr. DeJarnette and 24 individuals receiving pulmonary
tests from Dr. Poblete. All tests were completed for these 62 individuals
on August 23, 1988.
None of these test results indicated disqualifying
conditions.
To prevent recurrence of this problem, a new medical examination form
was developed to be used by the doctors.
This form includes all of the
specifics of ANSI /ANS 3.4-1983. In addition, Dan Moore, Nuclear Training
Coordinator, Georgia Power Company, will be reviewing all certificates of
medical evaluation for completeness prior to signing and submitting
In the future, licensing physical examinations will be
conducted independently of all other physical examinations.
Dan Moore will also be performing a check of the medical evaluation
records at Plant Vogtle to ensure compliance with the previously mentioned
standards.
14.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 22 and
August 24, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The
licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to
or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. Dissenting comments
were not received from the licensee.
Item Number
Status
Description / Reference Paragraph
366/88-24-01
Opened
VIOLATION - Inadequate EHC Drawing
(paragraph 2)
321/88-24-02
Opened
VIOLATION - Inadequate Turbine
Bearing 011 System Procedure
(paragraph 9)
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15.
Acronyms and Abbreviations
As-Built Notice
ABN
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ANSI
American National Standards Institute
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Annunciator Response Procedure
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Design Change Request
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Diesel Generator
D/G
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Electrohydraulic Control System
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Engineered Safety Feature
-
Feedwater Control System
-
Gallons Per Minute
GPM
-
High Pressure Coolant Injection
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Instrumentation and Controls
-
Inservice Inspection
-
Inservice Testing
-
'
LCO
Limiting Condition for Operations
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Loss of Coolant Accident
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Low Pressure Coolant Injection
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MCREC - Main Control Room Environmental Control
MWO
Maintenance Work Order
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Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
-
Reactor Feed Pump
-
RHRSW - Residual Heat Removal Service Water
i
-
Reactor Water Cleanup System
-
-
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