ML20148H711
| ML20148H711 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 03/07/1988 |
| From: | Holmesray P, Menning J, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148H683 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-88-05, 50-321-88-5, 50-366-88-05, 50-366-88-5, NUDOCS 8803300068 | |
| Download: ML20148H711 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000321/1988005
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION il
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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AT LANTA, oEoRGI A 30323
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Report Numbers:
50-321/88-05 and 50-366/88-05
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
P. O. Box 4545
Atlanta, GA 30302
Docket Numbers:
50-321 and 50-366
License Numbers:
Facility Name:
Hatch 1 and 2
Inspection Dates: January 23 - February 19, 1988
Inspectors:
D )[
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Peter Holmes 'Ra , Senior Resi/ent Inspector
Date Signed
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JohnE.Menning,ResidentIn@ector
Date Sitned
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AccompanyingPersgnel:/RanallA.Mussr
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Approved by:
Marvin \\f/. Sinkule, Chief, Project Section 3B
Date Signed
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas of
Licensee Action
on
Previous
Enforcement Matters,
Operational
Safety
Verification, Maintenance Observation,
Plant Modification,
Surveillance
Observation,
Radiological
Protection,
Physical
Security,
Reportable
Occurrences, and Reactor Operating Events.
Results:
Two violations were identified.
880330o068 8s0310
ADOCK 0500o321
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee. Employees
T. Beckham, Vice President-Plant Hatch
- C. Coggin, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
D. Davis, Manager General Support
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J. - Fitzsimmons, Nuclear Security Manager
- P. Fornel, Maintenance Manager
- 0. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance (QA) Manager
- M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager
- H. Nix, Plant Manager
- T. Powers, Engineering Manager
- D. Read, Plant Support Manager
- H. Sumner, Operations Manager
- S. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager
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R.-Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
mechanics, security force members and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- P. Holmes-Ray
- J. Menning
- R. Musser
NRC management on site during inspection period:
M. Sinkule, Chief, Project Section 38, Region II
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 19, 1988,
with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The licensee did not
identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the
inspectors during this inspection. The licensee acknowledged the findings
and took no exception.
Item Number
Status
Description / Reference Paragraph
321/88-05-01
Open
VIOLATION - Bypassing of APRM
Downscale Scram Inputs
(paragraph 5)
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Item Number
Status
Description / Reference Paragraph
cont'd
321/88-05-04
Open
VIOLATION - Inadequate MWO for
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Vacuum Breaker Maintenance
(paragraph 8)
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321,366/86-41-01'
Closed
VIOLATION - Failure to follow
plant procedures which
resulted in partial loss of water
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from the fuel pools (paragraph 3)
321,366/88-05-02
Open
URI - Leak Testing of Test
Solenoid Valves (paragraph 5)
321/88-05-03
Open
Surveillance (paragraph 8)
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
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(Closed) Violation 321,366/86-41-01, Failure to follow plant procedures
which resulted in a partial loss of water from the fuel pools.
The GPC
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letter of response dated May 8,1987, was reviewed. Licensee corrective
action involved replacement of the transfer canal inflatable seal assembly,
an enhancement of the leak detection system (implemented by DCR 87-99),
the addition of redundant air supplies to the inflatable seal assembly and
annunciation in the control rocin for loss of seal air pressure (implemented
by DCR 87-100), and specific training for operations personnel on the
spill event.
The inspector reviewed the GPC corrective action package,
DCR's 87-99 and 87-100 (and associated MW0s), toured the new seal air
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supply system with the system engineer and determined that the required
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corrective actions had been performed.
Since the actions to correct the
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specifics of this violation have been completed, this item is closed.
4.
Unresolved Item (URI)*
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(0 pen) URI 321,366/88-05-02, Leak Testing of Test Solenoid Valves.
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(0 pen) URI 321/88-05-03, Inadequate APRM Surveillance.
(Closed) URI 321,366/87-02-03, Method to Ensure Qualified Personnel are
Available to Fill Emergency Organization Positions.
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In Inspection Report 321,366/87-18 the Emergency Preparedness Section
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opened IFI 87-18-04, Veri fy Shift Augmentation Times and Violation
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87-18-05, Failure to Maintain a Trained and Qualified Emergency Response
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Staff.
These two items cover the same concern as 87-02-03. URI 87-02-03
is closed to remove the redundancy.
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"An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to
determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
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5.
Operational Safety Verification (71707) Units 1 and 2
The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall
plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant
operations. Daily discussions were held with plant management and various
members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits
to the control room. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints
and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on
equipment, controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to
limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily
journals and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access
controls. This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions
with operators and their supervisors.
Weekly, when on site, selected
Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) systems were confirmed operable.
The
confirmation was made by verifying the following:
accessible valve flow
path alignment, power supply breaker and fuse status, instrumentation,
major component leakage, lubrication, cooling, and general condition.
General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basis. Portions
of the control building, turbine building, reactor building, and outside
areas were visited.
Observations included general plant / equipment
conditions, safety related tagout verifications, shif t turnover, sampling
program, housekeeping and general plant conditions, fire protection
equipment, control of activities in progress, radiation protection
controls, physical security, problem identification systems, missile
hazards, instrumentation and alarms in the control room, and containment
isolation.
On January 28, 1988, the inspector observed tools and other materials in
the Unit 1 reactor building in the vicinity of Core Spray System Outboard
Injection Valve 1E21-F004A.
These items had apparently not been removed
following the completion of maintenance work. This matter was brought to
the attention of the Unit 1 Shift Supervisor.
On February 9,
1988, while administering an NRC operator licensing
examination, the examiner noted that Unit I was potentially operating with
less than the minimum number of operable Average Power Range Monitor
(APRM) Downscale scram inputs required by the Technical Specifications
(TS).
At the time of this observation (approximately 0840) Unit I was
operating in the RUN mode at approximately 100 percent of rated power.
The examiner noted that APRM channel A and Intermediate Range Monitor
(IRM) channel C were both in the bypassed condition.
A review of a
f acility print (H-17789) confirmed that the bypassing of IRM channel C in
effect bypassed the Downscale scram input of APRM channel C.
Since APRM
channels A, C and E provide input to Reactor Protection system (RPS)
channel A, only APRM channel E remained available to provide Downscale
scram input to this RPS Channel.
During power operations Table 3.1-1 of
the TS requires a minimum of two operable channel inputs per RPS channel
for the APRM Downscale scram function. If the min' um number of operable
inputs cannot be met for an RPS channel, the affected RPS channel must be
tripped.
The examiner observed that RPS channel A was not tripped.
The
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examiner discussed his concerns with the Unit 1 Shift Supervisor and noted
that IRM channel C was subsequently unbypassed.
The resident inspector attempted to determine how long APRM channel A and
IRM channel C had been simultaneously bypassed in following up on this
matter. This could not be determined from a review of control room log
books. However, on duty operations personnel indicated that the condition
had existed since at least the start of their shift.
This event is
considered a violation of TS Table 3.1-1 in that only one APRM channel
was available to provide APRM Downscale scram input to RPS channel A and
the RPS channel was untripped.
This matter will be tracked as Violation
321/88-05-01 - Bypassing of APRM Downscale Scram Inputs.
At approximately 1500 on February 9,
1988, while conducting an NRC
licensed one"/.or examination, the examiner noticed that halon tanks
serv 4 *., the Unit 2 Remote Shutdown Panel were discharged.
Discussions
wi .n operations personnel revealed that the tanks discharged at 2237 on
February 8, 1988. Operations personnel also indicated that no action had
,een taken to replenish the halon.
Since Unit 2 was in cold shutdown
during this time period, halon protection was not required for the Remote
Shutdown Panel.
However, the examiner and the resident inspectors were
concerned that the licensee had taken no action to replenish the halon
almost 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br /> af ter the discharge had taken place.
The licensee is
currently reviewing this matter. Region II NRC personnel will also review
this matter during a future inspection.
At 1920 on February 12, 1988, with Unit 1 operating at 100 percent of
rated power, the licensee declared a loss of primary containment integrity
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and entered a 12-hour hot shutdown LCO.
Proper NRC notifications were
made at that time.
These actions were precipitated by the results of
local leak rate testing (LLRT) in Unit 2 which is currently in an outage.
The licensee had previously been conducting LLRTs on vacuum breaker test
solenoid valves 2T48-F342A - L.
These test solenoid valves are in lines
that supply air to the air operators of torus to drywell vacuum breakers
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These vacuum breakers normally operate in the
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self-actuated mode.
The air operators exist for the purpose on
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demonstrating opening capability on a monthly basis.
For containment
isolation purposes, the licensee considers the air operators to be primary
barriers.
Test solenoid valves 2T48-F342A - L are considered outboard
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isolation valves, and are identified as containment isolation valves in
the licensee's Pump and Valve Program.
Until the current Unit 2 outage,
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LLRT's on these valves had been performed with pressure applied on the
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side of the F342 valves away from accident pressure. When recently tested
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on the accident side, the valves failed to hold pressure.
As a result of the Unit 2 test failures and the similarity of equipment in
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Unit 1, the licensee promptly declared a loss of primary containment
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integrity in Unit 1.
The licensee subsequently restored primary containment
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integrity in Unit 1 by disconnecting and capping the air lines at test
solenoid valves 1T48-F343A - L.
This avoided shutdown of Unit 1 and was
accomplished within the LCO time allowed.
The licensee it currently
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investigating this matter and exploring options for corrective action.
Pending completion of the licensee's investigation and -NRC review, the
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matter will be identified as Unresolved Item 321,366/88-05-02 - Leak
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Testing of Test Solenoid Valves.
One violation was identified.
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6.
Maintenance Observation (62703) Units 1 and 2
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During the report period, the inspectors observed selected maintenance
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activities.
The observations included a review of the work documents for
adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical
specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the
actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements,
and adherence to the appropriate quality controls.
The primary maintenance
observations during this month are summarized below:
Maintenance Activity
Date
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1.
Preventive maintenance on Limitorque operator
1/26/88
on valve 2E32-F001P per procedure
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52PM-MNT-005-0S (Unit 2)
2.
Plant service water pump "2A" sequencing
1/28/88
timer evaluation per procedure
(Unit 2)
3.
Inspection of "2C" diesel generator per
2/3/88
procedure 52SV-R43-001-05 (Unit 2)
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Inspection of Allis Chalmers Motor
2/8/88
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Control Center 2R24-5012 per
procedure 52PM-R24-001-05 (Unit 2)
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Removal of Valve 2E11-F005B per
2/9/88
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Maintenance Work Order 2-87-3462 for
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Inservice Inspection (Unit 2)
No violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
Plant Modification (37700) Unit 2
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The inspectors observed the performance of selected plant modification
Design Change Requests (DCRs). The observation included a review of the
DCR for technical adequacy, conformance to Technical Specifications,
verification of test instrument calibration, observation of all or part of
the actual surveillances, removal from service and return to service of
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the system or components affected, and review of the data for acceptability
based upon the acceptance criteria.
The primary DCR observations are
summarized below:
Date
2/2/88
81-008
2/8/88
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Surveillance Testing Observations (61726) Units 1 and 2
The inspectors observed the performance of selected surveillances.
The
observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy,
conformance to Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument
calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances,
removal from service and return to service of the system or components
affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the
acceptance criteria. The primary surveillance testing observations during
this month are summarized below:
Surevillance Testing Activity
Date
1.
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
2/2/88
Pump Rated Flow Testing per
procedure 345V-E51-002-1S (Unit 1)
2.
Functional Testing of Offgas Vent Pipe
2/4/88
Radiation Monitor per procedure
575V-011-010-1 (Unit 1)
3.
Post Maintenance Functional Testing of
2/11/88
"2" Diesel Generator per procedure
52SV-R43-001-05 (Unit 2)
4.
Functional Testing and Calibration of APRMs
2/15/88
345V-C51-002-15 (Unit 1)
On February 15, 1988, at 1720, the licensee discovered that the
surveillance for Average Power Range Monitors (APRM) did not test all
contacts in the trip logic. The downscale and the flow biased high flux
trip contacts had not been included in the surveillance procedure and
therefore had not been tested weekly as required by Technical Specifications).
The APRMs were declared inoperable at 1720, 2-15-88 and the LC0 atiion required
by TS 3.1, Table 3.1-1, Scram Number 8 was entered. This required action
was to reduce power to the IRM range and to have the Mode Switch in Hot
Standby within eight hours.
The licensee requested that the NRC grant
discretionary enforcement to extend the LCO time for about eleven hours
(until 12:00 noon, 2-16-88) to allow time for procedure development and
testing of the APRM trips.
The request was processed through proper
channels and discussed. Since the LC0 time limit of eight hours was rot
exceeded, the discretionary enforcement was not utilized due to clearing
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of the LCO.
The Senior Resident Inspector reviewed the procedure and
witnessed the testing of one of the APRMs.
All APRMs were tested
satisfactorily and the LCO cleared .by 2302, 2-15-88.
This item,
Inadequate APRM Surveillance, will be tracked as URI 321/88-05-03. As
discussed in Region II Reports 321,366/87-29 and 321,366/87-33, several
Unit 1 torus to drywell vacuum breakers failed to test satisfactorily
during recent monthly operability testing.
More specifically, vacuum
breakers 1T48-F323 C and F did not test properly on November 11, 1987, and
vacuum breaker 1T48-F323E stuck open during testing on December 11, 1987.
Vacuum breaker li:.e-F323E eventually did close when the test switch at the
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local panel for vacuum breaker IT48-F323F was depressed.
The licensee
subsequently initiated a program to identify and correct wiring problems
in the test circuitry for these vacuum breakers.
Required corrective
actions were taken under Maintenance Work Orders (MW0s) 1-87-8123,
1-87-7516, 1-87-7517 and 1-87-7950 during the month of January 1988.
In
essence, the licensee found that solenoid valves in the air test lines for
IT48-F323C, E and F had been incorrectly wired and that individual wire
conductor labels for these solenoid valves were incorrect. The solenoid
valves (designated IT48-F342 C, E and F) are two-way valves that remain
open after the test button is released to assure that all air is relieved
from the test line.
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The licensee conducted a broader investigation af the vacuum breaker
testing problems to determine the root cause and identify any additional
needed corrective actions. The resident inspectors reviewed the report of
this investigation dated February 5,1988.
It was determined that the
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wiring discrepancies causing the testing problems were introduced in
October of 1987 during the performance of MWO 1-86-7823. This MWO was
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generated primarily to mark and stow a spare cable and verify the wiring
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of a new cable.
Personnel performing this work noticed and documented
improper conductor termination at test solenoid valves 1T48-F342C, E and
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F.
Unfortunately, MWO instructions to correct the observed wiring discrepa-
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ncies were inadequate, and subsequent corrective maintenance actually introduced
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wiring errors into the test circuitry.
The operability testing difficulties
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of vacuum breakers IT48-F323C, E, and F were subsequently experienced in
November and December of 1987.
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Technical Specification 6.8.1.a.
requires that written procedures be
established, implemented and maintained covering the activities recommended
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in Appendix
"A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2,
February 1978.
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Appendix "A" recommends that maintenance that can af fect the performance
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of safety-related equipment be properly preplanned and performed in
accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings
appropriate to the circumstances.
The rewiring of solenoid valves
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IT48-F342C,E and F in October 1987 is considered to be a violation of TS
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6.8.1.a. in that the instructions of MWO 1-86-7823 were inadequate and
resulted in improper wiring of the three vacuum breaker test soler.oid
valves.
This matter will be tracked as Violation 321/88-05-04
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Inadequate MWO for Vacuum Breaker Maintenance.
In reviewing this matter
the inspectors noted that the incorrect wiring of the test solenoid valves
did not impair the ability of the torus to drywell vacuum breakers to
function in the normal, self-actuated mode,
One violation was identified.
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9.
.ESF System Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF systems. Valve
and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified
both locally- and in the control room to ensure that . lineups were in.
accordance with operability requirements and that equipment material
conditions were satisfactory. The Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal system "A"
loop was walked down in detail.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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10.
Radiological Protection (71709) Units 1 and 2
The resident inspectors reviewed aspects of the licensee's radiological
protection program in the course of the monthly activities.
The
performance of health physics and other personnel was observed on various
shifts to include:
involvement of health physics supervision, use of
radiation work permits, use of personnel monitoring equipment, control of
high radiation areas, use of friskers and personal contamination monitors,
and posting and labeling.
No violations or deviations were noted.
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11.
Physical Security (71881) Units 1 and 2
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In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors included
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a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of
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various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily
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activities to include: availability of supervision, availability of armed
response personnel, protected soc vital access controls, searching of
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personnel, packages and vehit 'es, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting
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of visitors, patrols and compensatory pests.
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On February 18, 1988, the resident inspectors toure, the new security
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building and observed operations in progress.
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No violations or deviations were noted.
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12.
Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700) Unit 1 and 2
A number of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential
generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective
actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately were
also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical Specifications
were being met and the public health and safety were of utmost consideration.
Unit 1: 86-11, Personnel Error Causes ESF Actuation.
The events of
this LER were cited as Violation 86-03-03. The licensee's
corrective action was raviewed and the violation closed in
Inspection Report 86-28.
This LER is closed.
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87-01, Spurious Ground Fault Trips Turbine Overspeed Device
Causing Reactor SCRAM. The licensee's response to to this
event was reviewed and appeared adaquate.
No fault was
located in the turbine overspeed device and the device has
operated properly during Unit 1 power operations. This LER
is closed.
87-02, Ground Condition Trips Main Generator and Turbine
Resulting in Reactor SCRAM. A loose wire was located and
repaired.
Checks were made for other loose components or
ground conditions with none found. A review for possible
additional preventative measures is continuing.
This LER
is closed.
87-05. Blocked Air Port Prevents Damper Closure Resulting in
Improper ESF Actuation. This event was caused by a missing
locknut on the damper control valve bleed off port
adjusting screw. The nut was replaced, the screw properly
adjusted and locked and the other dampers inr.oected for
loose or missing locknuts.
This LER is closed.
Unit 2: 86-20, Primary Containment Penetrations Failed LLRT. All failed
penetrations were repaired and retested prior to Unit 2
startup.
This LER is closed.
87-05, Leaking Valves Cause RWCU Isolation (Group 5).
The leaking
valves were located and isolated and the Group 5 isolation
signal reset.
There is a continuing RWCU upgrade in
progress to which this problem has been added. This LER is
closed.
13. Operating Reactor Events (93702) Unit 2
As discussed in Report 321,366/88-01, the maximum reactor coolant system
cooldown rate of 100 degrees F per hour specified in Technical Specification 3.4.6.1 was exceeded during the shutdown of Unit 2 on
January 13, 1988. The licensee determined that a cooldown from about 520
to 375 degrees F occurred in one hour.
The associated technical specification
Action Statement required the licensee to perform an engineering
evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the
fracture toughness properties of the r6 actor coolant system and to determine
that the reactor coolant system remains acceptable for continued
operation.
An engineering evaluation, performed by General Electric
Company for the licensee, addressed the potential cor.cerns of brittle
fracture, allowable stress and f atigue.
The evaluation concluded that
brittle fracture was not a concern, and that the impact of the transient
on maximum stress and fatigue were less severe than those evaluated for
the design basis single relief valve blowdown event.
In summary, it was
concluded that there were no structural integrity concerns with continued
operation of Unit 2.
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The resident inspectors reviewed the General Electric engineering evaluation
dated January 18, 1988.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
14.
Information Meeting with Local Officials, (94600)
On February 2,1988, the Chief of Region II Projects Section 3B and the
resident inspectors held an information meeting with the Appling County
Board of Commissioners. The NRC representatives provided the Board with a
description of the NRC organization and responsibilities, a summary of
plant status and the business telephone numbers of appropriate NRC
contacts. Additionally, the Hatch resident inspectors were introduced and
the inspection program was briefly described.
Information available in
the local Public Document Rnom was also discussed. The NRC representatives
responded to questions posed by the Board at the conclusien of this
information meeting.
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