ML20058Q094
| ML20058Q094 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 10/15/1993 |
| From: | Barr K 6, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058Q085 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-93-18, 50-366-93-18, NUDOCS 9310260079 | |
| Download: ML20058Q094 (22) | |
See also: IR 05000321/1993018
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.. . UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGloN ll
.y ?, 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
[. :g R ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199
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gb**+/ OCT l 51993
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~ Report Nos.: 50-321/93-18 and 50-366/93-18
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
P.'0. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201
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Docket Nos.': 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5
-Facility Name: Hatch Nuclear Plant
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l Inspection.Co ducted: . September 13-17, 1993
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'Inspe or: /- b, /O-/8-91
WJ. Sartor,Jr. Date Signed
Accompanying Personnel: B. Bonser
E. Christnot
J. Kreh
[ B. Haagensen (Sonalysts, Inc.)
Salyers
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Approved byi
R. P. Barr, Chief /
[r- /O-/.c- 73
Date Signed
EmergencyPreparedn[essSection
Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of
the full participation emergency preparedness exercise. Emergency
organization activation and response were selectively observed in the
licensee's Emergency Response Facilities including: the Simulator Control
Room;. Technical Support Center; Operations Support Center; and the Emergency
Operations Facility. - The inspection also included a review of the exercise
scenario and observation of the licensee's. post-exercise critique.
Results:
In the. areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified. The
licensee responded to the simulated emergency conditions and adequately
implemented their emergency plan and procedures. Emergency facilities were
promptly~st'affed and. activated. Exercise strengths included the challenging
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scenario and .the correct and prompt classification of events escalating to a
General Emergency. An exercise weakness identified the need for follow-up
-9310260079 931015 ~
PDR ADOCK 05000321
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'. notifications to 'the State and local authorities to be driven.by events -
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- occurring onsite that are indicative.of. changing conditions (either positive
- or negative), rather than by a procedural requirement of approximatei, avery
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-30 minutes (Paragraph 7). .
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REPORT DETAILS
1. -Persons Contacted-
p Licensee-Employees
- *L. Adams, Supervisor, Nuclear Security
- C. Brown,. Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, Hatch Project
_* E._Burkett, Acting Manager, Engineering Support
-.*C. Coggin, Manager, Training and Emergency Preparedness
- S. Curtis, Superintendent, Operations Support
- P. Fornel, Manager, Maintenance
- 0. Fraser, Site Supervisor
- M. Goode, Manager, Outages and Planning
,
- L. McDaniel, Acting Manager,- Plant Administration
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- C, Moore, Assistant General Manager, Plant Operations
t *J.- Payne, Senior Engineer
- R. Reddick, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
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- K. Robuck, Manager, Plant Modifications and Maintenance Support
g .*L. Sumner, General Manager
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l '*S. Tipps, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Compliance
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Other licensee employees' contacted during this inspection included
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F craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members,
technicians, and administrative personnel.
Nuclear. Regulatory Commission
- W. Cline, Branch Chief, Region II
- L. Wert, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
An index of the-abbreviations used throughout this report will be found
in the last paragraph.
2. . Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario'for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine
whether provisions.had been made to test the integrated capability and
a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee,
State, and local emergency plans and organization as required by
10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and
specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The scenario was reviewed in advume of the exercise and was discussed
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with licensee representatives. The scenario developed for this exercise
was challenging and fully exercised the onsite and offsite emergency
- organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient information to the
E State and local government agencies for their full participation in the
exercise. A scenario synopsis follows.
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The scenario events started with a 60 gpm reactor coolant leak into the
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drywell which was classified as an Alert in the Control room. A short
time later, a fire in a startup transformer caused a brief loss of
offsite power. The fire was extinguished but further degradation in the
switchyard transformers caused an extended total loss of offsite power.
After the TSC and E0F were activated, the RCS leak suddenly increased to
a small break LOCA and a partial loss of vital power caused a total loss
of ECCS injection to the core. The reactor was emergency depressurized
and a Site Area Emergency was declared.
Core uncovery occurred after one hour and fuel damage occurred causing a
large buildup of fission product source term in the primary containment.
A General Emergency was declared on the basis that the reactor was in a
potential core melt sequence accident and containment degradation was
likely. Primary containment flooding was initiated through the RHR
Service Water System to back-flood the reactor vessel. After
approximately one hour, the Plant Emergency Repair Team restored ECCS
injection and the core was covered.
Shortly after reactor water level recovery, a LPCI pump impeller and
casing failed causing a direct path breach of primary containment from
the torus to the reactor building with a monitored, elevated release via
the standby gas treatment system and the main stack. The release
continued for approximately one hour while .the core was being cooled and
pressure was reduced. The exercise was terminated without stopping the
release after all exercise objectives had been tested.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3. Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether primary responsibilities for
emergency response by the licensee have been specifically established
and whether adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.A, and r,pecific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.A.
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The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments had been mad-
for the licensee's emergency response organization and there were
adequate personnel available to respond to the simulated emergency. The .
initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee l
representatives and the planning capability for long-term staffing of
the emergency response organization was demonstrated.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4. Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine
whether responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously
defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility
accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the
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interfaces were specified as required by.10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), !
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in l
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The inspector determined that the licensee's onsite emergency 1
organization was effective in dealing with the simulated emergency.
' Adequate staffing'of the ERFs was provided for the initial accident
response and the interfaces between the onsite organization and offsite- l
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. support agencies appeared to be adequate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5. Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting
and effectively using assistance resources have been made, that
arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's ;
onsite E0F have been rade, and that other organizations capable of
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- augmenting the planned response have been identified as required by
10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),.10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and
specific . criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.C.
State and . local staff were accommodated at the EOF. As a result of the
county participation during the exercise, the license indicated the EOF
may be rearranged to better accommodate the interface with the county
representatives.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6. Emergency Classification System (82301).
This. area was' observed to determine whether a standard emergency
cla:sification and action level scheme was in use by the licensee as
required by'10 CFR 50.47(b)(4, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I.D.
Emergency Implementing Procedure 73EP-EIP-001-0S, " Emergency
Classification and-Initial Actions," established the EAL scheme to
identify and classify the simulated emergency conditions. The licensee
demonstrated the ability to correctly and promptly classify events
throughout the exercise. The ED correctly classified events at the
Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency levels.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7. Notification Methods and procedures (82301)
~This area was observed to determine whether procedures had been
establish'ed for notification by the licensee of State and local response
organizations and emergency personnel; that the content of initial and
follow-up messages to response organ 17.ations had been established;
and that means to provide early notification to the populace within the
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plume exposure pathway EPZ had been established as required by 10 CFR
50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific j
criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.E.
< 'An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been
established and were used to provide information concerning the
simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response
organizations.
The emergency notifications to the State and local authorities were
driven by the procedural requirement to make follow-up notifications
approximately every 30 minutes during Alert, Site Area, and General
Emergency conditions rather than emphasizing the importance of
communicating substantive emergency conditions and changes in status.
Examples include:
a
The TSC did not inform the offsite authorities that a fire had
broken out-at 0900 until 1023 when TSC message #4 reported that
the fire has been put out.
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The _TSC never informed the offsite authorities that a loss of '
offsite power had occurred.
- The TSC never informed the offsite authorities that the 63 gpm RCS
leak had substantially increased (to 1000 gpm).
Although the above conditions.did not result in an emergency
classification upgrade,- this type of follow-up information needed to be
provided to the offsite agencies shortly after occurrence as it
potentially impacted the offsite response. This issue was identified as
an exercise weakness.
Exercise Weakness 50-321,366/93-18-01: Follow-up notifications to the
State and' local authorities need to be driven by events occurring onsite
-that are indicative of changing conditions (either positive or
negative), rather than by a procedural requirement of approximately
every 30 minutes.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8. Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether provisions existed for
prompt communications among principal response organizations and
emergency personnel.as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6); 10 CFR Part 50,
- Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section II.F.
Communications between the licensee's emergency response organization
and offsite authorities were good with the exception of ENN
notifications from the TSC to Toombs and Tattnall Counties. Hardware
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problems delayed.the transmission and acknowledgement of notifications; j
i however, the communicator took appropriate follow-up action to ensure
that messages were received.
No violations or deviations were identified. l
9. Public Education and Information (82301)
This area.was observed to determine whether information concerning the
simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public
as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific
criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.G.
The ENC was activated in Vidalia, Georgia. Joint news releases were
coordinated and released from the ENC. In addition, three news
conferences were conducted and seven news releases were provided.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.. Emergency Facilities.and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether adequate emergency
facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided
and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section II.H.
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The inspector observed the activation, staffing, and operation of
selected ERFs and evaluated equipment provided for emergency use during
the exercise.
a. SCR - An inspector observed that SCR personnel acted promptly to
initiate emergency response to the simulated emergency. Emergency
procedures were readily available and used effectively,
b. TSC The TSC was activated and staffed promptly upon notification
by the Emergency Director of the simulated emergency condition
leading to an Alert emergency classification. The TSC appeared to
have adequate equipment for the support of the assigned staff.
c. OSC - The OSC was staffed expeditiously following the order to l
activate. Necessary emergency equipment was available to support ,
OSC repair team activities. The Post-Accident Sampling System was I
used effectively to obtain samples of reactor coolant.
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d. EOF - The E0F-was located onsite in the Simulator / Training
Building. The facility appeared to be adequately designed,
equipped and staffed to support an emergency response. l
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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11. Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether adequate methods, systems,
and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite l
consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as ;
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, i
Paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I. 1
The accident assessment program. included an engineering assessment of
plant ' status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite
and offsite personnel resulting from the accident. During the exercise,
an inspector noted that the TSC staff monitored the accident parameters
effectively using the SPDS terminals, frequently identified trends, and
promptly informed the ED.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12. Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether guidelines for protective
actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are
developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers,
including evacuation of nonessential personnel, are implemented promptly
as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section II.J.
An inspector verified that the licensee had emergency procedures for
formulating PARS for the offsite populace within the 10-mile EPZ. The
PARS for this exercise were appropriately formulated and promptly
transmitted to the State and local authorities.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Radiological Exposure Control (82301)
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This area was observed to determine whether means for controlling
radiological exposures during an emergency were established and
implemented for emergency workers, and that these means included
exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendations as required by
10 CFR 50.47(b)(11), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.K.
An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled
throughout the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency
workers and by periodic surveys in the ERFs. Exposure guidelines were
in place for various categories of emergency actions, and adequate
protective clothing and respiratory protection were available and used
as appropriate. When required, the emergency director expeditiously
approved emergency dose extensions and the issuance of KI for emergency
teams.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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14. Fire Drill.(82301)
This area was observed to assure that training and drills for persons
whose assistance may be needed in the event of an radiation emergency
were provided and maintained pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14);
Paragraph'IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50; and specific criteria in
Section II.N. of NUREG-0654.
The . inspector observed the overall response to the simulated fire in the
Unit 2 startup transformer 20. The transformer was located outside the
plant near the Unit 2 main transformer. Following the callout of the
fire brigade over the public address system, the brigade responded
promptly to the scene of the simulated fire with the recently acquired
fire fighting light truck and were dressed out properly. A momentary
delay occurred in establishing radio communications with the simulator
control room due to uncertainty over which radio channel to use for the
drill. Communications were then maintained and used to verify that the
2D startup transformer was electrically de-energized prior to attacking
the simulated fire. A damage assessment team was promptly dispatched to
the simulated fire scene.
No violations or deviations were identified.
15. Exercise Critique (82301)
-The licensee's critique of the emergency was observed to determine
whether deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and
weaknesses'noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were
formally presented to licensee management 'for corrective actions as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.E and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The licensee conducted player critiques following the exercise
termination. A formal licensee critique of the emergency exercise was
held on September 17, 1993, with exercise controllers, licensee
management, and NRC personnel attending. The licensee reviewed the
exercise objectives and listed major problems areas. The presentation
indicated that the controllers / evaluators had been effective in
identifying exercise problem areas and critiqued the performance of the
players in an objective and constructive manner.
No violations or deviations were identified.
16. Action on Previous Inspection Findings (82701)
a. (Closed) Exercise Weakness 50-321, 366/92-19-01: Failure to
classify the SAE. The licensee demonstrated the ability to
correctly and promptly classify events throughout the exercise
scenario, to include the SAE classification.
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.b. (Closed) Exercise' Weakness 50-321,366/92-19-02:, Failure to
perform a satisfactory fire drill. As: described in Paragraph 14 !
- of this' report, the licensee's fire drill during the current 'l
- exercise was satisfactory. l
[ m ,' 17 . Exit Interview q
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- The inspection scope.and results were summarized on September 17, 1993, !
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with those persons-indicated in Paragraph 1. 1The_ inspector. described ..
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the areas inspected and-discussed in detail the exercise weakness listed a
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- below.: :Some discussion followed.between-licensee management and the j
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inspector about the exercise weakness. The inspector-emphasized the- 9
. need to provide follow-up informationito the .offsite government a'gencies 1
that was based more on changing conditions, particularly when conditions
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are degrading,_ than on a rigid timefinterval such as the 30-minute clock
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Lobserved during this exercise. Additional discussions focused on
b follow-up information being provided telephonically _'and documented on a
communications log if acceptable.to the offsite agencies. Proprietary )
informationJis:not contained.in this' report. Dissenting comments were j
- .. not received from the licensee.
Item Number' Description and Reference
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50-321,366/93-18-01- Exercise Weakness Failure to provide timely
information on supplementary degrading
conditions to offsite; agencies-(Paragraph 7).
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18. Federal Evaluation. Team Report '
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~ The report by the Federal Evaluation ~ Team (Regional Assistance Committee
and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV staff) concerning the
k~; activities;of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by-
-separate _ correspondence. j
119. Index of Abbreviations'Used in This Report ;
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EAL Emergency Action' Level y
~ECCS ' Emergency Core Cooling System 1
ED . Emergency Director-
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ENCE . Emergency' News' Center i
ENNi Emergency. Notification. Network
- E0F ' Emergency Operations' Facility
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EPZ 1 Emergency Planning Zone
ERF Emergency Response Facility
KI Potassium Iodide .
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LOCA- Loss-of-Coolant Accident .
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n 1LPCI ilow Pressure Coolant._ Injection
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- NRC; c Nuclear. Regulatory Commission'. "
m Support Center
. OSC;
PAR: ~' Operations-~ Action Recommendation
Protective ,
, LRCSL 1 Reactor Coolant System l
q .RHR Residual Heat Removal q
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[;' SAE -Site' Area Emergency
t SCR . Simulator Control Room
I; SPDS Safety Parameter Display System
TSC -Technical Support Center
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- Attachment (11 pages)
Scope,; Objectives, Narrative
Summary, and Scenario Timeline
'for'1993-' Hatch Exercise
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EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT
EVALUATED EXERCISE I
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2.1 SCOP 3 l
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To assure that the health and safety of the general public is protected in the event of an accident - '
at the E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant (HNP), it is necessary for the Georgia Power Company (GPC) l
to conduct emergency preparedness drills and exercises. This evaluated exercise at HNP l
involves mobilization of utility, State and local personnel and resources to respono to a i
simulated accident scenario.
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Onsite facilities will be activat'ed in accordance with simulated conditions and appropriate
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emergency response procedures. Exercise participants (" players") will not have any prior
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knowledge of the simulated accident- events, operational sequence, radiological effluents or l
weather conditions.
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State and local government will participate fully in the exercise. ~
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In addition, the exercise incorporates the following:
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Radiological Monitoring Drill - both onsite and offsite teams will be dispatched to obtain
required air samples and measurements associated with a simulated offsite release of
radioactivity and communicate these results to the appropriate Emergency Response
Facility (ERF). (Field monitoring-team protective clothing and respiratory protection
will be simulated in the field.)
Health Physics Drill - involves the response to and analysis of simulated elevated activity
airborne or liquid samples, radiation exposure control, emergency dosimetry and the use
. of protective equipment onsite.
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Staff Augmentation - Augmented staffing of the emergency positions in the activated
facilities as a result of the emergency response.
Real-Time Activation - a demonstration of the real-time staffing of Emergency Facilities
within the guidelines of NUREG 0654 Table B-1 and HNP emergency plans and
procedures by emergency response staff personnel, i
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The preceding . sub-drills ' are incorporated into the main exercise scenario and will be
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demonstrated concurrently in the course of the exercise.
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The overall intent of the exercise is to demonstrate that the GPC staff assigned responsibilities in
an emergency situation' are adequately trained to perform in accordance with emergency l
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preparedness plans and procedures.
2.1-1 93EX
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HATCIINUCLEAR PLANT
{
EVALUATED EXERCISE i
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2.2 OBJECTIVES '
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The E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant 1993 emergency preparedness exercise objectives are based upon
Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements provided in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Emergency
Planning and Preparednessfor Production and Utill:ation Facilities. Additional guldance provided
in NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, Criteriafor Preparation and fraluation of
Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support rfNuclear Power Plants,
was utilized in developing the objectives. The following objectives for the exercise are consistent with
the aforementioned documents:
A. Accident Assessment and Classificatica
1. Demonstrate the ability to identify initiating conditions, determine Emergency i
Action Level (EAL) parameters and correctly classify the emergency l
throughout the exercise.
2. Demonstrate the ability to provide core damage assessments.
B. Notification
1. Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify and mobilize appropriate station and !
corporate emergency response personnel. j
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2. Demonstrate the ab"aty for prompt notification of the State, local and Federal ,
authorities. j
3. Demonstrate the ability to warn or advise onsite individuals (including
employees, visitors and contract personnel) of an emergency condition.
C. Emereency Response l
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1. Demonstrate that an individual is assigned and is in charge of the emergency ;
response.
2. Demonstrate planning for 24-hour per day emergency response capabilities. )
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3. Demonstrate the line of succession for the Emergency Director. 1
4. Demonstrate timely response of station and corporate management,
administrative and technical stafE
5. Demonstrate the timely activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC),
Operations Support Center (OSC), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and
General Office Operations Center (GOOC).
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6. Demonstrate the adequacy of equipment, security provisions and habitability
precautions for the TSC, OSC, EOF, GOOC and the Emergency News Center {
(ENC).
7. Demonstrate satisfactory communications ability of all emergency support
resources.
2.2 1
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' HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT
1993 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNELS
EVALUATED EXERCISE
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2.2 OBJECTIVES
D, Radiolocical Assessment and Control
1. Demonstrate the coordinated gathering of radiological and non-radiological
(meteorological) data necessary for emergency and environmental response
including collection and analysis ofin-plant surveys and samples.
2. Demonstrate the ability to develop dose projections, compare the projections to -
Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) and determine and recommend the
appropriate protective actions.
3. Demonstrate onsite contamination control measures including area access ,
control. '
4. Demonstrate, the ability for determining projected doses from available plant
instrumentation.
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5. Demonstrate onsite PAGs for a select number of personnel, as appropriate.
6. Demonstrate the decision making process for authoriz.ing emergency workers
to receive radiation doses in excess of Plant Hatch administrative limits, as
appropriate.
' E. . Public Information Procram
1. Demonstrate the timely and accurate response to news inquiries.
2. Demonstrate timely preparation of accurate news releases and suppression of
rumors.
3. . Demonstrate the adequacy of the Emergency News Center (ENC).
F. Evaluation .
1. Demonstrate ability to conduct a post-exercise critique to determine areas
requiring additionalimprovement.
Areas of the HNP Emergency Plan that will NOT be demonstrated during this exercise include:
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- Onsite personnel evacuation
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Actual shin turnover (long term shin a.4signments will be demonstrated by rosters).
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Real time actuation of the ENC
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Conduct of reentry and recovery operations
2.2-2
93EX
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EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT
1993 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS i
EVALUATED EXERCISE
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3.1 NARRATIVE SUMMA D' ;
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This scenario begins with a routine control rod exercise surveillance in accordance with (IAW) i
procedure 34SV-Cl1-003-2S, Control Rod Weekly Evercise. When rod #26-03 is selected for
exercise, it will not insert and will uncouple if any withdrawal motion is selected. The exercise of
this rod will coincide with an unidentified primary system leakage into the drywell from the #26-
03 Control Rod Drive (CRD) mechanism housing to reactor vessel fiange as a result of cracked
, and failing CRD housing cap screws. As a result of the unidentified reactor coolant system (RCS)
leakage >50 gpm, an ALERT should be declared IAW procedure 73EP-EIP-001-0S,' Emergency
Classification andInitial Actions, Section 20.0, " Loss of Coolant".
Operators should begin venting the drywell through the Standby Gas Tr,eatment System (SBGTS)
IAW procedure 34AB-T23-002-2S, Small Pipe Break Inside Primary Containment, to control
containment pressure. Operators should enter emergency operations procedures on Primary
Containment Control criteria as drywell pressure and temperature increase. A controlled reactor
shutdown should commence IAW Procedure 34GO-OPS-014-2S, Fast Reactor Shutdown. The
leakrate will remain relatively constant throughout the shutdown process as a funcGca of RCS
pressure.
After the reactor has been shut down and the drywell pressure and temperature stabilized, a fault
and fire will occur'in the 2D start-up transformer (SUT). This will deenergize the 2E 4KV
emergency bus and its associated electrical loads. The electrical system will be stabilized from the
2A EDG and the remaining 2C SUT. The 2A Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) will autostart
and reenergize the 2E emergency bus. The 2E and 2F 4KV buses will be reenergized from the 2C
SUT. Operators should respond IAW Procedure 34AB-X43-001-2S, Fire Procedure, and
dispatch the Hatch Nuclear Fire Service. The Hatch Nuclear Fire Service (HNFS) should respond
to the fire in the Unit I transformer yard.
After the simulated firefighting activities have controlled the fire in the 2D SUT (approximately
forty-five minutes afler the 2D fire begins) a phase-to-ground fault occurs in the 2C SUT as a
result of conductive mineral deposits and smoke buildup on the transformer insulators due to
firefighting overspray. This results in the loss of the 2C SUT and its associated electrical loads.
Available emergency diesel generators (EDG) 2A and 2C will energize the 2E and 2G 4KV
emergency buses. l
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3.1-1
93EX
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EDWIN L HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT
EVALUATED EXERCISE
3.1 NARRATIVE SUMMARY
Approximately fifteen minutes after the loss of the 2C SUT, the generator output breaker of the
2A EDG will burn out, leaving only the 2C EDG and the 2G 4KV emergency bus as available ,
power sources since the IB EDG is tagged-out for repairs. Simultaneously, the leaking CRD
housing cap screws fail and the CRD housing separates from the vessel flange. The #26-03 rod is
mechanically bound in its channel and does not seat onto the thermal sleeve, resulting in an RCS
LOCA of 2,000 gpm. -
Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) pump 2B autostarts with power supplied from the 2G
4KV emergency bus. LPCI injection valve F015B fails to open due to a hydraulic locking
- condition in its Limitorque motor operator. This prevents injection with this train of LPCI, but
will still allow torus cooling operation. An alternate injection path may be accomplished through
the opening of the manually isolated deenergized cross-connect valve F010 and de-energized "A"
train injection valve F015A.
Core Spray (CS) pump 2B autostarts with power supplied from the 2G 4KV emergency bus. The
disc stud and nut of pump discharge check valve F03B has failed and allowed the disc to travel "
loose into the discharge line. The loose disk travels up the core spray line and lodges in flow
element assembly N002B, effectively blocking all flow to the reactor vessel. CS flow to the RCS
indicates zero and the 2B CS pump runs in recirculation on the minimum flow line
With no High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) feed to the reactor vessel (since the HPCI
- turbine is tagged-out for repair) and the ongoing CRD housing LOCA, the reactor vessel
depressurizes and drains down to the drywell. As drywell temperature and humidity rise,
operators should secure drywell venting and address drywell/ torus cooling capability in the t
current electrical lineup. As reactor water level approaches the low-low-low level, a SITE
AREA EMERGENCY should be declared IAW procedure 73EP-EIP-001-0S, Emergency
Classification and Initialifcrions, Section 20.0, " Loss of Coolant"
3.1-2
93EX
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EDWIN L HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT
EVALUATED EXERCISE
3.1 NARRATIVE SUMM ARY
, Within forty-five minutes of fuel uncovery, fuel cladding failure begins and approximately 30% of
total gas gap activity is released to the coolant and containment. Within another thirty minutes,
. fuel decay heat has produced fuel damage releasing another 60% of total gas gap and
4
approximately 15% of non-gap fission products to the coolant and containment. As the released
activity is transported outside the sacrificial shield in RCS piping and released to the containment
atmosphere through the CRD LOCA, drywell post accident radiation monitors trend upward. As
the released activity is transported to the toms by water drainage down the risers, torus post-
LOCA radiation monitors trend upward and radiation doses from the torus and active ECCS
system piping begin to impact repair team activities in the lower Reactor Building areas.
~
Successful simulated replacement of the 2A EDG output breaker with a breaker scavenged from
the tagged-out IB EDG or another~ source will allow the recovery of the 2A EDG and re-
energization of the 2E 4KV emergency bus. This will allow the starting of the 2A Core Spray
pump and the 2A .LPCI pump.
Core Spray is initiated on the 2A Core Spray pump and fuel damage is halted at approximately
90% gas gap release and 15% fuel melt. Shortly afler the recovery of RCS feed, the thermal and
hydraulic shock of the restored feed causes rod #26-03 to release from its stuck position and seat ;
on the thermal sleeve, stopping the LOCA to the containment. Corc Spray continues to cool the I
i
core and LPCI 2A provides feed, flooding-up and recovering the exposed fuel. :
A water hammer occurring in the 2A LPCI pump on startup intensifies the existing undetected
impeller damage from low-flow operation of the pump and impeller vibration begins to build up.
Approximately one half hour after starting of the 2A LPCI pump, the impeller disintegrates,
rupturing the pump casing and allowing torus water to flood the northeast diagonal room.
l
As the water level equalizes between the torus and the diagonal, no more net flow occurs.
Reactor Building Area Radiation Monitors (ARMS) alarm as radioactivity released in the water
break diffuses into the reactor building and is released to the en ironment th augh the Standby
Gas Treatment System (SBGTS). A GENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared IAW
. procedure 73EP-EIP-001-05, Emergency Classification and initial Actions, Section 2.0,
" Radiological Efiluents"
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3.1-3
93EX
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EDWIN 1. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT -
EVALUATED EXERCISE
3.1 NARRATIVE SUMMARY
Isolation of the damaged 2A LPCI pump from the torus will restore primary containment
, ' int'egrity. Release of radioactivity to the environment will decline as the SBGTS " turns-over" the
Reactor Building atmosphere.
- .
After field monitoring teams have tracked and monitored the radiological release and protective
L-
action considerations have been determined and recommended from the EOF and Emergency.
Response Centers (ERCS), the exercise is terminated.
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3.1-4
l 93EX
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EVALUATED EXERCISE '
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3.2 SCENARIO TIMELINE
Tm1E EVENT
EASTERN CENTRAL DESCRIPTION
,
0730 0630 Initial Conditions:
HNP Unit 2 is in End of Core Life (EOL) at 100 % power.
Reactor power has been > 90% power for the last 180 days
and Xenon is at equilibrium. Unit 1 is in normal full-power
operation.
The following equipment is out-of-service:
> The backup meteorological tower suffered a l
lightning strike the previous day and is no longer i
providing data feed. It is under repair and j
mspection. _
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r > The " Swing" Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)
IB is under re 3 air for a damaged crankshaft bearing
identified on tile last routine surveillance operation.
The EDG is being disassembled and work is ;
anticipated to require another 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to complete. 1
This places both Units in a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Limiting
Condition for Operation (LCO) and the clock began
at 2200 yesterday when the 1-B EDG was tagged-
out. ;
4
> The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) steam
turbine is tagged-out for the repair of the turbine- i
driven oi1 pump. Low and irregular oil pressure
,
resultmg m, governor tnppmg was occurnng m test !
operation. Pump overhaul parts are on-hand. The i
HPCI turbine was tagged-out at 0100 and
disassembly began on the midnight shift This places 1
Unit 2 in another LCO of 14 days. !
1
Weekly control rod exercising in accordance with '
L procedure 34SV-Cl 1-003-2S, Weekly Control Rod
Excrcise, is to be performed this morning.
,
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Plant radiological and radiochemical conditions are normal. 1
The winds are from the south / southeast at 3 to 4 mph.
Temperature is 56 with an anticipated high in the low
seventies. No precipitation is forecast and there has been
no measurable precipitation in the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
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3.2 1
93EX
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.. EDWIN I. HATCil NUCLEAR PLANT ;
1993 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ;
EVALUATED EXERCISE j
3.2 ECENARIO TIMELINE
. TIME EVENT
EASTERN CENTRAL DESCRIPTION 1
0800 0700
After assuming control of the Unit 2 control room (Simulator) and
walking-down the panels, operators should maintain steady-state
operation and begin the weekly control rod exercise in accordance
with (IAW) procedure 34SV-Cll-003-2S, Weekly Control Rod
Exercise.
0815 0715
When rod #26-03 is selected for testing, it will not move in the
" insert" direction. If " withdraw" is selected on the rod control
switch at any. time during this test, control rod drive (CRD)
overtravel alarm and indication will occur indicative of an
uncoupled rod. .._
0815 0715
A leakage of the reactor coolant system (RCS) to the drywell (DW)
will begm from the #26-03 CRD flange at approximately 60 gpm.
0830 0730
DW temperature, humidity and pressure will begin to rise. DW
floor dram and equipment drain sumps will alarm. Sump timers will
start. Radwaste (RW) sump flow integrators data will indicate 60
gpm leakage to the DW, An ALERT should be declared based
upon >50 gpm unidentified RCS leakage (73EP-EIP-001-OS,
Emergency Oassification and initial Actions, section 20.0, " Loss
of Coolant"). Drywell venting should begin through the Standby
Gas Treatment System (SBGTS) to control DW pressure. A
controlled quick shutdown of the reactor should commence.
0900. 0800
Fire in the 2D start up transformer (SUT). Loss of the 2D SUT and
its associated electricalloads occurs. Power lineup switched to the
2C SUT and electrical system is stabilized.
0930 0830
Fire in the 2D SUT is extinguished. Ground fault occurs in the 2C
SUT. Loss of the 2C SUT occurs. The 2A and 2C EDGs start and
load on the loss of 4KV bus voltage.
3.2 2
93EX
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- EDWIN 1. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT. I
1993 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS i
EVALUATED EXERCISE
)
3.2 SCENARIO TIMELINE
TIME EVENT
EASTERN CENTRAL- DESCRIPTION
1000 0900
The 2A EDG output breaker burns out. Loss of EDG 2A and the
2E 4KV bus. The 2C EDG and the 2G bus are the only available
4KV power sources.
The leaking #26-03 CRD housing separates from the reactor lower
head flange. The RCS leak is now a loss of coolant accident
(LOCA) of approximately 2,000 gpm.
LPCI pump 2B autostarts off the 2G 4KV bus. LPCI injection
valve F0-15B fails in the closed position, preventing feed to RCS
-without manual opening of RHR cross-connect valve FO-10 and
i ."A" train injection valve F0-15 A. _
Core Spray (CS) pump 2B autostarts otTthe 2G 4KV bus. The CS
discharge valve, 2E21-F005A, will not open. The 2B CS pump
will run in recirculation on the minimum flow line.
With no available emergency core cooling system (ECCS) feed to
the RCS, the reactor vessel depressurizes and begins to drain down.
Drywell temperature and pressure increase as the RCS drains into
the drywell.
1030 0930
As reactor vessel level reaches the low-low-low level, a SITE
AREA EMERGENCY should be declared based on loss of
coolant criteria (73EP-EIP-001-OS, Emergency Classification and
initial Actions, section 20.0, " Loss ofCoolant"). ,
1115 1015
As the uncovered fuel overheats from decay heat, gas gap activity
and fuel damage releases radioactive material to the vessel.
Released activity is drained to the drywell and torus through the
CRD LOCA. DW and ~ torus radiation monitors increase. The
source term builds up in the torus and running torus cooling piping
of the active LPCI system, reducing access of repair teams to the
FO-15B valve and the LPCI cross-connect valves.
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1130 1030
EDG 2A output breaker.is replaced. EDG 2A is started and loaded
onto the 2E 4KV bus.
( Core Spray 2A and LPCI 2A are started and begin feeding the
reactor vessel A water hammer occurs in the piping of the LPCI
2A pump as it autostarts, partially damaging anc unbalancing the
pump impeller.
3.2-3
93EX
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EDWIN1. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT
,
EVALUATED EXERCISE
3.2 SCENARIO TIMELINE
TIME EVENT
EASTERN CENTRAL- DESCRIPTION
1200 1100
The 2A LPCI pump impeller disintegrates, rupturing the pum)
casing and flooding the Northeast Diagonal room wit 1
contaminated torus water.
The mechanical and thermal shock of the restored feed to the
' reactor vessel causes stuck control rod #26-03 to release from its
stuck position and seat onto the thermal sleeve, effectively stopping
the CRD LOCA flow to the drywell.
Torus and. diagonal room water levels equalize. Once the levels
have reached equilibrium, there is no further net flow and isolation
of the failed pump will restore primary containme_nt.
Area Radiation Monitors (ARMS) and leak detection monitors
alarm as the radioactivity is liberated to the diagonal room and the <
reactor building. Radioactive material is diffused into the reactor
building and pumped to the environment through the SBGTS.
A GENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared based on
radiological criteria (73EP-EIP-001-OS, Emergency Classification
andInitial Actions, section 2.0, "RadiologicalEffluents").
1300 1200
The primary system has~ been flooded-up, cooled-down and
stabilized. Release to the environment is declining as SBGTS turns
over the contaminated atmosphere of the reactor building. The
release has been monitored, tracked and sampled.
The exercise is terminated.
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3.2-4
93EX
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