IR 05000321/1986032
| ML20214L038 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 11/17/1986 |
| From: | Blake J, Menning J, Newsome R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214K987 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-86-32, 50-366-86-32, IEIN-86-034, IEIN-86-050, IEIN-86-34, IEIN-86-50, NUDOCS 8612020551 | |
| Download: ML20214L038 (16) | |
Text
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s UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION il n
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.: 50-321/86-32 and 50-366/86-32 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: September 29 - October 3 and October 14-17, 1986 Inspectors:
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so Date Si ned
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f/J ll 9 $[o J.
. Menning D&te' Signed Approved by:
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J.
. 8 ~aKe, Section Chief D(te' Signed Ma r is and Processing Section Di i lon of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was in the areas of inservice inspection (ISI) (Unit 2), IE Bulletins (Units 1 and 2), IE Information Notices (Units 1 and 2), and Inspector Followup Items (Units 1 and 2).
Results:
One violation was identified - failure to follow procedures to assure correct welds are examined during ISI - paragraph 8.d.
8612O20551 861120 PDR ADOCK 05000321
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- H. Nix, Site General Manager
- T. Powers, Manager of Engineering
- T. Seitz, Manager of Maintenance
- L. Sumner, Manager of Operations
- J. Wilkes, Manager, Special Projects
- A. Fraser, Acting Quality Assurance (QA) Site Manager
- T. Elton, Plant Engineering Supervisor
- J. Lewis, Operations Supervisor
- S. Tipps, Supervisor of Regulatory Compliance
- M. Blackwood, Senior Nuclear Engineer
- D. Vaughn, Senior QA Field Representative
- I. Luker, QA Engineer S. Brunson, Plant Engineer
- T. Huckaby, Inservice Inspection (ISI) Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, security force members, and office personnel.
Other Organizations
- T. Epps, Manager of Inspection, Testing and Engineering, Southern Company Services (SCS)
- G. Loftus, Lead Inspector - Level III, SCS
- G. Brinson, Engineer, SCS
- D. Swann Engineer, SCS K. Robuck, Implementation Engineering, SCS
- E. Thomas, Supervisor, Lambert, McGill and Thomas (LMT)
NRC Resident Inspectors
- P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector
- G. Nejfelt, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 3 and 17, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The following new items were identified during this inspection:
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(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 321, 366/86-32-01, Review of Approved Procedure for Monitoring Extraction Steam Piping - paragraph 5.b.
(0 pen) Violation 366/86-32-02, Failure to Follow Procedure to Assure Correct Welds are Examined During ISI - paragraph 8.d.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.
5.
Independent Inspection Effort (Unit 2)
a.
General Inspection (548348)
The inspectors conducted a general inspection of the containment, auxiliary building, and material storage areas to observe activities such as material handling, housekeeping and storage, b.
Extraction Steam Line Failure On April 25, 1986, an extraction steam line to the 6A feedwater heater ruptured while Unit 2 was at 85 percent power.
The failure was attributed to erosion / corrosion of a reducer section.
The inspectors reviewed this event with licensee personnel to determine what measures have been established to detect and monitor degradation in carbon steel extraction steam piping that is subject to erosion / corrosion.
The inspectors determined that the licensee had relied upon an informal monitoring program prior to this failure.
The licensee has subsequently decided to implement a formalized surveillance program that will require ultrasonic thickness measurements to be taken at specified locations each refueling outage.
The implementing surveillance procedure had been drafted and was being circulated for review at the time of this inspection.
Pending review of the approved procedure, this matter is identified as Inspector Followup Item 321,366/86-32-01, Review of Approved Procedure for Monitoring Extraction Steam Piping.
c.
Induction Heat Stress Improvement (IHSI)
IHSI was performed during this outage on the 12 reactor vessel nozzle to safe end welds in the recircelation system.
Nutech Engineers, Inc. was the contractor for this work.
These particular welds had not previously been treated for Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking
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(IGSCC) mitigation.
IHSI had already been completed at the time of this inspection, and review of these operations by the inspectors was necessarily limited to the examination of procedures and quality records.
(1) Procedure Review The inspectors reviewed the following documents controlling the IHSI:
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Nutech " Quality Assurance Manual" (QAM) - The QAM was not
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reviewed in detail, but to the degree necessary to determine that QA requirements such as procedure issue and control, process control, qualification certification of personnel, control of inspections, control of nonconformances, and control of records was covered by procedures.
Nutech Procedure XGP-16-100, Revision 0, " Procedure for
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Induction Heat Stress Improvement of Nozzle / Safe End Wilds at Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2."
(2) Review of Quality Records (a) The IHSI Weld Packages, including heat charts, were reviewed for the following welds:
2831-1RC-12AR-F-5 2831-1RC-12BR-A-5 2831-1RC-12AR-G-5 2831-1RC-12BR-B-5
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2831-1RC-12AR-H-5 2831-1RC-12BR-C-5 2831-1RC-12AR-J-5 2831-1RC-12BR-D-5 2831-1RC-12AR-K-5 2831-1RC-12BR-E-5 2B31-1RC-28A-1 2831-1RC-288-1 (b) The inspectors reviewed personnel training / certification records for personnel involved with the IHSI.
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
6.
InserviceInspection-ReviewofProgram(73051)(Unit 2)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's inservice inspection (ISI) program for the current outage in the areas indicated below.
In accordance with the
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I updated program, the applicable Code is the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI,1980 Edition with Addenda thru W81.
Southern Company l.
Services (SCS) has the responsibility as the ISI contractor.
Lambert, l
McGill and Thomas (LMT) is a subcontractor for Nondestructive Examination (NDE) inspections.
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a.
The inspectors reviewed the inspection plan listed in b. below to determine whether the plan had been approved by the licensee, b.
The inspectors reviewed the following Georgia Power Company (GPC) and SCS documents relative to the ISI program. Many of the documents have been reviewed during previous inspections.
Except for the Examination Outage Plan and SCS Inspection, Testing, and Engineering Policy and Procedures Manual, only changes to previously examined documents were reviewed.
(1) SCS "Edwin 1. Hatch Unit 2 NDE Outage Plan - 1986 Outage" (2) HNP QA-03-02, Revision 13. " Training and Personnel Qualifications" (3) HNP QA-05-01, Revision 15 " Field Audits" (4) Hatch Administrative Control ( AC) Procedure 10 AC-MGR-003-05, Revision 5, " Preparation and Control of Procedures" (5) Hatch AC Procedure 10 AC-MGR-002-05, Revision 1, " Plant Review Board Administrative Procedure"
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(6) Hatch AC Procedure 20 AC-ADM-01-0, Revision 0,
" Document Distribution and Control" (7) Hatch AC Procedure 20 AC-ADM-002-05, Revision 2, " Plant Record Management" (8) Hatch AC Procedure 40 AC-ENG-01-0, Revision 0,
" Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program" (9) SCS Inspection, Testing and Engineering (ITE) Procedure 09.3-50A, Revision 0, " Outage Planning / Control / Revision" (10) SCS ITE Procedure 09.3-51A, Revision 0, " Program Preparation and Revision" (11) SCS ITE Procedure 09.50-0A, Revision 0, "On-site Activities Conducted by ITE" (12) SCS ITE Procedure 09.5-50A, Revision 0, " Inspection Testing, and Engineering Files" (13) SCS ITE Procedure 09.5-51A, Revision 0,
" Final Reports -
Preparation. Approval, and Submittal" (14) SCS ITE Procedure 09.6-51A, Revision 0, " Control of Contractor Services"
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(15) SCS ITE Procedure 09.6-53A, Revision 0, " Contractor Procedures -
Review and Approval" (16) SCS ITE Procedure 09.7-0A, Revision 0, " Quality Assurance" (17) SCS ITE Procedure 09.7-50A, Revision 0, " Nonconforming Item" (18) SCS ITE Procedure 09.8-50A, Revision 0, " Relief Requests -
Preparation and Tracking" (19) SCS ITE Procedure 09.50-1A, Revision 0, "On-site Data Review" (20) SCS ITE Procedure 09.50-2A, Revision 0, "On-site Data Control" (21) SCS ITE Procedure 09.50-3A, Revision 0, "On-site Control and Issuance of Nondestructive Examination (NDE) Documents and Equipment" (22)
SCS ITE Procedure 09.50-4A, Revision 0, " Indication Notifications" (23) SCS ITE Procedure 09.50-5A, Revision 0,
"On-site Receipt, Inspection, Control, and Storage of Nondestructive Examination (NDE) Equipment, Materials,andSupplies" (24) SCS ITE Procedure 09.60-1A, Revision 0,
" Plant Hatch -
Responsibilities for ITE Activities" (25) Sections 5 and 10 of the GPC QA Manual for the Operation,
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Maintenance, and Modification of the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Revision 37.
These documents were reviewed in the areas of:
program approval; QA program requirements including organizational structure; audit requirements; general QA requirements (examination reports, control of deviations from established program; quality documentation and i
identification of components); work and quality inspection procedures; j
control of processes; corrective action; document control; control of
examinations and examination equipment; quality records; inspection scope; inspection intervals; personnel qualifications; and, NDE records
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including provisions for storage.
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
l 7.
InserviceInspection-ReviewofProcedures(73052)(Unit 2)
The inspectors reviewed the ISI procedures indicated below to determine whether the procedures were consistent with regulatory requirements and licensee commitments.
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(15) SCS ITE Procedure 09.6-53A, Revision 0, " Contractor Procedures -
Review and Approval" (16) SCS ITE Procedure 09.7-0A, Revision 0, " Quality Assurance" (17) SCS ITE Procedure 09.7-50A, Revision 0, " Nonconforming Item" (18) SCS ITE Procedure 09.8-50A, Revision 0, " Relief Requests -
Preparation and Tracking" (19) SCS ITE Procedure 09.50-1A, Revision 0, "On-site Data Review" (20) SCS ITE Procedure 09.50-2A, Revision 0, "On-site Data Control" (21) SCS ITE Procedure 09.50-3A, Revision 0, "On-site Control and Issuance of Nondestructive Examination (NDE) Documents and Equipment"
(22) SCS ITE Procedure 09.50-4A, Revision 0, " Indication Notifications" (23) SCS ITE Procedure 09.50-5A, Revision 0,
"On-site Receipt, Inspection, Control, and Storage of Nondestructive Examination (NDE) Equipment, Materials, and Supplies" (24) SCS ITE Procedure 09.60-1A, Revision 0,
" Plant Hatch
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l Responsibilities for ITE Activities" (25) Sections 5 and 10 of the GPC QA Manual for the Operation, Maintenance, and Modification of the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant,
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l Revisfon 37.
These documents were reviewed in the areas of:
program approval; QA program requirements including organizational structure; audit requirements; general QA requirements (examination reports, control of deviations from established program; quality documentation and l
identification of components); work and quality inspection procedures, i
control of processes; corrective action; document control; control of I
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examinations and examination equipment; quality records; inspection scope; inspection intervals; personnel qualifications; and, NDE records including provisions for storage.
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Inservice Inspection - Review of Procedures (73052) (Unit 2)
The inspectors reviewed the ISI procedures indicated below to determine whether the procedures were consistent with regulatory requirements and licensee commitments.
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a.
The following procedures were reviewed in the areas of procedure approval, requirements for qualification of NDE personnel, and compilation of required records; and if applicable, division of responsibility between the licensee and contractor personnel if contractor personnel are involved in the ISI effort.
(1) SCS-AUX-H-301, Revision 1, " Identification of Reference Points for Volumetric and Surface Examinations" (2) SCS-AUX-H-302, Revision 2. "Preservice and Inservice Inspection Documentation" (3) SCS-UT-H-400, Revision 6
" Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Full-PenetrationWelds(Greaterthan0.400 Inch)"
(4) SCS-UT-H-409, Revision 1, " Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Dissimilar Metal Nozzle to Safe-End Welds" (5) SCS-UT-H-410, Revision 4
" Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Pressure Vessel Welds (2 Inches to 12 Inches in Thickness)"
(6) SCS-PT-H-600, Revision 2
" Color Contrast, Solvent-Removable Liquid Penetrant Examination Procedure" (7) SCS-MT-H-500, Revision 2
" Dry Powder Magnetic Particle Examination: Yoke Method" (8) SCS-VT-H-710, Revision 1, " Visual Examination (VT-1)"
(9) SCS-VT-H-720, Revision 1, " Visual Examination (VT-2)"
(10) SCS-VT-H-730, Revision 1 " Visual Examination (VT-3)"
b.
UT Procedures SCS-UT-H-400, SCS-UT-H-4G9 and SCS-UT-H-410 were reviewed for procedure technical content relative to:
type of apparatus used; extent of coverage of weldment; calibration requirements; search units; beam angles; DAC curves; reference level for monitoring discontinuities; method for demonstrating penetration; limits for evaluating and recording indications; recording significant indications; and acceptance limits.
c.
Procedure SCS-PT-H-600 was reviewed in the area of procedure technical content relative to:
specified method; penetrant material identification; penetrant materials analyzed for sulfur; penetrant i
materials analyzed for total halogens; acceptable pre-examination l
surface drying time; method of penetrant application; surface
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temperature; solvent removal; surface drying prior to developing; type of developer; examination technique; evaluation technique; and procedure requalificatio.
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d.
The inspectors reviewed procedure SCS-MT-H-500 for technical adequacy
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and for conformance with ASME Section V, Article 7, and other licensee commitments / requirements in the following areas:
examination method; contrast of dry powder particle color with background; surface temperature; suspension medium and surface temperature for wet particles; viewing conditions; examination overlap and directions; pole or prod spacing; current or lifting power (yoke) and; acceptance criteria, e.
The inspectors reviewed visual examination procedures SCS-VT-H-710, SCS-VT-H-720 and SCS-VT-H-730 to determine whether they contained sufficient instructions to assure that the following parameters were specified and controlled withir the limits permitted by the applicable code, standard, or any additional specification requirement; method -
direct visual, remote visual or translucent visual examination of welds, leak testing, etc.; how visual examination is to be performed, type of surface condition available; method or tool used for surface preparation, if any; whether direct or remote viewing is used; special illumination, instruments, or equipment to be used, if any; sequence of performing examination, when applicable; data to be tabulated, if any; acceptance criteria is specified and consistent with the applicable code section or controlling specification; and report form completion.
f.
The inspectors reviewed the Code repair procedure for valve 2E11-F028B that failed to meet the leak rate acceptance criteria of test 425V-TET-001-25.
The repair procedure was included in the documenta-tion for Maintenance Work Order (HW0)-2-86-4829 and associated Work Process Sheets (WPS)-THIA-7.
The review was conducted to determine whether elements of the complete repair cycle included:
identification of the NDE method that revealed the flaw and description of the flaw; description of the flaw removal method; procedure for weld and welder qualifications prior to work authorization; provisions for ANII involvement in the repair; and description of the NDE program to be used after the repair is completed.
g.
The inspectors reviewed the Code replacement procedure for the removal and modification of large bore Reactor Water Clean Up (RWCU) piping to accommodate the new RWCU sealless pump.
The replacement procedure was included in the documentation for MWO-2-86-4774 and WPS-85-223-2.
The review was conducted to determine whether the procedure included:
provisions to verify that the replacements met the requirements of an acceptable Code edition; evaluation of the suitability of the replacement prior to authorizing its installation; retention of reports and records as required by the Code; and the performance of preservice inspection prior to the return to service of the replacement components (s) or part(s) in accordance with the applicable Code.
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identifie.
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8.
Inservice Inspection - Observation of Work and Work Activities (73753)
(Unit 2)
The inspectors observed a limited amount of work activities due to the Ifmited number of examinations being performed and the constantly changing Health Physics requirements for containment access. The inspectors reviewed certification records of equipment, materials, and NDE personnel which had been and will be utilized during the required ISI examinations during this outage. The review 3 conducted by the inspectcrs are documented below, a.
The inspectors reviewed the qualification documentation for the below listed SCS and LMT examiners in the following areas: employer's name; person certified; activity qualified to perform; effective period of certification; signature of employer's designated representatives; basis used for certification; and annual visual acuity, color vision examination and periodic recertification.
Method - Level VT Examiner SCS UT PT MT RT EC 1-Y-3-4
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GRB HI*
UI HI HI C
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II II II II TWL I*
II II
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I III III III III GAL III*
III III
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II II II II KJH II*
II II
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II II II II TKO II*
II II
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Method-Level-VT UT PT MT RT EC 1-7-3-4 Examiner LMT-I 7I
'TI Z-Z II RJA
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II II
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II II II II II GJD
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II II II II II II LFL
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II RDK I
II II
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II II II GJS II II II
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The inspectors observed the ultrasonic examinations and calibration activities for the welds indicated below.
The observations were compared with the applicable procedures and the Code in the following areas:
availability of and compliance with appr1ved NDE procedure; use of knowledgeable NDE personnel; use of NDE personnel qualified to the proper level; type of apparatus used; extent of coverage of weldment; calibration requirements; search units; beam ingles; DAC curves; reference level for monitoring discontinuities; method of demonstrating penetration; limits of evaluating and recording indications; recording significant indications and; acceptance limit..
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Weld I.D.
Description Scan 2831-1RC-12BR-E-5 Nozzle-to-Safe-End 45* Axial & Circ; From Both Sides 2831-1RC-12BR-D-5 Nozzle-to-Safe-End 45* Axial & Circ; From Both Sides 2831-1RC-12BR-C-5 Nozzle-to-Safe-End 45" Axial & Circ; From Both Sides 2831-1RC-12BR-B-5 Nozzle-to-Safe-End 45* Axial & Circ; From Vessel Side 2831-1RC-12BR-A-5 Nozzle-to-Safe-End 45* Axial & Circ; From Vessel Side Examination of the nozzle to safe-end welds require two separate exami-nations, one examination from the vessel side of the weld using a carbon steel calibration block and one examination from the safe-end side using a calibration block made of the same material as the safe-end.
c.
The following listed ultrasonic equipment and materials certification records were reviewed:
Ultrasonic Instruments Manufacturer /Model Serial No.
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NORTEC/131D 111 NORTEC/1310 128 NORTEC/131D 129 NORTEC/131D 167 Balteau-Sonatest/UFD 310 310043 Balteau-Sonatest/UFD 310 310061 Ultrasonic Rompas Blocks Step Blocks CS-402-2 STP-5 CS-403-3 STP-7 CS-404-4 STP-8 LMT-031 LMT-032 LMT-037 Ultrasonic Couplant
LMT Gel Batch No. 101885 Ultrasonic Transducers Size Frequency Serial No.
.5x.5 2.25 MHz J85256
.5x.5 2.25 MHz J85321
.25 5.0 MHz B6466
.5 2.25 MHz KB2341
.38x.38 2.25 MHz C85206 1.0 2.25 MHz 016575
.375 5.0 MHz KB2457
.5x1 2.25 MHz LC1 1x1 2.25 MHz W1283
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d.
The inspectors observed the liquid penetrant (PT) examinations ir.dicated below.
The observations were compared with the applicable procedures and the Code in the following area:
specified method, penetrant materials identified; penetrant materials analyzed for halogens and sulfur; acceptable pre-examination surface; drying time; method of penetrant application; penetration time; surface temperature; solvent removal; dry surface prior to developing; type of developer; and examination technique:
Item Drawing No.
Weld ID Description Class No.
89.11 2831-1RCH-12BE-3 Pipe to Safe-End I
A-15 B9.11 2B31-1RCM-28BS-2 Safe-End to Elbow I
A-18 (1) The above PT examinations were already in progress when the inspectors arrived at the examination location in the (Mit 2 drywell at the 156' level.
The inspectors had been informed that the examiners would be performing PT examinations on two raactor vessel to safe-end welds on loop "B".
One weld was identified as Item B5.10, weld no. 2831-1RC-12BR-E-5, isometric drawing no. A-15.
The second weld was identified as Item B5.10, weld no.
2831-1RC-288-1, isometric drawing no. A-18.
The NRC inspectors immediately noted that the examinations in progress were not being conducted on the nozzle to safe-end welds as they had been informed.
The inspectors questioned the PT examiners as to which welds they were suppose to be examining and were informed by them that the welds they were examining were the nozzle to safe-end welds.
After repeatedly asking the examiners if they were sure they were examining the correct welds and being assured by the examiners each time that they were conducting the examinations on the correct welds, the NRC inspectors strongly suggested that they contact someone or check their isometric drawings to be positive that they were examining the correct welds. At this point one of the examiners left the area and apparently contacted someone and referred to the isometric drawings that identified the welds which were supposed to be examined.
The examiner then returned to the examination site and informed the NRC inspectors and the other PT examiner that the welds currently under test were not the correct welds and terminated the PT examinations at that time.
The examiners apparently did not follow the basic procedure of positively identifying the welds to be examined by comparing the l
provided isometric drawings with the welds they were actually examining until being insisted upon by the NRC inspectors.
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Failure to follow procedure for activities affecting quality is l
in violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.
This item will be identified as Violation 50-366/86-32-02, Failure to Follow Procedure to Assure Correct Welds are Examined During ISI.
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(2) After discussions with the licensee regarding the above stated problem and subsequent discussions with the two examiners'
supervisors, who indicated that the examiners involved were not very familiar with BWR plants and until this examination had always worked with another qualified examiner, the licensee decided to take the following corrective actions:
repeat the PT examinations on the reactor nozzle to safe-end
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welds that the above mentioned examiners had previously worked on.
This required re-examination of six welds.
The re-examinations had been completed by the end of this inspection.
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the PT examiners involved in the problem would not be allowed
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to be a team leader during the remainder of this outage.
additional spot-checks would be conducted by SCS personnel
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while the ISI examiners were conducting examinations.
all of the NDE examiners would receive instruction cautioning
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them to be sure that they were examining the correct welds.
(3)
In addition to the above licensee actions, the inspectors recommended that each weld be permanently identified adjacent to the weld.
This recommendation was made after noting that the absence of permanent weld identification adjacent to some of welds may have been a contributing factor for examination of the wrong welds.
With regard to permanent weld identification, the inspectors noted the following:
nozzle to safe-end weld, 2831-1RC-12BR-E-5, did not have any
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permanent identification adjacent to the weld.
nozzle to safe-end weld, 2831-1RC-288-1, did have the weld
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permanently identified approximately halfway between it and the weld adjacent to it but the location of the identifi-cation marks were placed such that they could have been applicable to either of the welds.
examination of a total of 22,12 inch and 28 inch welds by
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the NRC inspectors, revealed that eight of the welds were not permanently identifie:d.
Documentation for the above licensee actions will be reviewed during a future inspection, e.
The inspectors reviewed the beloa listed liquid penetrant materials certificattun records to ascertain if the sulfur and halogen content of the material was within acceptable content limits.
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12 Materials Batch Number Liquid Penetrant 82F059, 84H027, 84E019 Cleaner / Remover 85E048, 85M053 Developer 85G029, 85H029 f.
The inspectors observed a portion of one Code replacement activity to determine whether an approved procedure was in use, personnel responsible for the performance of the activity were knowledgeable of procedural requirements, and the ANII was involved to the extent required by the licensee's ISI plar..
The activity observed was the welding of four class 3 RWCU piping welds. FW 03, 04, 07, and 08, in accordance with MWO-2-86-5650.
With the areas inspected, no violations, except as noted in paragraph 8.d.,
or deviations were identified.
9.
Inservice Inspection - Data Review and Evaluation (73755) (Unit 2)
The inspectors reviewed the ISI records described belov for the current outage to determine whether the records were consistent with regulatory and code requirements, a.
Records of completed NDE examinations of welds were selected and reviewed to ascertain whether:
the method (s), technique and extent of the examination complied with the ISI plan and applicable NDE procedures; findings were properly recorded and evaluated by qualified personnel; programmatic deviations were recorded as required; personnel, instruments, calibration blocks and NDE materials (penetrants, couplants) were designated.
Records selected for this review are listed below:
Class Weld ID NDE Method Notes
II 2E11-2RHR-6A-SS-6 UT-60*
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2HC-2-Closure Head-to-Flange UT-45*,60',0', MT
I 2821-1MS-248-8 UT-45*
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I 2B21-1MS-24A-9BC-3 UT-45,60'
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I 2E51-1RCIC-4-D UT-45*,60'
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2831-1RC-12AR-F5 UT-45'
2&3 l
I 2B31-1RC-12AR-G5 UT-45'
2&3 I
2831-1RC-12AR-H5 UT-45'
2&3 I
2831-1RC-12AR-J5 UT-45*
2&3 I
2831-1RC-12AR-K5 UT-45 2&3 I
2B31-1RC-12BR-A5 UT-45*
2&3 I
2831-1RC-12BR-85 UT-45'
2&3
2B31-1RC-12BR-C5 UT-45*
2&3 I
2E11-1RC-12BR-05 UT-45*
2&3
1 2831-IRC-12BR-E5 UT-45'
2&3 I
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I 2831-1RC-28A-1 UT-45*
2&3 I
2B31-1RC-288-1 UT-45*
2&3 I
-
-
I 2821-1CS-10A-18 MT
-
II 2HX-A-2S-3 Upper Shell Ring Support MT
-
II 2HX-A-2S-4 Upper Shell Ring Support MT
-
II 2HX-A-2S-3 Lower Shell Ring Support MT
-
I 2821-1MS-248-8 PT
-
I 30-03-1 CR0 Housing PT
-
2831-1RC-12AR-F-5 PT
I 2831-1RC-288-1 PT
-
I 2B31-IRC-12BR-E-5 PT
-
I 2831-1RC-12AR-H-5 PT
I 2831-1RC-28A-1 PT
I 2B31-1RC-12AR-K-5 PT
I 2831-1RC-12AR-J-5 PT
I 2831-1RC-12AR-G-5 PT
I 2831-1RC-12BR-C-5 PT
-
I 2831-1RC-12BR-B-5 PT
-
I 2831-1RC-12BR-A-5 PT
-
I 2831-1RC-12BR-D-5 PT
-
-
-
-
l I
-
-
NOTES (1) Re-examination of an indication detected during 1985 examination.
No apparent growth of indication was noted when compared with previous examination.
,
(2) Examination date prior to induction heating stress improvement (IHSI) application.
(3) Examination data after IHS! application.
'
(4) Re-examined as a result of violation.
Comparison of the two examinations did not change examination results, b.
9ecords of completed visual examinations were reviewed to determine whether the records contained or provided reference to examination results and data sheets, examination evaluation data, records on extent of examination, records on deviations from program and procedures, records on disposition of findings, or re-examination data after any repair work.
The inspectors reviewed the Hydrostatic Test Performance Packages for tests 2E11-PT-8, 9, and 19 (hydrostatic tests on various sections of RHR system).
Data was also reviewed for the VT1
)
(
examinations on Class I valve bolting on valves 2B21-F077A and B.
'
i f
-
-
-
- -
- - -
-
- -
-
- - -
e o
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
10.
IE Bulletins (92703) (Units 1 and 2)
(0 pen) IEB 321, 366/80-BU-08, Examination of Containment Liner Penetration Welds (see RII Report 50-321, 366/85-11 for a previous inspection of this Bulletin).
NUREG-CR 3035 was issued in July 1984 documenting, on a plant specific basis, evaluation of lioensee's responses to Bulletin 80-08.
In addition, the NUREG recommended necessary action to disposition the Bulletin for each plant.
The licensee and its consultants have subsequently re-evaluated the GPC bulletin rasponses relative to the recommendations in NUREG-CR 3053.
Licensee letter SL-865-2775N, dated August 8,1986, indicated that certain penetration welds would be nondestructively examined during the next scheduled refueling outage in cases whera weld quality could not be determined by available weld material information or the results of vendor performed radiography.
At the time of this inspection, the licensee was evaluating the inspectability of these welds and determining the most appropriate NDE methods to be used.
The results of the nondestructive examination of these penetration welds will be reviewed during a future inspection.
11.
Followup on IE Information Notices (IEIN) (92701) (Units 1 and 2)
The inspector reviewed the status of the IEINs listed below to determine whether they had been received and reviewed and whether appropriate corrective action was taken or planned.
The inspector determined that the licensee had received the IEINs and was currently reviewing them for applicability. Review of these IEINs remain open.
Licensee IEIN No.
Title Status 86-34 Improper Assembly, Material In Process Selection, and Test of Valves and Their Actuators 86-50 Inadequate Testing to Detect In Process Failures of Safety-Related Pneumatic Components or Systems 12.
Inspector Followup Items (92701) (Units 1 and 2)
a.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 321, 366/82-08-03, Implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.150.
The licensee's contractor, SCS, has evaluated this regulatory guide to determine if there are aspects of the guide that could enhance their program for reactor vessel inspections.
SCS has determined that this regulatory guide does not apply to DWR reactor vessels and recommended that the licensee not implement its provisions.
There are no further questions on this item.
l
o o
b.
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 321, 366/85-26-01, Examination of New Welding Program.
This item was opened in response to apparent deficiencies in certain of the licensee's maintenance welding and NDE procedures.
An inspector had noted inconsistency in applying codes and/or specific editions, unclear moisture control requirements for weld rod, weaknesses in requirements for maintaining the status of welder performance qualifications, and the need to upgrade and/or clarify visual examination requirements.
The licensee has recently implemented a new welding program and revised most of the procedures for maintenance NDE.
The inspector reviewed the following recently issued or revised maintenance welding and NDE procedures:
40AC-ENG-009-05, Revision 2. " Control of Special Processes" 42EN-EME-012-05, Revision 0, " Weld Process Control" 51GM-MNT-029-0S, Revision 0, " Repair and Replacement Welding" 51GM-MTL-002-05, Revision 1. " Control of Welding Materials" 51GM-MNT-025-05, Revision 0, " General Welding Requirements for Pressure Boundary Applications" 42EN-EME-011-05, Revision 0, " Welding Procedure Qualification" 51GM-PQL-001-05, Revision 1, " Welder Performance Qualification" 51GM-MNT-030-05, Revision 0, " Post-Weld Heat Treatment" 450C-PQL-002-05, Revision 0, " Maintenance of Welder Qualifications" 45QC-INS-004-05, Revision 0, " Visual Examination Procedure, Piping and Components" 45QC-INS-005-05, Revision 0, " Visual Examination Procedure for Structural Steel" 45QC-INS-006-0S, Revision 0, " Liquid Pen 2trant Examination Procedure" The inspector's review of these procedures revealed that the previously identified deficiencies have been essentially corrected.
However, two of the licensee's magnetic particle examination procedures for maintenance activities (521T-MNT-006.0 and 007.0) still contain nonspecific code references, and these procedures are currently being revised by the licensee. This item will remain open pending review of the revised versions of these two procedures.
.