IR 05000425/1988046

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Insp Rept 50-425/88-46 on 880804-0912.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Fire Protection, Piping Sys & supports,safety-related Components,Auxiliary Sys,Electrical Equipment,Raceways & Instrumentation
ML20204J620
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 10/03/1988
From: Rogge J, Schepens R, Sinkule M
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20204J611 List:
References
50-425-88-46, IEB-88-005, IEB-88-5, NUDOCS 8810250193
Download: ML20204J620 (19)


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{.., j NUCLEAR REGULATOMY COMMISSION t

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Report No.: 50-425/SS-46 I

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Lit.ensee: Georgia Power Company  !

P. O. Box 4545  !

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Atlanta, CA 30302 a {

! Docket No.: 50-425 Constru: tion Permit No..: CPPR-109 1 .

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Facility Name: Vogtle 2 f i inspect'on Conducted: August 4 - September 12, 1998

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i Inspectors: L b b_ _

.~ J. Schepens,' Senior Resident Inspector 9/ltbU -

D' ate Signed ;

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...f. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector

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Date Stoned

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Approvedby:/~ [ _o_

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  1. Sinkule, Sectio Nf Dst 31gned

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Division of Reactor P jects 4 j i -

SUMMARY l'

Scope

This routine, unannounced inspection entailed resident inspection in

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the following areas: fire protection, piping systems and supports, l

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safety related components, auxiliary systems, electrical equipment, raceways and instrumentation, preoperational testing, quality {

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i programs and administrative controls affecting quality, and follow-up !

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on previous inspection identified item !

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l Results: No violations or deviations were identifie '

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I 8810250193 391005  !

gDR ADOCK 05000425  !

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! i i j i REPORT DETAILS  !

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' Persons Contacted i f

i Licensee Employees l

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j 'P. O. Rice, Vice President, Vogtle Project Ofrector l

} *R. H. Pinson, Vice Prasident, Project Construction '

G. Bockhold, General Manager [

l *T. V. Greene, Plant Support Manager j i *C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality Assurance Manager [

, *E. D. Groover, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Construction- !

1 *0. M. Ftquett, Project Construction Manager i A. B. Gallant, Project Compliance Coordinator j C. L. Coursey, Maintenance Superintendent (Startup)

i 'H. M. Handfinger, Assistant Plant Support Manager 1 A. W. Harrcison, Construction Electrical Manager j l C. W. Rau, Construction Mechanical Manager i j L. N. Brooks, Construction Civil Manager  !

! *L. B. Glenn, QC Manager I

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J R. W. McManus, Readiness Review Manager  !

1 'J. E. Sanders, Assistant Project Manager {

1 * C. Ramsey, Project Er.gineering Manager  !

i L. D. Harless, Manager Quality Concerns  !

i *J. J. Maddry, Fire Protection Manager l i *J. J. Gilmartin, Construction Mechanical Engineering Supervisor ;

l *M. J. Ajiuni, Operations Superintendent a *R. A, Ebner, Mechanical Design Engineertag Group Supervtser

  • R. E. Hollands, Electrical Compliance Supervisor i
*P. R. Thomas, Readiness Review Team Leader '

I l Other licensee employees contacted included craf tst;en, technicians, 1 supervision, engineers, inspectors, and office personnel.

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Other Organizations l

C. Marcum, Westinghouse Project Manager  !

j T. E. Richardson, Project Engineering Manager - Bechtel I j A. J. Ayob, VSAMU, Supervisor - Westinghouse, l J B. Edwards Site Manager - Pullean Power Products l

! J. Miller, Quality Assurance Manager l i *D. D. Smith, Construction Engineer - Oglethorpe Power Company I *B. A. Dragon, Quality Assurance - Eechtel i NRC Region !! Inspector

'J. J. Lenahan, Civil Engineer Inspector

  • Attended Exit Interview l

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2. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters - (92702) l This area was not inspecte f 3. General Construction Inspection - (92706)

Periodic random surveillance inspections were rnade throughout this repo' ting period in the form of general type inspections in different areas of the facilit The areas were selected on the basis of the scheduled activities and were varied to provide wide coveragt. Observa-tiens were made of activities in progress to note defective items or items of noncompliance with the required codes and regulatory requirereents, On ,

these inspections, particular note was made of the presence of quality !

control inspectors, supervisors, and quality control evidence in the form !

of available process sheets, drawings, material identification, material protection, perforn.ince of tests, and housekeepin Interviews were ;

conducted with craft personnel, supervisors, coordinators, quality control :

inspectors, and others as they were available in tha work areas. The f inspector reviewed numerous construction deviation reports to determine if l requirements were met in the areas of documentation, action to resolv l justification, and approval signatures in accordance with 0PC Field j Procedure No. GO-T-0 i t

During the weekend of August 19, 1988, GPC conducted a major effort to [

clean up containment. Subsequently, on August C2,1988, GFC identified a i deficiency as a result of the clean up ef fort relative to spraying down l'

the inside of containment with water. GPC initiated deficiency report Nos. CD-9375 & CD-9377 to document the indeterminate condition inside containment. GPC immediately formed a task force to address this issue in .

two major areas: 1) Determine and e.aluate the extent of water intrusion [

f nto specified class 1E and major /significant non-safety related electrical r equipment, junction boxes, termination boxes etc., and sample the remainder of class 1E and non-safety related equip'nent, and 2) Determine and evaluate the effect of chloride / fluoride leaching as a result of wetting down the f Nukon piping insulation. The inspector held discussions with appropriate i personnel and monitored licensee actions such as witnessing nock up testing of the Nukon piping insulation and observing electrical equipment inspections and rework to dry out wetted equipment to verify the licensee's ,

actions with regard to the identified deficienc Also, the licensee

placed a hold on HFT, not to go above 180aF until this natter was satis- '

I factory resolve The inspector reviewed this incident with project l nanagement relative to a concerr. to tesure that adequate ranagement

. coverage was provided during weekends. Project management stated that !

I adequate management coverage was provided in this instance, however, )

i management was not fully aware of the details of the cleaning method thus i

' resulting in the problem. Project canagement has reinforced to management I personnel the inportance and necessity of the knodng and understanding I najor work details to prevent reeceu renc The inspector will continue to observe Tanagener t coverage and invohement for weekend work a:tivities during HF } .- -

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{ + Fire Prevention / Protection and Housekeeping Measures - (42051C)

The inspector observed fire prevention / protection measures threaghout the (
in>pection period, Velders were using welding permits with fire watches !
and extinguishers. Fire fighting equipment wa
in its designated areas g j throughout the plant, j t  !

] The inspector reviewed and examined portions of procedures pertaining to j i the fire prevention / protection measures and housekeeping measures to i j determine whether they comply with appitcable codes, standards, NRC !

Regulatery Guides and licensee commitments,

! The inspector observed fire preventien/ protection measures in work areas (

i containing safety related equipment during the inspection period to verify I the following:

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Combustible waste material and rubbish was removed from the work I j areas as rapidly as practicable to avoid unnecessary accumulation of !

j combustible [

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Flammable liquids were stored in appropriate containers and in designated areas throughout the plant, I 3 - -

Cutting and welding operations in progress have been authori:ed by an l appropriate permit, combustibles have been moved away or safely j covered, and a fire watch and extinguisher was posted as required.

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Fire protection / suppression equipment was provided and controlled in j accordance with applicable requirements.

) During the inspection period, the inspector conducted a review of the following documents which covered the design, construction, & testing of the deluge, water, spray, sprinkler, and halon fire suppression systems, ;

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Procedure No, Title J

X4AX03,R-16 Technical Provisions For Automatic Sprinkier And Halon Fire Suppression Systems  ;

! MD-T-22,R-0 National Fire Protectiot Association piping j Installation l I j MD-T-23,R-1 Testing Of NFPA Systems i i

MJ T-24,R-0 NFPA Piping Support Insta11stion l l MD-T-25,R-2 In-Process Evaluation Of Sepa ation For Mechanical i Comodities I 1 I b b

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' The inspector conducted a walkdown of the train "B" centrifugal charging pump room, the waste gas compressor room and the vestibule and pipe penetration roo- installed sprinkler systems for compliance with the ,

applicable design and construction requirements. Also, an inspection was i conducted of the train "A" pipe penetration room installed sprinkler {

system hangers, The following drawings were utilized by the inspector in }

the inspection:

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Ed_32./RiV Tit 1e l

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2X40F3 A239, R-1 Fire Protectien Sprinkler System #10 Startup  :

System 2KC-06 [

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2X40F3A274,R-1 Fire Protection Sprinkler System #101 Startup j System 2KC-06 i

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2X40F3A248-1,R-0 Fire Protection Sprinkler System #20 Startup '!

System 2KC-06 [

k 2X4DF3A249-2,R-0 Fire Protection Sprinkler System #20 Startup  ;

System 2KC-06  !

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2X4DF2A205-1,R-0 Fire Protection Sprinkler System #62 Startup Systen 2KC-05 [

f 2X4DF2A205-2,R-0 Fire Protection Sprinkler System #62 Startup (

System 2KC-05 V2-2301-000-5024 Pepe Support Hanger No's, 15, 16, & 17 V2-2301-000-55023 Pipe Support Hanger No. 75 l t

V2-2301-000-5022 Pipe Support Hanger No's. 63, 103, & 109 {

l V2-2301-000-5016 Pipe Support Hanger No's. 18 & 22 As a result of these walkdomns, the inspector held several meetings with l the licensee to discuss concerns with regard to: 1) inspecting sprinkler l lines for slope, 2) thoroughness of walkdown inspections, 3) proper density  ;

i coverage for rooms in accordance with the fire protection construction  !

' specification, 4) configuration control, and 5) construction specification l not being clear relative to the dif ferences between the design bafis for j the sprinkler systems in Unit I and Unit 2. The licensee has adequately l addressed the inspecto* con erns b/: 1) terroving walkdown checklist for l quality engineers to require inspections for slope and drain valve instal-

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l lation, 2) rechecking rooms with .21 density coverage to ensure compliance

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with construction specificatien design reautrements for sprinklers systems,  ;

3) acding a step to the design enange checklist to verify that modifications j do not block fire protecticn suppression systers nor alter configuration j I

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of piping support system hardware and, 4) revising the construction  !

specification to clearly specify the Unit 1 and Unit 2 sprinkler design )

basis requirements.

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No violat. tons or de',tations were identifie J l  :

1 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping - (49053C and !

! 49063C)

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i 1 Periodic inspections were conducted to observe construction activities of l l the Reactor Coolant Boundary and other safety-related piping insta11aticns l

insi je and outside Containment Varifications included out were not [

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Material and components were being properly handled and htored in j i order to prevent damage, j

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Fit-ups and alignments were within tolerances per specifications ;

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Piping was installed and inspected in accordance with applicable

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drawings, specifications, and procedure I a -

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Those people engaged in tha activity are qualified to perform the i

applicable function.

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Orawing and specification changes (revisions) are being handled 1 and used correctly.

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I I i Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping Welding - i i

j (55073C and 55033C)

I periodic inspections were conducted during daily plant surveillances on

safety-related pipe welding at various s? ages of weld completion. The ,

j purpose of t,he inspection was to determine whethar the requirements of

applicable specifications, codes, standards, work performance procedures j i and QC pro
ecares are being ret as follows:

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Work was conducted in accordance with a process sheet which identifws l I the weld and its location by system, references procedures or instruc-l tions, and provides for production and QC signoffs.

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Velding procedures, detailed drawings and ins + ructions, were readily available in the irrediate work area and te:hnically adequate for the i welds being reace.

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Welding procedure specification (WPS) were in accordance with tho !

applicable Code requirements and that a Procedure Qualification :

Record (PQR) is referenced and exists for the type of weld being [

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- Base metairs, welding filler materials, fluxes, gases, and insert l materials were of tne specified type and grade, have been properly l

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inspected, tested and were traceable to test reports or certifications, !

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Purga and/or sht ilding gas flow and composition were as specified in !

the welding procedure specifitation and that protection was provided !

to shield the welding operation from adverse environmental condition [

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Weld joint geometry including pipe wall thickness was specified and i that surfaces to be welded have been prepared, cleaned and inspected !

in accordance with applicable procedures or instruction '

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A suf ficient number of adequately qualified QA and QC inspection personnel were present at the work site, commensurate with the work in progres l t

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The weld area cleanliness was maintained and that pipe alignment and i fit-up tolerances were within specified limit [

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Weld filler material being used was in accordance with welding !

specifications, unused filler material was separated from other types l of material and wcs stored properly and that weld rod stubs were l properly removed from the work location, j

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That there were no evident signs of cracks, excessive heat input, sugaring, or excessive crown on weld Welders were qualified to the applicable process and thickness, and f that necessary controls and records were in plac >

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During the inspection period, the inspector observed in-process work j activities on rework of the PSARY ring assembly flange to aligr. with the ,

pressurizer code safety relief valve No. 2PSV-80108 flange in accordance I with procen sheet No. 2X4DL4020 l No violations or deviations we'e identified, l

! Reactor Vessel, Integrated Head Package, a.sd Internals - (50053C and l 500030) t i

The inspection consisted of examinations of the Reactor Vessel installed in centainment, and the letegrated Head pa:Lage which is tensioned in l

support of hot function testing. Inscectiens also dete. mined that proper storage protection practices were in place ar.d that entry of foreign objects and debris was prevente No stolations or ceviations ware verifie :

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1 I 8. Safety Related Components - (50073C)

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l The inspection consisted of plant tours to observe storage, handling, and q protection; installation; and preventive maintenance after installation of I

safety-related compor,ents to determine that work is being performed in l l Accordance with applicable codes. NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee l

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commitments, j

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During the inspection the below listed areas were inspected at various times during the inspection period to verify the following as applicable:

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Storage, environment, and orotection of components were in accordance with manufacturer's instructions and/or estabitsbed procedure Implementation of special storage and maintenance requirements such f as: rotation of motors, pumps, lubrication, i nsulation testing (electrical), cleanliness,et Performance of licensee / contractor surveillance activities and documentation thereof was being acccmplishe Installation requirements were met such as: proper location, place-ment, orientation, alignment, mounting (tortsing of bolts and !

expansion anchors), flow direction, tolerancea, and expansion clearanc .

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Appropriate stamps, tags, markings, etc. were in use to prevent oversight of required inspections, completion of tests, acceptance, ,

and the prevention of inadvertent operatio !

t Safety-Related piping, valves, pumps, heat exchangers, and instrutentation i were inspected in the following areas on a random sampling basis throughout l the inspection period:

- Residual Heat Removal Pump Rooms '

- Diesel Generator Butlaing

- Austliary Feed ~ater Pumphouse

- Containment Spray Pump Rooms

- Pressuriter Rooms

- Main Coolant Pump Areas  ;

- $ team Generat.or Areas

- Safety Injection Putp Rooms

- RHR and CS Containeent Penetration Encapsulation Yessel Rooms

- Ccxporent Coolte; Water (CCW) Heat Enchangers, Surge Tar (s & Pump Roems ;

- Cable Spreading Rooms ,

- Accumulator Tank Areas I

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Chemical and Volume Control System (CVC$) Letdcwn Heat Exchanger Pump i Roce I

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- CVCS Centrifugal Charging Pumps & Positive Displacement Pump Rooms

- Bottom Mounted Instrumentation (BMI) Tunnel and Seal Table Area

- NSCW Tower Pump Rooms and Pipe Tunnelt The inspector observed the installttion of the containment spray sump screens and reviewed the completed accumentation for the fabrication of the RHR & CS sump screens for compliance with the applicable design and construction requirements. The following documents were utilized by the inspector during this inspection:

Document N Title M01G-5311A,B,C,0,E,F Vogtle Miscellaneous Steel Fab Form M01G-S310A,B&C Vogtle Miscellaneous Steel Fab Form 2X2D48G012,R-2 Containment Internals Miscellaneous Steel Plan Sections And Details SHT.11 M01G-S310,R-0 Miscellaneous Structural Steel Details M01G-S311,R-0 Miscellaneous Structural Steel Details No violations or deviations were identifie . Safety Related Pipe Support and Restraint Systems - (50090C)

Periodic random inspections were conducted during the inspection period to observe construction activities during insta'.lation of safety-related pipe supports to determine that the following work was performed in accordance with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee commitment Spring hangers were provided with indicators to show the approximate

"hot" or "cold" position, as appropriat No deformation or forced bendin> was eviden ;

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Where pipe clamps are used to support vertical lines, shear lugs were welded to the pipe (if required by Installation Drawings) to prevent slippag Sliding or rolling supports were provided with material and/or

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lubricants suitable for the environment and compatible with sliding contact surface Supports are located and installed as specifie I i

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The surface of welds meet applicable code requirements and are free i from unacceptable grooves, abrupt ridges, valleys, undercuts, cracks, discontinuities, or ther indications which can be observed on the welded surface, i

No violations or deviations were identified, I I

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10. Electrical and Instrumentation Components and Systems - (51053C and 52153C)

Periodic inspections were conducted during the inspecticn period to observe safety-related electrical equipment in order to verif.y that the storage, installation, and preventive maintenance was accomplished in accordance with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee commitment During the inspection period inspections were performed on various pieces *

of electrical equipment during storage, installation, and cable terminating phase in order to verify the following as applicable:

- Location and alignment

- Type and size of anchor bolts

- Identification

- Segregation and identificat;on of nonconforming items

- Location, separation and redundancy requirements

- Equipment space heating

- Cable identification

- Proper lugs used

- Condition of wire (not nick.ed. etc.), tightness of connection

- Bending radius not exceeded

- Cable entry to terminal point

- Separation No violations er deviations were identifie . Electrical and Instrumentation Cables and Terminations - (51063C, 52063C, and 53053C) Raceway / Cable Installation The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following proce-dures pertaining to raceway / cable installation to d9termine whether they comply with applicable odes, NRC Regulatory Guides and licensee commitment E0-T-02, Raceway Installation

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E0-T-07, Cable Installation Periodic inspections were conducted to observe construction activities of Safety Related Raceway / Cable Installatio In reference to the raceway installation, the following areas were '

inspected to verify compliance with the applicable requirements:

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- Identification

- Alignment

- Bushings (Conduit)

- Grounding

- Supports and Anchorages In reference to the cable installation the following areas were inspected to verify compliance with the applicable requirements:

- Protection from adjacent construction activities (welding, etc.)

- Coiled cable ends properly secured

- Non-terminated cable ends taped

- Cable trays, junction boxes, etc., reasonably free of debris

- Conduit capped, if no cable installed

- Cable supported

- Bend radius not exceeded

- Separation Cable Terminations The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following proce-dures pertaining to cable termination to determine whether they comply with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides and licensee commitment ED-T-08, Cable Termination In reference to cable terminations the following areas were inspected to verify compliance with the applicable requirement Cable identification

- Proper lugs used

- Condition of wire (not nicked, etc.)

Tightness of connection

- Bending radius not axceeded

- CaLle entry to terminal point

- Seoaration No violations or deviations were identifie . Followup on Previous Inspection Items - (92701)

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item, 50-425/88-38-01, "Review Licensee's Finding Relative To The Saismic Qualification Of Valves 2HV-8152, 8888, and 8964." The inspector was provided the appropriate documentation which specified the required modifications to upgrade the Fisher valves to meet seismic requirement In addition, the laboratory reports for the seismic qualification data af ter the incorporation of the design modifications were reviewed ano determined to be acceptabl Based on the above inspection, this item is considered to resolve _ . .

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11 13. Offsite Review Committee (40301)

This inspection was conducted to determine if the functions of off site reviews are ueing performed in accordance with regulatory requirements of technical specification 6. Technical specification 6.4.2 specifies that the Safety Review Board shall function to provide independent review  :

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and audit of activities in the areas of nuclear power plant operations, nuclear engineering, chemistry and radiochemistry, metallurgy,-instrumen-tation and control, radiological safety, mechanical and electrical engineering, quality assurance practice The Safety Review Board is ,

organized as one board for all GPC Nuclear power plant The board is composed of a minimum of five person Additional information is contained in FSAR Section 13.4.3. The inspector attended meeting number 311 on August 24, 1988, discussed with board members how the board conducts business and reviewed past meeting mir.utes

, of the board and subcommittees. The inspector concluded that the board was conducting business as required by the technical specifications. The

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inspector noted that the open issues of the board has been reduced from 83

to O during the past yea No violations or deviations were identifie . Management Meetings - (30702) -

On September 2,1988, the resident inspector attended a meeting with the NRC staff and GPC at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. In attendance

, from the regional and headquarters office wera Mr. J. N. Grace, Regional a

Administrator, Mr. L. A. Reyes, Director Division of Reactor Projects, Mr. M. V. Sinkule, Section Chief, Mr. C. A. Patterson, Project Engineer, Mr. D. B. Matthews, Director of Project Directorate II-3, and Mr. J. B. Hopkins, Project Manager. The purpose of the meeting was to

. review Vogtle Unit 2's current status and to discuss GPC's preparedness i for initial fuel loading. Areas of discussion included: construction  ;

status, startup status, licensing status, special programs, and NRC ,

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bulletin 88-05. In addition, a tour of the Unit 2 facility was conducted by GP l i

1 Followup of Reportable Items - (92700) '

(Closed) CDR 50-425/86-97 "Westingho';se Reactor Protection System - P10 Function." The issue reported by letter dated April 8, 1988, was reviewed in datai This issue concerns the function of the permissive during operation with one or more of the power range neutron flux measurement channels inoperable or removed from service. Currently, the Technical J

Specification allow an instrumentation thannel to remain inoperable i provided that the associated trip bistables are placed in the tripped j conditio In the case of a power range neutron flux channel, the current practice would be to place the bistables associated with the NIS trips )

(Power Range High Neutron Flux Trip, Positive and Negative Flux Rate i Trips) and the P-10 permissive function in the tripped condition by l l

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removing power to the channel. This would affect the coincidence logic of the NIS trips and P-10 permissive in such a way as to require only one additional channel in the trip condition to generate a protective system actuation or the P-10 permissive state to be enabled. Howei,er, for the case where neutron flux is above the P-10 setpoint, if the inoperable channel is piaced in the tripped status while the plant is at power (the appropriate action) and the power level is later reduced below the P-10 setpoint, the protection system functions of the Power Range High Neutron Flux Trip - Low setpoint, Intermediate Range High Neutron Flux Trip and source range neutron flux detector voltage will be disabled if one assumes

, a single failure of a P-10 setpoint bistable from one of the three remaining operable power range neutron flux measurement channels. With the single failure of a bistable and a tripped channel bistable already existing, the P-10 permissive would not correctly change state due to the fact that the two out of four logic for blocking these functions would remain in effect. The P-10 permissive, which is comprised of a 2 out of 4 coincidence logic of the four power range neutron flux channels, has two functions. The first function of the permissive is to enable a manual block of the above mentioned functions during power escalations when at least two of the four power range neutron flux channels reach a value to i greater than the value corresponding to the P-10 setpoint (typically 10% i nuclear power). The second function of the permissive is to provide an automatic reinstatement of the above functions when power level is reduced below the setpoin Therefore, the previously referred to protection function would not be enabled when the power drops below the P-10

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setpoin To resolve this istue procedural provisions have been incorporated into operations procedure 12004-C, Power Operation, lhese caution, verifica-tions, and procedure steps were reviewed and determined to be adequate by the inspecto (Closed) CDR 50-425/86-103, "Separation Of Field Wiring In Isolation Transformers." This item was reported to the NRC Region II on April 3, 1986, and the final report submitted on June 12, 1986. This CDR addressed l the minimum 6 inch separation distance of field routed wiring within the isolation transformer enclosures. The concern was originally the fact that the separation distance between the primary (input) and secondary

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(output) wiring for these isolation transformers could not be me However, an additional concern was identified which pertained to the temperatures the wiring could reach under fault or short circuit condition The current limiting feature of these transformers allows for the use of a higher temperature rated cable which can withstand the maximum current

without damage. Therefore, since the primary side wiring is protected by i

trip devices and the secondary side wiring will not self ignite when faulted, the separation analysis meets the requirements of the FSAR, IEEE

384 and Regulatory Guide 1.7 (Closed) CDR 50-425/87-141, "Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies."

This item was reported to the NRC Region 11 on December 3, 1987, and a ,

final report was submitted on January 27, 1988. The licensee had identi-fied approximately 20 non-safety related electrical penetration assemblies i

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l I 13 that did not have redundant protective devices sized adequately to always I protect the EPA. These EPAs are used in the Neutron Flux Mapping System i and the Fuel Transfer System, both of which are non-safety related system.

l The root cause for the inadequate protection being provided for the FMS l and FTS circuits passing through the EPAs was determined to be an l

engineering oversight. Field Equipment Change Order Numbers E-165-B, E-383-B, E-384-B, E-386-BF, and E-389-BF were issued for the installation l of replacement circuit breakers and fuse The installation of these l breakers and fuses were examined and accepted by the quality engineering unit which is responsible for inspection and acceptance of all installation and modification on non-safety related component l (0 pen) CDR 50-425/82-33, "TransAmerica Delaval Diesel Generator - Governor Drive Coupling." This item was reported on December 14, 1982, and involved  !

the identification of an incorrect material used for the coupling's drive i elemen The drive coupling must function in the high temperature, oil environment of the engine's gear case. Coupling integrity must be main-

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tained for the diesel generator to achieve su'?ficient frequency stabilit The material, an isoprene, is designed for atmospheric use and is not suitable for use in the high temperature, oil atmosphere in the engine's gear cas The isoprene, a rubber deteriorates rapidly and ultimately ,

fails. During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the completed MWO's  !

N500101 and 28500049 which documented the replacement of the existing l

coupling insert with one made of neoprene on the train "A" and "B" diesel l ganerator In addition, the inspector conducted a review of the licensee's

! action with regard to the spare parts list to prevent recurrence. During this review, the inspector was informed that the new part had the same part number as the old and that quality control verified the installation l of the correct part based on the part number. Based on this information, the inspector raised the question, "How do you know that you have the

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correct part installed?" The licensee contacted the vendor and was informed that the inserts should have and "n" marked for neoprene rubbe Based on the above, the licensee has initiated MW0's to reverify that the correct coupling inserts are installed utilizing the vendor's informatio Pending the results of the licensees inspection, this item will remain ,

ope . Preoperational Test Program Implementation / Verification -

(70302 and t

71302)

l The inspector reviewed the present implementation of the preoperational test progra Test program attributes inspected included review of l l administrative requirements, document control, docun intation of major test '

l events and deviations to procedures, operating practices, instrumentation l calibrations, and correction of problems revealed by testing.

l Periodic inspections were conducted of Control Room Operations to assess plant condition and conduct of shif t personne The inspector' observed that Control Room operations were being conducted in an orderly and

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professional manne Shift personnel were knowledgeable of plant l conditions, i.e., ongoing testing, systems / equipment in or out of service, '

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and alarm / annunciator statu In addition. the inspector observed shift turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant testing, operational problems and other pertinent plant information during the turnover Control Room logs were reviewed and various entries were discussed with operations personne Periodic f acility tours were made to assess equipment and plant condi-tions, maintenance and preoperational activities in progress. Schedules for program completion and progress reports were routinely monitore Discussions were held with responsible personnel, as they were available, to determine their knowledge of the preoperational program. The Inspector reviewed numerous operation deviation reports to determine if requirements were met in the areas of documentation, action to resolve, justification, corrective acticn and approval Specific inspections conducted are listed below: Preoperational Tests (1) Test Procedure Review (70300)

The inspector reviewed the following listed preoperational test procedures. Each test was reviewed for administrative format and technical adequac The procedures were compared with licensee commitments from the applicable FSAR Chapters, Regulatory Guide 1.68 and the Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-1137). This included verifying that pertinent prerequisites were identified, initial test conditions and system status were

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specified, acceptance criteria were specified and management approval indicated:

Procedure NRC Ins N N Test Title

. 2-3SH-01 25020 ATWS Mitigation System Actuation l Circuitry ST-38 70336 RHR Operating Demonstration With RCS Partially Filled (2) Test Witnessing (70312)

The inspector witnessed selected portions of the following preoperational test procedures as they were conducte The inspection included attendance at briefings held by the test supervisor to observe the coordination and general knowledge of the procedure with the test participants. Overall crew performance was evaluated during testing. A preliminary review j of the test results was compared to the inspector's own observa-tions. Problems encountered during performance of the test were verified to be adequately cocumented, evaluated ar.d dispositioned on a selected basi I i

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Procedure NRC Ins Test Title N , N N Activity Observed 2-3AL-01 70438 Motor Driven Supply Breaker Auxiliary 2AA0217 Initial Feedwater Checkout Per System Step E0-01 70439 Auxiliary ACCW Pump No. 1 Component Performance Check-Cooling Water out Per Step System 2-3SH-01 25020 ATWS Mitigation Computer Setup System Actuation Cfrcuitry ST-38 70436 RHR Operating RHR Train "A" Mid Demonstration Loop Operation With The RCS At Level 187'-6" Partially Filled S01-92 70439 NSCW Train "B" NSCW Bypass System (2-300-09,R0) Bypass Retest Test Guidelines Steps A), B1) (3) Test Resu?ts Evaluation (70400)

The inspector reviewed the f.illowing listed preoperational test results. This review was periormed to ascertain if an adequate  !

evaluation of the test results has been performed; test data was within the established acceptance criteria, or that deviations are properly dispositioned; appropriate retesting was performed where necessary; administrative practices were adhered to; and that appropriate review, evaluation and acceptance of the test 1

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results have been performed.

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Procedure NRC Ins Preoperational Test Procedure N N Title j i

2-3BC-01 70536 Residual Heat Removal System l l

2-3KJ-01 70541 Diesel Generator Train "A" Starting l

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2-3BN-01 70534 Refueling Water Storage Tank 2-3JE-01 70541 'Jiesel Generator Train "A" Fu.c 011 Storage And Transfer Sys'.r:m

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i Procedure NRC Ins Preoperational Test Procedure N N Title (cont'd)

f 2-3RK-02 70329 Isolation Cabinets 2-3P0-01 70541 120 Volt Vital AC (Class 1E)

System 2-3PE-01 70541 Class 1E - Standby Power System Cor.struction Acceptance Testing The inspector conducted a review of the following completed construc-tion acceptance tests to verify that they were conducted in accordance with applicable procedures and vendor / design documerits:

NRC Ins CAT. N N Description CAT-87-1622 70536 2HV-0606 RNR HT Exch E600 1 Outlet Valve CAT-87-1651 70536 2HV-88040 RHR HEX Trq B To S1 Pump ,

Valve  !

CAT-87-1659 70536 2HV-88118 Containment Sump Isolation ,

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CAT-87-1660 70536 2HV-8812B RHR Pump P6001 In1r.t Valve  ;

CAT-87-1871 70536 2HV-8809A RHR Trn A SIS Cold Leg  !

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Isolation Valve The inspector witnessed portions of the following CAT's to verify implementation per Startup Manual Procedure No. SUM-12A:

NRC Ins CAT. N N Description

2-3785 70438 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump

M-01 i

Preoperational Testing OA Surveillance Raoort Review l The inspector conducted a review of the following licensee conducted surveillance reports performed by the QA department of various phases of the preoperational test progra . - -_ _ -- , _ - _ .

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Report N Description 2-KJ-88-007 Diesel Generator 2A Fuel Day Tank Preop Testing 2-BG-88-015 CAT Retest Of Train "A" Boric Acid Transfer Pump 2-88-88-006 SG#1 Tube Plug Installation 2-GL-88-001 Aux Bldg ESF Room Coolers Preop Testing 2-MA-88-001 Main And Unit Auxiliary Transformers Acceptance Testing 2-KC-88-002 CAT Implementation 2-SF-88-001 CROM Motor Generator Set Preop Testing No violations or deviations were identifie ,

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1 Exit Interviews - (30703C)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 13, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection result No dissenting comments were received from the license The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection. Region based NRC exit interviews were attended during the inspection period by a resident inspector. This inspection closed one Inspector rollowup Item and three Construction Deficiency Rroorts.

3 20. Acronyms And Initialism AC - Alternating Current  !

ACCW - Auxiliary Component Cooling Water System

, AFW - Auxiliary Feeuwater System l q ATWS - Anticipated Transient Without Scram  ;

i CAT - Construction Acceptance Test i CDR - Construction Deficiency Report CRDM - Control Aod Drive Mechanism  !

CVCS - Chemical & Volume Control System  :

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ESF - Engineered Safety Fettures l EPA - Electric Penetration Assemblies

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FMS - Flux Mappl... vstem FTS - Fuel Transfer 3ystem FSAR - Final eafety Analysis Report GPC - Georgia Power Company HFT - Hot Functional Test MWO - Maintenance Work Order l

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NFPA - National Fire Protection Association NIS - Nuclear Instrumentation System NSCW - Nuclear Service Cooling Water System NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission PSARV - Pressurizer Safety Atmospheric Relief Valve QA - Quality Assurance QC - Quality Control RCS - Reactor Coolant System RHR - Residual Heat Removal System RWST - Refueling Water Storcge Tank SG - Steam Generator SIS - Safety Injection System 501 - System Operating Instruction SUM - Startup Manual i

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