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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML20151W248
| number = ML20155H103
| issue date = 04/22/1988
| issue date = 06/01/1988
| title = Insp Rept 50-425/88-12 on 880217-0331.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Preoperational Testing & Readiness Review Module 4, Mechanical Equipment & Piping
| title = Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-425/88-12
| author name = Burger C, Patterson C, Schepens R, Sinkule M
| author name = Brownlee V
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| addressee name =  
| addressee name = Mcdonald R
| addressee affiliation =  
| addressee affiliation = GEORGIA POWER CO.
| docket = 05000425
| docket = 05000425
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = 50-425-88-12, NUDOCS 8805030336
| document report number = NUDOCS 8806200191
| package number = ML20151W233
| title reference date = 05-19-1988
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, NRC TO UTILITY, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
| page count = 27
| page count = 2
}}
}}


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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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n  REGION 11
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.g- i j  101 MARIETTA STREET. W  e  ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323
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Report No.: 50-425/88-12 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P.O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA- 30302 Docket Nos.: 50-425  Construction Permit No.: CPPR-109 Facility Name: Vogtle Unit 2 Inspection Conducted: February 17, 1988 - March 31, 1988 Inspectors: ba h  -
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p R. J. Schepens, Senior Resident Inspector  Date Signed
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Ll.f & g g h C. W. Burger, Resident Inspector  Date Signed
  @ <, . 4.}u )g g C. A. Patterson, Project Engineer  Date Signed
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Accompanying Personnel: P. A. Balmain Approved By:    z3, L M. V'. Sinkule, Section Chief  Dite Signed Division of Reactor Projects i
SUMMARY Scope: This inspection entailed a routine, unannounced resident inspection effort in the area of the preoperational testing and a special announced
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resident and region inspection effort in the area of Readiness Review Module 4,
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Mechanical Equipment and Piping.
 
t  Results: One violation was identified in the area of system walkdown (Failure
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to provide adequate instructions to ensure the proper installation of flow elements and orifices).
 
P8P 28834 88888 6 il Cl  DCD i,3
 
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
*P. D. Rice, Vice President, Vogtle Project Director
*R. H. Pinson, Vice President, Project Construction G. Bockhold, General Manager T. V. Greene, Plant Support Manager
*C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality Assurance Manager
*E. D. Groover, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Construction
*S. T. Halton, Quality Assurance Support Supervisor D. M. Fiquett, Project Construction Manager
* A. McCarley, Project Compliance Coordinator
*C. L. Coursey, Maintenance Superintendent (Startup)
*H. M. Handfinger, Startup Manager
*A. W. Harrelson, Electrical Construction Manager
*R. E. Hollands, Electrical Compliance Supervisor
*C. W. Rau, Mechanical Construction Manager
*J. J. Gilmartin, Mechanical Engineer L. N. Brooks, Civil Construction Manager
*L. B. Glenn, QC Manager
*R. W. McManus, Readiness Review Manager Lead Mechanical Engineer
*R. C. Sommerfield, Readiness Review
*J. E. Sanders, Assistant. Project Manager
*W. C. Ramsey, Project Engineering Manager L. D. Harless, Manager, Quality Concerns
*P. T. Ciccanessi, Senior Regulatory Specialist
* L. Hobbs, I & C Superintendent
" D. Duncan, I & C Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included craftsmen, technicians, supervision, engineers, inspectors, and office personne Other Organizations C. Marcum, Westinghouse Project Manager D. L. Kinnsch, Project Engineering - Bechtel
*T. E. Richardson, Project Engineering Manager - Bechtel
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*D W. Strohman, Project Quality Assurance Engineer - Bechtel I *A. J. Ayob, VSAMU, Westinghouse, Supervisor B. Edwards, Site Manager, PPP J. Miller, Quality Assurance Manager
"D. D. Smith, Construction Engineer - Oglethorpe Power Company
 
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* Attended Exit Interview l
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2 Exit Interviews - (30703C)
JUN 0 1 1308 Georgia Power Company ATTN: Mr. R. P. Mcdonald Executive Vice President -
The inspection scope and findings were summari7ed on March 31, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection result No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection. Region based NRC exit interviews were attended during the inspection period by a resident inspector. The following items were identified during this inspection:
Nuclear Operations P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 I Gentlemen:
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SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-425/88-12 Thank you for your response of May 19, 1988, to our Notice of Violation issued on April 26, 1988, concerning activities conaucted at your Vogtle facility. We have evaluated your response and found that it meets the requirements of 10 CFR 2.201. We will examine the implementation of your corrective actions during future inspection We appreciate your cooperation in this matter.
    (0 pen) Violation, 50-425/88-12-01 "Failure to Provide Adequate Instructions to Ensure the Proper Installation of Flow Elements And Orifices" - Paragraph 5.d.(1)(c).
 
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-424/88-12-02 "Followup Licensee's Corrective Action Relative To The Identification Of Unit Appli-cability For Calculations" - Paragraph 5.b.(1).
 
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-425/88-12-03 "Review Revised Calculation X4C1202V43 Regarding Design Objectives and Conclusions" -
Paragraph 5.b.(1).
 
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-425/88-12-04 "Review Revised Calculation X4C1202V18 Regarding Case 3C Description" -
Paragraph 5.b.(1).
 
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-425/88-12-05 "Review Revised Calculation X4C1202500F1 Regarding The Evaluation Of Flow Failure ,
Detection & Ef fect On System Safety Function For Item No's. 85b, 86b, 87b, 8Sb, 89b, & 90b" - Paragraph 5.c.(1), Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters - (92702)
Not inspecte Preoperational Test Program Implementation / Verification - (70302)(71302)
The inspector reviewd the present implementation of the preoperational test progra Test program attributes inspected included review of administrative requirements, document control, documentation of major test events and deviations to procedures, operating practices, instrumentation calibrations, and correction of problems revealed by testin Periodic inspections were conducted of Control Room Operations to assess l plant condition and conduct of shif t personnel. The inspector observed ;
that Control Room operations were being conducted in an orderly and professional manner. Shif t personnel were knowledgeable of plant condi- '
tions, i.e., ongoing testing, systems / equipment in or out of service, and alarm / annunciator status. In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant testing,
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operational problems and other pertinent plant information during the turnover Control Room logs were reviewed and various entries were discussed with operations personne Periodic facility tours were made to assess equipment and plant condi-tions, maintenance and preoperational activities in progress. Schedules for program completion and progress reports were routinely monitore Discussions were held with responsible personnel, as they were available, to determine their knowledge of the preoperational program. The Inspector reviewed numerous operation deviation reports to determine if requirements were met in the areas of documentation, action to resolve, justification, corrective action and approval Specific inspections conducted are listed below: Preoperational Tests (1) Test Witnessing (70312)
The inspector witnessed selected portions of the following preoperational test procedures as they were conducted. The inspection included attendance at briefings held by the test supervisor to observe the coordination and general knowledge of the procedure with the test participant Overall crew performance was evaluated during testing. A preliminary review of the test results was compared to the inspector's own observation Problems encountered during performance of the test were verified to be adequately documented, evaluated and dispositioned on a selected basi Procedure NRC Ins Test Title Activity Observed N N BG-01,R-0 70433 CVCS Preop Preop Of Charging Isolation Valve 2HV-8105 2-3BJ-01,R-0 70434 SI Preop Intermediate Head SI Cold Leg Flow Balance And Pump Run Out Verifica-tion 2-3BJ-03,R-0 70434 SI Preop Accumulator No. 2 Dump L/0
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4 Readiness Review Module 4 Inspection The following topics are discussed Introduction Review of Commitments Engineering and Design Review Safety-Related System Piping Insulation Review Safety-Related Equipment Installation Review Safety-Related Valve Installation Review Conclusions Introduction This inspection report documents Region II inspection activities relative to the evaluation of Georgia Power Company's (GPC's)
Readiness Review Module 4, Mechanical Equipment and Piping. The scope of GPC's Module 4 encompassed the design, procurement, and construction activities regarding safety-related mechanical equipment and piping systems classified as American Scciety of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Class I, 2, and 3, which are included in Unit 2 piping systems and are not a part of the nuclear steam supply syste Readiness review Module 4 is one in a series of modules being conducted by GPC that provide an evaluation of the design, construc-tion and preoperation testing of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 2 to assure its operational readiness in accordance with scheduled plans for obtaining an operating license. Module 4 is intended to describe the method GPC complied with the project commitments found in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and is not intended to make further commitments or revise in any way, prior commitment The inspection was conducted to aid in determining whether Module 4 provided an acceptable basis for it's reported conclusion - that adequate controls exist to ensure the quality of work and the implementation of FSAR commitments within the scope of mechanical equipment and piping for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP)
Unit 2. The inspection report contains a description of the inspector's activities and finding Review of Commitments This section of the module defines commitments as project obligations      y to regulatory guides, industry standards, branch technical positions, and other licensing requirements, to the extent defined in the FSA This section also identifies the source of the commitments to be l
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restricted to the FSAR and responses to NRC questions associated with the FSA As defined, commitments which were considered by the licensee to be most appropriately categorized in this module were tabulated in a commitment matrix identified in section 3.2 of the modul The licensee identified 248 commitments as being most ,
appropriately categorized in this modul '
This section of the module also defines an implementing document as a !
working level document, either program control or test procedure, that fulfills a construction commitment applicable to a specific ,
activity. Implementing documents were identified for each of the 248 .
commitments and this information was tabulated in an implementation matrix identified in section 3.2 of the modul The evaluation of this section consisted of reviewing the commitment and implementation matrices delineated in section 3.2 as discussed belo (1) Evaluation of The Commitment and Implementation Matrix
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Commitments applicable to the Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) system were selected and reviewed to determine that:
1) All project commitments detailed in licensing documents for ,
the NSCW system had been properly identified, 2) Licensing ;
commitments had been recognized and were addressed in primary design / construction documents and whether responses to those ;
commitments have been included in the appropriate working level documents, and 3) Whether the commitment and implementation matrices are accurate and demonstrate proper implementation of -
licensing commitments. The following commitments were reviewed ,
for the above noted attributes:
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Re FSAR  Document / Design /Cons No Source Subject Feature Implementation 683.00 1.9.2.7,2 Ultimate RG 1.27 DC 1202-A- Heat Sink 1743.00 3. PIP'C Sy CFR 50, DC 2415- Penetrating AP Cnm .00 3.2.2-1 NSCW Sy NSCW PIP'G DC 1202-3.1E Design & VLU's Outside Cnm ASME III CL3 4917.00 3.2.2-1 NSCW Sy NSCW DC 1202-3.1E Design PIP's & VLU'S Ir. side Cnm ASME III CL2
 
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Re FSAR  Document / Design /Cons No Source Subject Feature Implementation
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1778.00 3.8. Pipe ASME III, X4AQ10-4.1A  :
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Attached CL2 To Cnm !
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Wall Sleeves
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1782.00 3.8. Testing Of ASME III, X4AQ10- CL2 Pipe NC-6000 Assemblies 5026.00 3.9.B.1. Weld Insp ASME III X4AZ01-P3.3. Accept '77 Edition PPP IX-3- ,
Criteria Thru Winter PPP IX-18 Addenda '77
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5349.00 3.9. ASME III CL2 & 3 DC 1017-2,1 1  CL 1,2 & 3 PIPG NC & NO Components '74 Edition Thru Summer
    '75 Addena Re FSAR  Document / Design /Cons No Source Subject Feature Implementation 4913.00 9.2.1-1 NSCW Sy Max. Heat X4C1202V18 Design Load During Accident Conditions 34 Million  ;
BTV/ Hour  '
4914.00 9.2.1-1 NSCW Sy Min. NSCW X4C1202V03 Design From Per Train During Accident Conditions 15,733 GPM
, 384.00 9.2.1-3 NSCW Equi NSCW Pumps DC 1010-T1 Design ASME III,  ,
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Re FSAR  Document / Design /Const. '
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No  Source  Subject Feature Implementation
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3525.00 9.2.1.1.1-C  NSCW Sy Seismic DC 1202-3.1E Safety Cat, 1 Design Basis 3749.00 9.2.1.1.1-G  NSCW Sy Designed To DC 1202-3.1A Safety Perform  ,
I Basis Function Following  '
L.O. Automatically, Assuming
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Single Failure Loincident  ;
With a L,0. .00 9.2.1.1.1-H  NSCW Sy NSCW Designe( DC 1202-3.1P ,
Safety To Prevent  '
Oesign Boiling Basis Cnmt. Coolers During L.O. .00 9.2.1.1.1-I  N S C\,' Sy s . Sys. Pressure DC 1202-3.1H Safety Greater Than Design Cnmt. Bld !      Basis Max. Design Pressure  i 4915.00 9.2.1. NSCW Sy NSCW Pres DC 1202-3.1H !
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Ope Higher Than X4C1202V15 Fluid In Cooled 1        Safety-  ;
Related Component 400.00 9. UHS RG 1.27 DC 1202-A- l
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401.00 9.2. UHS Seismic DC 1202-A-3.1A Towers & Cat. 1  l Basin Design  l
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Sincerely, ORIGINAL S!GNED Sy VIRGlL L BROWNLEE Virgil L. Brownlee, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects cc: P. D. Rice, Vice President, Project Director C. W. Hayes, Vogtl e Quality Assurance Manager G. Bockhold, Jr., General Manager, Nuclear Operations L. Gucwa, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing J. A. Bailey, Project Licensing Manager B. W. Churchill, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge D. Kirkland, III, Counsel, Office of the Consumer's Utility Council D. Feig, Georgians Against Nuclear Energy bcc: (See page 2)
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8806200191 880601 gDR ADOCK 05000425 DCD
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Re FSAR  Document / Design /Cons No Source Subject Feature Implementhtion
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3755.00 9.2.5.1. UHS Single DC 1202-A-3.1C 3542.00  Safety Failure Design With Basis L.0. .00 9.2.5.1. UHS RG 1.27 DC 1202-A-1.0A Safety Design  i Basis 3541.00 9.2.5. UHS Fan Motors DC 1202-A-3.1B Component Powered by Description Class 1E 402.00 9.2.5. UHS BTP ASB 9-2 DC 1202-A- Performance  ;
403.00 9.2.5. UHS RG 1.27 DC 1202-A- Performance 4777.00 9.2.5. UHS BTP RSB 5-1 DC 1202-A-3.1C '
Performance ASME III,
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4221.00 NRC QUE NSCW Sy DC 1010-T1
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0210.11 Cooling CL3 Water Supply &
Return Piping For Pump Motor Coolers During the review of the implementation of the above noted commitments, the inspectors had the following comments:
COMMITMENT NO. 3750.00 & 4912.00 Commitment No. 3750.00 states that "the NSCW system is to be
' designed such that system pressure is greater than containment building maximum design pressure." The design implementation for this commitment is referenced as Leing contained in DC 1202-3.H. However, the inspector could not verify this to be i the case. Therefore, the following question was raised to the licensee: What are the first and second order implementation documeris for the subject commitment?
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The licensee's response was a follows: It has been assumed that the "Interfacing Heat Transfer Systems" referred to in DC 1202-3.1H included the containment building air coolers, and that the NSCW system serving them would be designed with a  !
higher pressure than the containment atmospher Upon further investigation, it has been discovered that the "Interfacing Heat Transfer Systems actually refer to the Component Cooling Water (CCW) and Auxiliary Component Cooling Water (ACCW) System '
Currently, there is no first order implementation of commitment 3750 in DC 1202. To correct this, design engineering will issue Design Manual Change Notice No. 1202-6 which will add paragraph 3.1R to address a commitment requirement that the NSCW system pressure be greater that the maximum calculated containment  !
atmosphere pressure following a LOCA. FSAR Change Notice No. 559, filed on February 27, 1987, makes the change in paragraph 9.2.1.1.1-1 from "Maximum Design Pressure" to maximum  ,
calculated pressure. This change notice will be reflected in FSAR Amendment 35. The licensee issued DMCN 1202-6 on March 8, 1988, therefore, this item is considered to be close Regarding the second order implementation, the licensee informed the inspector that it was contained in two design calculations:
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X4C120?V21, Rev. 2 Verification Of No Boiling In Containment Coolers and X4C1202V43, Rev. O NSCW Flow Balance. After  t
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further discussions with the licensee on this matter, the 4 licensee informed the inspector that calculations X4C1202V21, X4C1202S19, and X4C1202V09 were originally applicable to both Units 1 and 2. Due to later developments, it was decided to
: recalculate the pressure drops across the restricting orifices to balance the flows in the Unit 2 NSCW syste Therefore, calculation X4C1202V43 was prepared to apply to Unit 2 onl Revision 1 to this calculation was issued on March 2, 1988, and covers train "B" of the NSCW system. Revision 2 is currently in
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preparation and will cover train "A".   !
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The inspector questioned the method utilized by the licensee for determining which unit a calculation was applicable to? The licensee stated that the Calculation Control Log (CCL) was the
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I document for determining unit applicability of a c31culatio The inspector noted that the current Calculation Control Log (CCL) reflected that calculations X4C1202V21, X4C1202519, and  ,
X4C1202V09 as being applicable to both units. The inspector  [
raised the concern relative to correctness of the Calculation  <
Control Log. Also, the inspector questioned the appropriateness  [
of using this method of documenting unit applicability versus  ;
specifying the unit applicability in the calculation so as to  <
provide a positive reans for documenting engineering review and  (
sign off of the calculation for Unit II applicabilit r
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t The licensee confirmed that when calculation X41202V43 was    :
issued for Unit II, the common calculations (X4C1202V21, X41202519, and X4C1202V09) were not changed to Unit 1 on the CCL and remained as common. Furthermore, the licensee conducted a
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review of all mechanical calculations to determine the extent of the problem. This inspection revealed 4 additional calculations with incorrect designators. Therefore, a total of seven out of    r eleven-hundred-forty six mechanical  calculations had the incorrect unit designator on the CC Based on the above finding, the licensee has committed to re-review all calcula-    :
tions and insert a cover sheet which will specify the applicable    '
unit designator and will be initialed and dated by the respon-    ;
sible engineer and engineering group supervisor. The inspector
,       inforn:ed the licensee that, pending the completion of the above noted corrective action this matter will be identified as Inspector Follow Item 50-425/88-12-02  "Followup Licensee's Corrective Action Relative To The Identification Of Unit Applicability For Calculations."
 
Calculation X4C1202V43 was identified by the licensee as the working level document for implementing commitment numbers 3750.00, "NSCW system shall be designed such that system    ,
pressure is greater that containment building maximum calculated pressure" and 4912.00 "NSCW system shall be designed to prevent boiling in containment coolers during LOCA conditions". The inspector reviewed the calculation and determined that the design did incorporate the subject commitments. However, ths
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objective section of the calculation did not reflect these commitments as objectives therefore the calculation did not    !
contain any conclusions relative te these design objective ,
The licensee committed to include these commitments as    !
objectives and state conclusions relative to these design objectives when Revision 2 of the subject calculation is issue .
The inspector informed the licensee that, pending the issuance i      of the revised calculation, this matter will be identified as Inspector Followup Item 50 425/8S-12-03 "Review Revised    '
Calculation X4C1202V43 Regarding Design Objectives And Conclusions."      .
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During the review of FSAR sections 2.4.11, 9.2.1, and 9.2.5 the inspector questioned why was the following sentence in FSAR
 
9. 2.1.1.1-J not considered a licensing commitment? "The NSCW
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System Is Designed To Minimize The Ef fects Of Water Hammer Fo rc e s" .
The licensee's response was as follows: This sentence was apparently taken in context with the seventh paragraph of FSAR    :
9.2.1.2.3 on page 9.2.1-4 in which the features of the NSCW 4      system that minimize the effects of water hammer are describe :
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In as much as'these features appeared to implement the apparent commitment in paragraph 9.2.1.1.1-J, it was interpreted as a descriptive- statement when taken together with paragraph 9.2.1.2.3, and thus was . not considered a ' licensing commitmen The inspector considers the licensee's response to be a.cceptable and thus has no further questions'on this matte . COMMITMENT NO. 4913.00 Calculation X4C1202V18 NSCW/C0PATTA 11 Input Data /LOCA 1-Train" was reviewed to determine the adequacy of the implementation of FSAR commitment for a' maximum total NSCW heat. load of 34 million BTV/HR during accident conditions given in FSAR table 9.2.1-1. This commitment.was tracked by GPC asl readiness review commitment Reference no. 4913.00. Results of all cases. studied in this calculation to determine total' NSCW heat load were higher than the values given in FSAR Table 9.2.1-1. GPC has initiated FSAR Change Notice 559 to update the table.and will include the revised heat load values in FSAR Amendment 35. The inspector also noted that the description of one of the cases-(case 3C) dealing with fouling factors in heat exchanger tubes was misleadin The licensee committed to correct this discrepancy in the next revision ~ of the calculatio The inspector informed the licensee that, pending the issuance of the revised calculation, this. matter will be identified as
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Inspector Followup Item 50-425/88-12-04 "Review Revised Calculation X4C1202V18 Regarding Case 3c Description."
 
COMMITMENT NO. 4914.00 NSCW calculation X4C1202V03 "Verification Of NSCW Constant Heat Loads And Flows" was reviewed to determine the adequacy of the implementation of FSAR commitment- for a minimum NSCW flow of
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15,733 GPM per train during accident conditions given in Table i
9.2.1-1. This commitment was tracked by readiness review commitment reference no. 4914.00.
 
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This calculation was performed to compile the latest available constant heat load and maximum required cooling water flow rate for all equipment cooled by the NSCW system, as well as the component pressure drops.
 
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The inspector reviewed the calculation and noted that the data used was based upon the latest vendor data as of February 27, 1985, In particular, the number for the heat load per train of
. the standby diesel generator coolers was different than the number in the FSAR Table 9.2.1-1. The vendor number was 17.1 x 10 to the 6 BTV/HR. Since the FSAR had not been updated, the inspector qtestioned what was being used as the design basis of the plan ..
 
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The licensee provided a copy' of a FSAR Change Notice No. 631, which identified in January 1988, that the FSAR update was needed. A meeting was conducted on March 9, 1988 with the cognizant personnel concerning calculation reviews, FSAR
  . changes, and licensing personnel to discuss this ite The licensee provided project instructions which required calcula-tions be reviewed for possible FSAR changes. This resolved the programmatic. concern of updating the FSAR. The ' licensee provided a copy of a temporary exemption request from 10 CFR 50.71(e), FSAR annual update, dated January 15, 1988, to the inspector. The licensee is required to update the original FSAR within 24 months of the date of the issuance of the operating licensee. Unit 1 received its low power operating licensee on January 16, 1987, and the updated FSAR is due January 16, 198 .
The exemption would defer the submittal of the updated FSAR for units one and two until 12 months after the licensee for unit two expected in February 1989. The particular concern of the standby diesel generator coolers heat load would be incorporated in the update as requested by the exemptio (2) Evaluation of Commitment Additions / Changes From Unit 1 To Unit 2 The Commitment matrix identified 13 commitments as changes from those presented in the Unit 1 Module. Of these, seven were not included in the Unit report, but were subsequently added by an FSAR amendment and the remaining six were subsequently changed by various FSAR amendment The inspectors conducted a review of the added commitments to verify proper implementation by a working level document and the commitments which were revised were reviewed to evaluate the significance of the chang The inspectors reviewed the following commitments which were not included in the Unit I report, but were subsequently added by FSAR amendments as noted below:
Re FSAR  FSAR Design /Cons No Source Subject Amend Implementation 5107 3.6.2.1.1.B.4 No Welded 30 DC 1018-3.3.B.3
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Pipe Dia Of Highest Stress location On MS & tiFW Systems
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Re FSAR  FSAR Des'ign/Cons No Source Subject Amend . Implementation
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5108 3.6.2.1.'1. No Welded 30 DC 1018-3.3. Attac d. Within 3X
    .SQ.RT. Of
  -  Highest Stress Location On High Energy Sys. Other Than MS & MFW 5026 3.9.1. Weld Insp X4AZ01-P.3. Criteria PPP IX-3. ASME Code PPP IX-18 5027 3.9.B. Weld Irisp X4AZOI-P4.3. Criteria PPP IX-15-14 B31.1 Code PPP IX-18 5346 3.9. ASME III, 34 DC 1017- CL I PIP'G Design Per Sub NB '77 Edition Thru Summer '79 Addenda 5349 3.9. ASME III, 34 DC 1017- CL II & III PIP'G Design Per Sub.
 
l    NC & NO '74
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Edition Thru
!    Summer '75 l    Addenda 5091 3.11. BTP MSB 3-1 25 DC 1018 - 3.3.B.6 L    Designed To Break Exclusion Criteria MS i
PIP'G Thru Cnmt.
 
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The i nspectors reviewed the following commitments which were included in-the Unit I report, but were subsequently changed by various FSAR amendments as noted below:
Re FSAR    FSAR Design /Cons N Source  Subject  Amend Implementation 711  1.9.8 Sumps. For  19 - Adequacy Of CS Pump Emerg. Core  Available NPSH Cooling &  Recalculated To CS Systems  To Address Additional Factors 2295  3.F. Propagation  16 Design Basis Pipe Of Flood  Failure Mode Change Waters From  From A Critical Break In 96"  Crack To A Full CW PIP'G Into  Circumference Break Safety-Related  In The 96" CW PIP'G  -
Structures Precluded By Design      ,
2816  6.3.2. RWST Designed 17  Stipulated A Recir To Seismic  Htr, Is Provided Category 1 &  To Maintain Mi Htr. Provided  Wtr. Tem To Maintain Min. Wtr Temp. Of 50%
4923  9.2.2. Peak Load On  20 Peak Load On CCW CCW Sy Sys. And Time For 1-Train Ope Achieving Cold Is 189 x 10 To  Shutdown Was The 6 BTV/ Hour  Revised Upward Cold Shutdown Achieved In 34 Hours 3535  9.3.3. Testing Of  19 Pressurized Pressurized  Portions Defined Portions Of  As Pump Suction Waste  And Discharge Collection  PIP'G Systems Hydroed To 1 1/2 Times DP r
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Georgia Power Company 2 01 u bec: E. Reis, OGC J. Hopkins, NRR M. Sinkule, RII DRS, Technical Assistant NRC Resident Inspector Document Control Desk State of Georgie
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Re FSAR  FSAR Design /Cons No- Source Subject Amend Implementation
  { cont'd)
3834- 9.3.3. Non Pressured 19 Non-Pressurized Portions Of  Portions Chg'd To
    ' Waste  Equip. &~ Floor Collection  Drn's In Au Hydroed At  Bldg., Control Atm. Pres F.H, Radwaste Solidification, ARB, RW Transfer, And RW Tunnel Transfer Engineering and Design Review (1) Calculation Review A representative sample of NSCW system calculations were reviewed to determine that objectives, assumptions, numbers and conclusions in the calculation were vali The following calculations were reviewed:
Calc. No,/Rev  Subject X4C1202S00F1, Rev. 1 Failure Modes and Effect Analysis -
NSCW X4C1202V03, Rev. 1 Verification Of NSCW Constant Heat Loads and Flows X4C1202V14, Rev. 1 Ultimate Heat Sink Weather Screening X4C1202V15, Rev. 1 NSCW - ACCW - CCW Pressure Differential Verification X4C1202V18, Rev. 3 NSCW/COPATTA - II Input Data /LOCA - 1 Train X4C1202V43, Rev. 1 NSCW Train "B" Flow Balance During the review of calculation No. X4C1202500F1 (Failure Modes And Effect Analysis For The NSCW System) the inspector questioned the correctness of the conclusion reached in the calculation for the method of failure detection and failure effect on system safety function capability evaluation for failure mode item 85b. (NSCW pump P4-001 discharge bypass line
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check valve). Item Nos. 86b, 87b, 88b, 89b, and 90b are also effected. The calculation presently states that if the train
"A" bypass line check valve failed open with train "B" in service that this would be indicated by flow indicators and a low header pressure alarm in the control roo This would result in the starting of the train B standby pum The licensee reviewed the inspector's comment and concurred that the lower flow conditions would not be detected by the flow indicators in the control room since the indicators are in 500 GPM increments and the amount of flow bypassed would be approximately 200 GP In addition, this reduction of flow would not be sufficient to cause the starting of the train "B" standby pump. .However, this condition would be detectable in the control room by the high flow alarm annunciator off of FSH 11776 on the train "A" inter tie line. The licensee committed to revise the calculation to reflect the correct method of
; failure detection and failure effect on system safety function l
capability for items 85b, 86b, 87b, 88b, 89b, 90 The
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inspector informed the licensee that, pending issuance of the i revised calculation, this matter will be identified as Inspector Followup Item 50-425/88-12-05 "Review Revised Calculation X4C1202S00F1 Regarding The Evaluation Of Flow Failure Detection
& Effect On System Safety Function For Items No's. 85b, 86b, 87b, 88b, 89b, & 90b."
 
(2) Review Of Code / Seismic Interfaces A representative sample of Nuclear Safety-Related Systems were selected and reviewed for ASME code and seismic category interfaces. The purpose of this inspection was to verify that the systems were designed to meet seismic category I require-ments to ensure no loss of function during a safe shutdown earthquake. The inspector reviewed the following system design bases and P and ids to determine that appropriate ASME code and seismic interfaces were invoke Document N Title DC-1203-6  CCW System Design Bases 2X4DB136,R-13  CCW System P & ID 2X4DB137,R-14  Trains A & B DC-1202-5  WSCW System Design Bases 2X4DB133-1,R-21 NSCW System P & ID 2X40B134,R-18  Train A 2X4DB135,1,R-18 I
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DC-1302-5  AFW System Design Basis 2X408161-1,R-19 AFW System P & ID 2X4DB161-2,R-18 Trains A & B As a result of the above inspection, the inspectors raised the following comments:
NSCW SYSTEM REVIEW NSCW drain valve 2-1202-U4-129 off of the RHR pump motor. cooler shown on P and ID 2X4DB134 reflects incorrect code / seismic brea The inspector confirmed that isometric drawing 2K3-1202-155-01- which reflects the as-installed condition s correct. The licensee informed the inspector that this item was a result of.a drafting error during incorporation of a DCN on to the P and 10. Isometric /P and ID reconciliation discovered this drain missing from the P and ID and a DCN was issued against 2X4DB134 on December 22, 198 When it was incorporated in April 1987 a draf ting error was made switching the code / seismic break exactly opposite of the isometric drawing. The licensee considers this to be an isolated case, and to ensure that this is the case, the licensee - conducted a review of ten safety related P and ids relative to the incorporation of 200 DCNs/
FERs No additional incorporation errors were identified during this revie The licensee issued DCN No. 57 to P and ID 2X408134 to correct the identified discrepancy on March 28,
 
198 The inspector finds the licensee's response to be acceptable, therefore this item is considered to be close Also, during the above inspection, the inspector noted that P and ids in general don't reflect code / seismic breaks location for all vent, drain, and test connection piping. The licensee acknowledged this and issued DCN No.12 to P and 10 2X408101 which added a note to specify code / seismic locations for the type of corrections noted abov The inspector finds this action taken by the licensee to be acceptable, therefore, this item is considered to be close Safety - Related System Piping Installation Review (1) System Walkdown Inspection i Selected portions of the Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW)
System Containment Spray (CS) System and High Head Safety l
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Injection System, were walked dow The constructed piping systems were compared to the piping and instrumentation diagrams and the fabrication isometric drawing Examples of items checked were piping configuration, pipe class, weld location, valve location and appearance, orientation, labeling, piping support location, and engagement of threaded fastener (a) NSCW System Walkdown Train "A" of the NSCW piping system was walked down in the NSCW tower and pump house, connecting tunnel to the auxiliary building, auxiliary building, connecting tunnel to the diesel generating building, diesel generator building, and east of the U-II construction barrier on level 3 of the control building. The inspectors conducted the walkdown inspection with the piping and instrumentation diagram and fabrication isometric drawings to verify that the system was constructed as shown on the current approved revision and in accordance with the piping and instrumen-tation construction specification X4AZ01. The piping runs inspected were designed and constructed to ASME boiler and pressure vessel code (B and PVC), Section III Class III and seismic Category 1 requirements. The following drawings were used in the walkdow P&ID/ ISO /Re Title 2X4DB133-1,R-21 P&ID NSCW System - Train "A" 2X4DB134,R-18 P&ID NSCW System - Train "A" 2X408135-1,R-18 P&ID NSCW System - Train "A" 2K5-1202-023-01,R-7 FAB. ISO - NSCW Supply Header 2K5-1202-031-01,R-7 FAB. ISO - NSCW Supply Header 2K5-1202-033-01,R-7 FAB. ISO - NSCW Supply Header 2K5-1202-004-02,R-8 FAB. ISO - NSCW Supply Header 2K5-1202-004-01,R-6 FAB. ISO - NSCW Supply Header 2K3-1202-004-05,R-4 FAB. ISO - NSCW Supply Header 2K3-1202-037-01,R-7 FAB. ISO - NSCW Supply Header 2K3-1202-181-02,R-5 FAB. ISO - NSCW Supply Header 2K3-1202-408-01,R-4 FAB. ISO - NSCW Supply Header 2K5-1202-181-012,R-6 FAB. ISO - NSCW Return Header 2K5-1202-037-01,R-5 FAB. 150 - NSCW Supply To DG 1-A 2K5-1202-037-02,R-6 FAB. ISO - NSCW Supply To DG 1-A 2K5-1202-037-03,R-3 FAB. ISO - NSCW Supply To DG 1-A 2K5-1202-035-03,R-3 FAB. ISO - NSCW Return From DG 1-A 2K5-1202-035-01,R-5 FAB. 150 - NSCW Return From OG 1-A 2K2-1202-104-02,R-9 FAB. ISO - NSCW To ESF Chiller 2K2-1202-104-03,R-11 FAB. ISO - NSCW To ESF Chiller 2K2-1202-134-03,R-13 FAB. 150 - NSCW From ESF Chiller 2K2-1202-134-02,R-6 FAB. ISO - NSCW From ESF Chiller b
 
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  .19 In general for. the items reviewed, the piping was found installed in accordance with the drawings. One question was raised for a support location on drawing 2K5-1202-033-0 The drawing showed a support .at N0DE NO. 241 -
location between the discharge of the NSCW pump and the pump house wall. However, the support was actually located outside the pump house on the other side of the pump house wall. The licensee stated that the node points on the isometric drawing do not reflect the support location but rather the pipe support drawings which are referenced show the as-installed locatio The licensee confirmed that pipe support drawing (V2-1202-023-H004) which was referenced for node point 241 reflected the as-installed condition of the hange Therefore, this question was resolve (b) Containment Spray System Walkdown Train "B" of the Containment Spray System was walked down in the auxiliary building, fuel handling building, and containment buildin The inspectors conducted the walkdown inspection with the piping and instrumentation diagram and the fabrication isometric drawings to verify that the system was constructed as shown on the current approved revision and in accordance with the piping and instrumentation construction specification X4AZ0 The piping runs inspected were designed and constructed to ASME B and PVC, Section III Class II requirement The following drawings were used in the walkdow P&ID/ ISO /Re Title 2X4DB131,R-14 P&ID CS System - Train "B" 2K3-1206-019-01,R-6 FAB. ISO. - Spray Additive TK Piping 2K3-1206-019-03,R-7 FAB. 150 - Spray Additive TK Piping 2K3-1206-037-01,R-4 FAB. 150 - Spray Additive TK Piping 2K3-1206-048-01,R-8 FAB. ISO - Spray Additive TK Piping 2K3-1206-002-01,R-14 FAB. ISO - CS Suction Piping r
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2K7-1206-002-01,R-11 FAB. ISO - CS Suction Piping 2K3-1206-002-02,R-5 FAB. ISO - CS Suction Piping 2K3-1206-002-02,R-10 FAB.150 - CS Suction Piping 2K3-1206-006-02,R-10 FAB. ISO - CS Discharge Piping 2K3-1206-006-03,R-5 FAB. ISO - CS Discharge Piping 2K3-1206-006-04,R-5 FAB. ISO - CS Discharge Piping 2K7-1206-006-01,R-5 FAB. ISO - CS Discharge Piping 2K4-1206-008-10,R-4 FAB. ISO - CS Discharge Piping The piping system was found installed per the applicable drawings for those items checked.
 
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  (c) High Head Safety Injection System Walkdown This inspection consisted of a .walkdown on the train "A" centrifugal charging suction piping from the RWST and the discharge piping thru the SI discharge valves and-into the four reactor coolant loops. The inspectors conducted _the walkdown inspection with the piping and ir.strumentation diagram to verify that the system was constructed as shown on the current, approved revision and in accordance with the piping and instrumentation. construction specification X4AZ0 The piping runs inspected were designed and constructed to ASME B & PVC, Section III Class I and II and seismic category 1 requirements. The following drawings were used in the walkdow P&ID/ ISO /Re Title 2X4DB116-2,R-15 Chemical & Volume Control System DCN 35 & FCR MFCRB-8751F 2X4DB119,R-15 Safety Injection System 2X4DB121,R-17 Safety Injection System DCN 79, FCR's 17,860,MFCRB 17,741 During the walkdown, the inspector noted that P and 10 2X4DB119 did not reflect the correct installation of the vent valves on the loop 4 cold leg injection line. The P and ids reflected that the vent valves were installed inside the shield wall. However, the actual installation as shown on isometric drawing 2K4-1204-077-02,R-4, was outside the shield wall. The licensee has reconciled the P and ID to reflect the correct installation in accordance with the isometric drawing by issuing DCN 29 to P and ID 2X408111 and DCN 34 to P and ID 2X4DB11 The inspector considers this item to be satisfactory resolved.
 
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In addition to the above noted discrepancy, the inspector identified that flow elements (FE's) - 0924,0926, and 0927 were installed backwards. . These flow elements are located downstream of the SI discharge valves in the SI injection lines to the reactor coolant system cold legs for loops 1, 3, and 4 respectfull Several meetings were held with the licensee to discuss the above NRC finding as well as an NRC concern about the possibility for the performance of a preoperational flow
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balance test with FEs/ fos installed backwards since there is no prerequisite in .preops for test supervisors to check / verify the proper installation of FEs and F0 As a result of the above finding, the -licensee took appropriate corrective action consisting of but not limited to the following: 1) A walkdown of all FEs/F0s was conducted which identified an additional 17 installed backwards out of a total of 248. 2) PCN #7 was issued to Pullman Power Products procedure IX-5 to specify installa-tion instructions and to require QC verification of orifice plate orientation in relation to flo ) Training was -
conducted of craft personnel .on how to install FE's/F0' ) FE/F0 installations will be limited to trained flush /
hydro personnel and 5) Test supervisors are required to-verify FE/F0 orientation and document it in the test log prior to the performance of a tes The foregoing in considered to be in violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V and will be identified as Violation 50-425/88-12-01 "Failure To Provide Adequate Instructions To Ensure The Proper Installation Of Flow Elements And Orifices."
 
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It should be noted that this item was not inspected by the Readiness Review Staff during the performance of Module No. 4 since it was scoped to be inspected in Module No. 20 Instrumentation and Control The reason being that at the time of performance of Module  .
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No. 4 flow elements and/or orifices were not installe Therefore, it would not have been expected for the
>  Readiness Review Staff to have identified this item during the performance of Module No. (2) Review Of Documentation For Piping Installation (a) NSCW Supply And Return Header Piping To Diesel Generator (DG-1A)
An inspection was conducted of the train "A" NSCW supply and return header piping to DG-1A piping fabrication sheets to verify the following attributes: Proper material type and certification per piping classification, properly documented code data report for NPP-1 for fabricated nuclear piping subassemblies, proper weld history documen-tation, and proper non destructive examination (liquid penetrant) Documentation for ASME III, Class 3 pipin Piping fabrication sheets were reviewed for the following spool number . . _ _ ___ __ __ - _ _ . . _ _.. _ _,_ _ _ _  _ _ _ _
 
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Spool N Fab. Sht. N ~ Description 2-1202-035-S-01 4107 10" Return Header Pipe Assembly 2-1202-035-S-02 4201 10" Return Header Pipe Assembly 2-1202-035-S-03 4202 10" Return Header Pipe Assembly 2-1202-035-S-04 4108 10" Return Header Pipe Assembly 2-1202-035-S-05 4109 10" Return Header Pipe Assembly 2-1202-035-S-06 4110 10" Return Header Pipe Assembly 2-1202-037-S-01 4114 10" Supply Header Pipe '
Assembly
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2-1202-037-S-02 4115 10" Supply Header Pipe Assembly 2-1202-037-5-03 4116 10" Supply Header Pipe Assembly  -
2-1202-037-S-04 4205 10" Supply Header Pipe Assembly 2-1202-037-S-05 4117 10" Supply Header Pipe Assembly 2-1202-037-S-06 4118 10" Supply Header Pipe ,
Assembly
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2-1202-037-S-07 4119 10" Supply Header Pipe Assembly (b) NSCW Tower Header and Distributing Piping Documentation relating to selected portions of the NSCW tower distribution piping supplied by the Marley Cooling Tower Company was reviewed to verify that the piping met the requirements outlined in Construction Specification  ,
No. X4A002 "Specification For Nuclear Service Cooling Towers And Associated Equipment". This specification e
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states that-the design of the cooling tower, equipment, and piping shall be in _ accordance with ASME Section III, Class 3' ~and seismic Category 1 requirements. Specific drawings and documents listed below were used to verify that- the NSCW Train "A" header (2-1202-007-12) and branch arm a ssembly _ (2-1202-007-8) were installed in accordance with these requirement Isometric Orawings 2V5-1202-007-01 - Header 2V5<1202 007-02 - Branch Arm Assembly Weld Process Sheets 007-W-101 - Branch Arm Assembly 8" Butt Weld 007-W-102 - Branch Arm Assembly 8"' Butt Weld Pipe Support Installation Process Sheets V2-1202-T07-H045 - Header Support Assembly Bracket V2-1202-T07-H046 - Header Support Assembly V2-1202-T07-H048 - Branch Arm Saddle Assembly Bolting Verification Field Process Sheet Spool 007-S-04 to Vendor NPP-1 Code Data Reports AP & E S/N 3692 - Header AP & E S/N 2903 - Branch Arm Assembly AP & E S/N 2932 - Branch Arm Assembly Supplier Quality Verification Documentation Lists Equipment Tag # 2-1202-W4-001 Distribution Piping And Supports Equipment Tag # 2-1202-W4-002 Distribution Piping And Supports Documentation Turnover Package 2-1202-P02 Marley Drawings 78-42913 Plan View Of Spray System 78-4717 Spray System Anchorage And Load Points 78-4718 Load Tables For Spray System 79-41025 Spray System Installation 79-41026 Spray System Installation Details 79-41027 Mechanical Equipment Installation 79-41271 Branch Arm Saddle Fabrication And Assembly 79-41285 Header Assembly 79-41425 Header Support Bracket Assembly 81-4882 Specifications Required For NSCW Towers 83-2450 Standard Torque Recommendation For Fasteners
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24 Safety - Related Equipment Installation Review A ' representative sample of installed equipment was inspected to verify that the as installed condition was in accordance with the requirements specified. in the applicable manufacturer drawing and installation manual, layout drawing, and piping and instrumentation drawing. The following attributes were inspected: proper documen-tation of installation on field process sheets (i.e. tightening. or torquing of anchor bolts as required); proper evidence of equipment maintenance and cleanliness during construction and startup; proper equipment tag number and code plate serial number, proper nozzle location, size and elevation; proper drain, vent, and relief connections; proper handling of equipment; and proper code clas The following equipment was selected on the basis of either being cooled by or part of the Nuclear Service Cooling Water System by the inspector and inspected for the above noted attributes:
Equip. N Description Specification N P4-001 NSCW Pump - Train "A" 2X4AF02-33 2-1202-P4-005 NSCW Pump - Train "A" 2X4AF02-33 2-1203-E4-001 CCW Heat Exchanger  2X4AE01-4 2-1217-E4-001 ACCW Heat Exchanger  2X4AE01-50 2-1501-A7-001 CTB Cooling Unit Coils 2X4AJ16-2 2-1501-A7-005 CTB Cooling Unit Coils 2X4AJ16-2 2-1511-E7-002 Reactor Cavity Cooling Unit Coils 2X4AJ16-4 2-1515-A7-001 Containment Aux. Cooling Unit 2X4AJ16-3 2-1592-C7-001 ESF Chiller  2X4AJ04-11 Safety - Related Valve Installation Review A Representative sample of installed valves were inspected to verify that the as installed condition was in accordance with the require-ments specified in the applicable piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, and instrumentation index or valve designation list. The following attributes were inspected: proper valve orientation and flow direction; proper valve sizing and type;
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proper piping class (i.e. code class, pressure rating, material type, and end connection type); proper tag and serial number; proper piping of instrument air to air operated valves to ensure that valve will
 
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fail to the safe position on loss of air pressure; and proper operator sizing to ensure closure against maximum operational differential pressure conditions. The following valves were randomly selected by the inspector and inspected for the above noted l attributes:
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Valve N Description Drawing N Size / Type 2HV-780 Reac Cav & 2X4AR01-375- 10" Air Oper. Gate Cnmt Sump HDR ISO-HV-2791A- Hydrogen Monitor 2X5AC07-109 3/4" Solenoid
      . ISO Operated Globe 2HV-8030 PRT Fill ISO 2X6AA06-255 3" Air Operated Diaphragm 2HV-8149C LTDN Orifice ISO 2X6AA06-341 3" Air Operated Control 2HV-8160 CVCS LTON ISO 2X6AA06-428 3" Air Operated Globe 2HV-8986A RHR Cnmt 2X5AC07-153 1"' Solenoid Sump Pass  Operated Sample Train "A" 2HV-10466 RHR Train "B" 2X5AC07-107 3/4" Solenoid Suct Line Vent  Operated Globe 2HV-15214 CVCS Ltdn ISO 2X5AC01-291 3" Air Operated Control
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2-1204-U6-003 SI RWST 2X6AA06-250 3" Globe Purif. Pump Disch o RWST ISO 2-1204-U6-128 SI RHR To 2X6AA06-389 8" Swing Check HL Loop 1  ,
2-1204-U4-142 SI To C1 2X5AG08-58 2" Needle Loop 4
 
2-1205-U6-001 RHR Train "A" 2X6AA06-400 12" Swing Check Suct From RWST
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2-1205-U4-123 RHR Train "B" 2X6ARol-457 14" Check <
Suct From Cnmt Sump i
2-1206-U6-017 CS Train "A" 2X6AA06-391 8" Gate HDR ISO
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Valve N Description  Drawing N Size / Type-(cont'd)      i 2-1206-U6-018 CS Train "B"  2X6AA06-391 8" Gate
;,  HDR ISO 2-1208-U4-417 - CVCS Seal INJ  2X5AC08-50 1" Needle
  - To RCP #4 2-1901-U4-039 WPSL _CDT HX  2X4AR01-355 3" Swing Check Outlet HDR Conclusions      i The inspectors have concluded based on a review on a representative sample of the commitments designated in section 3.2 of module 4 that the licensee has accurately defined licensing commitments from the FSAR, responses to inspection and enforcement bulletins, and correspondence to the NR In addition, the licensee has accurately defined the working level implementing document utilized by site personnel to ensure that these commitments (within the scope of  r module 4) are invoked during the design and construction phas ,
Furthermore, based on independent NRC inspections of randomly selected mechanical equipment, and piping systems, the inspectors have concluded that the hardware inspected was installed per licensing commitments in accordance with Regulatory requirement Therefore, it is recommended that'this module be accepted by the NR ,
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Latest revision as of 20:11, 9 December 2021

Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-425/88-12
ML20155H103
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 06/01/1988
From: Brownlee V
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: Mcdonald R
GEORGIA POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 8806200191
Download: ML20155H103 (2)
v • d • e


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JUN 0 1 1308 Georgia Power Company ATTN: Mr. R. P. Mcdonald Executive Vice President -

Nuclear Operations P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 I Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-425/88-12 Thank you for your response of May 19, 1988, to our Notice of Violation issued on April 26, 1988, concerning activities conaucted at your Vogtle facility. We have evaluated your response and found that it meets the requirements of 10 CFR 2.201. We will examine the implementation of your corrective actions during future inspection We appreciate your cooperation in this matter.

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Sincerely, ORIGINAL S!GNED Sy VIRGlL L BROWNLEE Virgil L. Brownlee, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects cc: P. D. Rice, Vice President, Project Director C. W. Hayes, Vogtl e Quality Assurance Manager G. Bockhold, Jr., General Manager, Nuclear Operations L. Gucwa, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing J. A. Bailey, Project Licensing Manager B. W. Churchill, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge D. Kirkland, III, Counsel, Office of the Consumer's Utility Council D. Feig, Georgians Against Nuclear Energy bcc: (See page 2)

8806200191 880601 gDR ADOCK 05000425 DCD

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Georgia Power Company 2 01 u bec: E. Reis, OGC J. Hopkins, NRR M. Sinkule, RII DRS, Technical Assistant NRC Resident Inspector Document Control Desk State of Georgie

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RII RII RII RII ( C/ 'CPatterson:lb ( .MSinkule VLBr niee L s 06/r /88 06// /88 06/l /88 0 8

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