ML20246H647
| ML20246H647 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1989 |
| From: | Stohr J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Hairston W GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8909010325 | |
| Download: ML20246H647 (14) | |
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cDocket Nos. 50-424,150-425-l p LLicensee Nos. NPF-68, NPF-81
. Georgia Power _ Company ATTN: Mr. W.-G. Hairston, III'
_ Senior Vice President -
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- Nuclear Operations PMO.' Box.1295-Birmingham,_'AL1 35201
~ Gentlemen:
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SUBJECT:
. MEETING
SUMMARY
- V0GTLE UNITS 1 AND 2 This refers to the meeting conducted at our request in the Region"Il office on August 4, 1989.' The meeting concerned your efforts to identify and correct the-root cause.~of recurring = problems that have resulted in' repeat: violations of x
- security program _. requirements.
A list of attendees: and a copy of your presentation are enclosed, h
-It is our opinion,that the openness an'd_ candor displayed during this meeting -
made it beneficial for both GPC and NRC.
As emphasized in the. meeting, your plans' and efforts.toward improving.the effectiveness of the security: program at1 Plant Vogtle should be pursued expeditiously to ensure achievement. of
_ program standards and performance goals.
We will_ evaluate the results of your improvement efforts during future inspections.
'In accordance; with Section. 2.790 of the NRC's. " Rule of. Practice," Part:2,
~
- Title'10, Code.of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures
- will be placed in the_NRC public Document Room.
Should you.have any questions concerning this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them.
Sincerely, ORIGINAL SIGNED BY WlLUAM E. CUNE d
'. Philip Stohr, Director Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
Enclosures:
(See page 2) yIof L
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Enclosures:
'1.
List of~ Attendees
- 2. ' License Presentation (Handout)
'cc w/encls:
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R. P Mcdonald, Executive Vice-President-Nuclear Operations
.C. K. McCoy, Vice President -
l Nuclear G.'R. Fredrick, Quel 'y Assurance Site Manrmr -
' G. Bockhold, Jr.', General Manager Nuclear Operations J. A. Bailey, Manager-Licensing bec w/encls:
. Document Control Desk NRC Resident. Inspector.
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RI .ATillman:Jc ...uui re AHerdt 08/4f/89 08g/89 08/gg/89 __.- m.- ._mm__m._.
I.,S.".,. Georgia Power Company -2 AUG 811989
Enclosures:
1. List of Attendees 2. License Presentation (Handout) cc w/encls: R. P. Mcdonald, Executive Vice President-Nuclear Operations C. K. McCoy, Vice President - Nuclear G. R. Fredrick, Quality Assurance Site Manager G. Bockhold, Jr., General Manager Nuclear Operations J. A. Bailey, Manager-Licensing bec.w/encls: Document Control Desk NRC Resident Inspector i RII 9S - RI 9 ATiliman:jc 1.Juire AHerdt 08/,(i/89 08/y]/89 08/,jg/89
hjf ,x Enclosure'1 Meeting Attendance August 4, 1989 Georgia Power Company 1 l C..J. McCoy, Vice President - Nuclear G. Bockhold,' General Manager l A. L. Mosbaugh,' Acting Assistant General Manager C. Stinespring, Administrative Manager C. J. Kitchens,. Security Manager Nuclear Regulatory Commission B. K. Grimmes, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator, Region II (RII) D. M. Collins, Acting Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards (DRSS),RII. C. W.' Hehl=, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP),RII ' A. R.- Herdt, Chief, Reactor Trojects Branch 3, DRP. RII D. R. McGuire, Chief, Phys cal ' Security Section,. DRSS, RII J. Hopkins, Project Manager, Directorate 11-3, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation R. J. Goddard, Regional Counsel, RII A. Tillaan, Physical Security Inspector, DRSS RII D. Thompson, Physical Security Inspector, DRSS RII
ENCLOSURE 2 . a;. NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING SECURITY PLANT V0GTLE AUGUST 4, 1989 CONTENTS NRC VIOLATIONS o UNIT 2 VITAL AREA BREACH o SECURITY C(MPUTER LEVEL 1 OPERATION o ACCESS CONTROL VIOLATIONS EXAWLES 1. UNSECURED VITAL DOOR EVENTS 2. FAILURE TO DEACTIVATE BADGES (2-6-89), (5-I6-89) 3. FAILURE TO CONTROL ACAD 4. POSTING OF CONTAINMENT PERSONNEL HATCH SECURITY STATUS UPDATE o DEPARTMENT o SAFEGUARDS DOCUMENTS o SYSTEN L-______-___-__
U G A .UA . L .U L J 8 U J NU N 8 U S J S J E E H H C C A A Y E ?A E Y 8 A R N R N B B Y Y T7 T9 I 0 R 8 P I8 R R9 A R9 8 P 1 A O 1 U C C E E S S R 1 2 b R M 2 8 A N T T I I N N U U B AE B 2 d 7F 3 F F N N
- A J
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SAS LEVEL 1 VIOLATION March 26,19k@%h Event Unit 1 SAS in Level 1 mode with lone operator present Root Cause Inadequate Training / Key Control Corrective Actions Enhanced Alam Station Training. The CAS/SAS mode key is maintained in a locked repository. Additional Actions Taken Enhanced procedural guidance to ensure Plan comitments were met while operating in Level 1 mode. Event Unit 1 & 2 January 6, 1989 SAS in Level 1 mode with two operators present One of the two operators departed SAS for approximately two (2) minutes (1159 a.m. to 1201 p.m.). The. operator knew better. He had been trained but he marie a mistake. Root Cause Personnel error Corrective Actions Disciplinary action against operator. Considering computer software change to reduce the number of activities perfomed on Level 1. We have also counseled the individual who remained on post l regarding their role in this matter. This is a i dual responsibility. Summary The corrective actions taken as a result of the 1987 event were effective as evidenced by over 20 months of operations without further violations in the area of Level 1 operations. The 1989 event was an isolated event attributable solely to personnel error.
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ACCESS ~ CONTROL PROGRAM EVE.'tT l' - January 17, 1989 QUALITY CONCERN IDENTIFIED Access authorization for 77 terminated contractors were not deleted from the security computer until nine days later (January 25,1989). Procedure revised to clarify ALR responsibilities, termination notice form implemented. EVENT 2 February 6, 1989 LICENSEE IDENTIFIED Access authorizations for 52 personnel (51 contractors and 1 GPC) termi-nated on February 2,1989 had not been deleted from the security com-puter four days later. Installed computer software which prints badge inactivation information on the hard copy printout, inactive ACAD's are scanned on an ACAT to ensure inactive status prior to release of the ACAD's. MAY 16, 1989 EVENT 3 NRC IDENTIFIED Three contractors terminated in March did not have their badges with-drawn or their access authorization deleted until May 1,1989. Meetings were held with affected sponsor to clarify that the ALR must be the only source document used to verify continued need for access, a soft-ware change is scheduled which will allow the ALR to be generated from the security computer, "_ Notice Of Transfer Of Sponsorship" form im-plemented. EVENT 4 JUNE 5, 1989 LICENSEE IDENTIFIED One contractor who was tenninated on January 9,1989, still had active access authorization and an active ACAD in the badge island until June 5, 1989. Implementation of corrective actions for Event 3 led ?o discovery of this event. A " Notice Of Transfer Of Sponsorship" fsem was sent to thp receiving sponsor who then notified security of the individual's termi-nation. EVENT 5 JULY 20, 1989 LICENSEE IDENTIFIED The ACAD and access authorization for a contractor terminated in June 1988 was not deleted until July 20, 1989. This event was discovered through an internal audit. Completion of the software change referenced in Event 3 will rtduce the possibility of this type personnel error. Further audits and self-checking programs will be continued in the future to ensure the effectiveness of the overall program. I
SUMMARY
- All but one of the personnel involved in these five events was a contractor.
Site management has issued a directive that all contractor badges will be i deactivated by 8-4-89 unless specifically requested by the individual's sponsor.
J N - U l J m u m YA I Mm u m RPg I Ag mg mj m Y R R 0 A S 2 I M A T m M N m M E B U V E 5 I F S E 1 m m T D N A E C N 4 A A 2 I J V m E m C I EDm 3 Ug 2 I Og g Nj 9 T 3 I C O S g 0 0 0 g N E g 1 3 2 O TS E $9 6gS IL M
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y j 1..- ) POSTING OF-CONTAIMDIT PERSOMEL MTCH m. Initial fuel loading of Unit 2's. first coref began at approximately . 8:45 p.m. on February 19,1989. Security 'did not; become aware of this. until approximately 11:35.p.m. when. the Security Shift _' Supervisor. discovered that fuel loading cperations were in progress and an officer was not posted at containment. Operations personnel failed. to notify Security because' they were used to "ACAD" access to Unit 2 containment prior. to issuance 'of the operating license. Confusion may have existed - over the requirements. in administrative _ procedure 00303-0 about when posting was required. This event had not occurred.previously. I a i l
SECURITY STATUS UPDATE o COMPENSATORY ACTIONS I A sampling of compensatory actions taken on doors, cameras, and zones during l the period January 1987 through July 1987 revealed that the average duration j of compensatory actions were as follows: ) 1) Doors - In excess of eight days per event 2) Cameras & Zones - In excess of six days per event A similar sampling revealed that the average duration of compensatory actions during the period January 1989 through July 1989 were as follows: ) 1) Doors - Less than eight hours per event 2) Cameras & Zones - Less than eight hours per event
== Conclusions:== 1) Improved management support in directing appropriate resources to the correct security equipment problems. 2) Improved communications between security and maintenance. 3) Maintenance personnel have an improved understanding of security systems which has resulted in fewer recurring maintenance activities. During the first six months of Unit 1 operation the average number of compensatory actions per shift was more than 10. During the first six months of Unit 1/2 operation the average number of compensatory actions per shift has been less than 3. TURNOVER RATE In the last eighteen (18) months six (6) shift personnel have left the Security Department. The following is a breakdown of the circumstances under which those personnel left: Three (3) persons were teminated One (1) person transferred to another department Two (2) persons resigned due to family hardships or to pursue other career opportunities The Security Department has sustained a turnover rate of less than one (1) percent over the time period indicated. The experience base (Lieutenants, Captains, Superintendent) have been in the Department since Unit 1 lockdown. SHIFT SCHEDULES The Security Department is currently working a 12 hour rotating shift. There are 5 teams tssigned with one team in training or on day shift augmentation at all times. The schedule has approximately 9% overtime built in, however the overtime rate above and beyond normally scheduled hours is less than 2%. l
g-};;-- t SAFEGUARDS DOCUENT TRENDS AUDIT DATE NUMBER DOCUMENTS UNACCOUNTED FOR 1988 First Quarter 10 Second Quarter 4 1989 First Quarter 1 3 l. Second Quarter 0 l l l i
. ~= .:W. SYSTDI IfrROVDENTS Fence & Grading Unit 1 Microwaves (stacked heads) Static Transfer Switch ~ ' Magnetic-Locks (high traffic) 1' i-i l 1 l 1 . _ - - _ _. - - _ _... - _ _ _ _. _}}