ML20205A277
| ML20205A277 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1999 |
| From: | Skinner P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Beasley J SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9903300349 | |
| Download: ML20205A277 (20) | |
Text
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I March 19, 1999 Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
ATTN: Mr. J. B. Beasley, Jr.
l l Vice President -Vogtle !
P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 - )
SUBJECT:
PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW (PPR) - VOGTLE
Dear Mr. Beasley:
On February 2,1999, the NRC staff completed a Plant Performance Review (PPR) of Vogtle.
The staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety performance. The resib ::ra used by NRC management to facilitate planning and allocation of inspection resourcec. PPRs provide NRC management with a current summary of licensee performance and serve as inputs to the NRC's senior management meeting (SMM) reviews. PPRs examine information since the last assessment of licensee performance to evaluate long term trends, but emphasize the last six months to ensure that the assessments reflect current performance. The PPR for plant Vogtle involved the participation of all technical divisions in evaluating inspection results and safety performance information for the period August 1997 to January 1999. The NRC's most recent summary of licensee l performance was provided in a letter of September 15,1997, and was discussed in a public meeting with you on September 24,1997.
l As discussed in the NRC's Administrative Letter 98-07 of October 2,1998, the PPRs provide an assessment of licensee perfomlance during an interim period that the NRC has suspended its Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program. The NRC suspended its SALP program to complete a review of its processes for assessing performance at nuclear power plants. At the end of the review, the NRC will decide whether to resume the SALP program or terminate it in favor of an improved process.
l During the last six months, Unit 1 operated near or at 100 percent power. Power was reduced two times to perform maintenance activities for' equipment problems. In addition, a maintenance personnel error caused the 48 feedwater heaters to isolate causing a transient. On May 8, 1998, Unit 2 automatically tripped following a lightning strike which damaged one of the main l/( !
! step-up transformers. The unit was brought critical on May 9, but was shut down for five days to
- inspect the main generator and repair an auxiliary feedwater system valve. On June 9, the unit automatically tripped following a loss of a'l reactor coolant pumps due to a fault on a condensate pump and incorrect tap settings on instar,taneous overcurrent relays. Following corrective j maintenance, the unit returned to full power on June 15. On August 14, the unit was manually tripped following the closure of a main feedwater regulation valve due to component failures in the power supplies to the co t o o n September 4, the unit was manually tripped following L 732 288 8 3;88 L i
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l SNC 2 l a loss of both main feedwater pumps during surveillance testing due to incorrect testing methodology. Corrections were made and the unit retumed to full power on September 5.
Overall performance at plant Vogtle was acceptable. Both units operated well, although there was a noticeable increase in the number of equipment and personnelinduced transients.
Management oversight, involvemer,t, and emphasis on plant safety and equipment problem resolution continued to be strong, however, some lapses in performance were observed early in the assessment period. General maintenance and surveillance testing activities continued to be performed well. Management was aggressive in resolving equipment related problems.
Preventive maintenance activities were generally performed in accordance with requirements, however, there was an increase in the number of human performance errors related to procedure adequacy and compliance. There was no significant change in engineering performance during this assessment period. Excellent support continued from engineering and maintenance in resolving plant equipment problems. Engineering support for operations and ,
maintenance was usually effective and thorough. Plant support functions were generally I performed well, however some decline was noted in security performance in the area of escort control and security evaluations for work in the owner controlled area.
In the operations area, performance was consistent. Day-to-day control room conduct was professional and safety conscious. Control room operators responded well during plant transients, although, late in the assessment period the operator response to a specific feedwater transient was untimely resulting in a period of time operating in excess of the licensed maximum rated power limit. Management exhibited conservative decisions in addressing plant problems.
An exception to this conservative management action involved a decision to enter Mode 4 without all of the Technical Specification (TS) required reactor coolant system relief valves operable. There were examples where human performance errors related to TS compliance and logging, procedure compliance, and inattention to detail occurred. However, an improving trend was noted toward the end of the assessment period. The operator license training program remains effective. Operations performance during this assessment period does not
- warrant any additional inspection effort above the NRC core inspection program, although some increased emphasis will be placed on the areas identified above.
In the maintenance area, performance was consistent. Management was aggressive in resolving equipment related problems. Preventive maintenance activities were generally performed in accordance with requirements. A number of human performance errors related to procedure adequacy and compliance did occur during this period. Recent examples of performance errors were identified in instrumenStion, calibration, and electrical maintenance areas. Also, a number of equipment failures occurred during the period which resulted in challenges to safety systems and operators. Inservice testing activities were well planned and conducted in accordance with requirements and documented commitments. In addition to the NRC core inspections, a regional initiative inspection is planned in March to review procedures
. and electrical maintenance activities as a result cf recent problems identified with seismic restraints for circuit breakers.
In the engineering area, performance was consistent. Engineering support for operations and maintenance was usually effective and thorough. Modifications were generally performed in accordance with program requirements. Engineering performance during this assessment
4 SNC 3 period does not warrant any additional inspection effort above the NRC core inspection program.
Overall in the plant support area, performance was consistent. .The Emergency Preparedness program was maintained in a state of operational readiness, and exhibited an improving trend as a result of equipment upgrades. The licensee controlled occupational radiation exposures as low as reasonably achievable. Liquid and airborne effluent releases were maintained below regulatory limits and did not result in any advarse consequences to the public or the environment. Quality Assurance audits identified and corrected appropriate radiologicalissues.
In the Security area a decline in performance over the assessment period was indicated.
Response force capabilities continue to be competent; although some response strategies were questionable due to a failure to perform an adequate evaluation. Additionally, an adequate security evaluation was not performed concerning work in the Owner Controlled Area that impacted the Protected Area. The NRC also identified deficiencies in the area of escort control.
Security related equipment testing, maintenance, and operability continued to be effective. Plant Performance during this assessment period does not warrant any additionalinspection effort above the NRC core inspection program, although some increased emphasis will be placed on the areas identified above.
Enclosure 1 contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant issues Matrix (PiM), that were considered during this PPR process to arrive at an integrated view of licensee performance trends. The PIM includes items summarized from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and plant Vogtle. The NRC does not attempt to document all aspects of licensee programs and performance that may be functioning appropriately. Rather, the NRC only documents issues that the NRC believes warrant management attention or represent noteworthy aspects of performance.
This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting fron, the plant Vogtle PPR revie ev. It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite.
Enclosure 2 details our inspection plan for the next 8 months. The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program is provided so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas. Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.
i .,
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SNC 4 !
We willinform you of any changes to the inspection plan. If you have any questions, please i contact me at (404) 562-4520. !
Sincerely, i (Original signed by l Pierce H. Skinner) '
Pierce H. Skinner, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF-81
Enclosures:
- 1. Plant issues Matrix
- 2. Inspection Plan cc w/encis:
l J. D. Woodard Executwe Vice President Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35:01-1295 J. T. Gasser General Manager, Plant Vogtle Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
P. O, Box 1600 Waynesboro, GA 30830 J. A. Bailey l Manager-Licensing Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 1
Director, Consumers' Utility Counsel Division Govemor's Office of Consumer Affairs l 2 M. L. King, Jr. Drive Plaza Level East; Suite 356 Atlanta, GA 30334-4600 cc w/encls cont'd: (See Page 5)
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cc w/encls: Continued I Office of Planning and Budget' Room 615B 270 Washingtoa Street, N' V Atlanta, GA 30334.
l l Office of the County Commissioner l
Burke County Commission Waynesboro.GA 30830
, Director, Department of Natural Resources 205 Butler Street, SE, Suite 1252 i Atlanta, GA 30334 '
Manager, Radioactive Materials Program Department of Natural Resources ,
- 4244 International Parkway i Suite 114
- Atlanta, GA 30354 l l l' Attorney General l Law Department l 132 Judicial Building Atlanta, GA 30334 Program Manager Fossil & Nuclear Operations Oglethorpe Power Corporation 2100 E. Exchange Place ,
Tucker, GA 30085-134g i
Charles A. Patrizia, Esq.
Paul, Hastings, Janofaky & Walker 10th Floor ;
1299 Pennsylvania Avenue I Washington, D. C. 20004-3500 Senior Engineer- Power Supply l .. Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia
, 1470 Riveredge Parkway NW
- Atlanta, GA 30328-4634 Distribution w/encis: (See Page 6) l-a
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9 SNC 6 Distribution w/encis:
L. Plisco, Ril P. Skinner, Rll S. Collins, NRR J. Zwolinski, NRR W. Dean, NRR '
T. Boyce, NRR H. Berkow, NRR D. Jaffe, NRR G. Tracy, EDO J. Lieoerman, OE PUBLIC NRC Senior Resident inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8805 River Road Waynesboro, GA 30830
,
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE l
OFFICE RII;DRP Ril:DRF;MB Ril;DR5;EB Ril;DR5;OLHPB Ril.DR5;P5B l 5IGNATURE NAME BLHolbrook:dka* GPelisle* KLandis* HChristensen* KBarr*
DATE 3/ /99 3/ 199 3/ /99 3/ /99 3/ /99 3/ /99 3/ /99
' ICOPY? YE5 NO YES NO YE5 NO YE5 NO YE5 NO YE5 NO YE5 NO OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: G:WOGTLE\PPRLTR.WPD
SNC 6 ;
Qistribution w/encls: ,
L. Plisco, Ril l P. Skinner, Rll D. Jaffe, NRR l T. Boyce, NRR W. Dean, NRR G. Tracy, EDO i PUBLIC NRC Senior Resident inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissic.
8805 River Road Waynesboro, GA 30830 1
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE OFFICE Ril:DRP RIJ:55:RN5 Ril:DRg:{ W Ril:DR5:OLHPB Ril:DR5:P55 l NATURE gg}gjjpg g 7 gg !
NAME BLHolbrook:dka* GBelisle' KLandIk- HChr stensen (KBarr DATE 3/ /99 y' 199 g / 3g /99 3/ff /99 3/ jg 199 3/ /99 3/ /99 l
COPY? YE5 NO #E5] NO (YES) NO /YEJ NO (YES) NO YES NO YES NO OFFICIAL RECORP CopV' DOCUhlENT NAME: G:WtMErLE\PPRLTR.WPD L
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SNC 7 Distribution w/encis:
L. Plisco, Rll P. Skinner, Ril D. Jaffe, NRR PUBLIC .
NRC Senior Resident inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8805 River Road Waynesboro, GA 30830 l
1 l
l Urt Nr. Ril:6mr- Ril:DR5:MB RII DR5:E5 Ril.DR5:OLMPB Ril:DR5:P55 51GNATURE -gg NAME 9LHolbrock:dma G5ellste KLandis HChristensen K5arr DATE ~{ ,2/fft99 2/ /99 2/ /99 2/ /99 2/ /99 2/ /99 2/ /99 M/ ~' DYE 5) NC YE5 NO YE5 NO YE5 NO YE5 NO YE5 NO YE5 W Fh1AL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: G:WoGTLE\PPRLTR.WPD 1
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Poc,3: i of n Date:o2mnm United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm. .ssion i nme: is:2s:e aegion n PLANT ISSUE MATRIX VOGTLE By Primary Functional Area Functional Temploie Dcto Source Area ID Type Codes item Description il/15/IWS 1998009 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt 1B Operator response to o dilution event on Unit 2 was prompt and timely. Maintenance activities were well cmkoHeN comMM Nmq MwmenHo MsWe md detem N cmm oN Sec: ENG Sec: 3A dilution was good.
Tec 4B 11/14/1998 1998008 01 Prt OPS NRC NCV Prt 28 Following a surveillonce. Operations personnel failed to identify that the Unit 2 Essentid Chiller was g inoperable due to Check vdve leakage. Contribiting to the problem was a surveillance test procedure that did not enritain acceptance criteria for operobility.
Tec 11/14/1998 1998008 Prt OPS NRC POS PrtIC Adequate comperwatory actions were being taken for degraded freeze protection and heat trocing Sec: MAINT See: 2A Ter 09/26/1998 1998007 Pri: OPS NRC POS Prt 1B Operator actions to initiate o manual reactor trip prior to Lutomatic protection actuations were proactive.
Sec-n n e mi e seeng ws ch of W @em
' Sec:3A performance. The licensee's root cause investigotion and subsequent corrective actions for o manual Tec SB reactor trip on September 4 were thorough and addressed the cause of the trip. Operations personnel were prepored for the possible loss of feedwater ond responded in on oppropriate manner. -
07/26/1998 IW8007 Prt OPS NRC NEG Prt 5A The observed Plant Review Board (PRB) committee did not fully discuss the subjects presented and severo! ,
See:
members had not reviewed the material prior to the meeting Sec: OTHER y Tec 09/10/1998- 199800641 Prt OPS NRC VIO lV Prt 1A The Unit 1 Supervisor foiled to enter Technical Specification (TS) (LCO) Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3 A
' 3, ,
- Containment Ventilation isolation Instrumentatiort" for inoperable radiation monitors during performance of surveillance procedure 14420-1. " Solid Stcie Protection System and Reactor Trip Brecker Train A Operability Tec ;A Test." Revision 30, in the control room log. The failure of the correcuve actions for previous violations to -
preclude this occurrence was not effective. '
07/23/1998 199800541 Prt OPS NRC VIOIV Prt 3A 1) Unit 2 entered Moda 4 without meeting TS 3.4.12. which requires two relief volves to be operable. Only See:
- P *
- P* * * * * * *' *" 9* **
- Sec: 2B Tec 38 2) Unit 2 entered Mode 2 without the turbine trip function operable os required by TS 3.3.2-1. !
06/15/1998 1998004 41 Prt OPS NRC VIOlV PrtlA The Unit Shift Supervisor (USS) decided to enter solid plant operation without all three letdown orfice isolation i volves open as required by procedure. The USS mode the decision to continue with solid plant operation Sec-*
MM without fully understonoing the intent of having oil three isolation volves open. Additionally, the decision was Tec 3B made without thoroughly evoluoting the impact of the change in normal solid plant operation or soliciting guidance from engineering or monogement personnel 06/15/1998 1990004 03 Prt OPS NRC VIO IV Prt 3A Personnel failed to property log equipment tnot entered and exited the Spent Fuel Pool Zone 11 Foreign p Sec: * ""
Sec: 2B I Tec i
item Type (Compliance.Foilowup.Othe), From 10f01/1997 To 01/31/1999 Enclosure 1
_ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ __m.____________________-_____m __- _ _ _ _ . __ m _ u -
Page: 2 of 11 Date: 02/17/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm .ission Time: is 28:n
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iregion si PLANT ISSUE MATRIX VOGTLE By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Date Source Areo ID Type Codes item Description 05/16/1998 1998004 Prt OPS NRC NEG Prt 3A Operations personnel performance during Emergency Diesel Generator surveillance testing represented a we s nsee s @nN W mpMon Wo wmmen M oN memm MW
' Sec.2B Operations personnel did not understand what it would take to support the temperature measurement Tec activity. Also, no specific training had been given to old the operators in understanding or implementing The new procedure revision and operations personnel were not sensitivo to the action required.
05/16/1998 1998004 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt I A The identification by a Plant Equipment Operator of a degraded condit.on ossociated with the Unit 1 Train B Sec: Sec: 3A
- ' * * * *
- 9 Tec 05/16/1998 1998004 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt IB The operators property responded to a Unit 2 outomatic reactor tr:p that occurred as a result of a lightning p strike to the 500 kilovolt transmission line. Plant recovery actions were comprehensive and restort activities were well controlled and coordinated.
Tec SB 04/18/1998 1998003 Prt OPS NRC NEG Prt 1A Several discreponcles were identified in the licensee's implementation of foreign material exclusion (FME) l
- g. is a e ng caeo h ac h t M nsee W@esh
' Sec: 3A these discrepancies and improvement was noted in FME controls during core retood.
Tec SC Prt 1 A 2R6 refueling octivities were performed in a controlled manner and in occordance with procedures. A 04/18/1998 1998003 Prt OPS NRC POS Sec'- M SB t; rore ugh event review was performed after a fuel assembly was gripped by its hold <fown springs during unlood. The licensee's corrective actions for this problem were comprehensive.
Tec SC 04/18/1998 1998003 Prk OPS NRC POS Prt 1A The decision to monuo'ly trip Unit 2 while shutting down for refueling outage 2R6 was justified based on the Sec' observed rod position discrepancies between Digitol Rod Position Indicatiori and the demand position step Sec: 5B counters. The root cause of the rod control moltunction was odequately determined and corrected prior to ,
Tec SC toit restort.
04/18/1998 1998003 Prt OPS NRC ' STR Prt1A Monogment's direct involvement in contingency plan walkdowns and the heightened ow . mss of the Sec: oper ing stoft to the contingency plans during periods of increased risk during refueling outoge 2R6 was a See: 3A strength.
Tec 3C i
04/18/1998 1998003 42 Prt OPS NRC NCV Prt 1A The Test Coordinator performed a step out of sequence, resulting in the inadvertent resetting of the required Sec: Sec: 3A 9" Tec 04/02/1998 1998002-01 Prt OPS NRC VIO lV Prt 1A Foilure to enter o LCO for the CREFS which was rendered inoperable by scheduled heater maintenance g *. a s mMom W hM MEWgn W h %d M N Sec: 2B maintenance activity had on system operability prior to authorizing the work.
Ter: 3B ltem Type (Compliance. Followup.Ott.er), From 10/01/1997 Tc 01/31/1999
Pogo: 3 of 11 Dole: 02/17/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm. .ission rme:is 2s:e ,
nog.on n PLANT ISSUE MATRIX VOGTLE By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Dole Source Aroo ID Type Codes Hem Description 03/07/1W8 IW8002 Pri' OPS NRC POS P& IB The operators property responded to o vdtope trorsieat on Channel 1.125 VAC vitd instrument panel.
Am rmd operating procedures were entered and property followed. A foiled 7300 process instrument g '. M 3A power supply was identified as the root cause of the voltage transient.
Tec 58 02/18/1W8 IW8003 P& OPS NRC NEG P& 1 A Some debris was identified following the licensee's Unit 2 containment closecut inspection. Tne amount of debris found would not have challenged containment sump performance.
Tec SC 01/24/1W8 IW7012 Pri- OPS NRC NEG P& IC inconsistencies were observed in th.:. rslity of performance for short reteif tumovers for the various operator gg positions. Shift supervision and operonons monogement expectations for short relief turnovers varied and were not clearly delineated.
Tec 3A 01/24/1W8 1W701241 Prt OPS NRC NCV P& 1 A Operators failed to take oppropriate actions os required by on olorm response procedure ossociated with Sec-
- "
- UN* *" U **
- Sec: 3A did not report the findings to control room operators with respect to what was in clorm or whether actions Tec were needed to correct the problem.
12/Ji/1W7 IW7011-01 Pd OPS NRC NCV Prt 3A Foilure *o follow the standing order procedure preventing norWicensed operators from being ossigned multiple dedicated duties, e.g fire brigade team response and closure of a Residud Heat Removd drain Sec*' k' '
volve. It was determined that there was odequate availobility of other operators onsite to respond to T6c events.
12/13/1W7 IW7G11 P& OPS NRC POS Prt1C Freeze protection and heat tracing equipment was copoble of performing its intended function and was being maintained in better condition from previous inspections in 1W6. The improved system conditions T M 2A were the result of the licensee's efforts to closeout previously identified problem areas.
Tec 12/1 :sIW7 IW7011 Prt OPS NRC POS Pi iB Adequate instructions in Emergency Operating Procedures and odequate operator training was provided to ensure that personnel property operate dual function vdves os needed during design bases events.
Sec: PLTSUP Sec: 4A Tec 3B 11/26/1W7 IW7010-Ol Prt OPS NRC VIO IV Prt 1A Foilure to follow the electrical system olignment procedure resulted in misolignment of the emergency diesel Sec: MAINT O*"* *
- Sec: 3A Tec 11/14/lW7 P& OPS Ucensee LER Prt 2A initioting c monud reactor trip from Mode 3 in response to a Digital Rod Position Indicotion (DRPI) problem Sec*
w s ppr pri te during st rtup testing on Unit 1. The root cause was determined ic be o failed
' Sec: IB detector / encoder cord associated with DRPL Tec ltern Type (Compliance. Followup.Other) From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999
l Page: 4 of 11 Date: 02/17/1999 United Stat:s Nuclear Regulatory Comm. .ission Time: is:2em neo.on :: PLANT ISSUE MATRIX VO GTLE By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes item Description 11/01/1997 1997010 Prt OPS NRC WK Prt 1A Several plant events and inciaents resulted from inodequate survaillance and/or startup procedures. A 3,g. 7' weakness was identified for muitiple examples of a foilure to property re/iew procedure revisions which resulted in the procedure errors.
Tec 48 11/01/1997 1997010 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt 2A The licensee's implementation of a new program to clean the containment prior to the performanc.e of a u we cenmet &W Sec: MAINT See: 2B program. The increased emphasis that the licensee placed on material control within containment during Tec refueling outoge 1R7 ochieved successful results.
11/01/1997 1997010 Pri: OPS NRC NEG Prt l A An inodvertent dilution event occurred during activities to flush a chemicol volume and control system mixed bed domineralizer resulting in a power increase from 2% to 4.6% Poor work practices and communications Sec: PLTSUP Sec:IC by operations personr'elin conjunction with the use of out-dated boron samples of the boric acid tank Tec 3A concentration contributed tu the incident.
10/18/1997 1997010 Prt OPS NRC WK Prt 1 A The operations crew failed to recognize that a emergency core cooling system (ECCS) volve mis-positioning Sec: Sec: 3A resu CMm Mng WWor @cMn 6 epsoN m Condition.
Tec 3B 11/24/1998 1997012 Prt MAINT NRC NEG Prt 3A Maintenance activities on a spent fuel pool cooling pump did not meet the licensee's normal leve tof performonCO, in that there were numerous difficulties and maintenance rework involved. Activities were not properly scoped prior to work commencement. The lock cf maintenance personnel experience contributed Tec to pump ossembly difficulties. There was poor coordination and commurucation between the licensee and vendor.
11/14/1998 1998008 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 2B Troubleshooting activities for o Loop 3 Main Feedwater Regulation volve flow onomaly were well controlled 3, , and coordino'ed. Detoiled troubleshooting plons were developed and operations personnel were thoroughly briefed prior to risk involved troubleshooting evoluttons. There was good monogement Tec involvement in coordinating the troubleshooting activities and a strong commitment toward resoMng the problem.
10/15/1998 1998006 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 3A The observed maintenance and surveillance activities were tenerally completed by personnel knowledgeoble of their ossigned tasks. Procedures were present of the work location and being followed.
Sec: OPS Sec:2B Procedures provided sufficient detail and guidance for the intended octivities. (Also !Rs 98-05. 98C 98-02)
Tec 3C 10/07/1998 1998009-01 Prt MAINT NRC URI Prt 48 The licensee identified thot some breaker seismic clips were not in place and some bolt i were not securely fostened. The licensee indicated that they would evoluote the overoll risk impact of tre systems impacted Sec: ENG Sec: 3A during a seismic event as it relates to their existing Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) model. At the end of Tec 28 the report period. the licensee had not completed this evoluotion. This breaker seismic qualification issue wi!I remain unresolved pending licensee completion of the PRA evoluotion and NRC's review of 6.a results.
09/26/1998 1998007-01 Prt MAINT NRC VIO lV Prt 28 During modification of DG exhoust missle barrier. the licensee did not have sufficient controls in place to
- 3, .* remove concrete debris at a set interval. Debris had occumulated to a height of opproximately 30 inches blocking the exhaust ping. The licensee determined + hat DG 1 A would not have been able to perform Tec its intended safety fu. wwn in this condition.
Item Type (Compliance. Followup Other). From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999
Poge: 5 of 11 Dole: 02/17/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: is:2s:n .
nogion in PLANT ISSUE MATRIX VOGTLE By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Doto Source Area ID Type Codes item Description 05/16/1998 199 2 1 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 1 A The licensee ~s initial response to the identification ci errors in the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) a el we @ e. ces we rem W way Sec: Ors See: 3A octions were token.
Tec 05/15/1998 199800341 Prt MAINT NRC VIO IV Prt 3A An ISI examiner foiled to odequately perform pre-examination cleaning for o safety injection system weld, in See:
. as m o ew we e pecleW W Wo h #cdon of Sec: 2B penetront.
Tec 04/18/1998 1998003-03 Prt MAINT NRC NCV Prt 2A instrumenation and Control technicion failure to follow a sequencer calibration procedure resulting in the Sec- - Sec: 3A during Engineered Safety Features Actuation System testing.
Tec 2B 01/30/1998 1998001 Prt MAINT NRC NEG Prt 2A A lock of datoil existed in the Maintenance Rule procedures for structurd roonitoring and how unavailability Sec:
See: ENG Ten 01/30/1998 1998001 Prt MAINT NRC NEG Prt 2B Maintenance Rule program procedures did not contoin sufficient defoil to clearly describe the requirements fa g mo Wm & wn ems, sWNn hanpent6s).
Sec: ENG Sec:48 Ter:- ,
01/30/1998 1998001 Prt MAINT NRC NEG Prt 2B The Maintenance Rule procedure covering the periodic assessments was togue and did not provide details U #U
- U Sec: ENG Sec:4B for Structures System, and Components.
Tec 01/30/1998 1998001 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 2B For Maintenance Rule (oX2) systems structures. and components (SSCs). Industry-wide operating experience Sec: ENG cohd We poM. W opa% Ma W h poWW wpW Mme Sec: 48 criterio had been established suitable trending had been performed and correctwe actions were token Tec when SSCs foiled to meet performonce criteria or experienced failures.
01/30/1998 1998001 Prk MAINT NRC POS Prt 2B in generd. for Mointe Tonco Rule CoX1) systems, structures. and components (SSCs), operating experience Sec: ENG Sec: 4B
- "# P" # " * * * ** '
licensee consdered sotety in est bishment of Maintenance Rule gods and monitoring for the (nXI) systems Ten and components reviewed. Also corrective actions, gods, and monitoring were generally adequate for the (oX1) SSCs reviewed.
01/24/1998 1997012 Prt MAINT NRC NEG Pri:3A Two radioactive spil:s occurred during ouxiliary building floor drain tank cleaning octivities. The spills resulted !
- P" ' " # " ##
Sec- ' See: 3B equipment that was used.
Tec 3A ttem Type (Compliance, Followup.Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999
Page: seu Doce:0 m m m United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission nme: ism 3 noion il PLANT ISSUE MATRIX VOGTLE By Primary Functional /.rea Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes item Description 11/01/1997 1997010 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 3A Unit I split pin replacement and Steam Generatur #4 tubesheet rework activities dunng refueling outoge we supe wWe eedms W cmtroM W wMm pro des M@
Sec: See: 3B tro;ned individuals.
Tec 2B 11/01/1997 1997010 Prk MAINT NRC WK Prt 3C The licensee's programmatic coverage of orc strikes excluded requirements for the repair of orc strikes.
Sec: Sec:2B Tec 11/01/1997 1997010 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 28 Trouoleshooting efforts implemented during outoge work involved +he proper personnel, procedures and s wm ety mns, m s med we h occadm @
See: ENG Sec: 3A procedure guidance.
lec 11/01/1997 1907010 43 Prt MAINT NRC NCV Pri: 23 Maintenance calibration procedures implemented during the outoge resulted in instrument setpoints outside the trip setpoints stated in the Technical Specifications.
See: ENG Sec:
Ter.
10/20/1997 1997009-01 Prt MAINT NRC VIO!V Prt 2B A violation was identified for the licensee's failure to generate the required work order documentation prior
- O * * *~
Sec: ENG See: 3B No documentation of the existence of these leaks or the conective actions token was mode by Tec 3C maintenance personnel. This problem indicated a lock of maintence and engineering personnel understanding of the work order process requirements.
10/14/1997 1997010 Prt MAINT NRC NEG Prt 3A The failure to block a containment radiation monitor during control rod drive shoft removo! from
- 3,c. Containment resulted in on inadvertent engineered safety features octuation when a containment isolatic i signal was generated. The incident was caused by poor work practices and poor communications Ten associated with the work activity.
08/15/1998 1998006 Pri: ENG NRC POS Prt 4A Engineering design packages reviewed were well prepared. safety evoluotions were complete. thorough, 1 Sec- ' Sec.'
and oppropriate. Equiprnent changes os o resuli of engineering documents implemented were ochieved without odversely impoCting plant Operations.
Tec 06/09/1998 1998005 Prt ENG NRC WK Prt SA A weakness in design documentation resulted in incorrect instantaneous overcurrent relay top settings which Sec Sec' C caused a loss of power to all four reactor coolont pumps. Also. the licensee's review of a similar industry event did not identify the potential for o plant cooldown as a result of cu rent sy's tem configuration and Tec recent design changes completed on the air operated steam supply volves to the MSRs.
05/16/1998 1998004 Prt ENG NRC POS Prt 1A Engineering orx1 tnstrumentation and Control personnel support in oddressing sequencer degradation was Se* e e e N ce to opse was See: 3A property prepared and reviewed.
Tec l tem Type (hy;;anw Followup.Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999
D Page: 7 of 11 Data: 02/17/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission um.: iS:2s:o negion in PLANT ISSUE MATRIX VOGTLE By Pnmary Functional Area Functional Template .
Dale Source Area ID Type Codes item Description 04/18/1998 1998003 Prt ENG NRC POS Prt 48 Electried modifications on Unit 2 involving the 125-Volt DC g;ound cetection system, emergency desel generator fuse protection, and Class IE switchgear were being performed in occordonce with the desgn
- C change control program. The material condition of the completed work was good. Overo't the design Tec change packages and the 10 CFR 50.59 safety evoluotion were adequate.
04/18/1998 1998003-05 Prt ENG NRC NCV P:t 48 A non-cited violation was identified for on inadequate engineering Temporary test procedure to retest the
, sequencer engineered sofeguards feo*ure octuation svstem (ESFAS) octuotion signd to on auxiliary component cooling water pump. The procedure was inadequate, in that, os wTitten, the pump did not Tec receive the correct stort signd and other components cctuated unexpectedly.
03/07/1998 1998002 Prt ENG NRC NEG Prt SA A Deficiency Card (DC) failed to oddress o!! the problems ossociated with a brecker failure that occurred during refueling outoge IR7, The DC was not comprehensive or complete.
M 58 Tec SC 01/30/1998 1998001 Prt ENG NRC STR Prt 2A Effective integrotion of msigned system ongineers in the process for implementation of the Maintenance Rute (MR) progrom was o major contributing factor to the program effectiveness. Th:2 was considered a M MAIN 1 Sec*'1 strength in the MR progrom implementation.
Tec4B 01/30/1998 1998001 Prt ENG NRC WK Prt 2A The lack of check or oversight of the system engineer's decisions relative to functional failure cotis was See: MAINT cWMo M poed mWss n h Menon % Nan Weme.
Sec: 28 Tec 01/30/1998 1998001 Prt ENG NRC NEG Prt 2A A sensitivity andysis had not been performed to determine if Maintenance Rule reliability criteria were o c N hsset Sec: OPS Sec:2B Tec 48 01/30/1998 1998001 Prt ENG NRC POS Prk 2A The licensee's process for ensuring that critical safety functions were available during planned outoges was
- e. a ng s ct oMtme Wbs was goM Sec: OPS Sec: 2B Tec 48 01/24/1998 1997012 Prt ENG NRC POS Prt 48 The licensee's shor* term corrective actions for degraded conditions associateo e N tmergency Diesel ner m wem s s ncrete N M @ h W h N e
- M See: OPS Sec:5B piping was removed.
Tec 11/26/1997 1997010 04 Prt ENG NRC VIO!V Prt 4B A violatiU. was identified for the failure to odequctey implement corrective actions for a previous violot'on
. involving weaknesses in the APEX computer code user manual that is used for monud calculations of estimated critical position. Correctivs octions were not completed in a timely manner due to resource Tec limitorions.
Item Type (Cump6 afollowup,Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999
Page: 5 of Il Date:02/17/ 999 United Stat:s Nuclear Regulatory Commission nme:is:2823 nooion in PLANT ISSUE MATRIX VOGTLE By Pnmory Functional Area Functional Tempiate Dole Source Areo ID Type Codes llem Description 1* ~?/1997 1997010 Prt ENG NRC WK Prt 5A The licensee's review for Ucensee Event Reoort (LEiT; 50-424/%005 did not identify the full scope of the Ecton 3,e. 3,e. 5B Cable splicing discrepancy issue.
Tec 11/01/1997 1997010 Prt ENG NRC WK Prt 5B The process to document and determine if an LER issue qualified as on MPFF does not ensure timely determinations, nor is it cleorty procedural! zed. In additiort the responsibility to document and determine if
- C an LER issue qualified as on MPFF is also not clearly proceduralized.
Tec 12/26/1998 1998009 Prt PLTSUP NRC NEG Prt 2B The licensee's water chemistry control program for monitoring pnmary and secondary water quotify had been effectively implemented. However, miscommurucations and unfamiliarity with on infrequently Sec: OPS M 3A performed evolution resurted in a release of sulfates that exceeded chemtstry cction levels.
Ter: 3C 10/09/1998 1998012 Prt FLTSUP NRC NEG Prt 1C Security procedures were weak in that they failed to require o security review for non-sofety related Owner Contro!!ed Area work in order to prevent unauthorized access into the protected o'eo. .
Tec 10/09/1998 1998012 Prt PLTSUP NRC NEG Prt IC The response copobilities were generally acceptoble except when static positions were utilized as compensatory measures.
Ter:
10/09/1998 1998012 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt 1C Both the active and possive barriers of the Vehicle Barrier S,:..em were in place and operational as required by the Physical Security Plan and licensee procedures.
Sec- MM Tec 09/10/1998 1998006-02 Pit PLTSUP NRC VIO IV Prt 2A An employee failed to property secure the door to o locked high radiation area i~;n exit. Contributing to 3,e. g this problem was a weakness in the licensee's preventative maintenance for lockaJ high radiction doors.
Tec 09/10/1998 1998006 G Prt PLTSUP NRC VIOlV Prt 3A An employee failed to understand their vNtcr escort responsibit".as and follow requirements for maintaining y em W M codact of escoM Wdds Sec: Sec:3B Tec 06/27/1998 1998005 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt 2B The licensee was maintaining programs for controlling exposures ALARA and continued to be effective in Controlling overoil Collective dose.
Tec Item Type (Compliance, Followup,Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999
Page: 9ofit Date: 02/17/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm. .ission nme:iS:2s:u .
negion ii PLANT ISSUE MATRIX VOGTLE By Primary Functional Areo Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes item Description 06/27/1998 1998005 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: 2B The licensee met 10 CFR 20 requirements for control of personnel monitoring. radiooctive material.
Sec: Sec 3C r diological postings, radiction areas controls, and high radiction oreos.
Tec 06/26/1998 1998011 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NEG Prt 3A The utt'ization of the shift technical advisor functional responsibility did not provide for on independent Sec: Sec: 1C
- 9 Ter:
06/26/1908 1998011 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prk 3A The scenario was effective for testing the integrated emergency resporue capability for the onsite and h- o ge g r cW e opeoW mw pM Mp@ont Sec: IC conditions and responded with timely and correct actions.
Ter 06/26/1998 1998011 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS- Prt 3A Command and control of Technicot Support Center (TSC) operations were proficient. Accident W- Sec K man gement and mitigation efforts were adequate in scope and e'fective in their implementation. The Operations Support Facility staff effectively monoged to support the repair tasks directed by the TSC. A Tec 5A thorough post exercise critique process was followed by on outstanding management presentation that summarized the most signifiCont exercise observations. The Emergency Operations Focility staff functioned efficiently in performing ossigned tasks.
05/15/1998 19980034M Prt PLTSUP NRC VIO IV Pii- IC On two separate occasions, the escort responsible for the comeromon did not maintain control or visual Sec: Sec: 3B w ecWrea Tec 04/18/1998 1998003 Prt PLISUP NRC POS Prt IC Rodiction and contamination controls for routine and refuc3ng outage 2R6 were appropriate and met opplicable UFSAR. Technical Specificatiort and 10 CFR 20 requirements. Work ar doses from 296 were properly evoluoted. The reactor coolont system cleanup and refueling outege chemistry prc " oms Ter- contributed to reduced dose rates.
01/24/1998 1997012 Prt PLTSUP NRC STR Pri 3A Pownnel performance during a Fire Brigade drill was very good. The brigade leader effectively performed duties and good fire ground toctics and victim rescue operations were performed Sec- Sec M Tec 01/24/1998 1997012 P PLTSUP NRC POS Prt 48 Plant fire barrier penetration seal designs were properly supported by ceol testing documentatiort vendor dato, insto!!er qualifications and training records 5 and Quality Assurance records. Fire barrier penetration seci M WG 5B engineering evoluotions for deviations satisfied Generic Letter 86-10.
Tec 3A 12/13/1997 1997011 Prt PLTSUP NRC STR Prt 28 The licensee's program for operator requatification, specifically the implementation of segment Sec: OPS s, e g en s. ew ces Sec: 3B adequately addressed the various aspects of segment examinations to effectively administer exams and Tec implement remedal training os deemed oppropriate.
Item Type (Compliance,Fonowup,Otcer), From 10/01/1097 To 01/31/1999
Page: - 10 of 11 ' Date:02/17/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission nm.: iS-2s:e negion n PLANT ISSUE MATRIX VOGTLE By Pnmary Functional Area Functional Temploie Dole Source Area ID Type Codes llom Description '
11/01/1997 .1997010 Prt PLTSUF NRC POS Pri: 1C The removal and storage activities for the lower guide tube were well controlled. coordino+ed and in -
accordance with the vendor procedure. Worker precautions were oppropriate. The licensee's oworeness Sec: MAINT Sec: 3A of radiological and personnel safety associated with this activity was identified as a strength.
Ter-10/20/1997 1997000-03 Prt PLTSUP NRC VIOIV PrtIC A violation was identified due to packages and materiots permitted to enter o Unit I vitot creo without g, g performing a security search. Security procedures did not incorpo ote +he requirements of the physical security plan occurately.
Tec 10/20/1997 1997009@l Prt PLTSUP NRC VIO IV Prt 3A A violation was identified for fire watch fire extinguishers being use:] to support plant activities beyond the v m en e chms was M WW m h 28 ey See: OPS Soc: 3B requirement for 54 extinguishers issued to personnel This issue resulteo from o lack of training and knowledge Tec of the inspection process for fire protection and maintenance personnel.
3 6
Kem Type (Compliance Followup.Other), f rom 10/01/1997 To 01/31/199G
Page: 11 of 11 Date: 02/17/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm. -ission nmens:28:n PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Legend Type Codes: Temploie Codes: Functional Areas:
BU Bulletin 1A Norrnd Operations OPS Operations CDR Construction IB Operations During Transients MAINT Maintenance DEV Deviation IC Programs and Processes ENG Engineering eel Escalated Enforcement ! tem 2A Equipment Condition PLTSUP Plant Support IFI inspector followajp item 2B Programs and Processes OTHER Other LER Ucensee Event Report 3A Work Performanct UC Ucensing issue 3B KSA C Miscellanem 3C Work Environment MV Minor Viofotion 4A Desigr:
NCV NonCited Violation 4B Engineering Support NEG Negative 4C Programs and Processes NOED Notice of Enforcement Discretion SA identification NON Notice of Non-Conformance 58 Anolysis P21 Port 21 SC Resolution POS Positive ID Codes:
SGI Sofeguard Event Report NRC NRC STR Strength Self SetReveded wen Mam Licensee Licensee VIO Vidation WK Weakness EEis are apparent vidations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escdoted enforcement oction in occordonce with the 'Gererol Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actior** (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its find enforcement dacision on the issues identif:ed by the Eels and tne PIM entries may be modified when the iinal decisions are mode.
URis are ui resolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is on acceptable item, o deviation, a nonconto.monce, or o violation. A URt may oiso be o potentid violation that is not likely to be considered for escdoted enforcement actiort However, the NRC hos not reoched its find conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are mode, item Type (Compliance Followup.Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999
2 _
VOGTLE
, INSPECTION PLAN _
INSPECTION TITLE / PROGRAM AREA NUMBER OF- PLANNED INSPECTION- - TYPE OF INSPECTION - COMMENTS PROCEDURE / - INSPECTORS DATES
~ TEMPORARY. ,
_ INSTRUCTION 73753 in service inspection 1 March 1999 Core 62700 Electrical Maintenance 1 March 1999 Regional Initiative - Electrical Maintenance during Outage Activities I
u I:4750/86750 Rad. Protection / Chemistry 1 June 1999 ' Core 81700 Security 1 July 1999 Core 37550 Engineering 3 July / August 1999 Core 71001 Requalification inspection 1 August 1999 Core F
r 83750 Rad. Protection / Chemistry 1 August 1999 Core ,
i !
37001 Engineering - 50.59 1 August 1999 Core '
NUREG-1201 initial Exams 3 Nov./Dec.1999 initial Exams i
i- !
a b
+
l
, i e
I
- Enclosure 2
[
__. - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ .