ML20235A640

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Requests Addl Info Re Util Application to Construct Power Reactor at Bodega Head,Including Info Re USGS Rept (TEI-844) & Mods to Accommodate Shear Movement in Foundation
ML20235A640
Person / Time
Site: 05000000, Bodega Bay
Issue date: 05/19/1964
From: Price H
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To: Whelchel C
PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
Shared Package
ML20234A767 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-85-665 NUDOCS 8709230369
Download: ML20235A640 (3)
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l Mr. C. C. khelchel i Vice-President l

Pacific Gas and Electric Company l 245 Market Street San Francisco, California

Dear Mr. hhelchel:

The ACRS and Regulatory Staff review of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company's application to construct a power reactor at Bodega Head was not completed at the conclusion of the last ACRS meeting. The ACRS plans to consider the matter further at a.later meeting.

Additional definitive information is requested in respect to the particular items set .forth below. These items have been developed

.in discussions between members of our staff and of the ACRS, and although there may be some . overlap between some of the items, it j would be helpful if you would respond to each as comprehensively '

as is feasible, a

1. The Company's amendment #7 of March 31, 1964, indicates  !

that designs will accomodate a few inches of shear movement in

., the foundation. The amendrrent further states that offsets up to 2 feet would damage the building but would not irapair containnnnt.

It is not clear to us from the information submitted ho.1 your desica plan would achieve this objective.

  • Tne record in this case includes a report from the Geological Survey dated December 1963 (TEI. 844) in which it is stated that "displacennnt on the order of a few feet, either horizontally or vertically, should be anticipated." A primary question i concerns the ability of the plant, located approxifrately a l thousand feet west of the edge of the San Andreas fault zone, to withstand as much as a few feet of shear displacement without'

[ e, undue hazaf'd to the health and safety of the public. Assuming, for two different cases, total shear displacement of as much as (a) 2 feet, (b) 3 feet, including both horizontal and vertical r

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C. C. Vhelchel May 19, 19611  !

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. l components, along any line and in any direction in the foundation, would the plant, as designed or as you may propose to modify the design, be constructed so that:

(i) the structure and leak tightness of.the containment building would not be impaired?

1 (ii) the ability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in the shut down condition would not be impaired?

(iii) primary system would remain intact? and  ;

(iv) supply of power to the facility would not j be interrupted? l If so, please describe the specific means and arrangements, includ-ing any modifications in the designs you have heretofore submitted, to a'complish e this. j l

Under the displacement assumptions stated above, what m3asures are  !

proposed to assure that the reactor could be maintained safely in a i chut down condition indefinitely if all vital connections to the I reactor building were severad? Additional related questions include the following:

1 a, Wnat are the arrangements (pumps, power sources, connecting linas) which 61ve confidence that the  ;

reactor could still be shut down by normal or by altemate systems?

b. For what direction or directions of ground slippage are vital internal components most vulnerable in case of damage to the building? How would vital safety components inside the building be protected against damage if the building were damaged by slippage?
c. What and where are the vital components of emergency electrical power sources? What equipment would they serve and on what tim schedules?

. d. What am the alternative sourcos of emargency cool 5D5?

Where are their vital components and what assurance is there that these would not be inactivated by any accident which mipit inactivate the primary cooling system? What are their capacities and tim schedules of effectiveness?

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C. C. Whelchel May 19, 1964' If the Company consideres that asswnptions, criteria, or design objectives different from those stated in the questions contained under item 1 above could be used and provide adequate protection,.

please describe these and explain how they would be mat.

2. If damage should exceed all expectations and actual core meltdown appeared irmdnent, or if decay heat from released fission products was causing pressure buildup which threatened the integrity of the containmnt, what actions might be taken to prevent the melt-down? What devices and preparations could be made in advance?

What tine schedules would be involved?

3. What is the degree of damage to the reactor building and the reactor to be expected from shear displacement along any line crossing the reactor building shaft? This analysis should not assume

, a size of displacement. What is desired is damage as a function of displacem nt. What displacement leads to fractum of the concrete structure? What displacement would rupture the containment? What displacement would lead to rupture of the primary reactor system?

It is vital that these judgmants be based on features of the system as it is to be built, and not be supported only in general terms.

The effects of both shear and tensile strains should be considered.

4. We wish to be sure we understand the' specific methods the Company proposes to use to analyze the ability of the structures to l

' withstand earthquake oscillations. Some new featums of the analysis wem introduced at the last ACRS meeting. Does the Company propose l to modify the frequency spectrum previously proposed (based on l El Centro, 1940) to take into account the rock foundation at the Bodega site?

5. What measures would be taken to protect against tsunamis greater in size than the breakwater at Bodega Bay would suppress?

Sincerely,

/s/ Harold L. Price Harold L. Price Director of Regulation O

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