IR 05000327/1987058

Insp Repts 50-327/87-58 & 50-328/87-58 on 870901-04. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Review & Evaluation of Licensee Emergency Preparedness Program

ML20235M286
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	09/22/1987
From:	Decker T, Kreh J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235M223	List: IR 05000327/1987058 ML20235M222 ML20235M263
References
50-327-87-58, 50-328-87-58, NUDOCS 8710060127
Download: ML20235M286 (7)

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58 REco UNITED STATES N

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/ 'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON REGION 11

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r j 101 MARIETTA STREET, *- 's ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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SEP 3 01987 Report Nos.: 50-327/87-58 and 50-328/87-58 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 6N38 A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, 1N 37402-2801 Docket Nos.:- 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.: DPR-77 and DPR-79 Facility Name: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Inspection Conducted: Septe ber 1-4, 1987 Inspectors: d '4 A k 87 J. L. Kreh -() Date Signed Approved by: f 2/87 T. R. Decker, Chief Date Signed Emergency Preparedness Section Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspection involved review and evaluation of the licensee's emergency preparedness progra Results: One violation was identified - failure to conduct a required monthly '

communications test for three consecutive month No deviations were identifie i 8710060127 B70930 l PDR ADOCK 05000327  :

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted'

Licensee Employees Sequoyah Plant

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• B. S. Willis, Nuclear Plant Supervisor &

• L. L. Jackson, Assistant to Plant Manager

• A. M. Qualls, Assistant to Plant Manager

• P. H. Buchholz, Site Represent &tive, Office of Nuclear PowerL

• E. K. S11ger, Manager of Projects ,

• D. L. Paul, Project Manager .

• M. Skarzinski, Group Supervisor, Electrical Maintenance )

• T. H. Youngblood, Emergency Preparedness Program Manager

• T. J. Arney, QA Manager

• H. R. Rogers, Supervisor, Plant _ Reporting

• D P. Ormsby, Licensing Engineer

• C, Landstrom, Licensing Engineer

• T. Noble. Project Engineer, Emergency Preparedness J. S. Lewis, Shift Engineer J. D. Patrick, Shift Engineer J. R. Setliffe, Chief, Nuclear Security Services 1-B..C. Lake.. Supervisor, License Training Section-C. T. Benton, Supervisor, Simulator Training Section Corporate Office

• B. K. Marks, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness Program D. L. Wall, Supervisor, Exercise Development and Emergency Facilitie's '

T. E. Adkins, Emergency Preparedness Program Manager

• E. V. Kingery, Emergency Preparedness Program Manager R. M. Smith, Project Engineer T. P. Teague, Manager of Emergency Information Planning A. A. Schenk, Supervisor, State and Local Programs K. E. Giggy, Project Manager, State and Local Programs 9ther licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, security office members, and office personne NRC Resident Inspectors

• K. M. Jenison , !

P. E. Harnen M. W. Branch

• Attended exit interview

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2 Exit Interview r The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 4,1987,

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with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1- above. . The inspector outlined

"1 the areas inspected and discussed in detail the violation described below in' Paragraph 4 (failure to conduct a required monthly. communications test). The ifcensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio . LicenseeActiononPreviousEnforcementMatters(92702)

(Closed) Violation - 327, 328/87-10-02: Inadequate training for licensed operators regarding use of REP Appendix A as a supplement to IP-1. The inspector reviewed the licensee'siresponse, dated April 14, 1987, to the Notice of Violation. The inspectcr determined through review of docunents personnel that the licensee had completed and the commitments for 'correctiv action by the self-imposed deadline of interviews with cognizant,d j July 1, 198 . NotificationsandCommunications(82203)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and (6); 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix'Section IV.D; and Sections 5.0 and 6.0 of the licensee's Radiological Emergency Plan (REP), this area was inspected to determine whether the licensee was maintaining a capability for notifying and communicating with itsfewn personnel, offsite supporting agencies and authorities, and the population within the 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) in the event of an emergenc The inspector reviedd the licensee's offsite notification procedure The procedures were consistent with the emergency classification scheme used by the licensee. The inspector determined that the procedures made

.e provisions for nessage verificatio The inspector determined by review of applicable procedures and by discussion with licensee representatives that adequate procedural means existed for alerting, notifying, and activating emergency response personnel. The procedures specified when to notify and activate the onsite emergency. organization, corporate support organization, and offsite is " agencie l The licensee's managenent control program for the Prompt Notification l System '(PNS) was reviewed. According to licensee documentation and discussions with licensee represtutatives, the system consisted of 35 fixed sirens and numerous mobile sirens. Maintenance of the system was provided by the licensee. The inspector reviewed siren test records for the period January 1986 to July 1987.' The records showed that silent tests were conducted biweekly, growl tests quarterly, and a full-cycle test monthl The test regine exceeded the specifications of NUREG-0654, Appendix The inspector was inforned of the licensee's plans to

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eliminate the tppd for mobile-siren routes" by expanding the fixed siren system to 107 units by early 198 The inspector questnned licensee representatives regarding the two / /

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spurious activations of the PNS which occurred approximately 8 minutes and ,

13 minutes after the scheduled monthly test on July 4, 1987. Although the. 7 licensee had extensively investigated this matter, the cause was not pinpointe Various methods for preventing a recurrence of this incident were being investigated, including changing the frequency of the radio signal used to activate the siren Communications equipment. in the Control Room, Operations Support Center

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Cer.ter (CECC) was ini;pected. Provisions existed for prom'pt communications among emergency response organizations, to emergency response personnel, and to the public. The installed communications systems at the emergency response facilities were consistent with system descriptions in the plant and corporate emergency plan ; l

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The lice 9see had recently institutId an Automated Paging System (APS) for

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expediting the notification of the plant emergency response. organizatio The APS was a computerized, menu-driv (n system which activated radio pagers via one transmitter onsite and several offsit The inspector _ conducted operability checks on selected communications equipment in the TSC. No problems were observed. The inspector reviewed licensee records for the period January 1986 to July 1987. Documentation

- 't of test data for Proventive Maintenance Procedure PM 0633-244, " Technical Support Center Phones," indicated that this monthly test was not done during August, September, and October 1986 due to lack of manpowe (Although the procedure in question had not at that time been categorized as either " mandatory" or " discretionary," licensee personnel responsible for its performance apparently assumed the latter.) Section 6.0 of the REP stated that " communications facilities . . . are tested monthly in accordance with established procedures." This provision, implemented by the test procedures of PM 0633-244 (Revision 14), addressed the requirement for monthly testing of communication links with the NRC, as contained in Section IV.E.9.d of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and as clarified in NRC Information Notice No. 85-44, " Emergency Communication System Monthly Test." Failure to conduct the specified monthly test during the cited 3-month period constituted a violation of IG CFR

, 50.54(q), which requires the licensee to adhere to the requirempts of the l; RE Prior to the end of' the inspection, the licensee ce@leted appropriate corrective action for this violation by issuing Revision

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PM 0633-244, in which the procedure was classified as " mandatory."The ;15 to licensee informed the inspector that an ongoing plant-wide review program exists to evaluate whether surveillance instructions are mandatory or discretionary. This matter is considered close (Closed) Violation (50-327, 50-328/87-58-01): Failure to conduct monthly communication tests under PM 0633-244 as required by the RE ,

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V On August 1.1, 1987, at 10:10 a.m., the siren used to notify plant personnel of a site assembly / evacuation sounded its "ALL CLEAR" signal for

3 minutes as the result of a technician's error during a routine

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< surveillance test. . The inspector noted that the two control panels (one in the main Control Room, the other in the Auxiliary Control Room) for the onsite siren were identical and had a " CANCEL" button which, according to a licensee electrical engineer, could be used to manually terminate an activation of either the " EVACUATION" or the "ALL CLEAR" mode of the si ren. Licensee personnel stated that, in either mode, the siren stops

- after sounding for three minutes unless manually cancelled. The inspector

discussed with licensee representatives the merits of instituting a Control Room procedure or practice whereby the Shift Engineer would immediately cancel any siren activation that he did not authorize. Such action could be followed by a PA announcement advising plant personnel of a false alar One violation and no deviations were identified.

l Emergency Plan for the Design Services Complex (82203)

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The inspector reviewed Revision 0 of Sequoyah Engineering

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Procedure SQEP-AI-20, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Design Services Complex

, (DSC) Emergency Plan," which was developed to compensate for the inaudibility of the emergency siren (discussed in Paragraph 4 above) to persons located inside DSC buildings. A management representative of the security force briefed the inspector on compensatory measures that would be ordered by the Security Shift Captain in the event of a site assembly i l evacuation, including use of bull horns by security personnel to alert DSC i staf General Employee Training (GET) was required for all site personnel, including those working in the DSC. Review of lesson outlines verified thac GET 2.4 included training in site accountability / evacuatio Based on these reviews and interviews, the inspector concluded that the licensee had provided adequate means to notify DSC personnel in the event that site accountability and/or evacuation is ordere c r Changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program (82204)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(16); 10 CFR 50.54(q); and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E Sections IV and V, this area was reviewed to determine whether changes were made to the program since the last inspection under this -

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procedure (November 1985) and to note how these changes affected the i

overall state of emergency preparedness.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's system (as delineated in REP Section 16.0) for review and approval of changes to the REP and its I implementing procedures. The inspector verified that changes to the plan and procedures were reviewed and approved by managenen It was also noted that all such changes were submitted to NRC within 30 days of the effective date, as require '

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Discussions with licensee representatives indicated that no significant I modifications to facilities, equipment, or instrumentation were completed since November 1985, with the exception of the APS, discussed in Paragraphs 4 and Implementation of the APS did not necessitate changes in the REP or its implementing procedures.

l The organization and management of the emergency preparedness program were reviewed. The Emergency Preparedness Program Manager (EPPM) gained a staff assistant in March 198 The position of Manager of Projects (to whom the EPPM reported) was reassigned on September 1,198 These changes did not degrade the effectiveness of the licensee's emergency preparedness progra No violations or deviations were identifie . Shift Staffing and Augmentation (82205)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Sections l IV.A and IV.C, this area was inspected to determine whether shift staffing for emergencies was adequate both in numbers and in functional capability, and whether administrative and physical means were available and maintained to augment the emergency organization in a timely manne Shift staffing levels and functional capabilities of all shifts were I

reviewed and found to be consistent with the guidance of Table B-1 of

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NUREG-065 The licensee had implemented an Automated Paging System for prompt notification of its key emergency response personnel, whether at the site or no The APS, activated by the Shift Engineer's clerk, appeared to be effective in meeting Table B-1 goal The inspector discussed staff augmentation times with licensee representatives, who indicated that drills had confirmed that Table B-1 augmentation times could be met. The inspector reviewed licensee records which showed that tests of the APS were held on a weekly basis since June 30, 1987, and that estimated staff augmentation times were consistent with Table B-1 guidanc No violations or deviations were identifie . Public Information Program (82209)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7); 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.2; and REP Section 7.0, this area was inspected to determine whether basic emergency planning information was disseminated to the public in the plume-exposure-pathway EPZ on an annual basi The licensee developed an emergency response information brochure for use by the public residing in or frequenting the 10-mile EPZ. The REP stated that the brochure was updated annually; the inspector reviewed editions dated Spring 1986 and June 1987. The current brochure included the required informatio .c

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According to licensee representatives, the means used by the licensee to inform the transient ~ population of appropriate emergency response measures and action included dissemination of public information brochures to

- motels, . hotels, gas - stations, and tourist attractions _ in the area, and signs at boat access ramps. ' Distribution of brochures to the listed -

establishments was accomplished by the Tennessee Department of Touris In addition to the' public information. brochure, licensee representatives indicated.that the public information program included an annual media day for informing news media . personnel, public speaking engagements, and a visitors' center to be constructed at the site in the very near term. The inspector also reviewed a description of the public information program in

. the RE Based on documents reviewed and interviews with licensee personnel, the inspector determined that the licensee's public information program continued to meet the applicable regulatory requirement .No violations or deviations were identifie . Inspector Follow-up (92701) (Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item- (IFI) 327/80-03-08: Provide training program for technical support personnel reporting to site in an emergenc The subject training program has been reviewed on an

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annual basis by NRC since this finding was made during a 1980 inspection. The inspector concluded that no further review was necessary to close this ite (Closed) IFI 327/80-34-02: Completion of a procedure correlating readings from Area Monitor RM-90-2 with containment activity. With upper and lower containment high-range radiation monitors installed and available for determining containment activity, the procedure in question was no longer necessary, (Closed) IFI 327, 328/87-10-01: Adding a requirement in IP-1 and/or A01-9 to check panel XR-52-86 if an earthquake exceeds 1/2 SSE. The licensee determined that neither alarm panel XR-52-86 in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Control Room nor any other installed instrumentation was able to provide prompt information on whether the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) was exceede If the applicable Control Room annunciator were to indicate an earthquake greater than 1/2 SSE, a controlled shutdown would be performed and an Alert declared, in accordance with procedures. The licensee planned to revise IP-1 to l delete exceedance of the SSE as a criterion for a Site Area Emergency. A higher classification than Alert would be declared for an earthquake only if warranted by plant conditions.

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