IR 05000327/1987009
| ML20206H826 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 03/17/1987 |
| From: | Belisle G, Russell Gibbs NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206H811 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-87-09, 50-327-87-9, 50-328-87-09, 50-328-87-9, NUDOCS 8704150453 | |
| Download: ML20206H826 (5) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:* k3 UGO UNITED STATES O ' %, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,6 o REGION il
.N 101 MARIETTA STHEET, N.W., SulTE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 \\...../ Report Nos.: 50-327/87-09 and 50-328/87-09 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 6N38 A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.: 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.: DPR-77 and DPR-79 Facility Name: Sequoyah 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: February 18 - 20, 1987 hfk ll: b 2l/ 7/['l Inspector: R. D. Gibbs w / Date' Signed Accompanying Personnel: G. A. Belisle Approved by: bd /5 h/7[[7 G. A. Belisle," Chief Date Signed Quality Assurance Programs Section Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the area of the licensee's corrective action program at TVA corporate offices in Chattanooga, Tennessee and at the Sequoyah facility.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
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- . REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- W. Andrews, Assistant Director, Division of Nuclear Quality Assurance (DNQA)
A. Copozzi, Manager, Engineering Assurance (EA-DNE) D. Craven, Manager, Sequoyah Site Quality Assurance (QA) D. Deacons, Assistant Shift Engineer, Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant (SNPP) T. Frizzell, Supervisor, QA Training Section W. Hannum, Chairman, Nuclear Safety Review Board
- C. Hansen, Licensing Support Section Supervisor, DNQA M. Harding, Site Licensing Manager, SNPP J. Houston, Consultant, Stone and Webster Engineering.
T. Howard, Quality Surveillance Supervisor, SNPP R. Kelley, Consultant, Stone and Webster Engineering G. Killian, Nuclear Quality Audit and Evaluation Branch Chief, DNQA G. Kirk, Compliance Supervisor, SNPP J. Law, Nuclear Quality Systems Branch Chief, DNQA D. Love, Mechanical Maintenance Craft Foreman, SNPP L. Martin, Site Quality Manager, SNPP B. Mason, Steam Fitter General Foreman, SNPP D. McCloud, Manager Quality Programs Audit Group, DNQA B. McCreary, Welding Unit Supervisor, Division of Nuclear Engineering, SNPP R. Moore, Manager Operations Support Audit Group, DNQA L. Nobles, Plant Manager, SNPP D. Ormsby, QA Site Coordinator, SNPP
- R. Parker, Division Director, DNQA R. Pedde, D; vision Director, Division of Nuclear Construction (DNC)
R. Pierce, Mechanical Maintenance Group Head, SNPP H. Ricks, Shift Engineer, SNPP R. Seiberling, Head Nuclear Management Review Group J. Steigelman, Radiological Surveillance Supervisor, SNPP J. Stitt, Conditions Adverse to Quality (CAQ) Coordinator, SNPP J. Sullivan, Head Plant Operations Review Staff (PORS), SNPP D. Thomas, Machinist Foreman, SNPP M. Travis, Boilermaker, SNPP G. Wilson, Assistant Operations Supervisor, SNPP Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, operators, mechanics, and office personnel.
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NRC Resident Inspector K. Poertner
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 20, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
The purpose of this inspection was to determine an accurate status of TVA's (The Tennessee Valley Authority) corrective action program and to assess efforts being taken by TVA to incorporate the new Conditions Adverse To Quality (CAQ) Program.
The following contains background information, a brief discussion of the CAQ system, the scope of this inspection, and conclusions reached: a.
Background Historically, TVA has been relatively good at identification of problems, but has had significant difficulty in accomplishing adequate permanent corrective actions in a timely manner.
As a result of this long standing issue, TVA senior management directed that a new corrective action program be developed and implemented at all TVA sites. This program was developed and issued during the last half of 1986 as Part 1, Section 2.16, of TVA's Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual.
Lower tier procedures have been or are being developed at each site for implementation (eg. Administrative Instruction AI-12 at Sequoyah).
b.
CAQ Program This program utilizes one type of nonconformance report, the Conditions Adverse To Quality Report (CAQR), to report, evaluate, and correct conditions which had been previously processed by:
r-as - .
Corrective Action Reports (CARS) Discrepancy Reports (DRs) Nonconforming Condition Reports (NCRs) Significant Condition Reports (SCRs) Problem Identification Reports (PIRs) Audit Deviation Reports (ADRs) Site Fuel Discrepancy Reports (SFDRs) Site Fuel Status Reports (SFSRs) Nonconforming Item Reports (NCIRs) This CAQ program provides for added personnel accountability in the corrective action process; establishes specific time frames for each group / division to accomplish its. assigned function; provides for an l , immediate operability evaluation; and provides the framework for trending, generic review, root cause analysis, reportability to the NRC and proper closeout of deficiencies -as well as, providing an escalation process for CAQs which are not receiving adequate or timely corrective action.
c.
Inspection Scope This inspection consisted primarily of interviews with personnel concerning the implementation of the CAQ program and a review of the training actions that were taken in an effort to implement the new system at Sequoyah.
Thirty-two TVA employees from the Chattanooga office, Knoxville office, and the Sequoyah site were interviewed concerning CAQ implementation.
Personnel interviewed included the full spectrum of departments / divisions and all levels of management
from division directors to craft personnel on site at Sequoyah.
A complete list of personnel interviewed is provided under Licensee Personnel Contacted in Section 1 of this report.
Conclusions drawn from these interviews are provided under the conclusions section of this report.
Investigation into the training area concluded that TVA has undertaken an extensive training effort for implementation at Sequoyah and is undertaking similar efforts for the other TVA sites.
Personnel from Knoxville, Chattanooga, and Sequoyah all received training prior to Sequoyah implementation.
Implementation at Sequoyah was scheduled for February 23, 1987.
The training was accomplished at two levels. Level 1 (Identification and Reporting of Conditions Adverse to Quality) was designed for nonsupervisory personnel and first line supervisors.
The Level 1 training covered primarily the reasons for the new system, what types of nonconformance reports were being replaced by CAQRs, and a description of how to properly complete the forms.
The Level 2 (Processing Cone:tions Adverse to Quality Reports) course covered the subjects of the Level I course and also added subjects such as operability reviews, escalation, processing, reportability, root I cause analysis, etc.
Personnel attending the Level 2 course were
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' required to score 80 percent'or better on a 15 question test which followed the course.
No test was given in conjunction with the Level 1 course.
The following is an approximation of personnel trained to support implementation at Sequoyah: Level 1 - 3,068 Level 2 834 - . d.
Conclusions (1) The new CAQ system provides tighter controls on the corrective , action process and provides a rechanism for escalation -of problems and more visibility of problems to management.
^ (2) The system has a significant amount of TVA senior management support.
' " (3) The attitudes of all personnel interviewed on the subject were
very positive on the system.
Some personnel discussed concerns
over the complexity of the system and voiced some normal skepticism concerning implementation as would be expected of any '
major program change.
! (4) The training was viewed as positive by all-_ personnel
interviewed. The training for implementation was extensive with nearly 4,000 people receiving training to support implementation , at Sequoyah.
l t l Within this area, no violations or deviations were identified.
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