IR 05000327/1988046

Insp Repts 50-327/88-46 & 50-328/88-46 on 881005-11. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Including Operations Performance,Sys Lineups, Radiation Protection,Safeguards & Housekeeping

ML20206A491
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	10/27/1988
From:	Jenison K, Linda Watson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206A442	List: IR 05000327/1988046 ML20206A439 ML20206A486
References
50-327-88-46, 50-328-88-46, NUDOCS 8811150148
Download: ML20206A491 (17)

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UNITED STATES j )* .j e NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION ll o

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• [ 101 MARIETTA ST ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30373

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Report Nos.: 50-327/88-46 and 50-328/88-46 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 6N38 A Lookout Place i

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1101 Market Street ,

Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801  :

Docket Nos.: 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.: DPR-77 and OPR-79 ,

Facility Name: Sequoyah 1 and 2  :

Inspection Conducted: October 5-11, 1988 Inspector: cYO dU48n - b - /0!#7!73 K. finison, Startua Manager Date Signed ,

Team Members: P. Harmon, Shift Inspector D. Loveless, Shift Inspector E. Girard, Region II Approved by: M d M o[(ft_ /of.27 88 L. Watson, Chief Project Section 1 Date Sidned

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TVAProjectsDivIsion i

SUMMARY Scope: This announced inspection involved onshift and onsite inspections by the NRC Restart Task Force. The majority of expended ins l)ec' lon effort was in the areas of extended control room observation and i operational safety verification including operations perforrrance system lineups radiation protection andsafeguardsandhousekeepIng i inspections. OtherareasinspectedIncludedmaintenanceobservations, l review of previous inspection findings, follow-up of events review of licensee identified items, and review of ins)ector fo1}ow-ua l item During this period there was extended con".rol room and p1 ant  ;

activity coverage by NRC inspector (

l Results: One violation was identifie L Violation 327,328/88-46-01. Failure to Provide fire Watch for i Non-functional Fire Barriers, (paragraph 9).  ;

No deviations or unresolved items were identifie !

The areas of Operational Safety Verific.ation, Maintenance, Surveil-  !

lance, Event Follow-up, and htended Control Roou and Plant Activity ,

Observation appeared to be adequate to sup) ort current plant operation l The corrective actions implemented for vlo)ation 327,328/88-46-01 i were determined to be adequate to support the restart of Unit 1 and  !

two unit operation. No issues were identified that require resolution l prior to tie restart of Unit i G311150149 G81103 PDR ADOCK 05000327 j Q PDC  ;

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In general, menagement response to plant activities and events during the inspection period was timely and effective. The licensee's response to an October 9,1988 RCS leakage event indicated effective operator control of the event. The inspection also indicated that the licensee's program for maintaining work request status and correcting identified maintenance items is satisfactory. Additional management attention to supervision of fire watches and to reducing the number of delinquent PMs was warrante .- .

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REPORT DETAILS '

Persons Contacted i

licensee Employees

• Acting Site Director LaPoint,

• R. Beecken, Maintenance Su?erintendent J. Bynum, Vice President, iuclear Power Production l

• Cooper Compliance Licensing Manager ,

80. Craven,, Plant Support Superintendent H. Elkins, Instrument Maintenance Group Manager- .

R. Fortenberry, Technical Support Supervisor '

J. Hamilton, Quality Engineering Manager J " QASupervisor Kearney,

• R. Kemmer, Fire Protection Superintendent i L. Martin Site Quality Manager

K. Morriso,n Plant Operations Review Staff T.Nahay,PlantOperationsReviewStaff R. Olson, Modifications Manager J. Patrick, Operations Superintendent R. Pierce

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• M.Purcell,MechanicalMaintenanceSupervisor Licensing Engineer M. Sullivan, Radiological Controls Superintendent [

M. Ray, Site Licensing Staff manager <

R. Rogers, Plant Reporting Section  !

• Y. Sadre, Engineering Assurance Engineer

• S. Smith, Plant Manager S. Spencer, Licensing Engineer

• Toto, Office of Nuclear Power Advisor

"J. Walker, Manager, Operations Support / Procedures '

C. Whittemore, Licensing Engineer .'

• P. Wilson, Plant Operations Review Staff

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NRC Representatives

• , *K. Watson, Chief, Poertner, Resi dent InspectorTVAProjectsSection1 F. McCoy, Assistant Director for TVA Inspection Programs

"Attended exit interview l

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NOTE: Acronyms and initialism used in this report are listed in the last

paragraph.

. SustainedControlRoomObservation(71715) l The inspectors observed control room activities and those plant activities I L

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directed from the control roon on a routine basis for the entire period of this repor Control Room Activities Including Conduct of Operations The inspectors reviewed control room activities and verified that operators were attentive and responsive to plant parameters and conditions; that operators remained in their designated areas and were attentive to plant operations, alarms and status; that operators employed communication; terminology and nomenclature that was clear and formal; and that operators aerformed a proper relief prior to being discharged from their watc1 standing dutie No deficiencies were identifie Control Room Manning l

The inspectors reviewed control room manning and determined that TS reguirements were met and that a professional atmosphere was maintained in the control rooin. The inspectors found the noise level and workin conditions to be acceptable and observed that radios or other non- ob related material did not exist in the control roo The contro room appeared to be clean, uncluttered, and well organized. Special controls were established to limit personnel in the control room inner area. Operator compliance with regulatory and TVA administrative guidelines were reviewe No deficiencies were identified.

, Routine Plant Activities Conducted In Or Near the Control Room The inspectors observed activities which require the attention and direction of control room personnel. The inspectors observed that necessary plant administrative and technical activities conducted in or near the control room were conducted in a manner which did not compromise the attentiveness of the operators at the controls. The liceasee has a Shift Operations Supervisor office in the control room area in which the the authorized bulk ofofthe issuance keys, administrative take place. activities, In addit ion, theincluding licensee has a separate work control group to handle H0, WR, SI, and modification matrix functions which release the licensed operators from the bulk of the technical activities that could impact the performance of their dutie No deficiencies were identified, Control Room Alarms and Operator Response to Alarms The inspectors observed that control room evaluations were performed utilizing approved plant arecedures and that control room alarms were iesponded to promptly wit 1 adequate attention by the operator to the

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t alarm indications. Control room operators appeared to believe the l alarm indications. None were identified by the inspectors that were ignored by the operator The inspectors observed operator actions during the RCS leakage event i on October 9 (See paragraph 9). The operators handled the situation in a calm manner and their actions were effective in stabilizing the !

plant. In addition, the recovery and reviews were performed without problem No deficiencies were identifie I Fire Protection and Fire Brigade ,

The inspectors reviewed fire brigade manning and qualifications on a routine basis. Both manning and qualifications were found to meet TS requirements. Fire watch performance is addressed in paragraph ' Shift Briefing / Shift Turnover and Relief l

The inspectors observed that U0s completed turnover checklists, l conducted control panel and significant alarm walkdown reviews and '

reviewedsignificantmaintenanceandsurveillanceactivitiesprlorto i relie The inspectors observed that sufficient information was transferred on plant status, operating status and/or events and abnormal system alignments to ensure the safe operation of the Uni ,

The inspectors observed the A505 relief and concluded that sufficient information appeared to be transferred on plant status, operating status and/ . events, and on abnormC. system alignments to ensure the safe operation of the Uni Shift briefings were ot,lerved by the shif t inspector Personnel l assignments were made chiar to oncoming operations personne Significant time and effort were expended discussing, plant events,  !

plant status,testing surveillance expected shif t activities,ivities, or maintenance act and unusua' plantshif t traini!

condition i No deficiencies were identified, Shift Logs, Records, and Turnover Status Lists The inspectors reviewed 505, U0, and STA logs and determined that l the logs were completed in accordance with administrative require-  !

ments. The inspectors ensured that entries were legible; errors were l

corrected, initialed and dated; logbook entries adequately reflected ,

plant status; significant operational events and/or unusual parameters l were recorded; and entry into or exit from TS LCOs were recorded promptly. Turnover status checklists for R0s contained sufficient  ;

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recuired information and indicated plant status parameters, system al'gnments, and abnormalities. The following additional logs were reviewed:

Night Order Log

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System Status .og Configuration Control Log Key Log Temporary Alteration Log j LC0 Log

) No deficiencies were identified.

. Control Room Recorder / Strip Charts and Log Sheets

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The inspector observed operators check, install, mark, file, and

. route for review, recorder strip charts in accordance with the s established plant processes. Control room logsheets were found to

,, be complete and legible, parameter limits were specified; and out-l of-specification parameters were marked and reviewed during the approval process.

l No deficiencies were identifie . Management Activities l

TVA management activities were reviewed on a daily basis by the NRC shift

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inspectors, and the startup ma6agsr. First line supervisors appear to be 1 knowledgeable and involved in the day to day activities of the plan First line supervisor invcivement in the field has been observed. In

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! general, management response to those plant activities and events that

occurred during this inspection period was timely and effective.

Chronology of Unit 1 Plant Operitions

The following arovides a chronology of major Unit 1 plant operations from

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September 25, :.988 to the end of this inspection period.

I The NRC Restart Task Force began shif t coverage on September 25, 198 At that time Unit I was in Mode 5 with preparations underway for entry into Mode Unit 1 entered Mode 4 on September 27,1988, at 3:45 p.m. and bagan performing activities required for entry into Mode Unit 1 RCS was heated t: 135 degrees Fahrenheit on October 9, 1988 to continue testing snd prepare for entry into Mode ' -

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5. Operational Safety Verification (71707) Plant Tours The inspectors observed control room operations; reviewed applicable logs including the shift logs, night order book, clearance hold order book, configuration log and TACF log; conducted discussions with control room operators; verified that proper control room staffing was maintained; observed shift turnovers * and confirmed operability of instrumentation. The nspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, and verified compliance with TS LC0 The inspectors verified that maintenance work orders had been submitted as required and that followup activities and prioritization of work was accomplished by the license Tours of the diesel generator, auxiliary, control, and ;urbine buildings, and containment were conducted to observe plant equipment including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks and conditions,ibraHons excessive v and plant housekeeping / cleanliness condition The inspectors walked down accessible purtions of the following safety-related systems on Unit 1 and Unit 2 to verify operability and proper valve alignment:

Auxiliary Feedwater System Residual Heal Removal System No violations or deviations were identifie Safeguards Inspection in the course of the weekly activities, the shift inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The perfor-mance of various shif ts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities including: protected and vital area access controls; searching of personnel and packages; escorting of visitors; badge issuance and retrieval; and patrols and compensatory post In addition, the inspectors observed tected and vital area barrier integr t rotected The area inspectorslighting,ifiedpro-ver interfaces between the security organ lation and both operations and maintenanc Specifically, the Shift Inspectors:

interviewed individuals with security concerns inspected s(curity during cutages reviewed licensee security event reports visited central or secondary alarm station verified protection of Safeguards Information verified onsite/offsite communication capabilities The inspector noted that a vital area door was open with a public safety officer posted at the door as a compensatory measure. The

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officer stated that the door was open because the ventilation system in the vital area had been out for approximately two months. During ,

Unit I heatup, the area had become unbearable to work in with the  ;

door closed. The inspector was concerned that this ) articular door '

being opened could allow easier unauthorized entry 'nto the vital  ;

area. The licensee stated that they would expedite repairs of the i ventilatin system. This ir ue was also discussed with NRC Region II  ;

personne? and determine' not to be a violation of the licensee's i security pla l.

i No violations or deviations were identifie [

] Radiation Protection l The inspectors observed HP practices and verified the implementation !

, of radiation pre tection control On a regular basis, RWPs were ,

l reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to ensure the r

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activities were being conducted in accordance with the applicable

RWP Selected radiation protection int,truments were verified  !

operable and calibration frequencies were reviewed. The following '

! RWPs were reviewed:  ;

i RWP 88/0000011, Revision 1, M0EL Hot Tool Room l l j -

RWP 88/0000024, Revision 2, All RWP Areas, Excluding Containment No violations or deviations were identified, i  ;

Shift Sur',eil!ance Ot,servations and Review (61726)

l j Licenste activities were directly observed / reviewed to ascertain that [

1 surveillances of safety-related system; and components were being i j conducted in accordance with TS requirement ,

The inspectors verified that

testing was performed in accordance with ;

j adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; LCOs were met, i

test results met acceptance criteria requirements and were reviewed by l deficiencies were !

personnel identified, as other than theand appropriate, individual directing ident any deficiencies the test;ified during the i

. testing were properly reviewed and resolved by management personne ; and l l system restoration was adequate. For completed tests, the inspector l

verified that testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by l i qualified individual !

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I The following ictivities were observed / reviewed with no deficiencies I 1 identified:

l 51-208, CSSC Instrument Availability l

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S1-488, RCS RTO Sensor Verification of Cal:bration j SI-118, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump rd Valve Automatic  !

j Actuation j

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During the inspection period, the following problems were identified in SI performance:

51-166.6, Testing of Category A and B Valves After Maintenance or Upon Release From a Hold Order During the performance of SI-166.6 on the UHI isolation valves, 1-FCV-87-23 failed to stroke to the full closed positio The licer.see system engineer stated that the problem was probably attributable to an inadequate procedure for manual stroking of these valves. A VR was written to investigate and repair the proble Further testing is scheduled to be completed on the valve. Resolu-tion of the problem described above is designated shift inspector item 88-46-DL-0 No violations or deviations were identifie . MonthlyMaintenanceObservation(62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures re andinconformancewithYS.gulatoryguides,industrycodesandstandards, The following items were considered during this review: LCOs were met i while components or systems were removed from service; redundant l components were operable approvals were obtained )rior to initiating the work; activities were ac;complished using approvet procedures and were inspected as applicable; procedures used were adequate to control the l activity; troubleshooting activities were controlled and the repair records accurately reflected what actually took place; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems I to service; QC records were maintained activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly ces tified; radiological controlc were implemented QC hold points were estab'ished where required and were observed fire ; prevention controls were implemented; outsidecontractorforceactivitIeswerecontrolledinaccordancewiththe approved QA program; and housekeeping was actively pursue Tenporary Alterations (TACFs)

The (0110 wing TACFs, were rev' wed:

TACF 1-86-006-68, RID re acation to spare position in manifold TACF 1-82-97-87, Remove leads to allow inaccurate UHI troubie alarms to be cleare TACF 1-83-21-85, Replace detector P-4 cable with spare cable M The inspector rioted this tag on the control board and determined that the TACF was no longer active ana had actually been closed since April 5, 1984. The inspector expressed to plant management that this

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was an example of poor attention to detail on the part of the operators in that they had a)! owed the tag to hang on the main control board

, for over four years without knowing that it was close No violations or deviations were identified,

{ Work Requests The following work requests were reviewed:

WR B765246, U-1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Controller Troubleshooting WR 8237124, Investigate and repair failure of 1-FCV-87-23 to full stroke close No violations or deviations were identified.

Hold Orders The inspectors reviewed various H0s to verify compliance with AI-3,

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revision 38, Cler.rance Procedure, and that the H0s contained adequate information to properly isolate the affected portions of the system being tagge Additionally the inspectors verified that the required tags were installed on the affected equipment. The following H0s

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were reviewed:

Hold Order Equipment

! H.O. 2-88-613 U-2 Rad Monitor HVAC Unit

! H.O. 1-88-020 Culd Leg Accumulators l No violations or & ,iations were identified.

I 'ventFollow-up(93702,62703)

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At 1:43 p.m. on October 9,1988, personnel inside containment reported a i steam leak in or near the #4 accumulator room. Theplanthadjustbegun heating up from 270 degrees in the RCS to 316 degrees. The SOS immediately ordered all personnel out of containment and began cooling back down to 275 degree An AUD accompanied by a HP technician reentered containment to identify the source of the lea The leak was identified as Coming from valve 1-FCV-63-598, which had been tagged open, with a hose attached, to maintain a portion of the ECCS test header depressurized for valve leak testing (S1-166 series). The AVO closed valve 1-FCV-63-598 ana the leak stopped. The leakage path was later traced back from valve 1-FCV-63-598 to valve 1-FCV-63-97, an air operated valve in the test line on the RHR pump discharge lin The RHR pumn was running in recirculation at the time of the event which aressurized the upstream side of valve 1-FCV-63-9 Valve 1-FCV-63-97 aad been under repair for a stem rotation problem and tagged shut, with the repair work lef t ;ncomplete. No personnel contamination resulted from this event, and the actions taken by

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operators to stop the leak were prudent and timely. Resolution of this item will be tracked as shift inspector item 88-46-PH-0 No violations or deviations were identified.

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9. Resolution of Previously Identified Mode Change Items (92703)

(Closed) 327,328/8844-01, Adequacy of Fire Protectiun Watche The inspector reviewed vital / protected area key card printouts of selected fire watch personnel for September 28, 1988. 1he inspector noted four items:

I Certain routes had been walked simultaneously by two individuals l

required to walk separate routes.

{ Certain routes had not been adequately covere ' One individual had not been inside the protected area for the entire timeframe of one of his assigned route The times for all routes appeared to be of insufficient duration to survey the raquired area Specifically, on September 28,1988, from 10:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. the required fire watch patrol was not performed and several breaches of fire barriers on this route were not checked.

1 TS 3.7.12 requires that all fire barrier penetrations (including cable

{ penetration barriers, firedoors and fire dampers) in fire zone boundaries J protecting safety-related areas shall be functional at all times.

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TS 3.7.12 Action a. requires that with one or more of the above required

fire barrier penetrations non-functional, within one hour... verify the

! OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of the non-functional j fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol, j The failure to perform adequate fire watches is identified as Violation 4 327,328/88-46-01 for failure to comply with TS 3.7.12 action statement a.

The 1,1censee's response and corrective actions to this violation should

l address all the identified deficiencie On September 30, 1988, this concern was brought to the attention of TVA managemen The issue was documented and is being tracked under CAQR SQP-88-051 TVA's investigation report contained the following conclusions and recommendations:

Conclusions: Some fire watch personnel were lax in their duties as fire watche These laxities include not adhering to fire routes, impro tion.per documentation and log keeping, and inadequate inspec-

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10 Even though mistakes were made in the daily journal log, no evidence was found of malicious intent to falsify record Even though the VAACS computer printouts show that fire watch personnel were in the area of the open breaches, sufficient t he was not indicated to adequately check the are Apparent lack of enough management oversight was evident for the fire watch personnel and their route Recommendations: Provide additional training to fire watch personnel to emphasize the importance of accurate logs, and adherence to hourly route schedule Give the investigated individual a warning letter, Investigate feasibility of installing keyed watchman station Prohibit the exchanging of routes between fire itches during a given shift, Develop specific routes (i.e. by drawing) as an aid to the fire watche Provide management oversight as in spot check of routes and of personne Provide fire watch with unique identification (e.g. red vest).

The licensee's immediate corrective action was to suspend the individual in question and to emphasize the importance of the fire routes to the remaining watche Currently both fire protection management 7.nd NRC are spot checking routes to observe fire watch personnel and are satisfied with the improvements. The immediate corrective actions for this issue are considered adequate to allow two unit operatio . Maintenance Bas *!ine Backlog Review The licensee's backlog of maintenance work was reviewed to assess the licensee's management of the backlog. The inspector examined the status and management tracking of maintenance work requests, modifications preventivemaintenance,andlicenseeactionstoaddresserosion/ corrosio _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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11 Maintenance Work Requests The inspector's assessment relative to the status and management tracking of work requests included the following reviews:

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Reviews of the WR status information contained in the Sequoyah September 23, 1988, Site Weekly WR Summary and the October 4, 1988 ?rintouts of open prioritized WRs (including mode change

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prioritizations for Unit 1 and appropriate items common to both .

units) '

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A review of historical work request information (past five for the Unit 1 main steam isolation valves, the feedwater

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isolat ion valves and the feedwater control valves (including a regulators). The historical data was reviewed to determine if there were repetitive equipment problems which were not being i properlyaddressedforthesubjectcomponent The inspector concluded the following from the above reviews:

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Adequate WR status and completion trends are prepared for and utilized by managemen l

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Prioritizations of WRs appear appropriate,

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In the inspector's judgement the number of WRs open and the l The '

indicated trends licensee falls in WR close completions to the are satisfactory industry median of 50 % for

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i corrective maintenance backlog that is greater than 3 months  !

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No repetitive maintenance problems were identified in the i component histories checked by the inspecto The inspector ;

noted that the histories of older maintenance work lacked i details such as problem significance and cause. Better 6 information was provided for more recent maintenanc The inspector observed that there appeared to have been many WRs for .

maintenance of feedwater control valves. Licensee personnel '

stated that they did not consider the maintenance to have been [

excessive for this type of component. lhe inspector accepted l this explanatio Modifications ,

The inspector's assessment relative to modifications was performed by (

reviewing an October 4, 1988 modification status report for feedwater i and main steam system components. The inspector reviewed this report  ;

and determined that the amount of incomplete modification work did not appear to be excessive. Modifications appeared to be adequately tracked and manage l I

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12 Preventive Maintenance The inspector's assessment of the licensee's preventive maintenance (PM) backlog was performed through discussion with involved manage-men personnel, review of computer tabulations of available and delinquent PMs for October 4,1988 and October 5,1988, and review of status information on PM com 1988, Site Weekly WR Summary.pletions included in the September 23,The numbe large to the inspector. The industry utilizes percent PM items overdue is a median of 6% performance indicatorindicate Licensee personnel and for about 1987 reported 15-20% of anthe industry PM items for Sequoyah are overdue. Industry data indicates that about 20% of the stations hcve overdue PM item percentages this hig Because of possible differences between the data on which the Sequoyah and industry percentages were based, this comparison may not be of significance in determining PM program implementation adequac From the review of the licensee's PM listings and information provided in discussions, the inspector considers that the licensee does not appear to have an excessive number of overdue PMs, however, improvement is desirable and PM status should be closely monitore Erosion / Corrosion The inspector interviewed involved licensee personnel pertaining l to the status of their examinations and corrective actions for l detecting and correcting erosion / corrosion problems in balance of

! plant components. The licensee personnel stated that all examina-tions and corrective work required for the Unit 1 components have been completed and that examinations of Unit 2 components would be conducted in the outage scheduled for January 198 Based on the information provided to the inspector in his questioning of licensee personnel, he concluded that the licensee's actions relative to erosion / corrosion appeared satisfactor The inspector concluded that the licensee's maintenance activities and associated maintenance backlog were being adequately manage No violations or deviations were identifie . ExitInterview(30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 12, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The Startup Manager described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listtd below. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any of the material reviewed by the inspectors during the inspectio _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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I Inspection Findings:

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One violation was identified in paragraph 9 of this report for i Failure to Provide a Fire Watch for Non-functional Fire Barriers.

, No deviations, unresolved items or inspector follow-up items were f identifie During the reporting period, frequent discussions were held with the Site

, Director, Plant Manager and other managers concerning inspection findings. l 12. Shift Inspector Followup Issues  !

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Issue Number Description Resolution l j 88-40-GH-01 Personnel related events I (2 examples) i I

88-40-GH-02 Missing fuses in t.ommon board l J 2A  ;

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i 88-46-DL-01 S1-166.6, UHI Isniation Va've [

j Testing  ;

l 88-46-PH-01 1-FCV-63-598 Leak r

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13. List of Abbreviations l l ABGTS -

Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System i i ABSCE -

Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure t

AFW -

Auxiliary Feedwater r

AI -

Administrative Instruction  !

A0I -

Abnormal Operating Instructions .

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AU0 -

Auxiliary Jnit Operator

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A505 -

Assistant Shift Operating Supervisor  !

BIT -

BoronInjectionTank  :

C&A -

Control and Auxiliary Buildings l CAQR

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Conditions Adverse to Quality Report i i

CPP -

Centrifugal Charging Pump l

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CCTS -

Corporate Commitment Track,ng System j

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COPS -

Cold Overpressure Protection System l CSSC -

Critical Structures, Systems and Components  !

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Containment Ventilation Isolation  !

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Direct Current DCN -

Design Change Notice [

DNE

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Division of Nucler.r Engineering [

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Emergency Core Cooling System EDG -

Emergency Diesel Generator [

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Emergency Instructions i EL -

Elevation  !

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Emergency Notification System [

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Engineered Safety Feature  ;

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Flow Control Valve

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Final Safety Analysis Report ,

GDC -

General Design Criteria GL -

Generic Letter HIC -

Hand-operated Indicating Controller H0 -

Hold Order HP -

Health Physics '

HVAC -

Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning '

IN -

NRC Information Notice IFI -

Inspector Followup Item ,

IM -

Instrument Maintenance  :

IMI -

Instrument Maintenance Instruction IR -

Inspea. tion Report  !

KVA -

Kilovcit-Amp -

KW -

Kilowa?.t KV -

Kilovolt '

LER -

Licenset Event Report  ;

4 LC0 -

Limiting Condition for Operation :

LOCA -

Loss of Ctolant Accident  !

MI -

Maintenance Instruction l NB -

NRC Bulletin i NOV -

Notice of Violation l NRC -

Nuclear Regulatory Commission !

OSLA -

Operations Section Letter - Administrative !

OSLT -

Operations Section Letter - Training .

OSP -

Officeof$3ecialProjects  !

PM -

Preventive Aaintenance l PMT -

Post Modification fest l PORC -

Plant Operations Review Committee i,

< P0RS -

Plant Operation Review Staff '

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! PR0 -

Potentially Reportable Occurrence {

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C'uality Assurance ,

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('uality Control

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Reactor Coolant System j

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Regulatory Guide RHR -

Residual Heat Removal  !

RM -

Radiation Monitor  ;

R0 -

Reactor Operator  ;

RTD -

Resistance Temperature Detector .

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RWP -

Radiation Work Permit RWST -

Reactor Water Storage Tank  ;

SER -

Safety Evaluation Report j j SG -

Steam Generator

SI -

Surveillance Instruction i,

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501 -

System Operating Instructions

! 505 -

Shift Operating Supervisor ,

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Sequoyah Standard Practice Maintenance i SR -

Surveillance Requirements  !

Senior Reactor Operator

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SRO i STA -

Shift Technical Advisor l i

STI -

Special Test Instruction i i

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TACF -

Temporary Alteration Control Form l TROI -

Tracking Open Items  !

TS -

Technical Specifications i TVA -

Tennessee Valley Authority UHI -

UpperHeadInjection l U0 -

Unit Operator i URI -

Unresolved Item i

USQO

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Unreviewed Safety Question Detarmination .

VAACS -

Vital Area Access Control Sys',em  !

VIO -

Violation WCG -

Work Control Group  !

WP -

Work Plan WR -

Work Request

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