IR 05000327/1997014
| ML20197G976 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 12/08/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197G919 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-97-14, 50-328-97-14, NUDOCS 9712310154 | |
| Download: ML20197G976 (29) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION !
REGION 11 .
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. Docket Nos: 50-327. 50 328 i
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License Nos: DPR-77. OPR-79 .
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Report No: 50 327/97-14. 50 328/97-14 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) i r
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Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. Units 1 & 2 l
- Location: Sequoyah Access Road Hamilton County. TN 37379 r
Dates: September 28 through November 8. 1997 Inspectors: M. Shannon. Senior Resident inspector R. Starkey, Resident Inspector _ !
S. Sparks. Project Engineer. Region II. (Section 01.3) ,
G. Wiseman Reactor Ins)ector. Region 1 (Sections F1.1-througl F8.1)
- Approved by: H. Lesser. Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects t
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97 2310154 97 PDR ADOCK O 7 9 PDR i Enclosure 4
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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
. Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. Units 1 & 2 i
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NRC Inspection Report 50-327/97 14. 50-328/97-14 i
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This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, j
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maintenance, engineering, plant support, and effectiveness of licensee i
. and preventing problems: in addition, it controls includes the results of an announce fire protection inspection by a Region 11 in-identifying, resolving,d reactor enginee ,
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Doerations :t e Operations' performance during the plant shutdown. outage arid startup !
was considered to be very good and contributed to a successful 30 day '
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i refueling outage. -In addition, the. licensee's preparation and i- 3rocedural controls for reduced inventory operations were good (Sections 01.2 and 01.3).
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e A non-cited violation w3s identified for failure to follow TS 3. regarding administrative controls while performing a local Leak Rate Test on a containment penetration (Section 01.4).
e A non cited violation was identified for failure to follow a procedure during alignment of the component cooling water system, and operators did not ensure proper valve alignment prior to starting the containment spray pump (Sections 01.6 and 01.5).
- e A non-cited violation was identified for examples of failure u approve
overtime prior to it being worked. The inspector noted that the administrative procedure for controlling overtime was adequate and outage overtime was not excessive (Section 06.1). '
t e Changes in organization personnel, piar.ning and management oversight =
resulted in improved operations performance during the Unit 2 refueling outage (Section 06.2),
e- lhe Management Review Committee (MRC) was effectively performing its duties and plant management was actively involved with the MRC (Section .
07.1);
- e- A strength was noted-in that the Quality Assurance organization was '
aggressively identifying areas in need of improvement (Section 07.2).
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[MaintenanceL
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o - In: general.--the conduct of maintenance during the Unit-2 refueling '
outage was considered to be very good (Section M1.1).
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I 2 l l e A weakness was identified for the lack of 31anning and coordination of l surveillance cetivities that resulted in tie generation of an unexpected i i~
reactor tr.ip signal and tripping of the reactor trip breakers (Section
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M1.1). .
L 1 e- A weakness was identified for not using test leads of sufficient lengt ;
resulting in a blown fuse on one of the three loss of voltage sensors on
- the 2A A 6.9 kv shutdown boards and entry into a TS action statement (Section Hl.2).
4 e The licensee has made significant improvements to the freeze protection-program, most notably at the-ERCW pumping station (Section M2.1).
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The licensee appropriately addressed 1swer related to the inappropriate
"D" station air con. pressor high oil temperature set points, unexpected *
automatic closure of the air compressor ERCW cooling valve, and drifting of the service air isolation valve pressure switch set points (Section M2.2).
- o Changes in ihaintenance oversight, alanning and work practices resulted in improved maintenance performance during the Unit 2 refueling outage '
(Section M6.1).
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- e Modifications implemented during the refueling outage appeared to be
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correcting / addressing many long-standing plant deficiencies (Section E2.1).
Plant Suncort ,
. o Functional testing for the modifications to the high pressure fire protection water system was being performed in accordance with the '
i -licensee's test documents. Good cooperation and communications between test-personnel was observed during pre-job briefings and data collection activities (Section F1.2).
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o The fire protection program im)1ementation was effectivt in-the continued reduction of inoperaale or degraded fire protection components
. and open fire protection related maintenance work requests. The material condition of the. fire protection components was good and the operable components were well maintained (Section F2.1).
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e' A)propriate surveillance tests and inspections were being performed on
, tie. fire protection' features and systems. The surveillance tests and
inspections of the fire protection systems and features met the
- requirenents' spec 1fied by plant procedures (Section F2.2).
.o Implementation of the fire protection transient combustible control program and the general housekeeping for control of combustibles within
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3-the plant were satisfactory. -Transient combustible evaluations met the licensee 3 orocedural requirements (Section F3.1),
e The fire brigade organization and training met the recuirements of the l site procedures and the performance by the fire brigace as documented by :
drill evaluations was good (Section F5.1).
a The coordination and oversight of the facility's fire jrotection program >
met the licensee's procedures and commitments to the NRC in the Fire Protection Report. The personnel assigned various fire protection related functions within Operations / Fire Protection organization were working together as a team and with coordination by the onsite fire
. protection engineers and fire protection specialist to implement the-fire protection program at the site (Section F6.1).
e The licensee's 1997 Nuclear Assurance and Licensing assessment of the facility's fire protection program was comprehensive and effective in identifying fire protection program performance to management; The licensee corrective actions in res comprehensiv.! and timely (Sectin" 7.1). 0onse to the identified issues were
- During the U2C8 outage, the total estimated Tl0 expos"re was 140 rem which was the site's best ALARA performance for an outage by more than 70 rem (Section RI.1).
e The inspector concluded that when airborne radiation was detected in the control room.-the airborne radiation levels were well below established limits and that the~ control room ventilation system fur.ctioned as designed (Section R1,2).
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ReDort Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 operated at full power for the entire inspection perio Unit 2 began the ins)ection aeriod at 74% power coasting down for the U2C8 refueling outage. T1e unit )egan the refueling outage on October Following refueling activities, on October 22 core reload was completed and Mode 5 was entered on October 26. Mode 4 was entered on October 30 followed by Mode 3 on October 01. On November 1. the unit was taken back to Mode 4 to perform a missed surveillance on the 3ressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs). Mode 3 was entered on Novem)er 2. Mode 2 was entered on November 3 and the generator was synchronized to the grid on November 4. The turbine was manually tripped due to a stator cooling water leak in the exciter cabinet and following repairs, was placed back in service on November 4. The turbine was taken out of service to perform overspeed testing arid then synchronized back on the grid on November The refueling outage was completed in approximately 30 day Review of Uodated Final Safety Analysis Reoort (UFSAR) Commitments While performing inspections discussed in this report the inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the UFSAR that were related to the areas inspecte The inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the observed plant practices, procedures, and/or parameter I. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations, during the refueling outage, was considered to be very goo ) .2 1%nt Outaae and Startuo Observations. Unit 2 Insoection Scone (71707)
The inspectors observed various outage and startup activities during the Unit 2 refueling outage, Observations and Findinas During the inspection per iod, the inspectors observed portions of receipt of new fuel. Unit 2 down power and plant shutdown, initiation of RHR cooling, core off-load, core reload, redr d inventory operations, i
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- plant heat up, reactor coolant pump starts, reactor startup, physics 1 testing, and power increase to 100%. The inspectors noted that the i evolutions were well controlled, with a significant level of senior !
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management present in the control roo The inspectors observed an increased level of self checking prior to performing various evolution [
including management / peer review of switch manipulations. Overal ;
operat'ons' performance was considered to be very good and contributed !
to a ;uccessful_J0 day outag ;
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A) proximately 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after synchronizing the generator to the grid, t1e main turbine was manually tripped due to a stator cooling water leak !
in the exciter cabinet. The licensee noted that work had been performed j in the area during the outage, but no indications of a leak were present when the exciter cabinet was closed out. The leak was subsequently l
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repaire When the unit was taken off-line to repair the stator cooling leak, the i
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L condenser steam dumps were used to maintain reactor >ower at approximately 10%. During repairs to the exciter, t1e steam dumps went closed and the atmospheric dumps opened due to a loss of condenser -
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signal (C-9). The licensee found that the sensing line to the condenser vacuum instrument had faile A briefing was held in the control room {
and it was discussed that no work was to be started on the failed j sensing line until the control room operator had reset the steam dump .
controls. A few minutes later, the ins)ector noted that the steam dumps i had opened and then had to be isolated ay the control room operator. It i was subsequently noted that a licensed reactor operator, in the fiel ;
had reconnected the sensing line, which generated a condenser available signal. This allowed the steam dumas to automatically reopen. After
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the sensing line was repaired and tie steam dumps were placed back in ;
service, the licensee noted that the steam dump flow was inducing a relatively high vibration on the sensing line, which may have i contributed to the failure. The failure of the line was still under
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review at the close of the inspection p"io Conclusions
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Operational performance during the plant shutdown, outage and startup ,
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was considered to be very good and contributed to a successful 30-day !
refueling outag I Unintentional steam dump operation occurred when a licensed operator attempted to reconnect the-condenser vacuum sensing line without bein !
directed by the control roo ,
- 0153 Cut'aae Insoections - Reduced Inventorv Doerations. Unit 2 {
a .- Insoection Scone (71707)
During this period the inspectors reviewed the license (s pre >arations !
-for operation in reduced inventory and midloop operations. Tie inspection included a review of the licensee's responses to Generic .
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Letter 88 17, LOSS OF DECAY HEAT REMOVAL. Unit 2 entered reduced inventory on October 25, 1997, after completion of core reload, and exited the condition on October 26. 199 ObservatioD.s and Findinas Specific items reviewed by the ins)ectors included a detailed review of 3rocedure 0 G0 13. Rev. 12. REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM DRAIN AND FILL OPERATIONS to ensure that the procedure required the following:
appropriate guidance and directives for RCS drain down, reduced inventory, and midloop conditions: directions for adequate configuration control: guidance to ensure at least two exit thermocouples were operable and RCS temperature was tracked and recorded; a minimum of two RCS level indicators were in service and that level was tracked and recorded: that level instruments were in agreement to within required tolerances; that outage activities did not lead to perturbations in the RCS system: that RCS inventory could be accomplished by at least two additional means in addition to the RHR system: that the hot legs were not blocked unless a vent that containment closure capability was maintained: and path was that the available:
required power sources were maintained and appropriate switchyard controls were in place. In dddition, the inspectors discussed special training received by Operations crews prior to entering mid100p conditions, Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee's preparations and procedural control for reduced inventory operations were good. The in',pactors noted that the subsequent reduced inventory operations were accomplished in a very good manne .4 Lack of Administrative Controls Durino local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) Inspection Scone (71707)
The inspector reviewed the circumstances of an LLRT which was performed on a containment isolation valve without Technical Specifications (TS)
required administrative controls being in plac Observations and Findinns On September 25. 1997, PER No. 50972181PER was initiated by a Quality Assurance (0A) inspector to identify an adverse condition noted while observing an LLRT on September 15. During the review of.the draft PER, the licensee determined that TS required administrative controls had not been in place during the containment penetration LLRT on September 1 Subsequently, the licensee noted that the procedure used for the LLRT on penetration X-48B S1 158.1. Containment Isolation Valve Leak Rate Test, did not provide assurance that the administrative controls, required by TS 3.6.3. were implemented arior to starting an LLRT surveillance in Modes 1 Additionally, t1e licensee noted that the test director had failed to inform the control room that the test had started.
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During the subsequent review, the licensee noted that prior to ,
performing the surveillance, the test director had gone to the Unit 2 .
main control room (MCR) to % ief the operators on the LLRT. The unit supervisor (US) instructed the test director to 90 to the work control center (WCC) to get the work approval >ortion of the test package ,
signed. When the test director left tle WCC he assumed that the WCC ;
would inform the MCR of the test approval and therefore did not return to the MCR prior to beginning the test. Thinking that all necessary >
briefings and approvals had been completed, the test director, with the assistance of an assistant unit operator (AV0). started the LLRT. The test director stopped the test when he identified that the penetration being tested was not completely full of water. Prior to stopping the
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test, a test connection isolation valve. 2 VLV 72 544. which breached containment, had been open for approximately 25 r.iinutes. During that time, an assistant unit operator AU0 was stationed at the valve fo" all but approximately 30 seconds. The test director returned to the MCR to ,
request that operators fill the header water column to the proper leve !
It was at that time that the control room operators first became aware 4 that the test had been in progres TS 3.6.3. Containment Isolation Valves, requires that each containment !
isolation valve shall be operable. The TS states that penetration flow path (s) may be unisolated intermittently under administrative control The Basis for TS 3.6.3 indicates that the opening of penetration flow pathfs) on an intermittent basis under administrative control includes sever considerations which the licensee did not implement. The inspector concluded that the licensee failed to ensure that '
administrative controls, as required by TS 3.6.3. were in place while an LLRT was performed on containment penetration X-48B. based on the control room not being aware that testing was underway and that containment had been breache During the subsequent investigation the licensee determined that the root cause for the event was that adequate guidance was not provided in S1 158.1 to assure administrative controls required by TS 3.6.3 were implemented. Several significant contributing factors were also i documented in the PER evaluation. The licensee's corrective actions included: counseling the personnel involved in the event and revising SI-158.1 and other procedures to ensure that adequate guidance was provided to meet TS administrative control requirements during the performance of LLRTs during modes 1 through 4. The licensee was also reviewing the need for a more formal change management process pertaining to outage activities which are changed to on-line activities, and, based on this review, plans on developing corrective actions if needed. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation. consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-217, 328/97-14-01). .
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5 Conclusions ;
One non cited violation was identified for failure to follow TS 3. regarding administrative controls while performing an LLRT on a containment penetration.
015 Misalionment of the 28 B Containment Soray (CS) Pumo Insoection Stone (71707) .
The inspector reviewed the circumstances which resulted in running the 28-B CS pump with its suction valve close Observations and Findinas ;
On Oc'ober 22, 1997, with Unit 2 in Mode 6. an operator started the 2B B
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CS pump with its suction valve closed (CS pumps are not required to I,e operable in Mode 6). The pump start, required as part of the in-progress ESF testing, was performed using system operating instruction 0-50 72-1, Containment Spray System. Revision 12. Prior to running the pump, a temporary hold order lift had been issued on the preceding midnight shift which restored puwer to the containment spray system components. During the hold order release, the power to the pump suction valve was inadveatently omitted. The control room hand switch was placed in the correct )osition (open), but there was no power on the valve at the time. When tle mistake was realized, a hold order revision was made and power was placed on the valve. This resulted in the hand switch being in the correct position but the valve itself was still closed as a result of the improper sequence performed during the temporary lift of the hold orde When the on coming day shift operator completed the control board walk-down, he noted that the CS suction valve was closed with power ~0N".
Later during the scheduled ESF testing, the same operator started the CS pump but did not verify that the CS suction valve was open. After the operator noted that flow was decreasing and starting stopped the thepum pump, After securing the CS pump, the operator realized that the suction valve was closed, The licensee later determined that the pump had been run for 46 seconds with thc suction valve close During the course of the day shift, several other operators had walked by the control board and did not notice or question the valve misalignmen Although 0-50721 did not require verification of suction valve position prior to starting the pump. it did require the suction valve to be opened per the system standby alignmen The inspectors noted that each CS pump is equipped with a minimum flow line for pump protection. The minimum flow valve was verified by operators to have opened during this event, following its designed 10 second time delay. As a precautionary measure to verify no pump damage, the licensee manually rotated the > ump to check for rubs or interference. Additionally, an ASiE Section XI test of the pump was successfully completed on October 27, 199 ,
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c. Capclusions The inspector ccncluded that operators did not ensure correct system alignment prior to starting a containment spray pump for testing while in Mode .6 Misalicament of 28 B 'omponent Coolina Water System (CCS) Pumo Inspection Stone (71707)
The inspector reviewed the circumstcnces related to the valve misalignme:.t of the 2*l B CCS pump which resuh ed in running the pump with its discharge valve close b. Observations and Findinas On October 16 1997, two AU0s were dispatched to align the 2B-8 CCS pump from "A" train to "B" train per system o ting instruction (50) 0-50-70 1. Component Coolin breakers were close Trai gswitches Water Revision 1 System Various then transfer were placed in"B"pera the " AUX" positions and finally the valves were positioned individually in segurace in preparation to align the pump to the *B" train. The 50, which only required a single party sign off, was performed by two AU0 One AUD read the procedure stas aloud while the other AVO manipulated the various components. The AJO reading the procedure apparently skipped one valve in the sequence, but initialed the step as complete This led to a failure to open valve 2 FCV-7-28. CCS Pumps 2A A and 2B-B Discharge Crosstie to r-S Outlet Isolation. After the lineup was thought to b5: completed, control rom 1 operators started the 2B B CCS pump and then imediately stopped t cump after observing no change in CCS parameter The inspectors concluded that the failure to follow procedure steps 0-50 70-1 was a violation. This non-repetitive, licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non Cited Violation, cons 1.; tent with Section Vll. B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-327, 328/97-14-02 c. Conclusions One non cited violation was identified for failure to follow a procedure during alignment of the component cooling water syste Operations Procedures and Documentation 03.1 Start of All Four Emeraency Diesel Generators (EDG) Unexpected by Doeratoi s a. InspectinnScone(71707)
The inspectors reviewed the reason for the start of all four EDGs, which was unexpected by operators, during ESF testin _. . _ _ _ _. _ _ _. _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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' I Observations and Findinas )
On October 7, 1997, during performance of 2-SI 0PS-082-026.A. Loss of ;
4 Offsite Power With Safety Injection DG 2A A Containment Isolation Tes ,
i Revision 12. Section 6.3, Safety Injection / Phase B Actuation. Test *
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Sequence Three, all four EDGs automatically started. Due to recent i procedure changes which prevented multiple EDGs actuations during
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performance of different sections of this surveillance, operators 1
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expected only one EDG would start during the safety injection actuation -
section of this surveillance. In addition, operators noted that there was a step which had been added inadvertently by the procedure writers which also contributed to the operator's confusion. Although not :
-specifically stated. It was the intent of Section 6.3 that all four EDGs ;
would start during the safety injection actuation tes ,
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The inspector reviewed Section 6.3 of the procedure and noted that it '
- did not identify that all four EDGs would start during the test. -Section d
6.3 only discussed the starting and required run time of the 2A A ED The procedure apparently assumed that operators would recall, from ,
previous tests. that all four diesels would star The licensee
> initiated PER No. SO972292PER to document the procedure discrepanc Conclusions The inspector concluded that 2-SI-0PS-082 026.A. Section 6.P. did not include steps to indicate that all EDGs would start during a simulated safety injection test. The lack of procedure clarity resulted in i o)erator confusion during the test and is identified as a weakness in t1e procedure writing process.
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06 Operations Organization and Administration 06.1 Review of Overtijne 4 Insoection Scoce (71707)
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The-inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for administratively controlling overtime to meet regulatory requirements as specified in TS and reviewed overtime records for the Unit 2 outag ' Observations and Findinas On October 8.-1997, the licensee-placed in effect a new procedure,
, . Standard Programs and. Processes (SPP)-1.5 Overtime Restrictions (Regulatory), which established TVAN's revised program to meet -
regulatory requirements for overt 1me as specified TS. SPP-1.5-replaced
. SSP 1.7. Overtime Restriction (Regulatory) which was previously used to-
. address the subject of overtime. SPP 1.5 implemented the guidelines of TS 6.2.2.9 regarding working hours of the unit staff who perform safety
' ; related functions. The inspector reviewed SPP-1.5 and concluded that it adequately implemented the TS guidelines for the use of overtime, ,
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--The inspector reviewed the Overtime Limitation Exception Reports (from SPP-1.5) which were initiated during the Unit 2 (U2C8) refueling outage j (for the period October 1 31. 1997). Exception reports were generated i for those employees who exceeded the guideline overtime hours of SPP- ,
1.5. The inspector reviewed approximately 75 exceptior, reports, some of !
which granted approval to groups of employees rather than individual i However the inspector identified 11 examples where approval was not ;
granted, by the plant manager or the site vice president or their !
-designees, until after the overtime had been worked, which did not meet i the requirements of TS 6.2.2 9 and SPP- c The licensee failed to follow the requirements of TS 6.2.2 9 which l states that any deviation from the overtime guidelines shall be i authorized in advance by the plant manager or his designee, in accordance with approved administrative procedures. SPP-1.5. Section 3.0.E. states that the Overtime L. imitation Exception Report form must'be filled out and approved before the individual (s) exceed (s) the overtime
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limit. This failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is being treated as a Non Cited Violation, consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-327, 3?8/97-14-03).
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When informed by the inspector of the findings, the licensee promptly '
initiated a PER. No. S0972537PER and a Standing Order. 50 97-084. to address the necessity of approval prior to exceeding the overtime !
limits. Corrective actions included reminding all departments of the '
requirement to approve overtime prior tc exceeding overtime limit Conclusions I
One non cited violation was identified for failure to approve overtime prior to it being worked. The inspector concluded that the licensee has an adequate administrative procedure in place to control the use of overtime and that overtime, as a whole, did not appear to be excessiv .2 Doerations Performance Durinq the Unit 2 Refuelina Outaae Insoection Tcooe (71707 aD.d 40500)
- The inspectors reviewed the organizational and-planning changes made by $
operations for the outag ;
b .- Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed the Unit 2 cycle 8 outage related changes in the area of operations. Discussionswithoperationsmanagementindicated-significant changes were made in the areas of organization, personne preparation and management oversight. In the area of organizatio .
-changes were made-to have-se>arate shift monagers for Unit 1. Unit 2 and the Work Control. Center wit 1 each having responsibility for oversigh In addition, the work control center was staffed with adequate personnel to complete the large amount of work. Personnel were selected for the outage staff based on individual skills. There was extensive operations
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involvement in the outage schedule development, clearance development, and work package review. Managers were assigned to observe a significant number of ongoing activities with the guidance to remove barriers for getting the job done right. Although the inspectors noted it would be difficult to evaluate any individual change, overall. the sum of the changes resulted in a successful 30 day refueling outage with a limited number of operational errors / deficiencie i
, Conclusions Changes in organization, personnel, planning and management oversight resulted in improved operations performance during the Unit 2 refueling outag Quality Assurance in Operations 07.1 Review of the Manaaement Review Committee (MRC) Inspection Scope (40500)
The inspectors observed the performance of the Management Review Committe Observations and Findinas The inspectors attended several MRC meetings over the course of the inspection period. The purpose of the MRC is to review problem evaluation reports (PER) and to approve the disposition of PERs. The inspectors noted that the makeu) of the MRC had changed. In its present form, the committee is chaired ay the plant manager and is attended by the site vice president and various department managers. The inspectors noted that the senior managers closely review the root causes and corrective actions associated with the individual PERs to ensure that the deficient condition is adequately addressed. Over the last several months, this overview has resulted in a higher quality of root causes and corrective actions, that should ultimately result in improved plant performanc Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the MRC is effectively performing its duties and that plant management is actively involved in the Mh .2 Ouality Assurance Observations of Outaae Activities (40500)
The inspectors reviewed the QA department's findings and observations of outage activities for the first four weeks of the Unit 2 outag _ ._
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The QA Summary documented several problems associated with clearanc !
status control, poor labelling and verification. The OA organization !
was aggressively identifying areas in need of improvemen ,
II. Maintenance M1 t,onduct of Maintenance-M1.1 General Comments ;
- Insoection Scone (61726 & 62707)
- Using inspection procedures 61726 and 62707. the inspectors conducted *
frequent reviews of ongoing maintenance and surveillance activitie The inspectors observed and/or reviewed all or portions of the following I
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work" activities and/or surveillances:
e WO 97 001409 Alignment of 2A A MDAFW ;
e- 1-SI-0PS 082 00 Diesel Generator IB-B Operability Test ,
e 0 HI-MXX-062 00 Centrifugal Charging Pump Speed Increaser Inspection and Maintenance ,
e WO 97 001091 Change CCP Speed increaser 011 1 e WO 97-005723 MDAFW 1A A Change Oil, inspect Packing
- 0 PI-0PS 000-00 Freeze Protection
. 0 RT-NUC 000-00 Low Power Physics Testing
- 2-SI-0PS 082-02 toss of Offsite Power With Safety Injection DG 2A A Containment Isolation Test ,
e M&Al-27 - Freeze Protection :
I e- 2 SI-0PS 003-118 .R TDAFW Pump-Automatic Start and Roll
- - 2-SI-SXP 003 20 TDAFW Pump 2A S Performance Test-
>
- 2-PI;ICC 085 051'.0 Calibration-(Initial Cold / Final Hot) Of Rod Position Indication Channels
.* 0-SI-IFT-099 09 Functional Tests of Turbine Auto'Stop 011-
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Dump and Throttle Valves Reactor Trips
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o e' 0 SI-SXV-001'-266.0' ASME Section XI Valve Testing 2-FCV-1-25
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wn-- y ww y e- g--- t + , - .w-A- r y - wry-w--y- -- -- ,n, 1-- , - - -- r,w-
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- 2 SI-lFT 092-N3 Functional Test of 2XX-92-5003 1R Nuclear Instrument System Channel I
- 2 SI-IFT 092 N3 Functional Test of 2XX 92 5003 1R Nuclear Instrument System Channel 11
- 2-SI-IFT-092-N4 Functional Test of Pcwer Range Nuclear Instrument System Channel 44 e 2-SI-lFT-092 N4 Functional Test of Power Range Nuclear Instrument System Channel 43 e 2 St 0PS 068-13 Leak Rate Calculation b. Observations and Findinas The inspectors noted that in most cases, the work activities and the performance of the surveillance activities were adequately performe hile observing various activities and/or by reviewing control room logs, the inspectors noted some instances where deficient conditions or. curred during surveillance activitie On October 29. with Unit 2 in Mode 5. a reactor trip signal was initiated and the reactor trip breakers automatically opened. The reactor trip breakers had been closed to perform AMSAC testing. The unit supervisor subsequently authorized surveillance testing for two overtemperture delta T channels. When both delta T channels were tested with the reactor trip breakers closed. a reactor trip signal was generated. The licensee did not consider this to be a reportable even During testing on the main turbine control and trip circuits, the inspector observed that an unexpected turbine trip / reactor trip signal was generated. An actual trip did not occur because the plant was in Mode The licensee subsequently determined that a pressure surge occurred when the pressure switch being tested was valved in and actuated the second pressure switc Conclusions in general the conduct of maintenance during the Unit 2 refueling outage was considered to be very goo A weakness was identified for the lack of )lanning and coordination of surveillance activities that resulted in tie generation of an unexpected reactor trip signal and tripping of the reactor trip breaker .
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M1.2 Baintenance Activity Results in Blown Fuse on Shutdown Board Insoection Scooe (62707)
The inspector reviewed the event which resulted in a blown fuse in one of three loss of voltage sensors on the 2A-A 6.9 kV shutdown boar Observations and Findinas On October 20, 1997, with Unit 2 in Mode 6. electricians connected test equipment to the kw meter located on the front of the 2A-A centrifugal charging pump breaker cubicle on the 2A A 6.9 kV shutdown board to measure parameters during a pump full flow test. Three leads, one from each >hase, were connected to test instrumentation which was on a movea)le cart positionec adjacent to the cubicle. On October 21, 1997, the "C" phase lead became disconnected from the test equipment and shorted to ground which resulted in blowing a fuse in one of the three loss of voltage sensors for the shutdown board. Transmission and Power Supply (TPS) notified the control room of the blown fuse conditio Unit 1 entered the action of TS 3.3.2.1. Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation, which required that all three loss of voltage sensors be operable. Subsequently, operations and engineering developed an action plan to replace the blown fuse and the voltage sensor was restored within the allowed outage time of the T The inspector reviewed PER No. SQ972454PER which documented the event and discussed the event with TPS management. The inspector was informed that the cart had moved (5-6 inches) when electricians attempted to lock the cart wheels to prevent cart movement. The 'C' phase electrical lead became disconnected from the test equi) ment when the cart moved and resulted in the grounded condition. lie discussion revealed that the leads did not have sufficient length to allow for movement of the car Furthermore, the "C" lead was connected to the test equipment with a banana jack. The other two leads were connected with spade leads. All three leads had been tap 2d to the front of the breaker cubicle to restrict their movement. Although either type of connector is acceptable, apparently the electricians were only able to find two s)ade type connectors when setting up the test equipment. The short lengt1 of the leads in addition to the use of the banana jack, allowed the C'
phase lead to become disconnected when the cart was moved, Conclusions The inspector concluded that electrical leads of insufficient lengtii were used while performing a maintenance activity which ultimately resulted in a disconnected and grounded lead and the uplannned entry into a TS action statement. The use of electrical leads of insufficient length to safely perform a maintenance activity is identified as a work practice weaknes _ __
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M1.3 Missed TS Surveillance for the Pressurizer PORVs Insoection Scone (61726)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's activities associated with the missed streke testing of the pressurizer PORVs required to be tested in Mode Observations and Finding 1 At 2:52 p.m.. on November 1. with Unit 2 in Mode 3. the licensee identified that testing of the pressurizer PORVs did not comply with the requirements of TS Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b. Unit 2 was taken from Mode 3 to Mode 4 and the stroke testing of the PORVs was completed at 12:45 a.m., on November TS Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b requires that each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel durina Mode 4. Due to a scheduling error the licensee had completed this surveillance activity on October 28, 1997, with the unit in Mode 5. The 3ressurizer did have a steam bubble and plant pressure was at 350 psig: lowever. RCS temperature we below 200 degrees F. The inspectors noted that 4 conditions in the pressurizer could have been identical in Mode 4 or Mode 5 for purposes of testing the PORVs. Further review by the licensee noted that the Unit 1 PORVs were also tested in Mode 5 during the last refueling outage and that the 18 month surveillance interval for testing of the PORVs in Mode 4 will expire in January 1998. This issue is being identified as an Unresolved item pending further review of corrective actions (URI 50 328/97-14-04).
c. Conclusions A weakness was identified in the licensee's scheduling process for not aroperly scheduling the PORV surveillance activities for both units in iode 4 as require An Unresolved Item was identified for the missed TS surveillance requirement of SR 4.4.3.2. M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Cold Weather Preparations Insoection Scope (71714)
The purpose of this inspection was to deter-ine whether the licensee has effectively implemented a program to protect safety related systems against extreme cold weathe _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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b. Dhservations and Findinas
'.ne inspectors reviewed 0-PI-0PS-000-006.0, Freeze Protection Revision 13. Thi, procedure was performed in its entirety during the during week of October 1. A)pendices E through H of the procedure were performed -
weekly starting lovember 1, 1997 and will be performed weekly through 8 March 31, 1998 i Two doditional procedures are also used during freeze protection act?vities. Modifications and Additions Instructions (M&AI)-27, Freeze Protection. Revision 3, described the activities required for installing and removing temporary freeze protection measures to protect plant equi) ment that is cubject to poter,tial damage from abnormally cold f weatler (such as main steam pressure transmitters and other instruments o in the east and west main steam valve vaults and MSR dog houses). The instruction may also be used for temporary installation of freeze
{. protection in other areas of the plant when normal freeze protection fail Procedure 1/2-PI-EFT-234-706.0, Freeze Protection Heat Trace Functional Test, ft.nctionally tests het trace and cabinet heaters
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associaten with feedwater flow transmit,.ers, refueling water storage tank levei transmitters, condensate storage tank level transmitters, and high pressure fire protectior discharge pressure switches a pressure control valve sense lines along with ottar miscellaneous ,nt "
equipmen .
The inspectors walked down several areas of the plant, including the '
ERCW pumping station, refueling water sto age tanks and condensate storage tanks, and feedwater flow transmitter areas, to verify that the
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licensee had taken action to ensure operable heat tracing or to provide compensatory freeze protection measures. Notable improvements had been made to heat trace on piping at the ERCW pumping station including
.eplacing all heat true, all heat trace controllers and theruocouples
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which were not useabl The new ERCW heat trace system also 3rovides
, input to the plant integrated computer system which 't accessi)le to
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control room operator Previous problems with the licensee's freeze protection program were documented in Inspection Re) orts 96-01, 96-04, 96-14, and 97-01. The t
- inspectors had classified t1e freeze protection program, as it existed
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during the winter of 1995/1996, as weak and an Inspector Followup Iterc (IFI) 50-327, 328/96-04-13, was opened. That IFI ;ill remain open until the inspectors evaluate the effectiveness of the #reeze protection program during the vinter months of 1997/199 > Conclusions The licensee has made significant improvements to freeze protection systems, most notably at the ERCW pumpina -Ntion, v
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M2.2 Service Air Isolaticc Valve Unexoectedly Reocens Followina Automatic GDiuCP Insoection Scoce (62707)
The inspector reviewed the circumstances related to the tri) ping of the
" "D" station air compressor and the automatic reopening of tie service air isolation valve. 0-PCV-33 4. following a valid service air ;
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isolation conditio _ Observations and Findinas On October 11. 1997, when the 28 start buss was transferred to its alternate power supply during a re.nidual voltage decay test. the "D" b station air compressor tripped due to an apparent low voltage conditio The "A" and "B" station air compressors automatically started and
} carried the control air systen load. The service air system isolated I when control air pressure decreased to less than 88 psig. the setpoint lor service air system isolation. When the control air system pressure began to increase, due to the operation of the "A" and "B" air
, compressors. the service air isolation valve automatically reo)ened at
- approximately 86 asig. The valve reopenino was unanticipated )y n o)erator5sincetieisolationvalvenorma1Tyrequiresamanualresetof f t1e local pressure switch (0-PS-33-4) to allow it to ope ,
The inspector, who was in the centrol room immediately following the loss of the air co1 pressor, observed that the control air system pressure decreased to ap3roximately 83 psio When the "D" air compressor tripped, the ERCW cooling water supply valves to the compressor closed as designed. Without cooling water. D e air
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compressor oil temperature increased to 132 P which was above the high oil temperature trip set)oint of 125 F. The high oil temperature prevented a restart of t1e air compressor until operators were able to cool the compressor oil cooler by spraying r:w service water from a nearby hose onto the outside of the cooler. Approximately 25 minutes after it tripped. the "D" air compressor was restarted by operator As part of the corrective action for this event the licensee increased the high oil temperature set)oint to 135 F which corresponded to the trip setpcint as stated in t7e control room alarm response procedure (ARP). The licensee also modified the ERCW cooling valve logic to prevent valve closure upon a trip of the air compresso The inspectors were concerried that a system design problem permitted the automatic reopening of the service air isolation valve following the isolation signal. The licensee confirmed that the service air isoldtion valve is designed to remain closed until manually reset by operator The licensee's investigation revealed that the setpoint for 0-PS-33-4 had drifted 14 psig low (from its setpoint value of 88 psig).
Therefore, the pressure switrh (PS) never saw the low air pressure condition and did not initiate c' sure of the isolation valve. In addition to the PS. the service dir isalation valve is operated by a l
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! = ; pressure indicating controller (PIC). 0-PIC-33-4. which also has a-setpoint of 88 psig. The Plc initiates either a close or cpen signal-to-the isolation valve depending-upon control air system pressur The PIC
. closure signal does not seal-in as does the signal from the'P It was-the Plc which initiated closure of the service air system isolation
- - valve and then allowed the valve to reopen when control air system pressure increased.
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3- The inspector, in discussions with the licensee learned that a work
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request had been written on 0-PS-33-4 in March 1997 for a PS setpoint which had drifted 8 ,ig high. The insnector also learned that the installed PS mode' as obsolete and would have to be re) laced with a
.ie licensee stated that the PS would 3e replaced by a
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different type
~different model and that the existing PS would be calibrated at '
approximate 90 day intervals until such time as the PS is repiaced (in Jnuary 1998).
, Conclusions The licensee ap3roariately addressed issues related to the *D" station air compressor liga oil temperature set points, air compressor ERCW con 11ng valve automatic' closure, and drifting of the service air isolation valve pressure switch setpoin M6 Maintenance Organization and Administration
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M6.1 Suc. cess of Maintenance Durina the Unit 2 Refuelino Outaae JnipectionScooe(62707)
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The inspectors observed and discussed the changes made by the maintenance organization that contributed to the successful 30-day outage.
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._ -b, Observations and Findinos
G The inspectors reviewed the Unit 2 cycle 8 outage related changer in the Discussions with-maintenance management indicated
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area of maintenanc that significant changes were made in the areas of operations'
ownership. elimination of milestone managers, increased management in the field, and shifting work to pre-outage time frames. In ;ne area of
- operttions' ownership, operations took a leadership role and ensured-hold orders were in place as required and ensured. completion of work and
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post maintenance testing as scheduled. Elimination of milestone managers reduced the number-of meetings and allowed management focus on ongo_ing -activities. Increased management in the field helped overcome work 1 obstacles. By shifting work to non-outage time frames, maintenance
< planning focused:on safely. performing as much maintenance as possible
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In addition, maintenance management noted that work packages were generated in time to walk down the packages, housekeeping was stressed daily, planning identified manpower restraints, and 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shifts for the maintenance staff reduced turnover errors, c. Conclusioni Changes in maintenance oversight, planning and work practices resulted in improved maintenance performance during the Unit 2 refueling outag III. Enaineerina E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E2.1 Outaae Related Enaineerina Activities a. Insoection Scone (37551)
The inspectors reviewed the performance of various plant modifications completed during the Unit 2 refueling outage, b. Observations and Findinas Following th. Tutage, the inspectors reviewed the various modifications that were implemented during the Unit 2 refueling outage. Engineering management indicated that during the outage. 53 outage related modifications were implemented ano 38 non-outage related modifications were 1mplemented. During plant startup and initial power operation. the inspectors observed the operation of some of the modifications as follows:
- the obsolete RCP seal leakoff flow indicators were re> laced with higher accuruy transmitters and transmitters with a ligher range (previously the indicators did not read up to the maximum operating range).
. the rubber hoses on the SG wet layup tell tale drains were replaced with carbon steel drain lines (previously leakage of the drains caused a Main Feedwater Isolation valve to fail on multiple occasions) .
. the obsolete nuclear instrument delta flux recorders were replaced with new digital recorders (the inspectors had previously noted non-working rece-ders on multiple occasions).
- replaced multiple valves in the gland steam system which had resulted in leakage on other equipment and was a priority one work-around (had caused failure of a fire detector and led to failure of the turbine impulse pressure switches in 1996),
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e installed new supports for the main steam line drain traps (found broken by the inspectors): however, this modification was not fully successful in that the insnector noted tnat when the plant approached 100% the main steam line loop 1 steam drains vibrated excessively, further modification / support work was being planne * local indicators were installed to identify when the turbine impulse detectors were arming the auxiliary feedwater actuation / turbine runback circuitry (failed impulse detectors led to turbine runback and reactor trip in 1996).
- Installed redundant RCS level monitoring connections and instrumentation, e replaced the pressurizer pressure master controller due to the problem with reset windup in the present controlle . the main feedwater pump mini-flow valves were changed i Je to erosion of the piping): howe'.er, during initial startup one of the valves vibrated excessively ond the air line to the valve failed, the valves worked well during normal high temperature secondary conditiont , further review was planne * the steam dump drain tank level controls and signt glass were replaced and the steam dump spargers, located in the condenser, were drilled out (previous steam dump water hammer problems), the licensee identified another potential source of condensation in the steam dump lines due to condensation from the steam dump piping located 1n the condenser, and e various feedwater heaters had additional drain es installed and the heater level switches and sight glasses wei icplaced (due to previous heater control problems), some problems were noted during startup, further adjustments were being mad , C.gnclusions Modifications implemented during the refueling outage appeared to be correcting / addressing many long-standing plant deficiencie IV. Plant Sucoort F1 Control of Fire Protection Accivities F1.1 Fire Reoerts and Investiaations insoection Scooe (64704)
The inspectors reviewed the plant fire brigade dispatch and fire incident reports for 1997 to assess maintenance related or material condition problems with plant systems and equipment that initiated fire L
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events Tne inspectors verified that plant fire protection requirements
- were met-in accordance with SSP-12.15. Fire Protection Plan.- Revision 19, Appendix F. Fire Reports, when fire related events occurre O. Qttsgrvations~and Find 1nas J
i- The-fire incident reports-and fire brigade dis)atch logs indicated that there were five incidents of smoke or fire wit 11n safety related plant
. areas in 1997, which required fire brigade respons No safety
- significant fires- had occurred during this period, c; Conclusions 4 Good compliance with plant fire prevention procedures resulted.in no
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Lincidents of a safety significant fire within the plant safety _related
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areas-for 199 = F1.2 Hiah Pressure Fire Protectitn System Modifications
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- Insoection Scoce(64704)
The inspectors reviewed the work in process on the modifications to the-high pressure fire protection water system for compliance with the licensee's-commitments to the NR ' Observations and Findinas Work was in )rocess on Design Change Notices (DCNs) M-08811. M-08812 and i H-08813 whic1 will provide a new fire protection water system. These modifications include the installation of two fire protection water supply tanks, two fire pumn, a fire pump house, and the replacement of piping and valves inside tu power block. The new system uses potable water from the Hixson Utility District. Construction of the tanks, fire pumps, underground water su] ply piping, and connection to the utility district's water system 1ad been complete The inspectors perforaad a walkdown inspection of the two water supply tanks, the fire pump house and the new fire pumps. - The inspectors also observed portions of the preoperational water supply functional tes WO-95-06411-010. Revision 0, which verified tank fill capability and tank water level alcem set points for the water storage tanks. The test j
.was performed in accorjance with ~.pproved test procedures and good test practices. Good cooperation and communications between test personnel was observed during pre-job briefings and data collection activitie ~c . ' Conclusions-Functional: testing for the modifications to the high pressure fire
, ' protection water system was being performed in accordance with the licensee's-test documents; Good cooperation and communications between-test personnel were. observed during pre job briefings and data collection activitie _
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F2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment F2.1- Doerability of Fire Protection Facilities and Eouioment (64704) InSoection Scooe The inspectors reviewed open maintenance work orders. Problem Evaluation Reports (PERs), and Impairment Summary Reports on the facility's fire protection systems and features. The inspectors also inspected these items to determine the performance trends and the material conditions of this equipmen Qbservations and Findinas Maintenance Observations:
The total number of open or outstanding maintenance work orders related to the fire protection systems and features was 140. The inspectors noted that 26 of the fire 3rotection water system (System 26) work orders were associated wit 1 the ongoing fire protection water system modi fications. As of March 1997, the number of open or outstanding work requests related to fire protection components had been approximately 209. Since September 1996, the licensee has placed a strong em)hases on reducing the total number of o)en maintenance work requests. T1e inspectors' review confirmed-t1at th' . effort had been effective and had resulted in a continued reduction in open work orders for fire protection feature Fire Protection Problem Evaluation Reoorts (PERs):
The inspectors evaluated 134 fire protection related PERs initiated from January 1996 to September 1997 that were listed in the Tracking and Reporting of Open Items (TROI) database. Most of the identified issues had been resolved and were closed. Only 24 items which had been initiated in 1997 remained open. Discussions with operations fire arotection nersonnel indicated that no adverse trend deficiencies have 3een identiried as part of the problem evaluation process. The inspectors concluded that the number of open Problem Evaluation Report issues associated with the fire protection program or components was smal Fire Protection System Status:
A review of the Impairment-Summary Reports prepared by the Fire Protection Section for September 26 and October 17. 1997 identified 36 impaired or degraded fire protection components or systems. Twenty-four of these items involved temporarily degraded fire protection features that had been taken out of service within the two week period in support of the ongoing Unit 2 refueling outage. The remaining 8 items involved actual components which were degraded or out of service. Appropriate TS required compensatory actions had been implemented for these component _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . . . .. ..
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Overall. the number of degraded fire protection components had continu N to decline in recent months. Based on the trend report, currently there was an approximate 30% reduction from the number of impairments identified in April 1997. The inspectors toured the plant and noted that the material condition of the operable fire protection systems was good and the operable components were well maintaine ConclusioD1 The licensee's fire protection program implementation was effective in the continued reduction of inoperable or degraded fire protection components and open fire protection related maintenance work request The material condition of the fire protection components was good and the operable components were well maintaine F2.2 Surveillance of Fire Protection Features and Eouioment , Insoection Scooe (64704)
The inspectors reviewed the following operations surveillance test procedures and completed periodic inspections for various fire protection systems and features to determine compliance with SSP-12.1 " Fire Protection Plan:"
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0-SI FPU-026-167.M. Revision 9. " Fire Header Valve Lineup Inspection." (Monthly). completed September 26, 199 SI-237.1 Revision 16. " Power House CO, Fire Protection System Test." (18 Month). colnpleted April 19. 199 PI-FPU-000-001.W. Revision 3. " Operations Fire Protection Unit Weekly Inspection." (Weekly), completed October 19. 199 PI-FPU-247-001.0. Revision 1. " Emergency Lighting (Appendix R)."
(3 honths), completed August 29, 199 PI-410-701.M. Revision 4. " Inspection of Fire Doors." (Monthly).
completed September 29, 199 The frequency of selected surveillance test and periodic inspection procedures was also reviewe Observations and Findinas The test and inspection procedures were well written and met the fire protection surveillance requirements of the Fire Protection Pla The completed fire protection surveillance tests reviewed by the inspectors had been completed within the required frequency and had not extended into the allowed grace period. When the acceptance criteria were not met, the licensee properly identified the problem and initiated appropriate corrective action _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
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r A)propriate surveillance . tests and inspections were being performed on tie fire protection. features and systems. The surveillance tests'and 4
- inspections of the fire protection systems and features met the requirements specified by plant procedure ;
A F3 Fire Protection Procedures and Documentation F3.1. Transient Combustibles Proaram
- Insoectiun Scooe(64704)-
=The inspectors reviewed procedures FPI-0100. Revision 0. " Control of
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Transient Combustibles." and SSP-12.71. Revision 2. " Housekeeping," for -
compliance'with the NRC requirements and guidelines and reviewed the procedures' implementation.-
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- Observations and Findinas i Procedure SSP-12.71-' delineates the duties and responsibilities for
- 1mplementing the plant general housekeeping requirement ,
Procedure FPI-0100 establishes the requirements and controls to be provided for handling and use of transient combustibles associated with maintenance, modifications, and operations activities.
. The inspectors toured the Emergency Diesel Generator Building and the Unit 1 and 2 Auxiliary and Control Buildings on October 21-23. 1997.
with the licensee's fire protection specialist. The inspectors observed the general housekeeping for a number of licensee work activities in
procens and reviewed several transient combustible evaluations posted
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for tne use of cabustible materials associated with the ongoing Unit-2 refueling outage. No safety significant housekeeping issues were identifie Even though Unit 2 was in a refueling outage, implementation of the site's transient combustibles program for the control of combustibles.
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and general housekeeping was good. The accumulation of combustible
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materials.and the number of maintenance activities in process due to the-t refueling outage were more than anticipated during normal plant o)erations, however, ap3ropriate program controls were being applied to ._
F t1ese activities. The 1ousekeeping for areas containing lubrication oil was controlled.- The licensee made use of oil absor) tion materials-to catch and soak up the oil from leaks associated wit 1 the diesel-
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-generators.' The oil absorption materials were being replaced at
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appropriate interval The transient: combustible evaluations reviewed by the inspectors. met the
< licensee's irocedural requirements. -The evaluations effectively-addressed tie; impact'of a potential-fire involving the combustibles on the capabilities of the installed fire protection systems and fire
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23-barrier systems. However, the evaluations did not clearly-address the_ >
impact of a potential' fire involving the combustibles on the operation-a- l of _ plant safety related safe shutdown functions and equipment identified -
.in the Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis. -This was discussed with the-l licensee. Fire Protection Manager who-indicated that this item would be evaluate ;
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_ c.- - Conclusions
,. _ Implementation of the fire protection transient combustible control .- i
- ro p%
t gramwere Ilant and satisfactory.-
the general housekeeping-for control ofevaluations The transient combustible combustibles within-miawed by the inspectors met the licensee's procedural req'uirement ,
- F5 Fire Protection Staff Training and Qualification l
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F5.1 Fire Briaade
^ a- Insoection Scoce(64704)
-Thecinspectors-reviewed the fire brigade organization and training
, _ program for compliance with plant procedures and NRC guidelines ~and-requirement ?
~ Observations and Findinas L '
The organization and training requireinents for the plant fire brigade
- were established by the Fire Protection Plan. Section 9.0. Emergency Response. The dedicated fire brigade for each shift was composed of
- .four shift fire brigade / emergency response teams composed of an Operations / Fire Protection team foreman and at least four additional brigade members from the Operations / Fire Protection organization. Each
, operations shift also had a Unit Supervisor assigned to respond to fires
.with the fire brigade as an Incident Commander, i- A-review of the training records for the fire brigade members indicated that the training.. drill, respiratory and physical examination requirements for each active member were up to date and met the established site-training reqeirement Due_to Unit 2 being shutdown and the high priority work in process, a fire brigade drill was-not conducted during this inspection. To
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evaluate drill performance, the fire brigade leaders reports and fire
- -drill- critique data for the shift drills for 1997 were reviewed by the
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inspectors. The overall fire-brigade response and participation for
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-these' drills was satisfactory.
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24 . Conclusions The fire brigade organization and training met the recuirements of the site procedures and the performance by the fire brigace as documented by drill evaluations was goo F6 Fire Protection Organization and Administration F6.1 Fire Protection Manaaement and Oroanization Insoection Secoe(64704)
The licensee's management and administration of the facility's fire protection program were reviewed for compliance with the commitments to the NRC and to current NRC guideline Observations and Findinas
The designated onsite manager responsible for the administration and implementation of the fire protection program was the Operations Manager. This responsibility had been delegated to the Operations / Fire Protection Manage The Operations / Fire Protection Manager was responsible for implementation of the station fire protection program, general maintenance of fire protection systems and equipment and ensuring that the appropriate fire prevention procedures and fire brigade programs were implemente Coordination of the station's Fire Protection Report requirements was provided by two fire protection engineers and a fire protection specialist, Conclusions The coordination and oversigh+ of the facility's fire 3rotection program met the licensee's procedures and commitments to the NRC in the Fire Protection Report. The personnel assigned various fire protection related functions within Operations / Fire Protection organization were working together as a team and with coordination by the onsite fire protection engineers and fire protection specialist to implement the fire protection program at the sit F7 Quality Assurance in Fire Protection Activities F7.1 Fire Protection Audit Reoorts Insoection Scoce (64704)
The inspectors reviewed the Nuclear Assurance and Licensing (NA&L) Audit Report SSA-97-02. Fire Protection Program, dated June 6. 1997, and the-status of the corrective actions implemented for the PERs initiated for the audit report.
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i Observations and Findinal ,
l The licensee's Nuclear Assurance and Licensing organization performed an assessment of the fire protection program during the time period-of March 31, 1997, through May 9. 1997 The report for this assessment was Report No. SSA-9702. This report included an oversight analysis of ;
selected fire protection standards, procedures, self-assessment !
observations, regulatory issues, and trend issues for the plant fire protection program. The assessment report identified no . adit findings related to the fire protection program..but did identify two audit recommendations and six less significa.it implementation weaknesses related to minor procedure and drawing discrepancies that were addressed by PERs.
i The inspectors reviewed the final audit report the licensee response i the identified recommendation issues, dated July 12. 1997 end six PER closure packages. Planned corrective actions in res]onse to two identified recommendation issues were addressed in tie licensee response and were acceptable. The corrective actions in response to the six identified issues addressed in the licensee PER closure packages were comprehensive and had been implemented in a timely manne Conclusions The licensee's 1997 Nuclear Assurance and Licensing assessment of the facility's fire protection program was comprehensive and effective in identifying fire protection program performance to managemant. The licensee corrective actions in response to the identified issues were comprehensive and timel F8 Hiscellaneous Fire Protection issues F (Closed) EA 96-269 01023: Inoperable C02 System. The inspectors reviewed DCN M-12162A. updated drawings, functional testing results and conducted walk down inspections of the plant computer room CO system to verify that the corrective action identified by the licensee *2s res3onse of December 19, 1996, was reasonable and complet No similar pro]lems were identified during this inspectio R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R1.1 General Comments (71750)
The inspectors performed tou:s of the control building, auxillary building, turbine building. ERCW pump house and diesel generator-buildings and did not identify any noteworthy deficiencies in-housekeeping or radiological cor.trol The inspectors noted that during the U2C8 outage that the licensee determined that the total estimated TLD exposure was 140 rem which was the site's best ALARA perfora nce for an outage by more than 70 re .. = . .
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RI.2 Airborne Activity Detected in the Main Control Room Insoection Scooe (7175Q1 The inspector reviewed the licensee's technical operability evaluation for the control room emergency ventilation system which was necessitated by detectable levels of airborne contamination in the main control during a time when the normal auxiliary building ventilation system was out of servic Observations and Findinas On October 22, 1997. Xenon was detected in the MCR concurrent with performance of 2-SI-0PS-082-026.A. Loss of Offsite Power With Safety Injection-DG 2A-A Containment Isolation Test. Revision 12. The Xenon in the MCR was at a concentration of approximately 1/2625 (0.0381;) of the concentration required to Jeclare an area airborn During tne test the emergency gas treatment system (EGTS) and auxiliary building gas treatment system (ABGTS) were operating and the normal auxiliary building ventilation was shutdow The licensee determined that the Xenon originated from the Unit I containment via the annulus vacuum fan discharge ducting. The highest levels of Xenon were recorded in the EGTS room. Access doors (used to inspect fire dam)ers) in the annulus vacuum. fan discharge ducting, where it passes throug1 the EGTS room and the shutdown board room mechanical equipment room, were determined to be leaking. Air handling units mixed the air in the EGTS room with the shutdown board room return air and distributed the air (ato the shutdown board and from there the air entered the MCR as )ersonnel passed trrough doors C49 and C50. The inspector reviewed JFFAR Section 15.5.3. Environmental Consequences of a Postulated Loss of Coolant Accident, which indicated that doors C49 and C50 will not be used post accident except for special instance A work request was initiated to caulk the leaking access doors in the ducting. PER No. S0972471PER was initiated to document the event. The licensee determined that there were no operability problems associated with the MCR HVAC, and the habitability of the MCR was not in jeo)ardy, nor would it have been in jeopardy during accident conditions, T1e licensee *s review of the last two performances of the surveillance instructions for the control room emergen,v ventilation pressure test showedthatthepressureintneMCRhabitabilityexceededtheacceptance criteria of 0 120" Conclusions-The inspector concluded the airborne radiation levels in the main
. control room were well below established limits and that the control rcom ventilation system functioned as designe t
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V. Manaoement Heetinos X Exit Meeting Sumary-
'The inspectors 3 resented the inspection results to members of licensee management at tie conclusion of the inspection on-November - 18. 1997 and l Lon October 24.1997 -for the fire protection inspectio The licensee.-
acknowledged the findings presented During the inspection period, the inspectors asked the licensee whether
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any materials would be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
- PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED L
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Licensee-
- Bajestani. M., Site Vice President Burton, C. . Engineering and Support Systems Manager
- Butterworth. M.. Operations Manager I
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- Fecht. M., Nuclear Assurance Manager ;
Gates. J..' Site Support Manager l'
- Freeman. E.-Maintenance and Modifications Manager-
- Herron. J. Plant Manager ;
Kent. C.. Radcon/ Chemistry Manager 1
- Koehl. D. Asststant Plant Manager
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'O'Brien. B. . Maintenance Manager .
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Salas. P.,-Manager of Licensing and Industry Affairs
- Summy. J., Assistant Plant Manager +
Valente. J. , Engineering _& Materials Manager
- ' Attended exit interview
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551i Onsite' Engineering IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls In Identifying. Resolving. & l Preventing Probler LIP-61726: Surveillance Observ ions cIP 62707: Mainter.ance Observ >ns iP 64704: Fire Protection Pre %1 '
IP-71707: Plant-Operations:
'IP.71714: Cold Weather Preparations IP 71750: -Plant Support
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ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSEQ Doened IyDe Item Number Status Descriotion and Reference NCV 50-328/97-14-01 OPEN/ Failure to Meet TS 3. CLOSED Administrative Controls During LLRT (Section 01.4)
NCV 50-327, 328/97-14-02 OPEN/ Failure to follow Procedural CLOSED Requirements For Aligning the 28-B Comporent Cooling Water Pump (Section 01.6)
NCV 50-327, 328/97-14-03 OPEN/ Failure to Meet TS 6.2.2.9 Overtime CLOSED Authorization Requirements _(Section 06.1)
URI 50-328/97-14-04 OPEN Missed TS Sur/eillance Requirement SR 4.4.3.2.1.b For Stroking the Pressurizer PORVs During Node 4 (Section M1.3)
Closed lyDe Item Number Status Descriotion and Reference VIO 50-327, 328/E 96-269 CLOSED Inoperable CO2 System (Section 01023 F8.1).
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