IR 05000327/1987041

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Insp Repts 50-327/87-41 & 50-328/87-41 on 870622-26.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Fire Prevention/Protection & Followup on Previously Identified Insp Items
ML20237J246
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 07/27/1987
From: Conlon T, Madden P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20237J231 List:
References
50-327-87-41, 50-328-87-41, NUDOCS 8708180041
Download: ML20237J246 (10)


Text

f......

..

'

,

....

q

+f ** "00y{

i UNn1D S7ATES o

NUCLEAR FtEGULATORY COMMISSION

.,,.

i L

s

o.

REGloN H E-E 101 MARfETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900

  1. '

o ATLANTA, GEORGIA 3032J

. %,.....f I

!

l Report Nos.:

50-327/87-41 and' 50-328/87-41 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority

'{

6N'38A Lookout Place

l 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 j

Docket Nos.:

50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.-

DPR-77 and DPR-79 Facility Name: Sequoyah 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:

une 22-Es 1987 Inspector:

%

cP2#

v 7-27-77-Date Signed P. M. Madden

'

Accompanying Personnel:

B. Desai, NRC RII

. Wescott, NRC, P

l Approved

/

dWV M 7' 7. 7 - F 7

'

T. E. Conlon, Chief, Plant Systems Section Date Signed.

!

Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety l

SUMMARY i

Scope:

This' routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of Fire q

Protection / Prevention and Follow-up on Previously Identified Inspection: Items.

q l

Results:

No violations or deviations were identified.

l s

)

J l

.

l

'

I L

i l

i

,

%f

.f D

O

.

-

c_______

-.___z_z_____1-

-. _ _

- - -. _ _ _ _,

_ _ _ - - -. -

,

_

__

.. _.

_

J

l

.

.

I REPORT DETAILS 1.

Perscns Contacted Licensee Employees

  • W. Baker, Fire Protection Engineer i
  • E. A. Craigge, Safety Supervisor i

H. J. Fisher, Modifications Engineer

]

M. R. Harding, Site L' censing-j

  • G. B. Kirk, Site Licensing q

'

B. Lake, Operations Training

  • C. Landstrom, Site Licensing
  • J. D. McCarny, Appendix R Project Manager
  • L. M. Nobles, Plant Manager

',

B. M. Patterson, Maintenance Superintendent

  • J. S. Sullivan, P0RS Supervisor l

B. Williams, Nuclear Engineer

  • B. S. Willis, Operations Supervisor J. J. Pierce, Mechanical Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,

)

engineers, technicians, operatcrs, mechanics, security force members, and

!

office personnel.

J NRC Resident Inspector

  • D. Loveless
  • Attended exit inter view

.

2.

Exit Interview l

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 25, 1987, with those persons ind @ated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described'the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.

No

~ dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

!

i The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided

'

to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

-

l l

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters a.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-327, 328/86-66-01), Fire Protection Audit Program Fails to Properly Audit the Licensee's Fire Protection QA Program and Fire Protection Program.

As a result of an employee

>

concern received by NRC RII regarding the content of the 1986

Triennial Fire Protection Audit, a detailed review of TVA's Fire l

Protection Audit Program was conducted during the December 1-5, 1986, l

NRC inspection.

During this inspection, it was determined that there j

were program weaknesses in the licensee's Fire Protection /QA Audit

.

o- -------- ------ ----------

- - - - - - _ - - -

-

.j

.

_ _ _ _

-

x

.

' lq

Program in that the-licensee's : program did not follow the audit -

j guidance. of' Generic Letter 82-21 Enclosure 2, Quality Assurance and-

,

Enclosure 3, Minimum: Elements That.Should be: Incorporated in Annual and Triennial Fire Protection Audits.

Subsequently, by letter, dated

' December 12,1986, the NRC transmitted the subject employee concern regarding the' inadequacy oflthe 1986 Triennial Fire Protection Audit, to the licensee's employee concern program at the Sequoyah. Nuclear

!

Plant for disposition.

On March 26,1987, the licensee's employee: concern program issued.

its' investigative report - (ECP-87-SQ-009-01). regarding the concerns l

with respect to the 1986 Triennial Fire Protection Audit at Sequoyah.

(

This report substantiated the alleged concerns.

q In response to the concerns' identified 'in NRC Inspection. Report 86-66, the licensee reevaluated :their Module No.14 audit criteria against. the guidance of. Generic Letter. 82-21.

Based on this e

l

. reevaluation, the licensee performed Audit QSQ-A-87-0013 on February.23 - March 6,1987, which was in response to the inadequacy -

of the last 24 month. Fire Protection QA Audit-QSQ-A-86-0010.

The:

inspector. reviewed the content of Audit' Report -QSQ-A-87-0013 and found it to ' be adequate with-regard - to addressing Technical Specification 6.5.2.8.h and the guidance presented in Generic Letter :

82-21 Enclosure 2, Quality Assurance.. In addition,.the ' licensee

,

reevaluated their Module No.15 audit crf teria against the guidance l

of Generic Letter 82-21 Enclosure 3, Minimum Elements That Should be Incorporated in Annual and Triennial Fire Protection Audits.. Based on the licensee's reevaluation, On February.23 - March 5,1987,; the licensee' performed Audit QSQ-A-87-0012 which followed the. Enclosure-3 guidance provided in Generic Letter 82-21.

The inspector. reviewed i

Audit Report QSQ-A-87-0012 and found the content of this report to be adequate in respect to meeting the audit requirements of' Technical Specification 6.5.2.8; and the Enclosure 3 guidance'of Generic Letter

,

82-21.

I In addition, Triennial Audit QSQ-A-87-0012 incorporated the

!

recommendations of Employee Concerns Program Investigation Report ECP-87-SQ-009-01. Therefore, this item is closed.

b.

(Closed) Violation Item (50-327, 328/86-66-02),. Failure to Assign Qualified Personnel to the Fire Brigade.

Technical Specification i

6.2.2.f requires that a fire brigade of at least five members be

maintained on site at all times. ' Technical Specification 6.2.2.f was

.

not met in that a total of five qualified members of the fire brigade were not assigned to' the Group 5 fire brigade shift on August 29,

~

1986, and the Group 4 fire brigade shift on October 14,1986.

TVA has admitted the first example of' the violation: concerning assignment'of qualified fire-brigade members to Group.5 fire brigade shift on August 29, 1986', and have attributed this to an error.in the

computer program which generates the fire brigade membership status list.

This error allowed the computer program to1 overlook the.

y

.

m_._

.. __

.______m._m.___._.___.__

- - - _ - -

-

)

'

-

3 J

I members ineligibility because of misinterpretation of the symbol used to signify his initial certification.

Upon identification of the l

discrepancy between the fire brigade membership status list and the i

training records, the problems with the computer program was found and corrected.

The corrective steps taken will prevent recurrence of this discrepancy and the status list is now consistent with the i

training record.

Full compliance was achieved on December 3,1980 when the programming error was corrected. As for the second example,

,

Group 4 fire brigade shift on October 14, 1986, contrary to the initial information provided to the NRC inspector the Group 4 fire brigade leader was indeed qualified and TVA, therefore, has denied this violation example.

The discrepancy arose during the NRC inspectors review of a fire drill attendance roster, dated i

i October 14, 1986.

During that drill, another individual served as l

l brigade leader for the purposes of training.

This individual, although identified as delinquent on the October 8,1986 status list, had completed the necessary training on October 14, 1986, before the drill and was, therefore, fully qualified.

Since this individual

)

completed his training on October 14, 1986, he was not statused as

i qualified on October 8,1986 status list. The denial by the licensee

'

is justified and, therefore, this item is closed.

c.

(Closed) Violation Item (50-327, 328/86-66-03), Inoperable Fire Barrier Separating Two Safe Shutdown Related Areas.

Technical Specification 3.7.12 requires that all fire barrier penetrations in fire zone boundaries protecting safety-related arcas shall be I

functional at all times; however, on December 4,1986, fire damper

!

2-31C-926 separating the 125V Vital Battery Board Room IV from 6.9v l

Shutdown Board Room B was found inoperable and the required limiting condition for operation had not been established.

TVA has admitted this violation and have determined that the damper in question became inoperable because of a bent spring-steel locking clip.

This clip is part of the closure device designed to ensure the damper remains closed once the thermal link is broken. This closure device was damaged such that instead of ensuring. hat the damper remains closed, it was in fact holding the damper' in the open position, thus, making it inoperable.

Since the damper was in its normal position (open) and the closure device is located on the interior of the battery board room out of normal traffic, the damaged clip and missing thermal link were not noticed and the damper was not identified as inoperable.

Upon identification of the inoperable l

daicper, Maintenance Work Request (WR) B-209412 was initiated and the l

damper subsequently repaired.

l l

As for preventing recurrence, Surveillance Instruction (SI) 233.3, j

" Visual Inspections of Par.etration Fire Barriers -- Fire Dampers" l

e fulfills the surveillance % requirements of Technical Specifications

'

4.7.12a and b of verifying the barriers functional - by visual inspection at least once every 18 months. This SI specifically looks at the thermal link and verifies that there is nothing that would l

impair the damper from closing if the link were broken.

Furthermore, an ins"ructional memorandun was issued to alert those personnel with

.

_ _ _ _ -.

-

.

a

1 job assignment which could affect the operability of fire damper and i

reemphasize the importance of care and consequences.of' inoperable l

fire dampers.

Full compliance was achieved on December 4, 1986, when l

the damper was returned to functional status therefore, this item is

]

closed.

l

d (Closed) Violation Item (50-327, 328/85-01-01), Failure to Meet the l

Requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G with Regard to Maintaining

)

i-l One Train of Hot Standby Systems Free From Fire Damage.

8ased on the Appendix R noncompliance -found by the NRC at the Watts

,

Bar Nuclear Plant, the licensee, in response to an August 10, 1984

'

NRC confirmation of action letter, performed a comprehensive

Appendix R reevaluation of their Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. As a result of their reevaluation, interactions between redundant safe shutdown l

functions located within multiple plant areas were identified.

The licensee, in order to correct the Appendix R shutdown function interactions, developed and implemented shutdown and fire damage control procedures, implemented additional plant fire protection modifications (i.e., installed additional sprinkler protection, fire barrier walls, raceway fire barrier enclosures, etc.) and requested

,

certain deviations to the Appendix R requirements.

On May 29, 1936 the NRC granted the licensee's Appendix R deviation requests and during the Appendix R follow-up inspections, documented l

by Reports 85-37, 86-40, and 86-66 the NRC inspected the design and

!

installation of the required Appendix R plant fire protection modifications.

These modifications were found to be satisfactory except for the water spray systems in the 480-V shutdown board rooms.

Currently, the water spray system installations in the 480-V shutdown board rooms are not complete however, the licensee by letter dated July 10, 1987 committed to completing these systeras prior to restart.

Therefore, this item is closed.

e.

(Closed) Violation Item (50-327, 328/85-01-02), Failure to Provide

Adequate Breaker / Fuse Protection for Equipment Required for Hot l

Standby.

The licensee's December 21, 1984, submittal identified 245 auxiliary and control power circuits that required modifications in order to meet the common bus and enclosure requirements of Appendix R.

The licensee, in order to correct these Appendix R deficiencies, replaced fuses and breakers, reset breakers / relays trip settings, changed loads to different circuits, wrapped cables with a fire resistive material and replaced / rerouted cables.

These circuit modifications were installed by the licensee under ECN No. 6313

,

Workplan 11743, ECN No. 6314 Workplan 11559, and ECN No. 6315 Workplan 11588 and 12054. Therefore, this item is closed, f.

(Closed) Violation Item (50-327, 328/85-01-03), Failure to have Procedures in Effect to Implement Safe Shutdown Capability.

The licensee on February 22, 1985 implemented System Operating Instruction (50I)-26.2, " Fire Interaction Manual."

This manual provides operational instructions and precautions to plant operations s

personnel with respect. to determining equipment operability for a

_ _ _ _ _ _

i

..

,

5

)

fire in different plant locations.

This instruction includes

]

shutdown logic, identifies equipment affected by a fire in various

'

plant areas and the actions to be taken in order to achieve and

{

maintain cold shutdown conditions for a fire in a given safe shutdown related area of the plant.

.

In addition, this procedure covers the corrective actions associated.

'l

with the control room air handling unit deviation granted by the May 29, 1986, NRC Appendix R Safety Evaluation Report.

This deviation granted the use of wire lifts, jumpers and control fuse replacement for a fire condition on either auxiliary building

!

e'avation /14'-0" or 734'-0" were remote control cable IPL45128 for the main control room air handling unit (MRC AHU) interacts with cables associated with MCR AHU A-A, therefore, this item is closed, j

g.

(Closed) Violation Item (50-327, 328/85-01-04), 011 Collection System for Reactor Coolant Pumps does not Meet Appendix R,Section III.0

!

Requirements.

By letter, dated December 18, 1984, the licensee L

requested a deviation from the Appendix R,Section III.0 requirements

)

which requires that the reactor coolant pump oil collection system be l

designed to maintain its pressure boundary following a Safe Shutdown

]

Earthquake (SSE).

On May 29, 1986, the NP,C issued a Safety

Evaluation Report granting the Appendix R Section III.0 deviation to j

the licensee on the basis that the reactor coolant pump motors and i

lubricating oil systems are designed to withstand a SSE, therefore, l

this item is closed.

'

h.

(Closed) Violation Item (50-327, 328/85-01-05), Emergency Lighting

Units do not Meet Appendix R, Section -III.J Requirements.

The i

licensee performed an emergency lighting evaluation, determined the j

number of and the locations for the. lighting units required to i

support safe plant shutdown and installed them under ECN No. 5984 Workplan 11439 and ECN No. 6287 Workplan 11514.

During the NRC inspection documented by Report 86-40, the inspectors had the j

licensee conduct lighting blackout tests in selected plant areas in order to evaluate the adequacy of the emergency lighting and the lighting levels.

In the areas sampled the inspectors found the Emergency Lighting to be adequate therefore, this item is closed.

i.

(Closed) Violation Item (50-327, 328/85-01-08), Failure to Include Cable Fire Barrier Assemblies in a Surveillance or Maintenance Inspection Program.

The licensee on October 2,1985, implemented Surveillance Instruction SI-233.4, Visual Inspection of Thermal Fire Barriers which provides instructions and criteria for inspecting KAO-WOOL and THERM 0-LAG raceway fire barrier enclosures, therefore, this item is closed.

l j.

(Closed) Violation Item (50-327, 328/85-01-09), Failure to Maintain the Fire Barriers for Three Conduits in the Auxiliary Building. The licensee on January 15, 1985 issued Maintenance Work Request Nos. A-293851, A-293863 and A-293863 to repair the KAO-WOOL fire barrier

,

!

l l

i

_ _ - _

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _.

,

.

(

enclosure on conduits 2PM1001 I, 2PM2114 II, and 2PM2084 I.

The work

.

associated with these work requests was complete by January 17, 1985, l

therefore, this item is closed.

k.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-327/80-10-03), Failure to Conduct Main Drain Tests of Plant Fire Suppression Spray / Sprinkler Systems.

i l

l A number of conditions exist at'Sequoyah Nuclear Plant which make the L

performance of full-flow two-inch / main drain tests in the

,

i'

conventional manner impractical.

These conditions are briefly

!

outlined below:

!

(1) The preaction sprinkler system risers and associated trim involved are located primarily in the auxiliary building on-

,

various ' elevations and at divergent locations.

There does not I

presently exist any accessible drainage system in the areas l

'

l involved which is capable of receiving the volumes of water that would be discharged during full-flow two-inch drain tests.

]

(2) Any open discharge from the two-inch sprinkler system drain

!

!

located in the auxiliary building would have to be disposed of by means of the provided evaporator systems, which have a

,

limited capacity.

!

(3) Connecting hose to the involved drains and routing the discharge to an area where open discharge, or adequate - disposal I

facilities, are available would. present two significant problems:

(a) The hose would.have to be routed out of the auxiliary building.

All doors leading out of this building are airlock type doors and in most case hose lines could not normally be routed thru both doors.

(b) The length of hose runs involved would be extensive.

The friction loss at full available flow would restrict the

{

actual flow to a degree that the results of the tests would I

be of minimal value.

To functionally meet the requirement for two-inch drain test and resolve this item, the licensee proposed.

(1) Each involved sprinkler system in the auxiliary and control j

building will be modified to include a male hose connection on i

I the main drain, sized at least 1-inch larger in nominal diarreter than the drain proper.

(2) An adequately sized (gpm and net discharge pressure) portable booster pump will be provided, along with all associated appurtenances, piping, hose, valves, etc., to implement the

,

l procedure cutline below.

i

!

~

.

7.

(3) Hose will be connected to the-male hose connection on the drain to be tested.

This hose will be connected to the suction side j

of the electric motor driven booster pump.

A second length of

hose will be connected to the discharge side of the booster.

pump, routed to, and connected to either the main drain of a i

nearby sprinkler system preaction valve or to a hose connection.

i The main drain being tested will be opened and discharged to the l

ruction side of the booster pump.

The booster pump will serve I

to increase the water pressure sufficiently for the waterflow to be discharged back into the high-pressure fire protection system.

This will result in a substantial rate. of waterflow thru a closed loop where the sprinkler system isolation valve and the preaction system main drain are in the flow path.

The licensee's test program will not accomplish a system flush as such in itself, however, the primary purpose of full-flow main drain test is not to flush the system.

The purpose of the. main drain test is to verify to the degree possible that the flow path to, and thru, the isolation valve for the preaction system is not obstructed.. The licensee's program accomplishes this purpose, therefore, this item is closed.

4.

Unresolved Items

,

I

'

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5.

Fire Protection / Prevention Program (64704)

Plant Tour and Inspection of Permanent Plant Fire Protection Features.

!

A plant tour was made by the inspector.

During the plant tour, the following safe shutdown re' lated plant areas and their related fire protection features were inspected:

Cable Spreading Room

"

-

480V Shutdown Board Room 182 l

-

480V Shutdown Board Room 1B1 l

-

480V Shutdown Board Room 1A2

!

-

6.9KV Shutdown Board Room A

-

-

6.9KV Shutdown Board Room B 480V Shutdown Board Room 2B2

-

480V Board Rooms A/A and IB

-

480V Board Rooms 2A and 28 r

-

-

Unit 2 Mechanical Equipment Room The fire / smoke detection systems, manual fire fighting equipment (i.e.,

,

i portable extinguishers, hose stations, etc.) sprinkler protection and the l

fire area boundary walls, floors and ceiling associated for the above f

plant areas were inspected and verified to be in servicef or functional.

Based on this inspection, it appears that the fire protection features associated with the above plant areas are satisfactorily maintained.

I J

-

.

The plant tour also verified the licensee's imp.ementation of the fire prevention administrative procedures.

The control of combustibles and flammable materials, liquids and gases, and the general housekeeping were

,

found to be satisfactory.

l 6.

Licensee Event Reports (LER)

a.

(Closed) LER 327/84-046, Failure to Comply with Appendix R of 10 CFR 50.

The licensee, in Enclosure 5 to their December 21, 1984, i

'

submittal analyzed the Appendix R discrepancies identified in the subject LER and determined that the corrective actions required by Interaction Study No. 1 required a deviation to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G in order to achieve compliance. On May 29, 1986, the NRC issued their SER granting the licensee's Appendix R

,

l fire protection deviation request.

The licensee has installed the sprinkler protection in the ceiling

,

space above the elevation 690'-0" RAD-CHEM ceiling as required by the j

deviation request. Therefore, this item is closed.

!

I b.

(Closed) LER 327/84-049, Failure to Comply with Appendix R of l

10 CFR 50.

The licensee, in Enclosure 5 to their December 21, 1984, submittal analyzed the Appendix R discrepancies identified in the i

l i

subject LER and identified the appropriate corrective actions to

'

resolve these discrepancies in Interaction Study Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14.

In addition, the licensee determined that the

,

corrective actions required by Interaction Study No. 6 required a j

deviation to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R Section III.G

in order to achieve compliance.

On May 29, 1986, the NRC issued i

their SER granting the licensee's Appendix.R fire protection deviation request.

The licensee has installed a closed head water curtain / sprinkler system around the north auxiliary building stairwell openings on j

elevation 690'-0" and 714'-0" as "equired by the deviation request.

l Therefore, this item is closed.

)

c.

(Closed) LER 327/84-063, Failure to Comply with Appendix R of 10 CFR

,

'

50.

In Enclosure 5 to the licensee's December 21, 1984 submittal, the licensee analyzed the Appendix R discrepancies identified in the subject LER and identified the appropriate corrective actions to resolve these discrepancies in Interaction Study Nos. 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 56, 58, and 59.

The licensee determined that the corrective actions required by Interaction Study Nos. 57, 58, and 59 required a deviation to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, j

Section III.G, in order to achieve compliance. On May 29, 1986, the j

NRC issued their SER granting the licensee's Appendix R ' fire i

protection. deviation request.

The licensee has installed a closed j

head water curtain / sprinkler system around the South No. 5 and No. 6

!

auxiliary building stairwell openings on elevation 690'-0" and

!

714'-0" as required by the deviation request.

Therefore, this item is closed.

!

_

_

________a

C'

..

!-

i

'

l

d.

(Closed) LER 327/84-067, Failure to Comply with Appendix R to j

,

!

10 CFR 50.

The licensee, in Enclosure 5 to their December 21, 1984

!

l submittal, analyzed the Appendix R discrepancies identified in the l

subject LER and discrepancies in Interaction Study Nos. 86, 98, 100,

!

l 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, and 108. The licensee also determined

l that the corrective actions required by Interaction Study Nos.101,-

)

103, and.104 required a deviation to the requirements of 10 CFR 50,.

I Appendix R,Section III.G in order to achieve compliance. The NRC on j

May 29,1986, issued their SER granting the licensee's Appendix R j

fire protection deviation request.

The licensee.has installed a clo ed head water curtain / sprinkler system around the North and South Auxiliary Building stairwell openings on elevation 690'-0" and 714'-0" as required by the deviation request..Therefore, this item is closed.

e.

(0 pen) LER 327/84-059, Failure to Comply with Appendix R of 10 CFR 50.

The licensee, in Enclosure 5 to their December 21, 1984 submittal, analyzed the Appendix R discrepancies identified in the

,

subject LER and identified the appropriate corrective actions to

l resolve these discrepancies in Interaction Study Nos. 22, 23, 24, 25, l

26, 27, 30, and 34.

In addition, the licensee determined that the I

corrective actions required a deviation to the requirements of

)

10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G. in order to achieve compliance.

'

On May 29, 1986, the NRC issued their SER granting the licensee's Appendix R fire protection deviation request.

Currently, TVA' is scheduled to complete 1828 and 2A2A 480V shutdown board room cable l

tray water spray system installations prior to the restart of the

[

plant.

Therefore, this item remains open and the corrective actions

]

associated with this LER will be inspected during a subsequent NRC

inspection.

]

l

!

f.

(Closed) LER 327/85-002, Failure to Comply with Appendix R of

{

10 CFR 50.

During the NRC Appendix R fire protection inspection (NRC j

Report No. 85-01) three conduits 2PM1001 I, 2PM1084 I and 2PM2114 II l

were found to have been missing and/or damaged barriers.

The licensee on January 15, 1985 initiated a fire watch in the area of these conduits and issued maintenance requests to repair / replace the KAO-WOOL fire barrier enclosures.

The licensee alsr) revised Surveillance Instruction (SI) 233, " Visual Inspections of Penetration I

'l Fire Barriers and Fire Stops," to include all the Appendix P raceway l

fire barriers.

The repairs to the damaged raceway fire barriers l

protecting conduits 2PM1001 I,

2PM1084 I and 2PM2114 II were i

completed on January 17, 1985, therefore, this item is closed.

'

)

l I

l i

)

l

.

.