IR 05000327/1990021
| ML20058P817 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1990 |
| From: | Kreh J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058P815 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-90-21, 50-328-90-21, NUDOCS 9008200123 | |
| Download: ML20058P817 (18) | |
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pa ttep UNITED ST ATES
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g'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON
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REGION 11
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'j 101 MARitTTA STREEY.N.W.
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e ATLANT A.0EORGI A 30323
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AUS 0 31990 Report Nos.:
50-327/90-21 and 50-328/90-21 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 6N38 A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street
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Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.: 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.:
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Jacility Name:
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Inspection Conducted: July 9-13, 1990 Inspector: @d b,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Date Signed 7/3//98
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J. L. Kreh (/
Team Members:
D. P. Loveless S. M. Shaeffer G. D. Weale 8h
,7V)ateslene?
Approved byM _**7T.'Tiankin, chlu
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Will am Emergency Preparedness Section Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection included observation and evaluation of the annual-emergency response exercise.
Emergency organization activation and response were-selectively observed in the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operational Support. Center, and Central Emergency Control Center. The
inspection also included a review of the exercise objectives and scenario
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details, as well as observation of,the licensee's postexercise critique activities. The exercise, which included full participation by State and local governments, was conducted on July 11, 1990, between the hours of 8:30 a.m. and
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4:20 p.m.
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Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
The plant and corporate emergency organizations responded to the exercise j
conditions in a fully = successful manner, and convincingly demonstrated a capability to protect the public health and safety.
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l REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- T. Adkins, Emergency Preparedness Program Manager (Corporate)
- J. Anthony, Simulator Instructor
- L. Bush, Manager, Maintenance Program
- J. Bynum, Vice President, Nuclear Power Production
- N. Catron, Site Emergency Preparedness Program Manager
- M. Cooper, Compliance Licensing Manager
- R. Ford, Emergency Preparedness Project Engineer (Corporate)
- K. King, Jr., Emergency Preparedness Project Engineer (Corporate)
- R. Kitts, Manager, Emergency Preparedness (Corporate)
- B. Marks, Manager. Emergency Preparedness Programs (Corporate)
- M. Palmer, Radiological Health Manager
- M. Sullivan, Superintendent, Radiological Control
- J. Vincelli, Manager, Radiological Control Field Operations
- C. Vondra, Plant Manager
- J. Walker, Manager, Operations Support
- P. Wallace, Duty Site Director
'Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector
- D. Loveless
'* Attended exit interview 2.
ExerciseScenario(82301,82302)
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The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine whether l,
. provisions had been made to test the licensee's integrated emergency response capability as well as to test a major portion of the basic
elements within the licensee's Emergency Plan, as required by
10 CFR 50.54(t),10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), and Section IV.F of Appendix E to i
The inspector's advance. review of the scenario disclosed no significant l
technical problems.
Some minor inconsistencies in the scenario data
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l became apparent during the exercise; however, these did not significantly detract from the overall enactment of the simulated emergency.
During the period immediately prior to the General Emergency declaration, some unrealistic simulator data generated unnecessary player confusion regarding containment pressure and the extent of core damage, but this l-
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problem was fully disclosed during the licensee's critique and was considered by the inspectors to be an exercise artificiblity. The licensee will track this matter for appropriate correction action.
The scenario developed for this exercise presented a series of events i
which fully exercised the licensee's emergency organization, and provided sufficient information to the State, counties, and Federal agencies
consistent with the scope of their participation in the exercise. - The licensee demonstrated adequate training of personnel through use of controllers, evaluators, and specialists participating in the exercise.
The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the exercise.
Neither prompting by controllers nor undue interaction between controllers
and players was observed.
For the first time during a required exercise at the Sequoyah facility, f
the near-site simulator was employed as the exercise Control Room.
Its use provided a unique opportunity to evaluate player reaction to changing plant conditions.
Players were able to more realistically demonstrate those actions that they would take to cope with an errergency in the plant.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
OnsiteEmergencyOrganization(82301)
The licensee's organization was observed during the simulated energency to determine whether the requirements of Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 were met addressing the descriptions, responsibilities, and assignments of the onsite emergency response organization.
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TheLinspector determined that the initial onsite eniergency organization was adequately defined and that primary and alternate assignments for the positions in the augmented emergency organization were clearly designated.
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The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments were made for the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff
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was available to respond to the simulated energency. The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives; however, because of the scenario scope and conditions, long-term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not required.
Review of emergency call lists indicated that a sufficient
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number of trained personnel was available for continuous staffing of the
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. augmented emergency organization, if needed.
The inspector also observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency _ organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC), the Operational Support Center (OSC), and the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC).
The required staffing and assignment of responsibility at the facilities were consistent with the licensee's Emergency Plan and l
applicable implementing procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
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This area was observed to determine whether arrangenents for requesting i
and effectively using assistance resources were made, whether arrangenents i
to accommodate State and local staff at the CECC were made, and whether other organizations capable of augnenting the planned response were identified as specified by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), Paragraph IV.A.of Appendix j
E to 10 CFR Part 50, and guidance promulgated in Section II.C of
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NUREG-0654(Revision 1)
Licensee involvement and contact with Federal, State, county, and local support organizations occurred in accordance with applicable Emergency
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Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) and was consistent with the scope of the exercise.
Assistance. resources from offsite support agencies were available to the licensee.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
i This area was observed to verify that a standard emergency classification and action level schene was in use by the licensee as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(4)andParagraphIV.CofAppendixEto10CFRPart50.
An Emergency Action Level (EAL) matrix was available to identify and properly classify an emergency and escalate it to more severe classifications as the simulated accident progressed. The licensee's use of the Eats in deducing each of the emergency classifications (Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency) was generally adequate, although one misstep was observed.
The Site Emergency Director (SED) declared a Site Area Emergency at 10:18 a.m. based partially on the initiation of Safety Injection (SI), and cited the. EAL designated FS6 (in EPIP-1,
" Emergency Plan Classification Logic") as justification.
This
classification was based on a misreading of FS6, which stipulated both a
valid SI and indication of a large fission-product inventory in containment.
However,- plant conditions and instrunientation did not
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indicate the existence of a "large fission-product inventory in containment" as defined by a note on page 5 of EPIP-5, " General Emergency," and the SED subsequently stated that at.that tine he did not consider fuel integrity to have breached.
Licensee representatives acknowledged that the wording of EAL FS6 could be readily. revised to preclude further mhinterpretation.
(It should be noted that the SED validly cited a second EAL as a further basis for the Site Area Emergency classification.)
Th's matter will be tracked as an Inspector Follow-up
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Item (IFI) to verify termanent corrective action.
IFI 50-327, 50-328/90-21 01:
Clarification of Site Area Energency EAL FS6 to preclude misinterpretation or misapplication.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
NotificationMethodsandProcedures(82301)
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This area was observed to determine whether procedures were established
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for notification of State and local response organizations and plant i
emergency personnel by the licensee, and whether the content of initial and follow-up nessages to response organizations was established, j
The inspector observed that notification nethods and procedures were established and available for use in providing information regarding the
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simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response
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organization, inspection also disclosed that the licensee consistently implenented notification of the State and counties within the 15-minute time regime following declaration of the applicable emergency
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classifications throughout the exercise.
Periodic updating of offsite
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organizations was consistently implemented during the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency facilities and Equipment (82301)
L This area was observed to determine whether adequate energency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and n.aintained pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, _ and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.H of l
NUREG-0654(Revision 1).
The inspector observed activation, staffing, and operation of the
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energency response facilities, and observed the use of equipment therein.
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Emergency response facilities used by the licensee during the exercise
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included the Control Room simulator, TSC, OSC, and CECC.
a.
Control Room Simulator l
The inspector observed that, following review and analysis of the accident events, operations personnel acted promptly to initiate an acceptable response to the simulated emergency. Emergency procedures were available and followed
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The location of the simulator limited the number of personnel and precluded overcrowding.
Control Room simulator personnel demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification system for the Alert declaration.
The use of the simulator was considered a
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definite enhancement to the exercise.
b.
Technical Support Center The TSC was ordered activated and was promptly staffed following declaration of the Alert classification.
Facility personnel appeared to be cognizant of their emergency duties, authorities, and responsibilities.
The SED niaintained effective connand and control,
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providing periodic, informative briefings on plant status to the TSC o
staff (and to the OSC staff via a special PA system).
He also held periodic meetings with his principal staff to ensure a good i
cross-flow of information, the proper assignment of task priorities,
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and the application of forethought and preplanning-for possible further casualties.
In addition, the performance of administrative
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tasks in the TSC was superior.
The keeping of logs, status boards, and message files was accurate and timely.
The up-to-date team status board kept the SED well informed of team status and allowed him to ensure the proper priority was assigned to plant problem a reas.
c.
Operational Support Center The OSC was promptly staffed following the Alert declaration.
The
inspector observed that damage control teams were properly assembled.
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briefed, and dispatched. The OSC Manager appeared to be cognizant of his duties and responsibilities.
Information flow from the Operations Support Group (OSG) to the OSC Manager was not expeditious in several instances.
For example, the-Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) terminal at the OSG table
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indicated a Unit I reactor trip at 10:00 a.m., but the OSC Manager did not learn of the trip until 6 minutes later when the SED made a
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PA announcement.
Also, the OSG knew of the initiation of Unit 1 SI
with failure of one train of the Emergency Gas Treatment System to start, but did not inform the OSC Manager until about 10 minutes later, thus delaying the initiation of necessary corrective actions.
d.
Central Emergency Control Center Consistent with applicable procedures, the CECC (located at the licensee's main office complex in Chattanooga, TN) was staffed and i
fully activated within one hour of the Alert declaration.
The
operations at the CECC principally involved support to the plant t
emergency organization and. interface with cognizant governmental authorities, and those tasks were accomplished capably and methodically.
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The facility was well designed and equipped, enhancing the staff's
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l capability-to support and augment the response to the simulated-i emergency.
Security / access control was observed to be appropriately established and maintained.
Comunications with other emergency response facilities were reliable.
Status boards and other graphic L
aids were strategically located and well maintained.
L No violations or deviations were identified.
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AccidentAssessment(82301)
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This area was observed to determine whether nethods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite
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constquences of radiological emergency conditions were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and specificcriteriainSectionIIIofNUREG-0654(Revision 1).
The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel rcsulting from the simulated accident.
'These assessnents were adequately performed and the results properly employed in the development of mitigating actions.
The activities of onsite and offsite rbdiological monitoring teams were not observed by the inspector.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
ProtectiveResponse(82301)
This area was observed to determine whether guidelines for protective actions during the simulated emergency, consistent 5
'h Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and whether proiscto tions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential pt
- el, were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and secific criteria in SectionII.JofNUREG-0654(Revision 1).
The inspector verified that the licensee had and adequately used emergency procedures for formulating protective action recomniendations (PARS) for the offsite populace within the 10-mile emergency planning zone.
The inspector observed that protective actions were initiated for onsite emergency workers following the Site Area Emergency declaration by conducting an accountability of those personnel inside the plant perimeter.
The licensee's use of the computer-based Personnel Radiological Emergency Accountability System resulted in all except 11 persons within the site fence being accounted for within 30 minutes after l
eccountability was ordered.
The simulated evacuation of nonessential plant personnel was ordered in a tinely manner.
l In spite of 'a simulated airborne release of radioactive material, no
. preparations were observed to prevent the transportation of surface
contan;ination from plant and site environs into the TSC and Control Room.
i More frequent habitability checks of the TSC were not conducted after the onsite release began, and no control points were established to prevent the transportation of surface contamination from the plant and yard environs into the TSC and Control Room through the normal access portal.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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I 11. Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensce's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine whether weaknesses in the performance of the exercise were brought to the attention of managenent and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 'Part 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of
NUREG-0654(Revision 1).
The inspector observed the licensee's controller critique conducted the day following the exercise.
The subject critique involved a detailed
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discussion and analysis of required improvements and deficiencies
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identified during the exercise.
All substantive findings were documented for review and correction.
The respective corrective actions implemented to address these findings will be reviewed during future inspections.
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formal presentation of the critique results was made to licensee q
management on July 13, 1990.
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Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Report A report on FEMA's evaluation of offsite preparedness will be issued later
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and will be provided by a separate transmittal.
13.
Exit Interview
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The inspection scope and results were summarized on July 13, 1990, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.
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Although proprietary information may have been reviewed during this inspection, none is contained in this report.
Dissenting connents were
not received from the licensee regarding the listed item.
No previous NRC inspection findings were reviewed during the current inspection.
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Item Number Category,Descrjption,andReference 50-327, 50-328/90-21-01 IFI:
Clarification of Site Area Emergency EAL FS6 (Paragraph 5).
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Attachment:
Exercise Objectives and
. Narrative Summary of Scenario
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SEQUOYAll NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN)
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EMERGENCY PLAN (EP) EXERCISE
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GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
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The 1990 SQN EP Exercise will be a full scale exercise requiring full participation by TVA, and by State and local emergency response agencies.
ExereiEc_GDAla TVA's goals for the 1990 SQN exercise are as follows:
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1.
To allow plant and offsite personnel to test and demonstrate their response capability in accordance with the SQN EP and EP implementing procedures to protect plant personnel and general public as appropriate.
2.
To ensure that weaknesses observed in previous exercises have been corrected.
3.
To identify emergency response capabilities that are in need of improvement or revision.
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7-'s 1.
Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize TVA emergency response i,
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personnel and to activate TVA emergency centers in a timely manner.
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Demonstrate the adequacy, operability, and effective use of emergency communications equipment and the adequacy of the communications systems, including internal. plant communications, links to of f site emergency centers, and links to state and county emergency centers and
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authorities.
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Demonstrate the ability of each emergency response facility manager to
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maintain command and control over all emergency response activities
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conducted from his facility throughout the exercise.
4.
Demonstrate the primary functional responsibilities and/or l
problem-solving capabilities of emergency response personnel.
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Demonstrate that timely and accurate information can be supplied to l
the state on a frequent basis.
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Demonstrate that a timely and accurate flow of information can be
[~'y maintained between the plant and the Central Emergency Control Center
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(CECC).
Specific Objectives
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A.
Control room Objectives 1. Demonstrate the ability to Site Emergency Director (Shift Operations Supervisor) to classify an emergency condition and make required notifications in a timely manner.
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2. Demonstrate the ability to formulate and implement initial onsite
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protective action measures for plant personnel.
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3. Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the Control Room staff to the Technical Support Center (TSC) staff.
4. Demonstrate the ability of the Shift Supervisor to periodically inform Control Room personnel of the status of the' emergency situation and actions currently being planned by the TSC.
5. Demonstrate.the-ability of Control Room personnel to keop onsite-personnel apprised of the emergency status through poriodic PA system announcements. (See objective K.2)
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Demonstrate the ability of the Contrcl Room personnel to maintain fj current knowledge _of equipment and plant status and corrective actions U
taken through timely, detailed logkeeping.
7. Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room personnel to make a timely-determination of the cause of an incident and perform mitigating l
actions to place the unit in a safe and stable condition through effective command and control.
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TSC Objectives-1.
Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize the TSC emergency response personnel and to activate the TSC in a timely manner.- (See objective K.2)
2.
Demonstrate that.the Site EmerSency Director (SED) displays effective command and control in the TSC.
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Demonstrate the primary functional _ responsibilities and
. problem-solving capabilities of the.TSC staff in support of the
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Control Room staff's effort to identify the cause of the i
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incident, mitigate the consequence of the incident, and place
,j the unit in a safe and stable condition.
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Demonstrate the proficiency of the SED in the'TSC to classify an-emergency condition based on current plant' conditions, and the j
proficiency of the Site Director in directing the overall site i
response and resources to support the~ SED in accident mitigation activities.
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Demonstrate the ability to direct and coordinate inplant RadCon
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surveys in order to formulate and implement onsite protective
actions.
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. Demonstrate the ability to perform timely assessments on onsite radiological conditions to support the formulation of offsite protective action recommendations.
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7.
Demonstrate the timely updating of TSC status boards.
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Demonstrate timely updating of.each Operation Support Center
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(OSC) area and the Control Room, and the transfer of technical i
information to the CECC.
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Demonstrate the ability to assemble onsite personnel within the ( )
protected area and provide an accountability' report to the SED
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within thirty minutes of sounding the emergency sirens, without
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hampering the movement of OSC repair teams.
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Demonstrate the ability to effectively control access to the site and control rooms.
C.
OSC Objectives
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Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize the OSC emer6ency response personnel and to activate the OSC in a timely manner.
(See objective K.2)
2.
Demonstrate the ability of the OSC staff to initiate and
coordinate activities in a efficient and timely manner through effective command and control.
3.
Demonstrate that OSC teams are thoroughly briefed on plant conditions, that adequate RadCon support is provided before being dispatched, and that the exposure of onsite emergency workers is controlled.
4.
Demonstrate the ability of the OSC teams to develop troubleshooting plans and maintain a log of repair cetions taken.
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Demonstrate that adequate communications are maintained between
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_(T L OSC teams and the OSC and that each team is tracked in a timely ()
manner.
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Demonstrate that tEcre is adequate communications and efficient j
transfer of informa?aon between the OSC areas and the TSC, i
RadCon laboratory, and Chemistry laboratory.
7.
Demonstrate the timely updating of OSC status boards.
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Radiological Control and Chemistry Objectives 1.
Demonstrate the ab!11ty to alert and mobilize RadCon personnel.
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in a timely manner.
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Demonstrate the ability of the RadCon staff to perform effective l
inplant and site boundary. surveys during radiological.
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emergencies while-following good RadCon and ALARA practices.
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Demonstrate the ability to track changing radiological
conditions through timely and detailed documentation of survey results.
4.
Demonstrate timely and effective transfer of survey results from
the RadCon laboratory to the TSC and OSC.
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Demonstrate the ability to track and control the exposure of.
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onsite emergency workers, j
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Demonstrate a timely and efficien environment monitoring van and the,t activation of the plant 6.
establishment of adequate communications with the TSC, RMCC, and/or CECC.
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Demonstrate the ability to obtain and analyze samples drawn from the inplant normal or postaccident sampling systems and'aupport
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plant radiation release calculations.
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E.
CECC Objectives 1.
Demonstrate that the Operations Duty Specialist makes the initial notification to the state in.a timely manner.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize the CECC emergency response personnel and to activate'the CECC in'a timely manner.
(See objective K.2)
3.
Demonstrate that the CECC Director makes a clear announcement when he. determines the CECC operational, maintains effective command and control in the CECC, and provide periodic briefings to the CECC staff.
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Demonstrate the ability to effectively call upon and utilize TVA
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T corporate or outside support organizations and to obtain vendor N.)
or other outside reraurces if appropriate.
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Demonstrate the precase and clear transfe' of accurate information between tht. TSC staff and the CECC staff.
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Demonstrate the ability of the CECC staff to direct and
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-coordinate the deploy ent of Radiclogical Monitoring Teams and coordinate n'A dose assessment Activities with those conducted by the state.
7.
Demonstrate the ability of the Dose Assessment Team to obtain, i
analyze, and'use onsite and/or offsite radiological conditions i
and meteorological information to preduce dose assessments to support formulating protective action recommendations and
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provide the recommendations to the CECC Director in a clear and t mely manner,.
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8.
Demonstrate the ability to inform, update, and coordinate with i
State Radiological Health personnel regarding meteorological and
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dose assessment information.
9. ' Demonstrate the ability to periodically inform and update
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Radiological Monitoring Control Center (RMCC) emergency response personnel regarding the status of the emergency conditions.
'l-j-10. Demonstrate the ability of the CECC Plant Assessment Team to (j analyze current plant conditions, identify projected trends and
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i potential consequences, and make protective action
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l recommendations to the CECC Director using.the Protective Action Guide (PAG) logic diagram.
(See objective K.4)
11.
Demonstrate the ability of the CECC to provide periodic updates of onsite status and provide protective action recommendations
to-the state in a clear and timely manner.
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l-12.
Demonstrate the ability of the Core Damage Assessment Team to generate source term information in-a timely manner.
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L-13.
Demonstrate a timely and effective flow of information between CECC Radiological and Plant Assessment Teams.
14.
Demonstrate the timely updating of CECC status boards.
15.
Demonstrate that proper security is established for the CECC.
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Dcmonstrate the ability to alert federal and industrial emergency contacts as appropriate.
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Environs Assessment Activities
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, Demonstrate the ability to coordinate
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Teams from the RMCC in conjunction. nn.uw.. ate.
(Some
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participating personnel and radiological monitoring vans will be l
prestaged.)
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2.
Demonstrate the ability of the Radiological Monitoring Teams to
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efficiently and effectively utilize their procedures to perform.
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doce rate surveys, collection and analysis of radiological t
samples, and other prescribed radiological monitoring activities.
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3.
Demonstrate the ability of the monitoring teams to follow contamination control procedures under field condition, if warranted.
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Demonstrate the ability to control the exposure of offs.ite
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utility emergency workers.
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Demonstrate effective command and control of radiological j
monitoring activities from the plant, RMCC, and/or CECC es appropriate.
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Public Information Objectives I
1.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate information with non-WA
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(y agencies from the CECC.
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2.
Demonstrate the ability of the Communications staff in the CECC i
to develop timely and accurate news releases.
3.
= Demonstrate the ability of the JIC to provide timely and
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accurate information to the public during JIC briefings and j
coordinate public news briefings with State and federal agencies.
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Demonstrate that the CECC Information Manager exercises
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effective command and control of the overall Communications response.
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Demonstrate the ability of the media relations at the JIC to
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answer telephone calls from the media.
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6.
Demonstrate the ability of 'IVA's public information swff in the
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JIC to provide timely and accurate information w employees and
the public calling the public information telephone numbers.
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' Communications Objectives
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1.
Demonstrate the EP notification procedure throughout the notification chain, beginning at the SQN Control Room and
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CN extending to state and local authorities.
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Demonstrate the adequacy of communications links between the-l
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plant and the CECC.
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Demonstrate the adequacy of communications links between the i
CECC and the State Emergency Operations Center.
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4.
Demonstrate the adequacy of communications links between the
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5.
-Demonstrate the adequacy of communication links between the
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CECC, the RMCC, and monite ing vans.
1.
Exercise Conduct Objectives f
1.
Improve controller and evaluator performance through training
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and improved communication among lead controllers.
(See l
objective K.1)
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f 2.
Demonstrate the ability to adequately perform postexercise critiques to determine any areas requiring additional capability
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improvement.
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3.
-Participating personnel will know the date of the exercise but not its starting time or duration.
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4.
Provide training for new emergency response personnel.
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i. Credit will be taken for the following required REP drills.
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1.
Plant radiological monitoring drill.
2.
Plant'RadCon drill
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3.
Radiochemistry drill.
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4.
CECC/ State communications drill.
5.
TSO/CECC communications drill.
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Offsite environs monitoring drill.
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7.
CECC dose assessment drill.
8.
Accountability drill
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K.~ Open NRC insp9ctor follow-up items (IFIs)
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'N 1.
Exercise inconsistencies resulted from controller-provided incorrect data and controller altered data. (IFI 50-327,
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328/89-20-01)
2.
Delayed activations of the TSC, OSC, and-the CECC identified for corrective action by the licensee.
(IFI 50-327, 328/89-20-02)
3.
Plant personnel were not kept apprised of accident status.- (IFI 50-372, 328/89-20-03)
4.
Licensee failed to follow PAR guidance as the basis for recommendation to the State.
(IFI 50-327, 328/89-20-04)
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7420E TEAI AKP
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4/16/90
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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR FIANT (SQN) 1990 GRADED EXERCISE SCENARIO NARRATIVE SUPNARY
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Detailed initial conditions are provided to players through pre-exercise messages and are susanarized as follows:
Unit 1 -
At full power steady state operation, core is end-of-life on the 46-day of an extended run. Core history is as follows: 150 days i
at 100 percent power, 5 days shutdown, and 46 days at 100 percent power. Surveillance Instruction (SI) 128.2 in progress on 1A-A
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Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump.
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'Jnit 2 -
At full power steady state operation for 26 days after refueling.
I Core is at beginning-of-life. The annunciatiot. for high turbine i
vioration is in alam. The low pressure Stage b Bearings 5 and 6 are indicating between 9 and 10 mils vibration. Because of high
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power demand, the unit is kept on line even thout:h this vibration is above the 7 mil alam point. The vibration doas not exceed the 14 mil level where Westinghouse recommends tripping the turbine.
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Vibration personnel have monitored the condition and due to the steady level operation is not restricted, however, rebalancing as soon as possible is recommended.
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The exercise begins with Surveillance Instruction SI-128.2 " RESIDUAL HEAT RD10 VAL PUMP 1A-A QUARTERLY OPERABILITY TEST" underway. At ten minutes into
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the exercise Unit 1 1A-A RHR pump is discovered to be leaking oil. The source of the leak is a leaking sight glass oil line.
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At thirty minutes into the exercise Unit 2 low pressure turbine experiences a disintegration of two turbine blades with the blades penetrating the turbine casing. Unit 2 trips due to loss of vacuum in the condenser caused by the penetration of the turbine casing by the turbine blades. ALERT conditions exist due to a turbine blade penetrating the turbine casing.
At one hour thirty minutes into the exercise, the Unit 1
'B' Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seizes. Unit I trips. Fuel is damaged due to a loose part and
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fuel overheating. The event also causes a LOCA in containment resulting in radioactive reactor coolant being released into containment through the
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damaged seal.
A safety injection (SI) signal occurs at one hour forty minutes. Snergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS) train A fails to start due to seized fan bearings. All diesel generators start as a result of this SI signal. A fire affecting the 1B-B diesel generator starts inanediately as the diesel generator begins to run. SITE AREA DifAGENcy conditions exist due to a fire affecting vital equipment (1B-B Diesel generator).
At four hours thirty minutes into the exercise indications of a challenge to containment are obse'ved when a Pressurizer safety valve opens and fails'to close. A leak develops through FCV-30-48 and check valve 1-30-573 has debris
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across the sealing surface which prevents closure.
Small amounts of q
radioactivity begin to leak into the annulus and then enter the Emergency Sas Q
Treatment System (EGTS). Monitored '>w level noble gas release to the environment begins through the shi
. building stack. GDfERAk. EMERGENCY conditions exist due to loss of three barrier _ _. _...
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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) 1990 GRADED EXERCISE
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SCENARIO NARRATIVE SUMMARY.
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Page 2
At six hours thirty minutes into the exercise FCV-30-48 fails full open between containment and the annulus allowing large amounts of radioactivity to leak into the annulus. Noble gases are vented through the shield building stack and iodines are trapped in the train B EGTS charcoal filter beds.
The noble gas release rate greatly increases and a small amount of_ iodine begins to be released to the environment.
The noble gas release will continue for the duration of the exercise.
At-seven hours fif teen minutes into the exercise a fire develops in the train
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B EGTS filter due to buildup of heat from the trapped radioactivity. The fire
- causas a release of the iodine that had been trapped in the charcoal to the environment through the Shield. Building stack.
Thi6 large release may be followed by a smaller continuous release of iodine if EGTS continues to' vent the annulus.
This iodine release continues until'a filtered release path is repaired or placed in service. The exercise can be terminated at this time.
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7447E (Rev. 6, 7/2/90)
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