IR 05000327/1997016
| ML20197H131 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 12/05/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197H116 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-97-16, 50-328-97-16, NUDOCS 9712310197 | |
| Download: ML20197H131 (28) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11 Docket Nos.:
50 327 and 50 328 License Nos.:
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Report Nos.:
50 327/97-16 and 50 328/97-16 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority Facility:
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Location:
2600 1900 Ferry
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Soddy-Daisy. TN 37379
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Dates:
November 3 6, 1997 Inspector:
D. H. Thompson, Safeguards Inspector
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Approved by:
George A. Belisle, Chief Special Inspection Branch ilvision of Reactor Safety
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Enclosure 9712310197 971205 DR ADOCK 0500 3 7
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v EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. Units I and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-327/97 16. 50 328/97-16 A Chronological Sequence of Events was established for the October 17. 1997, wire damage event at the Electrical Penetration No. 22. Unit 2 Containment Building. The chronology of events is documented in Attachment A to this report.
Overall the licensee's response to the October 17, 1997, wire damage event was excellent.
The licensee's reportability of the event to the NRC was in accordance with regulatory requirements.
The licensee's evaluation has concluded that the wire damage was perpt.trated by an individual (s) who had authorized unescorted access to the site.
The act of damaging the wires at the Unit 2. Electrical Penetration No. 22 did not compromise the continued safe operation of plant systerhs.
(Section
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02.1.1)
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Based on independent review of the documentation of the licensee's inspections and walk-down of the plant (Attachment B). it was concluded that there did not appear to be any other examples of tampering related to the wire cutting event.
(Section 02.1.2)
Site management developed an excellent plan to pursue identification of the individual (s) who vandalized the electrical cables and identification of any additional potential tampering with plant equipment.
(Section 02.1.3)
It was concluded that vandalizing the electrical cables at the Electrical Penetration No. 22 had occurred and that the most likely individual (s)
involved had authorized access to the protected area and vital areas.
Following extensive reviews by the licensee and independent verification by NRC. it was concluded that vandalism occurred. However to date, a suspect has not been identified.
(Section 02.1.3)
It was verified that management expedited the im)lementation of actions to enhance detection of additional vandalism throug1 the use of patrols and surveillance equipment. The licensee intends to maintain some of the surveillance equipment to detect or deter future tampering.
(Section 02.1.4)
The Tennessee Valley Authority Office of the Inspector General (OlG)
investigative staff adequately reviewed the event ard other previous events to ensure that any potential tampering events had been fully evaluated. The OlG investigators have concluded that the wires were most probably cut as an act of vandalism. The investigation is continuing. The Region 11 Physical Security staff is continuing to monitor the investigation.
(Section S1.2.5)
The licensee was in compliance with the Physical Security Plan with res)ect to fitness for duty. personnel access authorization, criminal history chects, and access control of protected and vital areas.
(Section S1.2.7)
Attachment C contains a rearesentation of the wires and copies of photographs of the Unit.2. Electrical )enetration No. 22.
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l Report Details
Operational Status of facilities and Equipment 02.1 Tamnerino Event (71707)
On October 17. 1997, at approximately 7:35 a.m., two Modifications Department electricians arrived at the Seal Table Room. Elevation 690
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foot, of the Unit 2 Containment Building. to begin their shift assignment.
Replacement of electrical cables in penetration no. 22 was in progress with work being performed on both day and night wires to the new penetration wires. point of splicing existing field shifts. Work had progressed to the The two arriving electricians immediately observed that the condition of the wiring was abnormal and subsequently notified the Modifications supervision.
Eleven individual conductors had sustained damage from a sharp object coming in contact with the conductors.
The damage ranged-from insulation
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damage to two conductors being totally severed.
Security-was notified of the event at approximately 9:45 a.m., and immediately secured the
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scene with a security officer, who was directed to limit access to authorized personnel.
Plant management was informed of the event at o
10:00 a.m., on October 17. 1997.
02.1.1 Evaluation and Correction of Damaaed Comoonents a.
Insoection Scone
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Review the licensee's evaluation of the damaged wires to determine: 1)
if the as-found conditions represented vandalism:
and determine: 2)1f the damaged components were replaced: 3) and if operability was satisfactorily demonstrated, b.
Observation and Findinos The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions as a result of the wire damage event.
The inspector noted that the licensee event team concluded that there were no apparent safety implications from the,act of vandalism.
Five factors were considered in determining the probability of a malevolent act:
The cut wires were left ex)osed and damage could be immediately
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observed which indicated tle individ ial(s) who damaged the wires were not trying to hide the act. A thorough search of the area did not disclose evidence of deliberate manipulation of any other equipment within the area.
-There was no communicated threat received toward the plant or plant
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equipment.
There were no other events of this nature.
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have been cut as a person traversed through the area and the devices
capable of being used to damage wires was readily cvailable within
the immediate area.
j The target selection indicated that the individual (s) may possess a
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poor knowledge of the plant parameters since none of the damaged
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wires affected safety related equipment.
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' Conclusion The act of damaging the wires at the Unit 2 Electrical Penetration No. 22 did not conr>romise the continued safe operation of the plant systems.
02.1.2 Evaluation of Plant Systems for Additional Tamoerina 7
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Insoection Scoce Verify plant safety systems have been sufficiently evaluated for
potential tampering to assure they can perform their intended functions.
b.
Observation and Findinas In response to the wires being damaged at Electrical Penetration No.
22. the licensee performed an inspection of additional systems.
Including safety related systems and nonsafety related systems that could have an impact on the safe operation of the plant, to assure that the systems were intact with no signs of potential tampering.
This walk-down included a Unit I containment entry.
The Operations.
Engineering, and Quality Assurance Departments conducted independent walk-downs of the systems. nece3tance criteria for these system walk-downs were conducted using the NRC Draft Information Notice (IN).
" Guidelines for Assessing Indications of Equipment Tampering / Sabotage."
A search of the industry" data base was conducted using the key words
" vandalism." * tampering.
and " sabotage" revealed other instances of apparent deliberate acts.
The purpose of a previous similar events search was to determine if previous corrective actions were ineffective or if previous opportunities to take corrective actions were missed.
Although actions to absolutely prevent vandalism are generally not feasible, actions can be taken to reduce the probability of vandalism.
Two NRC ins was reviewed that discuss industry events in that context.
IN 86 91. " Limiting Access Authorizations" cites examples where individuals having no supportable reason had access to vital equipment.
A similar situation existed on October 17. 1997, at Sequoyah, when approximately 950 people had vital area access (specifically the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) and the emergency raw cooling water (ERCW) intake station) that was not needed.
Sequoyah's response to IN 86 91 was to evaluate existing controls for access authorization,
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I which were found to be adequate. Although not a regulatory concern. the
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licensee will re evaluate this issue to determine if authorization
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controls are still adequate, and if so, is there an implementation
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problem.
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The second NRC IN relevant to this event is IN 96-71. * Licensee Response to Indications of Tampering. Vandalism, or Malicious Mischief." This IN described problems with contingency plans and procedures. extent and
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depth of licensee responses, a lack of sensitivity by Operations
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' personnel, and failure to promptly inform Security of apparent
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tampering.
The Sequoyah response to IN 96-71 was to train Operations
and Maintenance personnel on recognizing intentional damage and a site
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bulletin stating that Operations or Security should be notified immediately if tampering vandalism. or malicious mischief were found.
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c.
Review of Previous Performance Evaluation Reoorts (PERs) for Evidence of
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Tamoerina
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The licensee reviewed the PERs written from the time pre sJtage work
started September 2. 1997 through October 18. 1997. in an effort to
determine if any other suspected issues existed that had the potential to have been caused by tampering.
The events are as follows:
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Unit 1. had loose flex conduit connections at penetration
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150 and reactor coolant drain tank flow control valve and one loose panel bolt at The loose bolt appeared to be stripped. penetration 22.
This was not considered tanpering.
Security seal and sealing device for IA component cooling
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water pump shaft housing was found on concrete next to housing door.
Reported to the unit supervisor, and subsequently discussed with site Security.
These housing doors are no longer required to be sealed.
The seal is not required and was found in an obvious location.
This was not considered tampering.
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Breaker for Valve 0 FCV 67-363 on 1Al A EDG 480v diesel
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auxiliary) board was found in wrong position (closed rather than open.
1ms valve controls the ERCW supply to an abandoned cooling tower. The system engineer stated that thepositionofDFCV-67-363isirrelevantwithregardto ERCH system operation.
This was not considered taapering.
Screws were missing from component cooling water junction
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boxes and a screw backed out on a control switch box cover locking mechanism, inspection of the interior of the junctionboxesandswitchboxrevealednoproblems.
Tbfs was not considered taapering.
A hole was found in the air line to the controller for 2-FCV 3 90A
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(Unit 2 feedwater regulating bypass valve) during troubleshooting to determine the cause for fail >-e of the valve to stroke during
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surveillance testing. The affected air line is located i
approximately 10 feet above the floor and close to a conduit,
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investigation by System Engineering determined that contact between the conduit cover plate and the air line caused the hole.
l This was not considered tanpering.
Bearing oil bubbler for the 2A motor driven auxiliary
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feedwater pump was found on the floor adjacent to the pump.
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Approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> earlier, drain hoses were removed from
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an area about 2 feet from the bearing oil bubbler, and it is postulated that during this activity the bubbler was inadv:!rtently dislodged.
The bubbler was found in an obvious 1ccation and a reasonable explanation exists.
This was not considered taapering.
Foreign material (nails, staples and a washer).was found in
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batching tank.
The PER states that the source appears to be
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previous scaffold installation and removal.
This was net considered tanpering.
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Cables were damaged in diesel auxiliary board 102 8.
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cables discussed in this PER were damaged when a transformer located nearby either overheated or caught fire.
The cable damage was either the result of the surrounding metal overheating or melting due to direct contact with the
flames.
This conclusion was the result of direct observation of the damajed cable and by discussion with the system engineer.
This was not considered tanpering.
- Several cables inside panel 1 H-15 were found with lugs removed.
The untaped/ unsecured cables discussed in this PER were the result of the tape originally used to spare the cables falling off. most likely due to age.
These conductors were spare conductors that were to be used as part of a modification in panel 1-M 15.
This conclusion was the result of discussion with the modifications lead electrical engineer.
This was not considered taapering.
Conductor was found unlanded in control a'ir sequencer )ane'
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0 LOCL 500-246.
The unlanded cable discussed ici this
)ER was originally installed during the modification to install the first new air compressor, The work plan showed the cable had been landed and verified in place. The cable also showed the appropriate indentations for being landed..
During the installation of the second new air compressor, this cable was identified to be unlanded.
Discussions with personnel involved did not identify any person that disconnected the cable.
During this time period. a vendor was working on and cround Also,quipment; however he denicd unlanding the' cable.
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during this time, work was ongoing in the air s -
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sequencer >anel for the C-compressor installation.
It is possible tlat as cables were ")ushed around" Tor the ongoing modification. the cable could lave come loose if the termination was not torqued sufficiently.
This was not considered tam ering.
c The reactor vessel head sensor bellcws capillary tube was
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found pulled away from the cavity wall during the removal of
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the missile shield.
Per discussion with the Instrument Maintenarce manager, this event most likely occurred during a previous refueling outage and was not identified until this outage when the missile shield was removed.
Due to the rigidity of the material and the amount of force needed to
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causc the bend in the tubing. it is considered most likely
that the tubing was snagged during previous work involving a hoist or lift and is the result of work practicese This was not considered tam ering.
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Damagewasfoundonconductorsinthecontrolcabinetfor
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the C" main bank tratisformer cooling equipment.
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conductors were fcund to be * 'rn or cut.
The conductor length was the minimum required to allow the conductor to be formed and terminated.
The cut or tear appears to have occurred during installation since a tool (such as pliers)
would be required to form the conductors so they could be landed.
This event appears to be the result of poor workmanship.
This conclusion was reached based on discussions with the Modifications field engineer and the TVA engineer that inspected the damage.
This was not considered tam ering.
A drain line for the 2A condenser vacuum pump heat exchanger
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was found broken at a 90 degree elbow, with water spraying out. A nearby support pedestal for the drain line was bent.
suggesting that force was applied which bent the pedestal and caused the break at the e1 bow.
This was not considered tamering.
Foreign material (welding rods, tye wraps'. nails, paint
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chips, and a ball of tape) was found in the "A" refueling water purification filter housing, in spite of extensive efforts in recent years, material such as this is sometimes dropped into the system.
This was not considered tam ering,
- Load limit adjustment knob for the 18 B EDG was found set at about 75 percent of maximum, rather than the normal " max fuel" setting.
This did not affect operability.
Load limit settings for the other three EDGs were checked and found to be set correctly.
This was not considered tamering.
Site Quality performed an assessment to determine the
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effectiveness of the Operations and Engineering walk-downs.
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Quality walked down selected Unit I areas in the turbine and auxiliary buildings and concluded that no tag ering with cables or equipment was apparent.
On October 28, 1997 Mechanical Maintenance was requested to
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fix incorrectly installed pant leg washers on the reactor
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coolant pump (RCP) air coolers.
The Maintenance Management Group foreman discovered that 57 of 60 bolts used to attach
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the discharge air cooler to the #4 RCP were " finger tight."
The boilermAer foreman (and support worker) stated the
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bolts were torqued when left on October 19. 1997. The bolts
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were " snugged up" and pant leg washers restored to the correct position, j
A review of the work order documentaHon for installation of the
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RCP air coolers identified that there were no torquing
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j The review also noted that step 2 in Section 6;11 of the Maintenance Inspection which documented the installation of the
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air coolers was marked "not applicable" by the general foreman and
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the "second check" block was left blank." Consequently, there is no documentation supporting the pr per installation of-the coolers.
Potential explanations f r the lack of bolt torque are poor workmanship unclear installation requirements, and other ongoing work activities.
Since the cause of the loosely torqued bolts is inconclusive from a review of the documentation, a field inspection was performed of other RCP #4 connections which this
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crew worked on.
No other anomalies were found.
This was not considered tampering.
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Conclusion
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Based on independent review of the documentation of the licensee's inspections and walk down of the )lant, the inspector concluded that
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there did not appear to be any otler examples of tampering related to the wire cutting event.
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02.1.3 Site Manaaement's Resoonse to the Event
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Insnection Scoce Review the actions taken by site management in responding to the tampering with the wires to determine if management's response was appropriate for the circumstances, b.
Observation and findinas-
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-Theinspectorreviewedthelicensee'sactions-forrecoveryfromthe event.
Prompt dction was taken to investigate the event and a recovery
. action plan was quickly started. The action plan included the
.following:
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Ensure integrity / operability of required security equipment j
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Initiate / conduct an independent investigation
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Develop plan for recovery from the event
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Comunication and event documentation
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Management initiated the following immediate measures:
1. Heightened presence of senior site management on both units was initiated by the site vice president and plant manager in an effort to observe key work during the outage, protect Unit 1 from outage activities, and support worker morale as they perform their outage tasks.
This extra presence contributes to the overall defense network provided at Sequoyah as a deterrent to random-acts of
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vandalism.
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2. Plant management conducted briefings on the event with site personnel.
The briefing requested an increased presence in the field
with increased attentiveness to personnel in the " wrong" area and to
"other than normal" behaviors.
3. A phone line (TIPS) was established to permit personnel to l
anonymously identify to Security items which could lead to the identification of the person (s) causing the damage.
4. Site Security instituted an additional foot patrol inside the plant.
Management's actions to keep NRC (site personnel, and Regional NRC management) informed of the actions being taken and the status of the recovery plan was excellent.
c.
Conclusions Site management developed an excellent plan to pursue identification of
the individual (s) who vandalized the electrical cables and identification of any additional potential tampering with plant equipment.
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it was concluded that vandalizing the electrical cables at the Electrical Penetration No. 22 had occurred and that the most likely individual (s) involved had authorized access to the protected area and vital areas.
Following extensive reviews by the licensee and independent verification by NRC, it was concluded that vandalism occurred.
However, to date, a suspect has not been idertified.
02.1.4 Imolementation of Interim Action To Detect Other Vandalism a.
Insoectiin Scope
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Determine if-adequate interim actions were implemented to detect any new events of vandalism,
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b.
Observation and Findinns After the wire damage event. the licensee took the following actions to detect new vandalism:
Posted the affected area to preserve the scene
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Established an additional vital area patrol
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Took compensatory measures to preserve the integrity of essential
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plant systems Operations. Engineering, and Quality Assurance conducted an
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inspection of all Unit 1 and 2 vital areas and safety related equipment
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Plantwalk-downswereperformedbyOperationsandEngineeringusing
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the NRC's draft 1989. IN 89 XX.
Guidance For Assessing Indications
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of Equipment Tampering / Sabotage" as guidance Target areas for enhanced protection were defined
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Additional surveillance cameras to monitor known target areas were
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installed c.
Conclusion Hanagement expedited the implementation of actions to enhance detection of additional vandalism through the use of patrols and surveillance equipment, The licensee intends to maintain some of the surveillance equipment to detect or deter future tampering.
S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.2.5 Security investication of the Event (81700)
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insoection Scooe Determine if Security and Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
investigation staffs adequately reviewed the event, b.
Observations and Findinas The OlG was consulted. Based on the number of personnel working in proximity to the electrical penetration, the decision was made to utilize the OIG to interview the involved personnel.
The OlG investigators reviewed the list of personnel who had access _to all areas and the radiological access printout and selected approximately 80 Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and contractor personnel with )otential for being in the vicinity of the damiged cable at the time of t1e
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incident.
The number of personnel interviewed as of Navember 6.1997.
has been expanded to approximately 150. The OlG investigation is ongoing.
No information has been identified, to date, which could lead to the identification of the individual (s) responsible for the damaged cables.
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Conclusion The TVA O!G investigative staff adequately reviewed the event and other previous events to ensure that any potential tampering events had been fully evtluated for potential tampering. The OIG investigators have concludeo that the wires were most 3robably cut as an act of vandalism.
The investigation is continuing.
Tie Region 11 Physical Security staff is continuing to munitor the investigation.
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S1.2.7 Eyaluation of Comoliance with the Physical Security Plan (PSP)
a.
Insoection Scone (81601)
Determine if the licensee was in compliance with their PSP an't
procedures.
b.
Observations and Findinas To preclude individuals from being authorized access to the facility who may engage in vandalism. the licensee established a screenir; program in accordance with 10 CFR 73.26 and 73.56 requirements.
The PSP states
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requires "At Tennessee Valley Authority Nuclear Plants. al1 elements of Regulatory Guide 5.66 have been implemented to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56." The PSP further requires that
"Ident :.*ication and access authorization is controlled by an automated security system."
Portals for granting access to the protected / vital areas are locked and alarmed.
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Conclusion The licensee was in compliance with the PSP with respect to fitness for duty, personnel access authorization, criminal. history checks, and access control of vital areas.
V.
Manacement Meetinas X1 Exit Heeting Summary The inspection scope and findings were summarized to licensee tsagement at the conclusion of the inspection on November 7. 1997.
The inspector described the a'eas inspected and discussed the inspection results.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee
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H. Bajestani. Site Vice President P. Brooks. Site Quality Assurance
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C. Burton. Engineering and Support Manager i
X. Derryberry. OlG. TVA i
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H. Fecth. Nuclear Assurance Hanager H. France. Security Specialist
J. Gates. Site Services Manager
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S. Gilley. Licensing Engineer H. Seay. Security Shift Supervisor
J. Setliffe. Site Security Manager
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K. Stevens. Security Field Support Supervisor
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L. Wallace. Site Quality Assurance
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D. Starkey. Resident Inspector o
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Other licensee employees contacted included Operations. Engineering.
Licensing, and Maintenance personnel.
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I INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 71707:
Plant Operations
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IP 81601:
Safeguards Contingency Plan Imalementing Review IP 81700:
Physical Security Program for )ower Reactors
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CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS MIE
.TE flE!iI 10/17/97 1:02 a.m.
Night shift electricians enter work area at elevation i
690. Unit 2 Containment Seal Table Room.
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e 10/17/97 5:15 a.m.
Night shift electricians depart work area at elevation 690. Unit 2 Containment Seal Table Room.
10/i?/97 7:35 a.m.
Day shift electricians enter elevation 690, Unit 2 Containment Seal Table Room.
10/17/97 8:15 a.m.
Day shift electricians notify Modifications supervisor that cables being spliced at the cable penetration junction box had been damaged.
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10/17/97 9:45 a.m.
Security su)ervision received a c611'from Operations about possiale cable' damage in a junction box at the
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Unit 2 Seal Table.
10/17/97 9:50 a.m.
Auxiliary Building security officer posted at
elevation 690 Unit 2 access to stop traffu. and secure the area while situation is evaluated by Houfications management.
10/17/97 10:00 a.m.
Plant and Security management were notified that an electrical penetration through the containment wall on Unit 2 was found to have unex)lained electrical wire
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damage. The penetration was ning replaced as part of
the Unit 2 Cycle 8 Refueling outage activities.
(These wires were out of service and provided no functir
.:nder existing plant conditions.)
10/17/97 10:13 a.m.
All Security personnel were put on increased awareness due to discovery at elevation 690 Unit 2 Electrical Penetration No. 22, 10/17/97 10:20 a.m.
Auxiliary Building security officer was relieved by an armed security officer dedicated to nintaining security cf the cable penetration.
All traffic in the area was halted.
10/17/97 10:55 a.m.
Photographs of the cables and area were taken and turned over to Operations by Security.
10/17/97 10:59 a.m.
One hour phone call was made by the shift manager to NRC.
(Prior to this, the site vice president notified the NRC Region 11. Regional Administrator, that a decision was being made on the reportability.)
10/17/97 11:07 a.m.
Day shift electricians who discovered the damaged wires were interviewed and statements taken by the security shift supervisor.
ATTACHMENT A
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10/17/97 11:10 a.m.
TVA OlG was contacted by Sequoyah management to assist i
in the investigation of the cable damage in the Unit 2 penetration.
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10/17/97 11:15 a.m.
Meeting between Engineering and Support Services manager and NRC Resident Inspector to discuss similar events.
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10/17/97 11:30 a.m.
Officers reminded o, the significance of the incident l
and advised that the event was a one hour reportable
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incident to NRC.
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10/17/97 12:15 p.m.
Day shift electricians reinterviewed by security manager and staff and additional statements received.
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10/17/97'
2:30 p.m.
Teleconference with Sequoyah management-lTorporate i
TVA NRC NRR. and Region 11. about findings and progress in the investigation.
,
10/17/97 3.05 p.m.
Discussed the investigation with the Federal Bureau of Ir:vestigation and advised that they would be notified of any criminal findings.
10/17/97 6:20 p.m.
NRC Region 11. briefed on status of investigation.
10/17/97
'7:30 p.m.
Security met with night shift electricians about cable damage at the Unit 2 Seal Table Room.
10/17/97 8:00 p.m.
Night shift electricians en route to the Unit 2 Seal
,
Table Room with Modifications management for inte"'li ew.
-
10/17/97 8:45 p.m.
Security met with the night shift electricians and they stated that the work area at the Unit 2 Seal Table Room was not the same as they had left it that morning. They said the cables were not damaged (cut or crimped) when they left.
Statements were received.
10/17/97 9:10 p.m.
Engineering and Su) port Services manager notified of the findings and tlat the damage done to the cables was apparently vandalism.
10/17/97 9:15 p.m.
Notified NRC Resident inspector at his residence of the investigative findings.
10/17/97 9:25 p.m.
NRC Region 11 advised of the investigative findings.
10/17/97'
9:35 p.m.
Interviews with personnel who were in the area of the incident continues.
No new information identified.
ATTACHMENT A t
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10/21/97 Electrical Penetration No. 22 restored to full l
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.1 LIST OF LICENSEE DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Physical Security-Plan Nuclear Security Instruction. NSI-5.6 900. Revision 0. Safeguards Events Reporting Criteria Operations Logs Evaluation of thc Tampering Events, dated November 17, 1997 Historical Access Control Reports Radiation Control Shift List
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Operability Test / Inspection, dated 10/17 to 11/06/97
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