IR 05000327/1996015
| ML20133F640 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133F630 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-96-15, 50-328-96-15, NUDOCS 9701140303 | |
| Download: ML20133F640 (19) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos:
50 327, 50 328 License Nos:
50 327/96 15, 50 328/96 15 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority Facility:
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Location:
2600 Igou Ferry Soddy Daisy TN 37379 Dates:
November 4 8, 1996 Inspectors:
W. Sartor Exercise Team Leader K. Clark, Public Affairs Officer G. Salyers, Emergency Preparedness Specialist E. Testa, Senior Radiation Specialist i
Approved by:
K. Barr, Chief, Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety EO " ado $K No$$$27 Enclosure G
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t EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Sequoyah Nuclear Plant NRC Inspection Reports 50 327, 328/96 15 This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of
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the biennial emergency preparedness exercise. The exercise was held in conjunction with emergency response demonstrations by the State of Tennessee
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and several local governments on November 6, 1996. This report summarized the observations of the four members of the NRC inspection team as they observed selected portions of the licensee's response in key emergency response facilities during the exercise.
Control Room Simulator
The Shift Manager assumed the responsibilities as the Site Emergency e
Director following his declaring the Alert. The shift properly implemented their emergency procedures.
Technical Suocort Center (TSC)
e Good command and control by the Site Emergency Director in the TSC with i
his staff was apparent as they effectively mitigated the simulated accident.
Operational Sucoort Center (OSC)
The OSC Manager was effective in managing resources as directed by the e
TSC.
- Central Emeroency Control Center (CECC)
e The CECC Director was effective in coordinating licensee activities related to the emergency and providing information to Federal, State and local authorities responding to the radiological emergency.
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o This facility was effectively managed to provide timely and correct information to the media.
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l Report Details
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Summary of Exercise Events This biennial emergency pre)aredness exercise included full participation by the State of Tennessee and.ocal Government emergency agencies. The exercise, which was evaluated by the NRC inspection team, was held from 8:30 a.m. to 2:02 p.m. on November 6, 1996.
Player critiques were conducted by the licensee players in the Emergency Response Facilities following termination of the exercise. The NRC exit meeting was conducted on November 8, 1996.
VI. Plant Suocort P4.
Staff Knowledge and Performance in EP P4.1 Exercise Scenario a.
Insoection Scope (82302)
The inspectors reviewed the exercise scenario to determine whether provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's plan.
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b.
Observations and Findinas The scenario was challenging and progressed from an Alert to a Site Area Emergency and then to a General Emergency. The scenario fully exercised the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient information to the State and local government agencies for their full participation in the exercise.
c.
Conclusion The scenario developed for this exercise was effective in testing the integrated emergency response capability.
l P4.2 Onsite Emeraency Oraanization i
a.
Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the functioning of the onsite emergency organization to determine whether the responsibilities for emergency response were defined and whether adequate staffing was available to respond to the simulated emergency.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors noted that the res)onsibilities for emergency response were clearly defined. The Shift ianager assumed the responsibilities of the Site Emergency Director (SED) and other personnel assumed pre-established emergency responsibilities. The SED declared the Alert emergency declaration and ap3 roved the notification message to the Operations Duty Specialist.
ollowing the classification of the Alert,
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the SED also directed the call out of the emergency response organization to staff the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs).
Sufficient trained personnel then promptly responded to staff and then activate the ERFs.
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Conclusion The initial on duty Simulator staff and augmented call out staff were sufficient to respond and perform defined emergency responsibilities, j
j P4.3 Emeraency Classification System a.
Insoection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed selected emergency response personnel to verify that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the licensee.
b.
Observation and Findinas The licensee's Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures provided an emergency classification system. The Simulator staff used it effectively to classify the off normal conditions as an Alert based on a reactor coolant system leak exceeding the capacity of one charging pump.
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At 10:18 a.m., the SED upgraded the emergency classification to a Site
Area Emergency based on the loss of the second fission product barrier.
At 11:53 a.m., the SED declared a General Emergency based on the loss of
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the third fission product barrier.
c.
Conclusion The licensee's Emergency Action Level Table was effectively used by the SED to properly classify the off normal conditions.
P4.4 Notification Methods and Procedures
a.
Insoection Scoce (82301)
The inspectors observed the licensee's notification of State and local governmental organizations and emergency personnel to determine whether timely and substantive emergency information was provided in accordance with procedures.
b.
Observations and Findinas The initial emergency notification to the State was made by the
Operations Duty Specialist (0DS) in Chattanooga. The SED received a
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call back from the ODS that the State had been notified. The remainder
of the notifications to include follow up notification were made from the CECC.
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Conclusion The licensee demonstrated the ability to make initial and follow up notifications to the State in a timely manner with essential information.
P4.5 Emeraency Communications a.
Insoection Scooe (82301)
The inspectors observed the flow of communications from and between the ERFs to determine whether provisions existed for the prompt transmission of emergency communications.
b.
Observation and Findinas The inspectors observed that the communications between the utility and the State were effective for the prompt transmission of emergency information.
c.
Conclusion Provisions existed for the prompt communications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel, and they were effectively used during the exercise to provide timely information and coordinate emergency response.
P4.6 Public Education and Information a.
Inspection Scope (82301)
An inspector observed how information concerning the simulated emergency
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was made available to the public.
b.
Observations and Findinas
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TVA established its Joint Information Center (JIC) at it Chattanooga Office Complex,1101 Market St., Chattanooga, TN.
From this location they provided timely and accurate information to reporters and to the public via periodic news releases.
c.
Conclusions The JIC and its staff were activated and organized in a manner that provided for the dissemination of timely and accurate information to the public.
- P4.7 Emeraency Facilities and Eauioment a.
Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the activation, staffing, and operation of selected Emergency Response Facilities to determine whether adecuate emergency facilities and equipment were available and maintainec to support an emergency respons.
b.
Observations and Findinas Control Room Simulator An inspector observed that the on shift designated crew in the Simulator acted promptly to initiate the emergency response. The facility and equipment supported the crew as they implemented their emergency procedures.
Technical Support Center The TSC was promptly activated with assigned emergency response personnel. The facility layout provided for good communication between the SED and his primary staff. The SED and his staff interacted frequently as plant conditions were monitored and evaluated, emergency classifications upgraded when necessary, and accident assessment and mitigating activities were implemented. The TSC staff also identified and prioritized the repair activities for the Operational Support Center (OSC).
Operational Support Center The OSC was promptly activated and provided an effective source of maintenance specialties for repair activities as directed by the TSC.
Central Emergency Control Center - The CECC was activated and functioned well as trained personnel worked effectively with the available equipment.
Dose assessment personnel were proactive in making dose projections, and field team control exhibited good communications and positioning. The inspector noted that core damage assessment was calculated differently by the scenario developers vice the players during the exercise, but the differences were not significant enough to affect the protective action decision making.
c.
Conclusion The ERFs were organized, equipped, and maintained in a manner that facilitated the emergency response.
P4.8 Protective Resoonses a.
Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the protective actions implemented for onsite personnel and the protective action recommendations (PAR) provided by the licensee to the State.
b.
Observations and Findinas Protective action recommendations made by the CECC Director were promptly and properly formulated and communicated to State authorities in a timely manner. On site protective actions included the assembly and accountability of all personnel in the protected area, followed by the evacuation of non essential personnel, c.
Conclusion The licensee demonstrated the ability to implement protective measures for onsite personnel and to make the required PARS for the protection of the publi *
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P4.9 Exercise Critiaue
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a.
Insoection Scoce (82301)
The inspectors observed the facility critiques immediately following the exercise and portions of the controller / evaluator organization critique process to determine whether weaknesses noted in the licensee's
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emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed that the exercise participants demonstrated good ownership and su) port of the emergency areparedness program with their involvement in t1e critique process. T1e controller / evaluator organization identified areas for further analysis to determine if improvements were needed. One area identified addressed better coordination with some of the data inputs by the controller organization. The findings were presented to management in a formal critique conducted on November 8, 1996.
c.
Conclusion The controller / evaluator organization did a good job of analyzing exercise performance.
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a V. Manaaement Meetinas
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i X1 Exit Meeting Sunnary
i The inspectors ) resented the inspection summary to members of licensee i
management at t1e conclusion of the inspection on November 8,1996. No proprietary information is contained in this report.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
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Licensee I
B. Adney Site Vice President R. Driscoll. Site Training Manager T. Flippo. Site Support Manager
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J. Herron Plant Manager R. Kitts. Cor) orate Emergency Pre]aredness Manager M. Lorek, Meclanical Engineering Manager R. Rausch, Maintenance / Modifications Manager J. Rupert. Engineering and Services Support Manager J. Setliffe. Site Security Manager R. Shell Licensing and Industry Affairs Manager l
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i INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
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IP 82301:
Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors
IP 82302:
Review of Exercise Objective and Scenarios for Power Reactors
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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED i
None
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CECC Central Emergency Control Center EAL Emergency Action Level EP Emergency Preparedness ERF Emergency Response Facility FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency OSC Operational Support Center SCR Simulator Control Room SED Site Emergency Director TSC.
Technical Support Center Attachment (8 Pages):
Goals and Objectives, and Scenario Narrative Summar.
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l SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN)
1996 EMERGENCYPLAN EXERCISE The 1996 SQN Radiological Emergency Plan Exercise will be a full scale exercise consisting of full participation by TVA and full participation by the State and Local Govemment emergency agencies.
EXERCISE GOALS TVA's goals for the SQN 1996 exercise are as follows:
1.
A!!ow plant and offsite personnel to demonstrate and test the capabilities of the emergency response organization to protect the healih and safety of plant personnel and the general public in accordance with the Nuclear Power-Radiological Emergency Plan (NP-REP), Site Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs), and the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) EPIPs.
2.
Provide an interactive exercise to ensure proficiency of onsite and offsite emergency response capabilities.
3 Provide training for emergency response personnel.
4.
Identify emergency response capabilities that are in need of improvement or revision.
5.
Provide an interactive exercise to allow the State responders to demonstrate their proficiency in emergency response capabilities.
EXERCISE OBJECTIVES A. Control Room / Simulator 1.
Demonstrate ability of the Shift Operations Supervisor to recognize conditions, classify emergencies, make required notifications in a timely manner, and assume the initial responsibilities of the Site Emergency director.
2.
Demonstrate ability of the Shift Operations Supervisor to maintain effective command and control of control room activities, prevent interference with classification analysis, dispatch and track response teams as needed prior to Technical Support Center activation, and periodically inform the control room staff of the status of the emergency situation.
3.
Demonstrate ability of the control room staff to make timely determination of the cause of the incident, perform mitigating actions, keep onsite personnelinformed of the emergency situation through periodic PA announcements prior to Technical Support Center activation, and a precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the Control Room Staff to the Technical Support Center Staff.
4.
Demonstrate ability of the control room staff to use proper procedures, maintain an accurate chronological account of events, and defer problems that cannot be quickly resolved to the Technical Support Center for resolution.
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Demonstrate ability of the control room staff to continuously evaluate information, redefine / confirm
l conditions and event classifications, establish an effective flow of information between the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, Central Emergency Control Center, and NRC.
Exercise Objectives Page1
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B. Technical Support Center (TSC)
l 1.
Demonstrate ability to perform a precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the control room staff to the TSC staff and assume the primary responsibilities of the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) prior to CECC activation.
2.
Demonstrate the Site Emergency Director's (SED) ability to provide effective direction, command and control, to manage activities in a manner to prevent interference with classification, analysis, or mitigation of an event and to perform periodic briefings for TSC/OSC staff and personnel.
3.
Demonstrate ability of the TSC staff to use proper procedures, solve problems related to incident identification and mitigation, and maintain an accurate account of events through chronologicallog keeping.
4.
Demonstrate the TSC's ability to determine the appropriate sampling and monitoring required to support accident mitigation, perform timely assessments of onsite radiological conditions, and formulate, coordinate, implement, and track on site protective actions.
5.
Demonstrate the TSC's ability to maintain effective communication between the Operations Support Center (OSC), Control Room, CECC, NRC, and between various groups within the TSC.
6.
Demonstrate ability of the TSC to continuously evaluate available information, redefine / confirm plant conditions and event classifications.
7.
Demonstrafe the Site Vice President's proficiency serving as a corporate interface for the SED.
i 8.
Demonstrate effective direction of site security throughout the exercise.
C. Operations Support Center (OSC)
i 1.
Demonstrate ability of the OSC Manager, through effective command and control, to coordinate and
initiate activities in a timely manner, maintain effective communications between various groups within
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the OSC, and use of proper procedures in the coordination and initiation of activities.
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2.
Demonstrate ability of the OSC staff to properly plan required tasks, promptly dispatch response teams,
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track response teams, and maintain communication with the response teams.
3.
Demonstrate ability of the OSC response teams to quickly and effectively enter the plant, make necessary repairs orinspections, and perform an adequate de-brief upon retuming to the OSC.
4.
Demonstrate ability of the OSC staff to maintain accurate status board information, maintain an accurate account of equipment, plant, and response team status through accurate chronologicallogs, and
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effective transfer of information between the OSC, TSC, RADCON laboratory, and Cheniistry laboratory.
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5.
Demonstrate ability of the RADCON personnel to use proper procedures and follow good RADCON and ALARA practices to effectively support accident mitigation efforts, ensure adequate worker protection, and perform effective inplant and site boundary surveys during radiological emergencies.
6.
Demonstrate ability of the OSC to track changing radiological conditions through survey results and/or
inplant monitors, controlintemal and extemal exposures and personnel contamination of onsite emergency workers, and incorporate the information into personnel protective actions and exposure tracking.
Exercise Objectives Page 2
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l D. Central Emergency Control Center 1.
Demonstrate ability of the Operations Duty Specialist to make initial notifications to State agencies in a i
timely manner.
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2.
Demonstrate ability to perform precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the TSC staff to the CECC staff.
l 3.
Demonstrate ability of the CECC Director to maintain effective command and control within the CECC l
and establish and maintain effective communication between various groups within the CECC.
4.
Demonstrate ability of the CECC to perform, update, coordinate offsite activities with the STATE and provide protective action recommendations in a timely manner.
5.
Demonstrate ability to effectively transfer radiological survey information from the field, keep the field teams informed of emergency conditions, and adequately monitor and control the exposure levels of offsite personnel.
6.
Demonstrate ability of the CECC staff to maintain detailed chronologicallogs of plant status, ongoing activities, extemal TVA correspondence, corrective actions taken, protective action recommendations and to continuously evaluate available information and redefine / confirm the conditions and event classifications.
7.
Demonstrate ability of the CECC staff to effectively call upon and obtain TVA corporate, vendor, or other outside support resources as appropriate or needed (technical, logistics, financial, federal, industrial, etc.).
bemonstrate ability cf the CECC staff to establish and maintain effective communication between the 8.
various emergency centers (Control Room, TSC, RMCC, State /t.ocal EOC) and NRC responders in the CECC.
9.
Demonstrate ability of the CECC staff to analyze current plant conditions, identify projected trends, determine the potential consequences, and maintain CECC status board information accurate.
10. Demonstrate ability to establish and maintain adequate security access control for the CECC, 11. Demonstrate proficiency of the CECC staff with emergency procedures, equipment, and methods.
E. EXERCISE SPECIFIC 1.
Demonstrate ability of the exercise controllers to perform their function without prompting, coaching, or otherwise Interfering with the performance of exercise players.
2.
Demonstrate that personnel participating in the exercise were not pre-positioned prior to commencement.
3.
Conduct of the exercise players demonstrated that they did not have prior knowledge of scenario details or initiation time.
4.
The scenario should demonstrate technical accuracy, anticipation of significant player actions, and be sufficiently difficult to exercise capabilities of the emergency plan.
5.
Demonstrate ability to conduct post exercise critiques.
6.
Demonstrate adequacy of control room and emergency centers facilities, resources, equipment, and communication systems to support emergency operations.
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Exercise Objectives Page 3
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'7.
Demonstrate ability to alert and mobilize personnel for emergency response centers and activate the emergency centers in a timely manner.
8.
Demonstrate ability to conduct habitability surveys for the TSC, OSC, control room, and all assembly i
areas.
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9. Demonstrate ability to maintain effective communication between the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, Central Emergency Contio! Center, Control Room / Simulator, and NRC.
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10. Demonstrate ability to coordinate plans for termination of the emergency and recovery operation.
F. MEDICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM 1. An incident Commanderis promptly dispatched to the scene of the emergency where he/she
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demonstrates ability to establish a command post, setup communication with the main control room, and f
effectively interact with the Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) leader.
2.
The MERT demonstrates the ability to arrived on the emergency scene in a timely manner, assess
medical injuries, identify hazards, and provide medical care.
3.
The priority of medical and radiological concems was properly established and contamination control measures were implemented for personnel and equipment during the treatment, transport, and following transport of contaminated or potentially contaminated injured personnel.
4.
Security personnel demonstrate their ability to provide sufficient and effective control at the scene of the s
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emergency.
5.
Derhonstrate ability to determine means of transportation forinjured personnel and provide follow-up
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notification to receiving hospital upon site departure.
6.
The agreement hospital demonstrates their ability to receive the injured person, assess radiological and
medical conditions of the victim, and implement proper contamination control measures.
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7.
RADCON personnel demonstrates their ability to monitor MERT exposures and provided sufficient i
radiological information to the incident Commander and / or MERT Leader.
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8.
The Incident Commander and MERT demonstrates ability to communicate and interact effectively.
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G. ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING 1.
Demonstrate the ability of the Environmental Monitoring Teams to effectively utilize their procedures to j
perform dose rate surveys, collect and analyze radiological samples, and conduct other prescribed radiological activities.
2.
Demonstrate the Environmental Monitoring Team's abilities to adhere to appropriate contamination control procedures in field conditions.
3.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the Environmental Monitoring Vans to support emergency operations (monitoring equipment, supplies, communication equipment, etc.).
4.
Demonstrate ability to timely and effectively activate and establish communiccion with environmental monitoring vans.
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5.
Demonstrate ability of the SITE to timely and effectively transfer control of the environmental monitoring vans.
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Exercise Objectives Page 4
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Demonstrate ability to effectively dispatch and control Radiological / Environmental Monitoring Teams, coordinate with the State when applicable, and obtain, analyze, and utilize meteorological, onsite and offsite radiological conditions, and source term information to develop dose assessments in a timely manner.
H. PUBLIC INFORMATION / JOINT INFORMATION CENTER 1.
Demonstrate the ability of the CECC Communications staff to coordinate information with non - TVA i
agencies.
2.
Demonstrate the ability of the CECC Communications Staff to develop timely accurate news releases.
3.
Demonstrate the ability of the CECC Information Manager to exercise effective command and control of the overall communications response.
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Demonstrate the ability of the JIC to coordinate public news briefings with State and Federal agencies and provide timely information to the public during periodic JIC briefings.
5.
Demonstrate the ability of media relations personnelin the JIC to answer telephone calls from the media professionally and accurately.
6.
Demonstrate the ability of TVA's public information staff in the JIC to provide timely and accurate information to anyone calling the public information telephone number.
7.
Demonstrate the ability to provide reasonable media access with minimal impact on emergency response activities.
8.
Demonstrate the ability to provide information to the public that is accurate, presented at a meaningful technical level, and take corrective actions for inaccuracles.
9.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the CECC communication staffs facilities, resources, equipment, and communications system to support emergency operations.
I. The following drills will be conducted during the exercise:
CECC/ State Communication Drill 2.
TSC/CECC Communication Drill 3.
Plant RADCON Drill
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4.
Plant Radiological Monitoring Drill (Environs Monitoring)
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l S.. Medical Emergency Drill 6.
Chemistry Post Accident Sampling Drill Exercise Objectives Page5
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1 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) 1996 GRADED EXERCISE SCENARIO NARRATIVE SUMMARY CONFIDENTIAL Rev. date: 10/28/96 INITIAL CONDITIONS:
l U l at 100% power for the last 150 days. The core is at end oflife.
Boron concentration is 14 ppm.
The Floor Drain Collector Tank (FDCT) is full.
The Auxiliary Waste Evaporator Feed (AWEF) Pumps and the Auxiliary Condensate
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Demin Waste Evaporator Feed (ACDWEF) Pump are out of service (0. O. S.) due to cavitation.
The Auxiliary Building Floor and Equipment Drain Sump (ABFEDS) pumps are aligned to the Tritiated Drain Collector Tank ('IDCT) which half full.
RHR IB-B Pump is O. O. S. for pump seal replacement.
At five minutes (T=00:05) into the exercise a crack occurs on loop two of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
causing a leak inside the U-1 Containment. This leak exceeds the capacity of,one Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) in the normal alignment.
At fifteen minutes (T=00:15) into the exercise an ALERT should be declared based on loss of RCS barrier EAL 1.2.2(non isolatable RCS leak exceeding the capacity of one charging pump iri the normal alignment).
At twenty-two minutes (T=00:22) into the exercise the Unit I reactor will trip and a SI signal will occur due to increased contmment pressure caused by the RCS leak.
At one hour (T=01:00) into the exercise a medical emergency occurs when a person working on IB RHR pump is injured and contaminated.
At one hour and thirty minutes (T=01:30) into the exercise the cacked RCS loop separates further resulting in a greater loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and a rapid depressunzation of the RCS. This depressurtzation and thermal shock of thousands of gallons per minute of cold water (from the SI and cold leg accumulators) on the fuel rods results in about 40 percent clad failure. The accident radiation monitors inside containment begin to rise.
At one hour and forty-five minutes (T=01:45) into the exercise a SAE should be declared based on the loss of two fission product barriers. RCS barrier loss due to EAL 1.2.2 and now fuel clad barrier loss due to EAL 1.1.5(valid reading on contamment accident monitors exceeding limits).
At two hours (T=02:00) into the exercise RHR 1 A A pump begins to vibrate excessively due to a deteriorating lower motor bearing.
At three hours (T=03:00) into the exercise RHR IB B pump is repaired. When started the RHR IB-B pump will run for about 30 seconds when the IB 6.9KV shutdown board trips on differential due to a phase-to-ground fault on the Shutdown Transformer IB1-B. The fault on the IB1-B transformer melts a hole in the transformer casing releasing some burned and vaporized Polychlorinated Biphenlys(PCBs) which set off one smoke detector in the room. Additional PCBs spray and flow out of the casing into the room.
At three hours and five minutes (T=03:05) into the exercise the vibration of the RHR 1 A-A pump results in a leak of about 120 gpm when the weld for the flushing connection piping breaks at thejunction with the 8 inch discharge piping leaving a hole about.85 inches in diameter on the discharge piping. The temperature of the
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leaking water from the RHR 1 A-A system is about 185'F. The release path is from the I A-A RHR system to the
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1 A-A RHR pump room air which is pulled into the U-l pipe chase by the Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment
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system which is then evhm*A to the environment after being filtered by charcoal and HEPA filter._
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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) 1996 GRADED EXERCISE SCENARIO NARRATIVE SUMMARY CONFIDENTIAL Rev. date: 10/28/96 At three hours and ten minutes (T=03:10) into the exercise flooding alarm LS-40-29 is activated due to the rising l
water in RHR 1 A-A pump room. Radiation monitors and ventilation exhaust monitors will begin to alarm.
l At three hours and fifteen minutes (T=03:15) into the exercise a temperature sensor in RHR 1 A-A pump room i
exceeds 136*F which causes annunciator window E-1 on panel XA-55 6D to alarm. Additionally, a GE should be l
declared based on loss of two bemers and potentsal loss of the third barner RCS barrier loss due to EAL 1.2.2, fuel clad barrier loss due to EAL 1.1.5 and now the potential loss of Containment due to EAL 1.3.4(Unexplained valid increase in area or ventilation rad monitors adjacent to coneninment with a LOCA in progress).
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At three hours and forty minutes (T=03:40) into the exercise the water in the RHR 1 A A pump room reaches the top of the coffer dam and begins to build up between the door and the coffer dam. As the water builds up, the
pressure on the door unscats it from the frame allowing water to leak out of the room onto elevation 653. Dose l
rates on elevation 653 begin to ri:,e rapidly.
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At three hours and forty-five minutes (T=03:45) into the exercise the first pump for the ABFEDS starts pumping water to the TDCT.
I At four hours and twenty minutes (T=04:20) into the exercise the second pump for the ABFEDS starts pumping water to the TDCT.
At five hours (T=05:00) into the exercise the IB 6.9KV shutdown board may be repaired and returned to service.
i At five hears and fiAcen minutes (T=05:15) into the exercise the Exercise may be terminated aAer the RHR 1B-B
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pump is returned to service, the RHR 1 A-A pump discharge leak is isolated, and the environmental monitoring objectives have been met.
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SON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS g gy g,g yggy
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REV. DATE 8-05-06 08:30 EST 00:00 00.30 01:00 01:30 02:00 02:30 03:00 03:30 04:00 04:30 05:00 05:30 06.00 06:30
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ALERT (EAL 1.2)
S.A.E.(EAL 1.1)
C.E.(EAL 1.3)
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T=00 00 RilR II -B pump is 0 13.
T=03 00 RllR lB-B pump is returned to strvice.
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T=00 05 loop 2 of 11-1 T=01:30 tooq2 RCS
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leak mereases RCS begins to leak.
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T=0100 Medi:al
'T=02.00 Medical Emergency enils.
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Emergency occurs.
m mv T=01.31 Cled Iailures occur 9ae to thermal shoch and rapid depressurization.
T=01 45 Containment Accident
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Monijors exceed EAll 1.1 values.
- T=02 00 RilR IA-A pump T=03 05 Rille I A-A pump begins to begins to degnade-leak (Contain nent bypassedi O
O T=03 01 IB iSKV shutdowr, board fails T=05 00 IB E 9KV shutdown, board may be returned.o service il rebaired.
I e
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a er in the RHR
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T=03 05 RilR A-A IA-A rump room bellns oom b gins f, ump to overgow the coffer fem
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Administratively Confidential w
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