IR 05000327/1987003
ML20207T479 | |
Person / Time | |
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Site: | Sequoyah ![]() |
Issue date: | 02/24/1987 |
From: | Bassett C, Hosey C, Weddington R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20207T460 | List: |
References | |
50-327-87-03, 50-327-87-3, 50-328-87-03, 50-328-87-3, IEIN-86-103, IEIN-86-107, NUDOCS 8703240057 | |
Download: ML20207T479 (13) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.
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101 MAAltiT A ST Atti, N.W.
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FEB 2 41987
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Report Nos.: 50-327/87-03 and 50-328/87-03 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 6N38 A Lookout Place
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1101 Market Street
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Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
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Docket Nos.: 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.: DPR-77 and DPR-79
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Facility Name: Sequoyah 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: January 20-21,1987 Inspec' tor:
M/d 8)t/d'rbd
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R. E. Wladdington j Date 5fgned
{/b Gddt$
J/5/97 C. H. Bassett Datt 5fgned Approved by:
hh 2./7/f 7 c. M. Mosey, 5ectthn chief pate sfgned
Division of Radiatuon Safety and Safeguards
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SUMMARY Scope This was 'a special announced inspection in the areas of previous enforcement matters, the Unit 1 steam generator outage, health physics restart
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Issues, followup on nonroutine events, followup on previous inspector identified items and followup in IE Information Notices.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- L. M. Nobles, Acting Plant Manager
- P. R. Prince, Site Radiological Control Superintendent D. E. Crowley, Radiological Control Operations Supervisor J. Osborne, Radiological Control ALARA Supervisor S. P. Holdefer, Radiological Control Supervisor J. M. Qualls, Radwaste Section Supervisor D. Bateson, SQN Training Project Coordinator D. Goetcheus, Steam Generator Project Manager S. liarrison, Dosimetry Unit Supervisor
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J. A. Leamon, ALARA Engineer
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F. W. Reiman, Radiological Assessor
- B. Schofield, Compliance Engineer
- M. Cooper, Compliance Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, security force numbers, and office personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission K. A. Jenison, Senior Resident inspector P. E. Ilarmon, Resident Inspector
' Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection _ scope and findings were sumarized on January 28, 1987, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and took no exceptions.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters I
(Closed) Violation (50-327/840401and50-328/84-0401), failure to comply with radiation work permit requirements.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response of April 10, 1984, and verified that the corrective action specified in the response had been taken.
(closed) Violation (50-327/86-04 02 and 50-328/86-04-02), Failure to use bicassay results to evaluate the regulatory significance of an internal exposure.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's responses of April 30. July 3, and October 17, 1986, and verified that the currective action specified in the responses had been taken.
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E 4..
Unit 1 Inspection and Heat Treatment of Steam Generator Inner Radius U-Bend Tubes (83729)
a.
Planning and Preparation
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When' low level primary to secondary (leakage in the Sequoyah Nuclear
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Plant (SQN)' Unit 1 steam generator S/G) Number 3, first noted in December.1984, gradually worsened, it was decided to oerform helium leak -tests and eddy current tests of' the U-bend tubes of S/G No. 3.
Because problems with the U-tube. walls were noted, one hundred percent eddy current testing of the U-tubes in Rows 1 and 2 of all Unit 1 S/Gs
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was completed in September 1985.
This testing and other ' tests performed in Unit 2 resulted in the plugging.of numerous tubes in some of the'S/Gs in both units.
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After a review of industry experience and the licensee's own experience
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-at SQN, it was decided to use a vendor U-bend heat treatment process in
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an effort to alleviate some of the U-tube wall problems.
subsequently contracted with two vendors to perform further eddy F
current testing and the heat treatment of the S/G's inner. radius U-bend-tubes for both SQN. units..SQN representatives presented a briefing to members'of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) of the NRC on January 2,1987, which detailed the project and the actions planned to maintain: exposure as low as reasonably. achievable (ALARA) during the work.. The schedule in the briefing -indicated that after mock-up and
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other training activities were completed, actual work was to begin January _15, 1987, and Le completed March 1,1987.
The inspector reviewed the ALARA plans for the project and the notes from the briefing.
The planning and preparations. appeared to be adequate for the project.
b.
Training
The-licensee determined that all personnel involved in the S/G t
l inspection and heat treatment work would be-required to receive training prior to participation on the project.
General Employee
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Training (GET) was provided or verified to be current for all personnel involved.
In one case, the licensee sent a radiological controls
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instructor and a safety officer to the vendor's facility in order to ensure that proper training was given to those likely to be involved in
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the work, Specific job training was also provided for those involved with specialized tasks.
The training was given in a mock-up training facility set up, for the project. The training was made as realistic as
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possible by establishing full radiological controls for the mock-up area and by requiring all personnel to perform their specific task
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under those conditions. The scope of the training involved set-up, use
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and removal of the remote controlled robotic manipulator, installation of shielding and use of specialized tools, h
The inspector toured the mock-up training facility and observed training in progress.
Training records of individuals involved in the
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f project'were al'so reviewed.
Observations were also made of-workers as they applied the training in the actual working environment.. - The mock-up, facility appeared to provide an. adequate-environment in which to familiarize the workers Lwith the actual work to be performed. The training also' appeared to'be adequate.
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c.
Maintaining Exposure As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)
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In the briefing given to NRR by the licensee, several measures were-outlined to maintain exposure ALARA. These measures included:
Using primary manway lead shielding doors to reduce the dose rate
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from inside-the S/Gs.
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Using. the same 'robotic manipulator to perform such jobs as
- deplugging U-tubes, heat treatment, eddy current _ testing and
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plugging activities to reduce the number of full and partial jumps made into the S/Gs.
Using lead lined huts placed between comon S/Gs to provide an
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area with a lower general area radiation level ~where workers could wait while not needed'on the work platform.
Ensuring. that the operational sequence of the work was planned to
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minimize radiation exposure.
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Using shielding to the extent possible on hot spots in proximity
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to the work area.
Using video monitoring and radio comunications equipment to
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monitor and direct the work effort.
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. The inspector verified that these ALARA measures described in the licensee's briefing to NRR had been taken and were apparently effective
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in minimizing worker exposures, d.
External Exposure Control and Dosimetry The inspector reviewed selected records of radiological surveys l '
performed to support the S/G work.
Radiation surveys inside the S/Gs
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indicated contact readings from 25,800 to 43,000 millirem per hour L
(mr/hr) beta and from 8,000 to 12,000 mr/hr gama.
Radiation surveys j
taken outside the S/Gs at the open manways indicated readings from 578 to. 3,400 mr/hr beta and 280 to 1,500 gama.
However, general area surveys taken in the work areas between the S/Gs with the manway lead shielding doors closed indicated gamma readings of only 25 to 120 mr/hr.
The inspector also noted that contamination surveys in the work area indicated contamination levels of 2 to 80 millirad per hour per one hundred square centimeters (mrad /hr/100 cm2).
The licensee stated that, in the interest of ALARA, the work areas were only decontaminated - between major work evolutions or when airborne
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radioactivity was noted.
This ' decontamination was accomplished by removing one of the several layers of herculite that had been placed on
!the work area floor before work commenced. Tools and equipment in the work area were wiped down as well.
In order-to assess the exposure each person received, workers were required to wear low and/or high range direct reading dosimeters, depending on the job, and thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs).
Extremity and multibadge monitoring was required in certain instances as well.
The inspector noted that the monitoring of exposure appeared
'to be adequate and placement of TLDs and dosimeters appeared to be standardized and correct in order to achieve consistent results.
The inspector reviewed daily dose records of contractor personnel working under the S/G project radiation work permits (RWPs).
It was noted that. the average dose rate for-all. work completed as of January 20, 1987, was 10 mr/hr and that 25,411 mr of the total 64,540 mr allotted for the job had been used.
Also, all cumulative.
exposures were below contractor or licensee imposed administrative quarterly exposure limits of 1,800 mr or 1,250 mr respectively.
Form NRC.4s of selected vendor individuals and multiple TLD issuance.
records and TLD processing reports of personnel involved with the S/G
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U-tube project were also reviewed.
The records appeared to be complete and to contain the proper supporting documentation.
The in',pector reviewed the-licensee's administrative exposure controls and deta mined that those controls were designed to maintain exposure ALARA. The licensee required cor.secutively higher tiers of supervision to approve dose extensions with the plant manager having approval authority for whole body exposures in excess of 3 rem during the calendar year. The administrative limits appeared to be adequate.
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Internal Exposure Control Various engineering controls were employed to limit concentrations of radioactive material in air.
These controls included constructioa of tents in two locations to provide an area in which the remote manipulator probes and associated equipment could be repaired.
These tents and one leg of each S/G were provided with auxiliary ventilation by means of separate ducting and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA)
filters for each.
The personnel working on the S/G project were required to wear respiratory protection equipment during certain job evolutions to preclude the intake of any airborne radioactive material.
As work progressed, the health physics staff also monitored the airborne radioactivity in the work areas using both high and low volume air samplers.
The air sampling data was reviewed by the inspector and it was determined that the controls used were, in general, effective in maintaining the level of airborne radioactivity below the maximum
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permissible ~- concentration (MPC) listed in 10 CFR 20, = Appendix B, Table 1, Column 1.
On two occasions the airborne levels exceeded MPC
'(i.e., 3 times. MPC),. but the majority of _the air sample results
- indicated airborre radioactivity was being maintained.below twenty-five.
percent of MPC.
f.
Control' of. Radioactive Material and Contamination, Surveys and-Monitoring While touring various plant areas, the inspector. observed the movement of material from controlled areas to uncontrolled areas to determine.if-proper direct and removable contamination surveys were being conducted.
.It was.noted that adequate surveys were performed and that the amount of material requiring a release survey had apparently been reduced as compared to previous inspections.
The inspector reviewed reports of radiation and contamination surveys posted at selected job sites.-
During a tour of the facility, the inspector performed independent radiation surveys using NRC equipment and noted no inconsistencies with area postings.
The inspector also observed removing personal anti-contamination clothing (PC) personnelwhile exiting contamination control zones and personnel performing whole body personal contamination surveys.
All PC removals and personnel surveys appeared to.be adequate.
f.
. Control of the Project In order to control the work and operate the remote controlled robotic manipulator, the licensee established two "comand centers." Each was-equipped with four video monitors and radio headsets which were in turn connected to cameras and headsets in the S/G work areas.
It was noted that this comunications equipment allowed the licensee and vendors to maintain good control of and. closely follow the' progression of the work.
As an additional control measure, a meeting was held twice a day which included representatives from all the groups involved in the project.
The meetings were used to discuss the next work evolutions to be attempted as well as the problems, if any, that had been encountered on previous shifts.
The meetings appeared to be an effective means of controlling the work effort and of resolving problems.
RWPs and the Pre-Job ALARA Planning Report were also used to control the work.
The inspector reviewed RWPs, 87-1109-001 through 87-1109-009, governing the S/G work as well as the Pre-Job ALARA plan
- Attachment II, SQN Radiological Control Instruction (RCI)-10 ALAP,A Planning, Rev.12, APR No.87-001 dated January 7,1987.
The RWP requirements and the ALARA planning appeared to be adequate to ensure
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_ Conclusion
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's plans and preparations for the
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steam generator U-tube testing and-heat treatment..It appeared that
. the ALARA pre-planning was effective in focusing the proper. attention-on' personnel exposure and methods to control it.
Through observation
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of the. work in _ progress, the inspector _ noted that the work was apparently' being followed closely and was proceeding on schedule. The
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work was.being conducted in accordance with established plans and in
conformance with regulatory requirements..
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Health Physics Restart Issues'(83722, 83728)-
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a.-
Review of reorganized health ' physics staff (50-327/86-36-02 and-50_-328/86-36-02).
The inspector reviewed the reorganized health physics staffing with the Site-Radiological Control Superintendent.
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During the_ inspection conducted during the period October 6-10,1986 (Inspection Report Nos. - 50-327/86-54_ and 50-328/86-54) ' this restart
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issue was left open pending subsequent review of staffing and program changes that. were being considered at that time.
Licensee
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representatives stated 'that staffing issues had been resolved and-
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active recruiting efforts were' in progress to fill existing vacancies.
There had been no personnel replacements since the previous inspection and two additional health physics professionals had been added to the Technical Support Section. The remaining recruitment effort involved a search for a RadiologicalL Control Supervisor to augment the technical staff and recruitment of five additional ANSI qualified health physics technicians.
The inspector determined that filling these vacancies should not have an adverse effect on the restart decision since an adequate number of experienced technical staff was in place and health physics technicians from TVA Watts Bar Nuclear Plant were used to fill
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recruited.
In regard to program changes,'which involved the ALARA and
radiation work permit programs and the contaminated clothing laundry,
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these issues were also reviewed and found acceptable (see Paragraphs 5.b and 7).
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b.
Review of licensee's resolution of weaknesses identified in the ALARA program (50-327/86-36-03 and 50-328/86-36-03).
A number of weaknesses in the licensee's ALARA program were identified during previous
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inspections which the licensee had committed to resolve prior to restart.
The following is a discussion of the licensee's resolution of
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i those issues.
(1) A revision to the radiation work permit preplan criteria in RCI-10, ALARA Planning, changcd the work preplanning criteria so i
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that fewer jobs were being preplanned.than under the previous
criteria.
The inspector reviewed Revision 12 to RCI-10, dated December 24, 1986, which defined a two level review process for
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radiation work permits'.
Level I work was defined as that which involved whole body dose rates greater then-1 rem / hour or whole-
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. body doses greater than-1 man-rem.
Level II work was defined as that which. involved whole body doses greater than 1 rem / day per individual, individual extremity doses. greater than 25 percent of the limit -per day, collective whole body doses greater than 5 man-rem or-individual internal, exposure greater than 10 MPC-hours per day.
The preplanning criteria used in the
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previous revision of RCI-10 was the same as that defined as Level II in the current procedure revision. The only difference between
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the two levels of preplans was that Level II required completion of a detailed checklist of ALARA considerations for the work.
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Both levels of work required review and approval by the work _ group supervisor and ALARA supervisor or engineer, post job reviews and evaluation and corrective action if actual exposures exceeded J
estimates by 25 percent or greater. The inspector determined that
-the current revision to RCI-10 had corrected the problem identified with the previous revision in that preplans were now i
being performed for all of the types of jobs for which they were previously performed.
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(2) The licensee had no ALARA review connittee.
Licensee representatives stated that management had approved formation of an ALARA review consnittee.
The committee consists of the Site i.
Radiological Control Superintendent, ALARA Supervisor and supervisors from the maintenance and operations departments. The charter for the committee was still under consideration, however a
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licensee representatives stated that the committee will review ALARA suggestions and will perform other functions, such as reviewing plans for high exposure wrk, as will be prescribed for the committee in a forthcoming revision to the TVA Corporate Radiation Protection Plan.
The inspector detennined that the licensees actions to date and their commitment to formalize the committee's charter was sufficient to conclude that this issue was being adequately addressed.
(3) Worker participation in the ALARA suggestion program had been historically poor and the licensee did not have an incentives program.
Licensee representatives stated that a suggestion incentives program had been established. An award of a dinner for two at a local restaurant would be given every two months for the best ALARA suggestion as determined by the ALARA Review Committee.
Licensee representatives stated that award of ALARA T-shirts and/or hard hat stickers for other commendable suggestions was
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also being considered.
The licensee had announced the program to
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plant employees on the first of December 1986, and had already
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received five suggestions.
The inspector determined that the L
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licensee's. actions; in regard to promoting the ALARA ' suggestion program were adequate.
(4). Reviews' and ' plans to-reduce the number of contaminated areas were not made during outage periods.
As part of the TVA Nuclear Performance Plan, the licensee committed.to meet every two weeks during-nonoutage periods to review plant areas controlled as contaminated zones and develop plans for their reduction or elimination.
It was noted that during outage periods, particularly during extended outages, contamination zones continued to increase and there was no periodic review to either justify their continued presence or plan for their release.
The-licensee agreed with this observation and had begun conducting biweekly decontamination meetings since the end of October 1986.
As of the inspection, over 20,000 square feet of plant floor space had been released from contamination area controls. The inspector determined the licensee's actions on this item were adequate.
(5) Annual exposure and preplan job : goals were not reviewed periodically.and corrective action was not taken if a goal was exceeded.
Licensee representatives stated-that action to review
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l performance towards exposure goals for job preplans _ had been
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accomplished with the revision to RCI-10.
With regard to plant L
work group annual exposure goals, the Systems Engineering Section l
currently monitors performance toward all plant goals' including radiological goals.
Licensee representatives stated that plans
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were being formulated for the ALARA'section to begin monitoring
the performance of plant radiological goals.
The inspector determined that the licensee's actions on this item were adequate.
In addition to the previous items, the licensee has also taken a number of other actions to increase the effectiveness of their ALARA program.
(1) The ALARA section was reorganized.
The staffing was increased by the addition 'of a new ALARA Supervisor, two ALARA engineers, two ALARA Shift Supervisors, and ten fully ANSI qualified health physics technicians.
The ALARA staff now administers the complete radiation work permit (RWP) program. The shift supervisors and technicians provide around the clock coverage on 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shifts that are divided into three four hour rotations for the shift technicians on the control point, RWP issue station and job surveillance. RWP timesheets are now pulled every shift and exposure entered into the dose tracking computer system (HPDT) twice a day.
All workers now receive an ALARA briefing by ALARA personnel the first time they sign in for work under a CWP.
(2) The licensee implemented a program to reduce the number of high radiation areas within the facility. Since the first of the year, the area of plant floor space controlled as high radiation areas has been reduced from 13,000 to approximately 10,000 square
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This reduction was achieved by flushing lines to reduce-hot
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. spots -and by redefinition of some high radiation area boundaries.
~. Licensee. representatives stated it was their goal to reduce-the
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number of high radiation areas by 50 percent.'
(3) The. licensee established a system of " standing" or presade radiation work. permits for repetitive jobs, such -as auxiliary
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operator. tours, that present low radiological: risk.
Licensee representatives stated that of the approximately 6,000 radiation
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work permits issued the previous year, approximately one half of
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those were for repetitive jobs that only accounted for ten percent e
of the station's annual man-rem exposure.
Twenty-two " standing".
1-radiation work permits had been established, which was expected to
significantly reduce the number of radiation work _ permits.
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processed and allow more time to be devoted to planning _ higher exposure work.
The inspector reviewed the " standing'l radiation work permits that were posted in the vicinity of the radiation work permit control point and determine,i that adequate precautions.
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were specified and.that the documents c.ontained adequate descriptions of limitations in the ' remarks sections to minimize
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inappropriate.use.
The inspector determined that the licensee had adequately addressed the-weaknesses that had been previously identified in the ALARA program and
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there are no additional actions required of the licensee in this area t
p_rior.to restart.
.No violations or deviations were identified.
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Onsite Followup of Nonroutine Events (92700)
a.
LER SQR0-50-327/86052.
This event report concerned a violation of the
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requirement of : Technical Specification' 6.12.2 that areas in which the intensity of radiation is greater than 1,000 millirem per hour be secured by locked doors to prevent unauthorized entry into the area.
On'. November 4,1986, radiation work. permit 86-0564-041 was issued to
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allow electricians to rewire two junction boxes inside the radioactive-
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waste _ packaging area, a locked high radiation area.
The RWP required L.
continuous health physics technician coverage for the work.
However,
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the health physics technician assigned to the job immediately left the L
area after unlocking the door for the workers.
Approximately two and a half hours later another health physics technician entered the area to perform a routine radiological survey.
He also left the door unlocked
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upon completion of his survey.
Upon reviewing the shift log at shift change, the oncoming health physics supervisor immediately recognized the potential problem and sent a health physics technician to the waste
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packaging area to control the high radiation area access.
The door to
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the area was found unlocked.
After verifying there were no personnel
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in the area, the door was properly locked.
Licensee investigation of the event did not discover any unauthorized entries that had been made into the area during the approximately four and one half hours that the e
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The highest dose received by the workers in the area:was 80 millirem.
The work area dose rates ranged from 200 to
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300 millirem per hour in the immediate work area, but radiation sources
,in other areas of. the waste packaging area ranged to 10 rem per hour.
- The licensee prepared a radiological incident report-(RIR) on the event and took disciplinary action against the personnel involved.
The licensee also revised - Radiological Control Instruction 13, Access Control to High Radiation Areas when. Radiation Intensity is Greater Than or Equal to 1,000 mrem /hr, to provide for enhanced control over high radiation area entries.
The _ inspector discussed the event with licensee representatives and reviewed the changes that had been made to RCI-13, the - RWP and the RIR.
The inspector determined.that-the licensee's investigation and corrective action for the event were
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adequate. Failure to control access to the high radiation area door in the waste. packaging area was a violation of Technical Specification 6.12.2, however, it was -determined pursuant to 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C.V.A that a notice of violation would not be issued because
i the licensee had met the self-identification criteria for not issuing a
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notice (50-327/87-03-01 and 50-328/87-03-01).
b.
Failure to'make advance notifications of a Type B radioactive material
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shipment.- At 1855 hours0.0215 days <br />0.515 hours <br />0.00307 weeks <br />7.058275e-4 months <br /> on January 16, 1987, the licensee made a four
hour - report to the NRC Headquarters Duty Office pursuant to 10 CFR part 50.72(b)(2)(vi) that they had failed to provide advance notification as required by 10 CFR 71.97 of a Type B radioactive materials shipment to the governors of the States of Tennessee, L
Georgia, and South Carolina for. a shipment performed on December 2, 1986, and that reports were to be made to the states of the failure to
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report.
The shipment was made under Control Number 447 and consisted of dried mechanical filters and miscellaneous solid wastes packaged in a lined CNS 8-1208 Type-B shipping cask.
The total activity of the
package.was 412 curies.
The inspector reviewed TVA Radioactive-Material Shipment Manual, Revision 26, dated September 29, 1986.
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Paragraph XVIII.D of the procedure required that the plant notify the
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.TVA Radioactive Waste Operations Section (ROS) at least 12 days prior
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to the shipment of any radioactive material for which prior notifications were required to be made of the intended shipment and the descriptive information required to be provided in the notification.
The TVA R0S was then required by the procedure to make the i;
notifications to the State governors in accordance with the procedures specified in 10 CFR 71.97.
The procedure did not specify the manner in L
which the TVA R0S was to be informed.
Licensee radioactive waste personnel stated that they had telephoned the information within the specified time frame to the TVA ROS, but the call was not documented.
The inspector contacted a representative of the TVA R0S and was informed that no one recalled the plant having made the call. TVA R0S personnel had. identified on January 16, 1987, the failure to make the notifications for the December 2,1986, shipment while reviewing plans for a future Type B shipment.
The inspector reviewed the shipping i
papers 'for the shipment and noted that the preshipment checklist did
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not address verification that required prior notifications had been
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made.
Licensee representatives stated that their final corrective actions were not yet in place, but they were. evaluating means to formalize the notification to the TVA R0S of the intended shipment and providing a step concerning the notification to the state governors on the preshipment checklist.
The licensee stated that no Type B shipments would be made until corrective actions are in place.
The inspector reviewed HRC Certificate of Compliance Number 9168, Revision 3, dated May 12, 1986, for the CNS 8-120B shipping cask and verified that TVA was a registered user of the cask and preparation and use of the cask had been in accordance with requirements of the Certificate of Compliance.
Failure to make the prior notifications to the state governors was a violation of 10 CFR 71.97, however, it was determined pursuant to 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C.V.A that a notice of violation would not be issued because the licensee had met the self-identification criteria for not issuing a notice (50-327/87-03-02 and50-328/87-03-02).
7.
FollowuponInspectorIdentifiedItem(92701)
(Closed) IFI (50-327/86-36-02 and 50-328/86-36-02).
Review of reorganized health physics staff.
This item was designated a restart issue.
See Paragraph 5.a.
(Closed) IFI (50-327/86-36-03 and 50-328/86-36-03).
Review of licensee's resolution of weaknesses identified in the ALARA program.
This item was designated a restart issue. See Paragraph 5.b.
(Closed) IFI (50-327/86-54-02 and 50-328/86-54-02).
Review licensee's evaluation of laundry contamination monitor to determine if it was capable of detecting residual contamination on laundered protective clothing at the licensee's administrative control level. This item was opened subsequent to the inspectors review of the calibration procedures for the laundry monitor and observation of how the monitor is used to check laundered protective clothing.
Licensee representatives stated that they had performed the evaluation and had concluded that the monitor was not capable of detecting residual contamination on laundered protective clothing at their administrative control level.
Licensee representatives stated that they are now sending protective clothing to an offsite contractor laundry and that the returned clothing is spot checked with portable beta-gamma survey instruments.
The licensee is evaluating various state-of-the-art laundry l
monitors and stated that one will be procured to either check clothing when l
it is returned from the vendor laundry or after clothing is laundered onsite if a decision is made to reestablish the onsite laundry.
The inspector determined that licensee action on this item was adequate.
l 8.
IE Information Notices (IEN) (92717)
The inspector determined that the following information notices had been received by the licensee, reviewed for applicability, distributed to appropriate personnel and that actions, as appropriate, were taken or scheduled.
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IEH 86-103: _ Respirator Coupling Nut Assembly Failures IEN 86-107: Entry Into PWR Cavity with. Retractable Incore Detector
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