IR 05000327/1987049

Insp Repts 50-327/87-49 & 50-328/87-49 on 870804-06.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Observation of Emergency Exercise at Site,Including Partial Participation by Region II Site Team

ML20234D764
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	08/18/1987
From:	Decker T, Gooden A, Sartor W, Testa E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20234D718	List: IR 05000327/1987049 ML20234D715
References
50-327-87-49, 50-328-87-49, NUDOCS 8709220186
Download: ML20234D764 (26)

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i ,1 j l 1 ;_ Report Nos.: 50-327/87-49 and 50-328/87-49 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 6N38 A Lookout Place ,

   -1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-280L i A ,-

Docket Nos.: 50-377 and 50-328 License Nos.: DPR-77 and DPR-79 Facility Name: Sequoyah

- ', laspection Conducted: Au' gust 4-6, l'987
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c Impectors: O d Nd A P/MM

,   W M. Sa7Iop , //   'Date Signed E.N(J W /JM'    W/N'/fV l  ,-  A. Gooden    Date Signed
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C . s . c/ L G E. D. Testa 1/M/rt Date Signed i l ' Ace'ompanying Personnel:

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B. B. Desai , C. D. Perny l - - D. P. Loveless, RI

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Schultz (Comex) l ' Approv d by:

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d & T. R. Decker, Section Ciiief

      '  8I8[67 Date Signed l Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards    l SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspect'lon involved the observation of an emergency exercise at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant that included partial participation by a Region 11 Site Team. The NRC Inspection Team was comprised of six (6) inspectors from the Region II Office and one NRC contractor. The
 , NRC Site Team (Reactor Safety oriented) consisted of 17 individuals from the Region II Offic This off-hours exercise was initiated at 6:30 p.m. on August 5, ar.d terminated at approximately 3 a.m. on August 6    ,

i I Desults: tb violations or deviations were identified. The licensee's onsite  ! einergency response actions for this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the publi J f[ 7 '

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REPORT DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

*H. L. Abercrombie, Site Director
*L. M. Nobles, Plant Manager
*T. H. Youngblood, Sequoyah REP Manager
*B. K. Marks, Manager, Emergency Preparedness Branch
*L. T. McEathern, Electrical Maintenance Engineer
*R. Y. Pierce, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer
*T. Noble, Sequoyah Project Management Staff
*D. Wall, Emergency Preparedness Branch
*N. S. Catron, Emergency Preparedness Branch
*J. Espy, Reactor Engineer
*R. J. Kitts, Division of Nuclear Services   ,
*T. E. Adkins, Division of Nuclear Services   i
*K. K. King, Division of Nuclear Services
*A. M. Qualls, Assistant Plant Manager   l
* . Kirk, Compliance Licensing Manager   l

Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, ! operators, nechanic,s, public safety nembers and office personne NRC Resident Inspectors K. Jenison  : D. Poertner M. Branch J

* Attended exit interview    !

2. Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 6,'1987, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed i belo No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The i licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspectio ! 4. Exercise Scenario (82301)

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The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made' to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's Emergency _____

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(      2, Plan an_d organization as required - by 10 CFR : 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR ' 50, Appendix   E, Paragraph , IV.F and specific criteria in l NUREG-0654, Section I The scenario was. reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was. discussed with licensee representatives. The scenario developed for this exercise was challenging and adequate to exercise' the onsite emergency organizations .' consistent with _the licensee's scope . and -

objectives. The scenario also provided sufficient information to the State and local government agencies for their participation in the exercis Exercise control was considered adequate in all areas. Controller instructions and the licensee's pre-exercise meetings provided for a'wel coordinated exercis No violations or deviations were identifie . Assignment of Responsibility (82301) This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for .

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emergency response by the. licensee have been specifically established, and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1),10 CFR'50, Appendix E Paragraph IV. A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Sections II. A and I ' ' The inspectors verified that the licensee made specific' assignments to the-emergency organization. The inspectors observed the activation,. staffing,  :]

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and operation of the emergency organization :in the Control Room, the  ! Technical Support Center (TSC),'the Operations Support Center '(OSC),- and the Central Emergency Command Center (CECC). At each of these' centers, " the assigned responsibilities of emergency staff personnel appeared to be consistent with the licensee's Emergency Pla a No violatior.s or de'viations were identifie . Onsite Emergency Organization (82301) The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine that the responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility j accident response in key functional areas ~at all times, and. that the < interfaces were specified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),10' CFR 50, 1 Appendix E, Paragraph IV. A, and specific criteria in -NUREG-0654, Section I Control Room - A supplemental Control Room shift. had bee designated for the exercise. The Control Room player shift responded quickly in classifying the ' simulated emergency conditions. The on-duty Shift Engineer assumed the duties of Site Emergency. Director' promptly upon the initiation 'of the - - _ - _ - - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

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3  : i simulated emergency, and directed the response until relieved by I the Plant Manage The Control Room shift appeared j knowledgeable of their emergency duties and promptly referred to ] their emergency procedure An inspector notec' that the TSC call list was implemented with player assistance. Specifically, a TSC organization member (who was pre-positioned for the exercise) assisted .the Operations Clerk with initiating the computer programmed TSC call list when  ; directed by the Shift Engineer following the Alert-classification. The Operations Clerk had indicated knowledge of j

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the back-up system (i.e. the clerk making telephonic notifications to key personnel on the TSC call list). The TSC 1 call list was implemented timely; however, this may have been as  ! a result'of the player's assistanc l The need for additional training of the Operations Clerks in using the recently implemented computer directed TSC call list was identified as an exercise weakness at the exit briefin (50-327/87-49-01,50-328/87-49-01).  ; b. Technical Support Center - The TSC was declared activated approximately 1 hour and 5 minutes after - the Alert classification; however, most members were ~ present and i performing emergency functions prior to the formal declaratio l TSC personnel performed well during the exercise; good i role-playing and professional attitudes were displayed at all j times. The Site Emergency Director (SED) was clearly in command l and provided frequent briefings to the staff as well as maintainsd an acceptable noise leve Status boards were not j completed in sufficient detail to determine significant events and equipment statu However, the SED compensated for this by later writing a list of problem areas and ongoing repair Although the list was not prioritized it appeared that repairs were properly managed by the TS c. Operations Support Center (OSC) - The OSC was promptly staffed as defined in IP-7, " Activation and Operation of the Operations Support Center." The inspector noted that the initial repair teams were delayed because the radios required for communicating with OSC teams were not readily available. -This was identified as an inspector follow-up item (50-327/87-49-02, 50-328/87-49-02). It was also noted that the repair team which was deployed to seal door A62 did not appear to be fully briefed-and equipped prior to dispatch. As a result, final repair preparations were made in a 700 mR/hr area (simulated). The need to fully brief and prepare OSC teams prior to dispatch was identified as an inspector follow-up item (50-327/87-49-03, 50-328/87-49-03). Central Emergency Control Center - The licensee promptly _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _

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established its offsite emergency organization at its CECC in Chattanooga, TN. The CECC appeared to be adequately staffed and 1 equipped to direct and coordinate the overall TVA response to j the emergency condition and perform assigned functions such as offsite radiological monitoring and dose assessment, public 3 information, State and local government coordination, and plant I assessmen The licensee's critique identified the :need to 1 improve the initial briefing / reception of the NRC Site Team upon j its arriva An inspector also noted that the positioning of ) the CECC status boards resulted in their partial obstruction by 1 personnel standing in the vicinity of board No violations or deviations were identified . 7. Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)

This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and 1 effectively using assistance resources had been made cnd that other I organizations capable of augmenting the planned response were identified j as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),1G CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV. A, i and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section I The licensee's Radiological Emergency Plan provides for emergency response I suppor The scope of .this exercise did not include offsite fire or j medical support to the Sequoyah Nuclear Plan I No violations or deviations were identifie ) Emergency Classification System (82301) This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level was in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C. and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section I An inspector observed that the emergency classification system was in effect as stated in the Radiological Emergency Plan and the implementing procedures. The system appeared to be adequate for the classification of , the simulated acciden ! No violations or oeviations were identifie . NotificetionMethodsandProcedures(82301) This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations had been established; and means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway have been established as required by 10CFR 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D. and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section - _ _ _ _ _ _

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I An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organization No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Communications (82301) This area was observed to determine that provisions existed for prompt communications among the principal response organization and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section I Communications among the licensee's emergency response facilities and between the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite authorities were adequate with the exception of the initial lack of radio , support to the OSC repair teams as previously reported, j 11. Public Education and Information (82301)  ! This area was observed to determine that information concerning the L simulated emergency had been made available for dissemination to the public as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph ]

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IV.0, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section I l Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the exercis The licensee promptly established its Joint Information Center (JIC) and provided a total of eight accurate and. timely press releases that were properly coordinate Good communications existed among Knoxville, the CECC, and the JI Excellent use of the satellite medium was made at both the State and licensee facilitie ! No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301) This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8),10 CFR 50, Appendix E. Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section I The emergency response facilities were activated and promptly staffed during the exercise. The facilities appeared to be adequately equipped to support the emergency response with the exception of the radios for the OSC teams. Offsite radiological monitoring teams were dispatched by the

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licensee but were not observed by an NRC inspector uuritig this nerci:> l No violations or deviations were identifie . m___.__________--_____ _ _ _ _

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13. AccidentAssessment(82301) , i This area was observed .to determine that adequate methods, systems,. and j equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or . potential offsite .j consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by'10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50,' Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B and specific . criteria in NUREG-0654, Section 1 , l

The accident. assessment program included both an engineering assessment'.of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards.to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident. Dose-assessment activities were conducted by the CECC staff and coordinated with, the: State. ~During

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the exercise, the CECC plant assessment team functioned adequately in

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       .i analyzing the plant . status so as to make recommendations to the TSC.and '!

the CECC Plant Assessment Manager concerning mitigating actions.to reduce damage to the plant equipment, to prevent release of radioactive [ i materials, and to terminate the emergency condition No violations or deviations were identifie . Protective Responses (82301) . This area was observed to determine ~that guidelines for protective-actions ] during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and

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in place, and protective -actions 'for emergency ' workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, . were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific. criteria 'in NUREG-0654, Section I An inspector verified that the licensee had and used emergency procedures for formulatir.g protective action recommendations for offsite populations within the tea-mile EPZ. The licensee's protective action recommendations were consistent with the EPA and other criteria and notifications were made to the appropriate State and local' authorities within -the 15-minute criteri Protective actions for emergency workers onsite were initiated by an assembly to account for all personnel and provide for the simulated evacuation of non-essential persons if appropriate. An inspector noted that public safety members prevented OSC repair teams. from moving t required locations to perform needed repairs during the assembly. This significant problem was identified by the licensee at the critique for followup action. The review of the licensee's actions taken to.-insure that repair teams dispatched to mitigate the casualty are not prohibited from moving to required locations during an assembly was identified as. an inspectorfollowupitem(50-327/87-49-04,50-328/87-49-04).

An inspector was positioned in the Alpine Village area to observe the notification of. personnel in this work are Observations included-the inability to hear the site siren sounded for assembly and the lack of'the plant's public address system remoted to this are Public Safety

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personnel responded to the - area and provided workers with assembly instructions. However, some confusion was noted in that both alpha and numeric designators were' used for the same assembly area. Only seven employees were in the area for 'this off-hours drill and were adequately accounted for. Although no deficiencies regarding the accountability of personnel were observed during the exercise, notification of an emergency and accountability 'for personnel in this area during normal working hours would be much more difficul No violations or deviations were identifie . Exercise Critique (82301) The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organizations were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section I An informal critique was held by the licensee immediately after termination of the exercise to permit players to provide comments. A formal critique of the emergency exercise was held on August 6, 1987, with exercise controllers, key exercise participants, licensee management, and NRC representative The licensee's critique was adequate for this ; exercis Following the licensee critique, the NRC inspector provided ; preliminary findings observed during the exercis i No violations or deviations were identifie . Inspector Followup (92701) _ ' (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-327, 328/86-64-01: Improper controller prompting of players. No controller prompting was observe (Closed) IFI 50-327, 328/86-64-02: Failure of the SED to be knowledgeable of changing conditions and direct assigned activities 10 minutes after assuming his duties. The SED maintained awareness of conditions at all times and had verified communications capability with the Control Room before moving to the TS (Closed) IFI 50-327, 328/86-64-03: Failure to use public address (PA) system to inform site personnel of emergency conditions and to provide for timely staffing of the emergency response organizatio Good use of the PA system was made in notifying personnel of the emergency and to initiate staffing of the- emergency response I facilitie (Closed) IFI 50-327, 328/86-64-04: Failure to coordinate Control ! Room activitie's with the SED in the TSC. Control Room personnel kept l

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the SED apprised of all necessary activitie (Closed) IFI 50-327, 328/86-64-05: Failure to provide for an alternate location which can provide HP support should high radiation levels prevent operation from the HP lab. Personnel were aware of an alternate location for HP support, (Closed) IFI 50-327,.328/86-64-06: Failure of the CECC director to be aware of previously coordinated protective actions to be taken by the State. The CECC director was fully aware of the previously coordinated protective actions to be taken by the Stat ' (Closed) IFI 50-327, 328/86-64-07: Failure to provide an accurate report of the emergency class to the NRC. Accurate emergency classification reports were provided to the NR (Closed)IFI 50-327, 328/86-64-08: Emergency Implementing Procedures (EIPS) for emergency classification did not adequately provide for transition to a higher level of classificatio The EIPs were reviewed and provided for transition to' higher levels of , classificatio l Attachment: Exercise Objectives, Narrative Summary, and Scanario Timeline i

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SEQUOYAH N.U6 LEAR PLANT RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN (REP) EXERCISE

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   ' Thel 1987 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) REP exercise will be a limited
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W3TVA's goals for.the 1987 SQN exercise are as follow . r ;;

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  .2 51!' To allow plant and offsite personnel to test and demonstrate their
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2 .~ To ensure that weaknesses observed in previous exercises have been

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3 .. To identify emergency response capabilities that are in need of

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improvement or revisio '

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  * 'Q;rg General Objectives:
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;  2f}1.~ Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize TVA emergency response p . ,l'p fn i personnol

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and to activate TVA emergency centers in a timely manne '

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This exercise will be initiated between the hours of 6 p.m. and

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j 'E ' Demonstrate the adequacy, operability, and effective use of emergency communications equipment and the adequacy of the communications

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n 3', . Demonstrate the ability of each emergency response facility manager

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,    activities conducted from his facility throughout the exercis . Demonstrate the primary functional responsibilities and/or problem-solving capabilition of emergency response personne . ' Demonstrate that timely and accurate information can be supplied to
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   .the State on a frequent basi s
'   [6k : Demonstrate that a timely and accurate flow of information can be maintained between the plant and the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC).

y > 7.- Demonstrate the ability to effectively generate protective action  ; recommendation . R F '!!'

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Demonstrate the ability of the Sito Emergency Director (Shift

[ jph. Q y notifications in a timely manne Engineer) to classify an emergency condition and make required ,

I ', [ m M g. m , o M f ${$$@2;^ 6 ,' ^ Demonstrate the ability to formulate and implement initial onsite' protective action measures for plant personne ya ;rdi$;b3.' jQt f e W:T . Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of responsibilities U"

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T from the Control Room staff to the Technical Support Center V b:?

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E Demonstrate the ability of the Shift Engineer to periodically y, g($' inform Control Room personnel of the status of the emergency , T' . ~

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maintain current knowledge of equipmenta'nd plant status and corrective actions taken through timely, detailed logkeepin : v 6.-

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Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room personnel to make a

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the ability to alert and mobilize the TSC emergency response personnel and to activate the TSC in a timely manne a . ,. e> ,w W ' ,l- Demonstrate that effective command and control' occ

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3.- Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of responsibilities p

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from the Control Room staff to the TSC staf '. 4.

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problem-solving capabilities of the TSC staf '5.' (

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t .. Demonstrate the ability of the TSC staff.to support the Control 1 _1" Room staff's effort to identify the cause of the incident, mitigate the consequences of the incident, and place the unit in ( a safe and stabic condition.

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gbj , l Demonstrate the proficiency of the Site Emergency Director in

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TSC to classify an emergency condition based on current

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plant condition g ._ n j i e s

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y a my LpE - protective actions based on timely assessments of onsite radiological conditions.

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Demonstrate the ability to perform timely assessments of~onsite

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4, d@_, radiological conditions to support the formulation of protective s,

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gf4 "., Demonstrate the timely updating of TSC status board ' %7j * - - ! .'M, p Ly;,'l M, ,10. ' Demonstrate timely updating of each Operation Support Center [ lhf ,

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information to the CEC '

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coordinate activities in an efficient and timely manner through , .

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effective command and contro , y ' Q W Demonstrate the ability to direct and coordinate in-plant health .f q 9 . #

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physics (HP) surveys and to control the exposure of onsite emergency worker N) ^ lll '

 
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p ' Demonstrate that OSC teams are thoroughly briefed on plant

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Demonstrate that there is adequate communications and officient transfer of information between the OSC areas and the TSC, Hp' laboratory, and Chemistry laborator . O Demonstrate the timely updating of OSC status board y y

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the 11P laboratory to the s er TSC of survey and OSCDemonstrate results from ti

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onsite emergency worker control the exposure of '

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j the in-plant normal or postaccident

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3.- response personnel and to activate the CEmobilize the CECC emergen

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  "  Demonstrate that the CECC Directo when he determines the CECC operatir makes a clear announcement

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command to the CECC staf and control in the onal, CECC maintains effective G 4. - , and provides periodic briefings

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Demonstrate the ability to effecti - - l',(<

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and other outside resources if approp icorporate or o ons and to obtain vendor r at Demonstrate the precise and cle ~ from the TSC staff to the CECC staffar transfer of responsibilities

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 ;l I (.- ' Demonstrate the ability of the CECC staff to direct and coordinate the deployment of Radiological Monitoring Teams and
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coordinate TVA dose assessment activities with those conducted by the Stat . Demonstt 'e the ability of the Dose Assessment Team to obtain, analyze, an2 use onsite and/or offsite radiological conditions and meteorological information to produce dose assessments to l support formulating protective action recommendations and ' provide the recommendations to the CECC Director in a clear and timely manner, t Demonstrate the ability to inform, update, and coordinate with State Radiological Health personnel regarding meteorological and dose assessment informatio . Demonstrate the ability to periodically inform and update ~ Radiological Monitoring Control Center (RMCC) emergency response . personnel regarding the status of the emergency condition e t i 1 Demonstrate the ability of the CECC Plant Assessment Team to l analyze current plant conditions, identify projected trends and

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potential consequences, and make protective action recommendations to the CECC Director using the Protective Action Guide (PAG) logic diagra V 1 Demonstrate the ability of the CECC' to provide periodic updates of onsite status and provide protective action recommendations to the State in a clear and timely manne . Demonstrate a timely and accurate flow of information between the TSC staff and the CECC assessment team . Demonstrate the ability of the Core Damage Asssssment Team to generate source term information in a timely manne . Demonstrate a timely and effective flow of information between CECC Radiological and Plant Assessment Team * l 1 Demonstrate the timely updating of CECC status boards, 1 Demonstrate that proper security is established for the CEC . Demonstrate the ability to alert Fedbral and industrial l emergency contacts as appropriate, { j l

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l- * Environs Assessment Activities , Demonstrate the ability to coordinate Radiological Monitoring Teams from the RMCC in conjuration with tiie State. '(Some . participating personnel and radiological monitoring _ vans will be prestaged.) . Demonstrate the ability of the Radiological Monitoring Teams to efficiently and effectively utilize their procedures to perform dose rate surveys, collection and analysis of radiological

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samples, and other prescribed radiological monitoring activities.

. Demonstrate the ability of the monitoring teams to follow '

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I contamination control procedure . Demonstrate the ability to control the exposure of offsite emergency worker , . j

 ~ Demonstrate effective command and control of radiological i

monitoring activities from the plant. RMCC, and/or'CECC as appropriat Public Information Objectives i ~ Demonstrate the ability to effectively provide timely'an'd {' accurate information to the public and coordinate periodic news media briefing with 'he t Stat . Demonstrate the ability to produce a news release from the CECC every two hour ' Demonstrate the ability to operate the Joint Information Center (JIC) and coordinate public information activities with other participating agencies. (Some personnel and equipment will be i prestaged.) Communications objectives I Demonstrate the REP notification procedure throughout~the notification chain, beginning at the SQN Control Room and

 ' extending to State and local authoritie .

Demonstrate plant and the the CECC.adequacy

   ' of communications links between the
    * Demonstrate the adequacy of communications links between the CECC and the State Emergency Operations Cente Dbn idential , g; v     J
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  ;l I Demonstrate the adequaer of communications links between the
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4.' - Q~ ' CECC and; the JI . i Demonstrate the adequacy of communication links between the CECC-the RMCC, and monitoring van . Exercise Conduct Objectives

      . Provide specific and measurable objectives'for the exercis . Continue' improvements of controller and evaluator performance
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through an increased level of participatio . Demonstrate the ability to' adequately perform postexercise critiques to determine any areas requiring additional capability improvemen . Participating personnel will know the date of the exercise but .

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 'not its starting time or duratio .. Provide training for new CECC personne Credit will be taken for the following required REP drill . Plant radiologic'al monitoring dril ' ~

Plant !!P dril . Radiochemistry dril . CECC/ State communications dril . TSC/CECC communications dril . Offolte environs monitoring dril . CECC dose assessment dril NSC:RKQ 5-12-87 2474E

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NARRATIVE SUMMARY  ! l Unit 1 is at 100-percent power steady state on the 60th day of an extended run with the core near EO Several large fossil units are off-line resulting in low system voltage due to a high system loa The plant start bus voltages are at 6800 volt U-1 containment is

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being purged due to high Noble CaF concentration. 1A-S Auxiliary ) l Feedwater Pump ( AFW) has been out of service and tagged for 20-hours j to replace the pump inboard shaft bearing. The bearing had been ' running hot and was found to be slightly wiped. Investigation found a partial blockage in the oil supply lin This action has unit 1 in a 72-hour L.C.O. by T.S.3.7. Door A62 on elevation 690' between the auxiliary building and the penetration room has its latching  ; mechanism broken and a bent hinge. The door has been removed and is  ! in the shop for repairs. A fire watch has been established. The spent fuel pit heat exchangers are aligned to unit 1 Component Cooling System (CCS) in accordance with SOI-70.1 with both 1A-A and IB-B CCS pumps running. C-S CCS pump is supplying Units 1 and 2 train "B" ECCS equipmen Spreader room penetration AB734A0311Q005 has been breached to pull a replacement cable, IV1222A, in tray NN-A. RCS identified leakage from HCV-68-536 on RCS loop 3 hot leg and cold leg manifolds return line is .9 gpm. The leak rate has not changed since steady state full power operation was attained. Unit 2 is in Mode 5 main turbine work scheduled. Unit 2 has been shutdown for 72-hours and the RHRS is aligned in the shutdown cooling mod B-B Component Cooling System (CCS) pump is tagged to replace the discharge valve flange. The flange was leaking through a cracked weld. The pump suction butterfly valve, 2-70-365A leaked by so badly the clearance was extended to include suction isolation' valves FCV-70-78 and 39, and 2-HCV-70-53 At time 00:00 a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak of 4 gpm occur Containment pocket sump level increase is alarmed. The unit enters a 4-hour LCO (TS-3/4.4.6.2) and a NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT may be declared by the Shift Engineer (SE). After about 15 minutes, the RCS leak has increased in size and an ALERT is declared when it has been determined the leak rate exceeds 50 gp Charging pumps are able to maintain pressurizer level but containment pressure is slowly increasing due to the RCS leak. Following unsuccessful attempts to q identify and isolate the leak the operator begins turbine shutdown at 5%/ minute. Reactor cooldown is started to cool and depressurize the RCS to minimize the Loss cf Coolant Accident (LOCA). Containment j purge dampers FCO-30-37 and 40 have been partially blocked open due ' to an obstruction across their seats. This is indicated on panel M-9 l l by the red open and green closed position lights for both dampers ' still being illuminate s

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At approximately 1-1/2 hours into the scenario the 6.9 KV Shutdown Board 1A-A trips and locks out due to a fault on the normal feeder )' breaker 1718. This prevents 1A-A diesel generator from supplying power to the board and results in the loss of all 6.9 KV train "A" components. A SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared due to fire or i explosion compromising the function of required safety systems and/or loss of,all control room alarms for > 15 minutes and plant transient ]' in progres Electrical maintenance projects er 10 hours to repair- l and recover 1A-A Shutdown Boar j

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The RCS leak continues to increase. Charging pumps are still able to i maintain pressurizer level but at a reduced RCS cooldown rat containment pressure continues to increase and results in phase A f j containment isolation and a safety Injection (SI) signal at 1.54 l p81 The operator isolates Cold Les Ac:umulators (CLA) and dumps the nitrogen into containment resulting in a phase B isolation. When the SI signal is initiated, 1B-B RHR pump fails to start and all idle ERCW pumps star The ERCW pump start results in a pressure surge in the system causing a rupture of a bimetallic welded pipe reducer in the IB main supply header on elevation 690' in the auxiliary buildin ERCW is lost to 1B-B Centrifugal Charging pump (CCP) and IB-B SI pump room and oil cooler Equipment in the immediate area is sprayed with raw wate ! The LOCA continues to increase. If not turned off, the motor bearings on the train "B" CCp and SI pumps may begin to fail, because- j of a lack of coolin All makeup water to the reactor, with the

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exception fail, of the positive Displacement Pump, is lost if these pumps j The running CCp and SI pumps are stopped and locked out due to lack ' i of cooling. A GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared due to LOCA in progress  ! and degradation of ECC The scenario further postulates that a gasket in the containment purgo duct work ruptures in the elevation 690' penetration roo This vents containment to the room, and then through door A62 into the auxiliary building. A ground level release is detected and the Auxiliary Building is evacuated as all maintenance is stoppe At no point in the scenario is the core uncovere However, as the LOCA continues and due to the degraded condition of ECCS, fuel failure would result at some time in" the future if cooling is not reestablishe Radiation levels in containment and environmental radiation levrls continue to increase. Containment pressure continues to slowly increas % 7

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y' 1 4 - l-3-Approximately 8 hours into the scenario, electrical maintenance is 1

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able to repair 1A-A'6.9 KV shutdown board sufficiently to reenergize ) it returning all train "A" ECCS equipment.to operable status. This _i allows the operators to refill.the RCS, place.the RHRS in the' l shutdown cooling mode and reduce-containment pressur The ruptured purge duct may be repaired sealing the containment breac The exercise-is terminated at this poin ._ _

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2180E Revised: 7-21-87 l y-

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S:quoyah Nucis:r Plant (SQN) Scen:rio Timelins ) INITIAL CONDITIONS

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Unit 1 is at 100-percent pover near End of Life (EOL); oteady state power for last 60 day * Reactor coolant system (RCS) activity is 0.40 uci/gm Dose Equivalent I-13 * The grid voltage is low due t'o several large coal fired plants being off-line. Start bus voltage is 6800 volt * The latching mechanism on door A62 is broken and a hinge was bent. The door has been removed and is in the shop for repairs. A breach permit has been issued and a fire watch has been established in accordance with physi-1 * Containment is being purged due to high Noble Gas concentration '! of 10-3 uci/c B-B Component Cooling System (CCS) pump is tagged to replace a cracked discharge valve flang * The spent fuel pit heat exchanges are aligned to unit 1 and the C-S CCS pump is supplying train "B" ECCS equipmen + Spreader room to auxiliary building penetration AB734A0311Q005 is breached to pull a replacement cable, IV1222A, in tray NN- * The unit is in hour 20 of a 72-hour Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) due to 1AS auxiliary feed pump being out of service and tagged to replace the pump inboard shaft-bearin (T.S.3.7.1.2)

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1-M-21 annunciator panel is being supplied by its alternate power supply from power rack A breaker 1 on panel 1-M-7. The ) j 480V breaker in compartment 6C on 480V C&A ventilation board l 1B1-B and breaker 208 on 125V vital battery board 1 are tagged to repair the inverter. Electrical maintenance expects to be finished and will releace the clearance next shif + i l Reactor coolant system identified leakage is .9 gpm from valve HCV-68-536 in the RCS loop 3 hot leg and the cold leg manifolds return lin The leak rate has not changed since startu * Unit 2 has been shutdown 72 hours, is in main turbine outage, Mode 5, with the RHRS in the shutdown cooling mod ~ NSC:TCB '~ ' ---

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2180E 4;(M

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Revised: 7-20-87 'N

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.a-1 T = 00:00 A 4-gpm leak from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) into containment begin " pocket Sump Level High" is alarmed and printed by the plant compute RA-90-106C alarms, " Containment Building Lower Compt Air Monitoring," on panel M-12. AOI-6, "Small Reactor Coolant System Leak" and A01-32, " Emergency Shutdown" is entered. A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT may be declared. Surveillance Instruction 13 initiate T = 00:15 j

The RCS leak has increased to > 50 spm as indicated by increased-charging flow. Ice condenser equipment door open alarm is received on panel M- Lower compartment high radiation alarms are receive Charging flow has increased from 88 gpm to 150 gpm. An ALERT should

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' be declared within 15 minutes by the Shift Engineer (SE) due to a ! primary system leak rate in excess of 50 gpm. The containment  ! ventilation system isolate ! T = 00:20 t An additional centrifugal charging pump (CCP) is placed in servic Lower compartment high moisture and temperature alarms are received on panel M- g T = 00:25 Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS) volume control tank makeup initiate Containment pressure is = .7 psig and pressurizer level is increasing with charging flo ! T = 00:30 i ' Main turbine shutdown begins at = 5-percent / minute after not being able to identify the leak, in accordance with AOI-32. Containment pressure is increasin T = 00:35 Containment pressure is = .9 psig, and is still increasing but at a l slower rat T = 00:40

 " Reactor coolant loop Tref Tauct hi-lbw" alarm on panel M-5 and
 "NIS power range upper detector high flux deviatio,n or auto defeat" alarm on panel M-4 are_ receive . .
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 ' Unit. station service.is transferred, the main turbine'is tripped, and C01-3B is entered.." Plant' Shutdown from Hot standby to Cold Shutdown". 'RCS cooldown to-cold shutdown at = 500F/ hour is started using steam dumps. Although containment purge isolation has-initiated, 2 containment purge dampers (FCo-30-37 and 40) are partially open because of an obstruction laying across the ' seats in -

the duct work. This is indicated by both the red open and, green closed position lights for.the dampers still being illuminated on panel M-9.

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surveillance Instruction 38 " Shutdown Margin":is completed, manual > , insertion of control rods is complete with the control-banks out fiv steps each and the shutdown banks fully withdraw T = 01:15 Upper Head Injection (UMI) is-isolated by procedure. " Pressurizer low pressure" and " Reactor coolant loops 10-10 Tave" alarms'are received on panel H- T = 01:25 Reactor Coolant. Pumps (RCP) 1 and 3 are removed from service by. the 'l operator,

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T = 01:30 i A loud noise is heard coming from shutdown board room A. 6.9 KV _ l Shutdown Board 1A-A trips and'is locked out on A-B phase differentia over current on feeder breaker 1718. The unit ASE investigates and activates initiated.theAllfire alarm from shutdown board' room A. "AOI-30'is train "A" 6.9 KV components are inoperable. Alarms received on panel H-2 include, "A 6.9 KV Shutdown BD Trip", "6900 V s SD BD 1A-A Failure or Undervoltage", "480V SD BD11Al-A (1A2-A) Failure or Undervoltage". 'fhe Site Emergency Director (SED) may declare a SITE AREA EMERGENCY based on fire or explosion damaging safe shutdown equipment and/or loss of all control room annunciators i

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for greater than 15 minutes with a plant transient in progres T = 01:35 '

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The Fire Brigade responds to the fire alarm and roports that breaker

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1718 looks burned and they can smell hot metal and see smoke but no fir i The ASE cannot remove the breaker from its compartmen . . . . . . cz. . . .

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T = 01:45 Electrical maintenance is dispatched to investigate and repair the board and breake The fire alarm is terminate ;

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T = 01:50  ! The main turbine is on the turning gea T = 02:00 l

The RCS leak increases and containment pressure continues to slowly l increase. Power is restored to the control room annunciator T = 02:15

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Safety Injection initiates on high containment pressure of 1.54 psi M-6, RilR pump 1B-B does not start and indicates tripped on panel Emergency Instruction E-O is entered. Electrical maintenance at breaker 1718 reports the breaker is welded into its compartment by  ; the fault and has probably caused bus damage. They request a board clearance to disassemble the breaker compartment. Projected repair timo is = 10 hours. The RCS leak has continued to increas T = 02:20

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Safety Injectiott is terminated and RCS cooldown and depressurization continues. The ASE reports a target on relay device 50 showing A phase overcurrent on RilR pump 1B-B breaker compartment 14. An I electrical maintenance team will be dispatched by the OSC to investigat T = 2:30 l l The operators isolate cold leg accumulators 2 & 4 and dumps the !

nitrogen from 1 & 3 to containmen T = 2:40 l Containment phase B isolation and containment spray initiates on high containment pressure of 2.81 psig. RCP's 2 and 4 are tripped by the operator Natural circulation is established and cooldown is continued using SG atmospheric relief valve . h

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 'T = 02:45     .)

A crack has opened in the pipe reducer bimetallic weld in the 1B ERCW main supply header on elevation 690'. . Water is. spraying; local equipmen ,

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T = 03:00

 'The RCS leak continues to increase. The ERCW is isolated in accordance with AOI-13,,Section B, part II. Due to' lack of cooling water on the "B" train equipment the CCP and SI pumps.are locked out
 .until needed to prevent damage. A GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared due ,
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to a.LOCA in progress beyond the capacity of makeup pumps and/or degradation of ECCS upon loss of ERC Plant cooldown, with

,  atmospheric reliefs from SG's #3 and 4, continues at a rate within the capacity of the AFW system to maintain level in the.SG' T = 3:05 The Positive Displacement (PD) Charging Pump is placed in servic T = 03:15 CS pump 1B-B is stopped by the operator when containment pressure is l

less than 1.54 psig. The main feedwater isolation is manually rese T = 03:30 A rupture has occurred in the containment purgo duct work ' gasket. in l

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the elevation 690' penetration room. This has breached containment allowing the containment atmosphere to vent to the auxiliary building through door A62. Auxiliary building' ARM's, CAM's and ventilatio monitors begin to alar T = 03:50 A cold leg accumulator is realigned by the operator for makeup when neede { t T = 03:55  !

      . i, Containment Spray pump 1B-D is started by the operator due to increasing containment pressur T = 04:00 Assessment of plant conditions indica'te that significant failed fuel

will occur in several hours if makeup to the reactor cannot be reestablishe .

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N s i CS pump 1B-B is stopped by the operato )*$, ' - ;

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      .. - - - . , .~.+ t Electrical maintenance reports breaker 1718 compartment and bus damage is not as extensive as first feared but will still take several hours to repai ,

T = 05:00 Radiation levels outside containment continue to incroac T = 06:00 Maintenance teams continue working on shutdown board 1A-A repai Containment pressure has stabilized as A cold leg accumulator is being used intermittently to maintain pressurizer leve T = 07:00 Containment pressure begins to slowly increase agai T = 07:10 1

 " Condensate storage tank A level abnormal" alarm is received on panel M-15.

, ! ! T = 07:20 l i CS pump 1B-B is started by the operato i T = 07:40 The RWST level has decreased to = 8%. The operator stops CS pump 1B-B and realigns its suction to the containment sump then restarts the pump heat exchange although there is no ERCW supply to the containment spray

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T = 08:00 The 6.9 KV Shutdown Board 1A-A is repaired and reenergize This returns "A" train ECCS equipment to operable statu T = 08:05 o

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CS pump 1B-B is stopped by the operators, the phase B isolation signal is reset, and RHR pump 1A-A is being aligned to the shutdown cooling mod T = 08:10 RHR pump 1A-A is returned to service and pumping in the shutdown , l cooling mode on hot leg (14 ( ) { L _ _ _.- __ -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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T =-08:15,

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CCP 1A-A is~ returned to. service and the PD pump.is stoppe i

T = 08:30' i dI The pressurizer level has been returned to' normal', RHRS has been placed in the shutdown cooling mode,' . con tia nment pressure is reduced-and maintenance may repair the ruptured duc i T = 09:0 . . i' The release from containment.has been s' topped, i s

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