IR 05000327/1988040

Insp Repts 50-327/88-40 & 50-328/88-40 on 880925-1004. Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Extended Control Room Operation & Operational Safety Verification,Including Radiation Protection & Safeguards

ML20205K562
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	10/21/1988
From:	Jenison K, Linda Watson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II), NRC OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
To:
Shared Package
ML20205K546	List: IR 05000327/1988040 ML20205K543 ML20205K548
References
50-327-88-40, 50-328-88-40, NUDOCS 8811010216
Download: ML20205K562 (16)

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y* 4,. UNITED STATES '

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r [o .[ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

• REGION 11

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101 MARIETTA ST., ATLANTA GEORGIA 30323 i Report Nos.: 50-327/88-40, 50-328/88-40 i

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place 1101 Market Square Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.: 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.: DPR-77 and DPR-79 Facility Name: Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: September'25, 1988 thru October 4, 1988 Inspectors: _l b kidd Jed /0/2/ /88 K.Jenison,prtspManager Date Signed Accompanying Personnel: P. Harmon, Shift Inspector G. Humphrey, Shift Inspector D. Loveless, Shift Inspector W. Poertner, Shift Inspector Approved by: (bA C. Watson, Chief, Project Section 1

/d!8/!86 Date S(gned TVA Projects Division SUMMARY Scope: This announced inspection involved onshif t and onsite inspections by the NRC Restart Task Force. The majority of expended inspection effort was in the areas of extended control room observation and operational safety verification including operations performance, system lineups, radiation protection and safeguards, and housekeeping inspections. Other areas inspected included maintenance observations, review of previous inspection findings, follow-up of events, review of licensee identified items, and review of inspector follow-up items. During this period there was extended control room and plant activity .: overage by NRC inspector Results: One violation was identified: 327,328/88-40-01, Failure to Meet the Requirements Specified for Conducting Test A.ctivities (paragraph 8.a)

One unresolved item * was identified: 327,328/88-40-02, Improper Exit From LCO 3.4.6.2.f (paragraph 8.c)

No deviations were identifie "Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviation PDR j

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O ADOCK 05000327 PDC 4

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In the area of Event Follow-up, one violation was identified, 327,328/88-40-01, Conduct of Test Activities. The areas of Opera-tional Safety Verification, Maintenance, Surveillance, and Extended Con t ro's Room and Plant Activity Observation appeared to be adequate to support current plant operations. No issues were identified that require resolution prior to the restart of Unit In those items designated as "closed", the licensee's actions appeared to be adequate. The items designated as "open" require further review by the inspector or further action by the licensee as identified in the body of the repor Some issues listed as "open" were found to be adequately corrected to support the restart of Unit 1 and were determined to be resolved for unit restart, There were no items which remain open from this report that require resolution prior to Unit I restar .

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J. La Point, Acting Site Director

• T. Arney, Quality Assurance Audit Manager R. Beecken, Maintenance Superintendent J. Bynum, Vice President, Nuclear Power Production M. Cooper, Compliance Licensing Manager D. Craven, Plant Support Superintendent H. Elkins, Instrument Maintenance Group Manager R. Fortenberry, Technical Support Supervisor J. Hamilton, Quality Engineering Manager L. Martin, Site Quality Manager R. Cison, Modifications Manager

• J. Patrick, Operations Superintendent R. Pierce, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor

• M. Purcell, Licensing Engineer M. Sullivan, Radiological Controls Superintendent M. Ray, Site Licensing Staff Manager R. Rogers, Plant Reporting Section B. Schofield, Licensing Engineer S. Smith, Plant Manager S. Spencer, Licensing Engineer C. Whittemore, Licensing Engineer

• Attended exit interview NOTE: Acronyms and initialisms used in this report are listed in the last paragrap . Sustained Control Room Observation (71715)

The inspectors observed control room activities and those plant activities directed from the control room on a routine basis for the entire period of this repor Control Room Activities Including Conduct of Operations The inspectors reviewed control room activities and verified that operators were attentive and responsive to plant parameters and conditions; that operators remained in their designated areas and wert attentive to plant operations, alarms and status; that operators employed communication, terminology and nomenclature that was clear and formal; and that operators performed a proper relief prior to being discharged from their watch standing duties, r

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b. Control Room Manning The inspectors reviewed control room manning and determined that TS requirements were met and that a professional atmosphere was main-tained. The inspectors found the noise level and working conditions to be acceptable and observed that radios or other non-job related material did not exist in the control roo The control room ap-peared to be clean, uncluttered, and well organized. Special con-trols were established to limit personnel in the control room inner are Operator compliance with regulatory and TVA administrative guidelines were reviewe The licensee plans to employ shift operating advisors for the restart of Unit No deficiencies were identified, c. Routine Plant Activities Conducted In or Near the Control Room The inspectors observed activities which require the attention and direction of control room personne The inspectors observed that necessary plant administrative and technical activities conducted in or near the control room were conducted in a manner which did not compromise the attentiveness of the operators at the controls. The licensee has established a Shift Operations Supervisor office in the control room area in which the bulk of the administrative activities, including the authori:ed issuance of keys, take place. In addition, the licensea has establish;d H0, WR, SI, and modification matrix functions to release the licensed operators from the bulk of the technical activities that could impact the performance of their dutie No deficiencies were identifie d. Control F,oom Alarms and Operator Response to Alarms The inspectors observed that control room evaluations were performed utilizing approved plant p"ocedures and that control room alarms were responded to promptly with adequate attention by the operator to the alarm indications. Control room operators appeared to believe the alarm indications. None wer identified by the inspectors that were ignored by the operator No deficiencies were identified, e. Fire Brigade The inspectors re'.tewed fire brigade manning and qualifications on a routine basis. Bota manning and qualifications were found to meet TS

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requirement A fire watch issue was identified in IR 327,328/88-44 which does effect the restart of Unit No deficiencies were identified, f. Shif t Briefirg/Shif t Turnover and Relief The inspectors observed that U0s completed turnover checklists, conducted control panel and significant alarm walkdown reviews, and reviewed significant maintenance and surveillance activities prior to relie The inspectors observed that sufficient information was transferred on plant status, operating status and/or events and abnormal system alignments to ensure the safe operation of the Uni he inspectors observed the A505 relief and concluded that sufficient information appeared to be transferred on plant status, operating status and/or events, and on abnormal system alignments to ensure the safe operation of the Uni No deficiencies were identifie g. Shift Logs, Records, and Turnover Status Lists The inspectors reviewed SOS, U0, and STA logs and determined that the logs were completed in accordance with administrative requireuent The inspectors ensured that entries were legible; errors were cor-rected, initialed and dated; logbook entries adequately reflected plant status; significant operational events and/or unusual para-meters were recorded; and entry into or exit from TS LCOs were recorded promptly. Turnover status checklists for R0s contained sufficient required information and indicated plant status parame-ters, system alignments, and .bnormalities. The following additional logs were reviewed:

Night Order Log System Status Log Configuration Control Log Key Log Temporary Alteration Log LCO Log No deficiencies were identifie h. Control Room Recorder / Strip Charts and Log Sheets The inspector observed operators check, install, mark, file, and route for review, recorder strip charts in accordance with the established plant processe Control room and plant equipment logsheets were found to be complete and legible; parameter limits

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were specified; and out-of-specification parameters were marked and reviewed during the approval proces No deficiencies were identifie . Management Activities TVA management activities were reviewed on a daily basis by the NRC shift inspectors, shift managers, and startup manage First line supervisors ;

appear to be more knowledgeable and involved in the day to day activities of the plant. More first line supervisor involvement in the field has been observe In general, management response to those plant activities and events that occurred during this inspection period was quick and effectiv During this reporting period the Plant Manager and Plant Reporting Super-visor were called by the SOS for guidance on a leak rate in excess of TS limits for valve 1-FCV-74-1. The SOS was informed that TS 3.4.6.2.f was ,

riot applicable since the valve had been reopene Details of this issue are discussed in paragraph 8.c of this repor . Chronology of Unit 1 Plant Operations The following represents a chronology of events during the restart of Unit The NRC Restart Task Force began shif t coverage on September 25, 1988. At that titte, the unit was in mode 5 with preparations under-way for entry into mode Unit 1 entered mode 4 mi September 27, 1988, at 3:45 p.m. and began performing activities required for entry into mode . Operational Safety Verification (71707) Plant Tours The inspectors observed control room operations; reviewed applicable logs including the shift logs, night order book, clearance hold order book, configuration log and TACF log; conducted discussions with control room operators; verified that proper control room staffing was maintained; observed shif t turnovers; and confirmed operability of instrumentatio The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, and verified compliance with TS LCO The inspectors verified that maintenance work orders had been sub-r.itted as required and that followup activities and prioritization of work was accomplished by the license t Tours of the diesel generator, auxiliary, control, and turbine i buildings, and containment were conducted to observe plant equipment l

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corditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and plant housekeeping / cleanliness condition The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following safety-related systems on Unit 1 and Unit 2 to verify operability and proper valve alignment:

Verified RHR system alignment from the control roo Verified CS system alignment from the control roo No violations or deviations were identifie b. Safeguards Inspection In the course of the inspection activities, the inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities including: protected and vital area access controls; searching of personnel and packages, escorting of visitors; and badge issuance and retrieval; patrols and compensatory post In addition, the inspectors observed protected area lighting, and protected and vital area barrier integrity. The inspectors verified interfaces between the security organization and bcth operations or maintenance. Specifically, the Shift Inspectors: inspected security dering outages visited central or secondary alarm station No violations or deviations were identifie c. Radiation Protection The inspectors observed HP practices and verified the implementation of radiation protection control On a regular basis, RWPs were reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to ensure the activities were being conducted in accordance with the applicable RWP Selected radiation protect ion instruments were verified operable and calibration frequencie. ere reviewe RWP 88-1-279, rev. O, Initiated to replace the operator diaphragm on valve 1-FCV-62-70A, was reviewed by the inspector. This work area was located in the #2 accumulator room. The protective clothing, re-spirator, and allowable manhour requirements were specifie In addition, the area radiation surveys and individual exposures were reviewe No violations or deviations were identifie .

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6. Shif t Surveillance Obsarvations ano n . iew (61726)

Licensee activities were directly observed / reviewed to ascertain that surveillance of safety-related systems and components was being conducted in accordance with TS requirement The inspectors verified that: testing was performed in accordance with adequate p ocedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; LCOs were met; test results met acceptance criteria requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; deficiencies were identified, as appropriate, and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by ma.1agement personnel; and -

system restoration was adequat For completed tests, the inspector verified that testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by  ;

qualified individual j The following activities were observed / reviewed with no deficiencies identified:

Witnessed partial performance of SI-166.18, rev. 15, RHR Return Valve Leak Rate Test. Valve 1-FCV-74-1 f ailed this leak rate test due to excessive leakag This was determined to be caused by improper valve limit switch settings. This condition was corrected, the valve was stroke-time tested, and then leak tested agai The inspector witnessed the performance of the initial performance and successful retes Reviewed on going activities associated with the performance of SI-300, rev. 8, Acoustic Valve Monitor Verification Test. The in-spector noted that out-of-tolerances had been documented and work requests we?e initiate Witnessed activities in-progress during the performance of SI-153.1, rev 5, Periodic Calibration of Hydrogen Recombiner System Instru-ment Reviewed activities in progress during the performance of 51-94.21, rev. O, Channel Calibration of Delta T / ' avg, Channel 1, Rack 2 (T-68-2). This calibration of the reactor protection system instru-ment tion was being performed under close supervision of tht foreman and general foreman, Reviewed completed Unit 2 surveillance data package, SI-78, rev. 11, Power Range Neutron Flux Channel Calibration By Heat Balance Compari-l so Reviewed activities in progress during the performance of 51-94.81, Chinnel Calibration of Pressurizer Pressure Channel 1, Rack 1, Loop P-68-340.

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Reviewed completed Unit 1 surveillance data package SI-166.3.2, Full Stroking of RHR Valves FCV-74-1 and Reviewed completed Unit 2 surveillance data package, SI-137.2, rev. 22, Reactor Coolant Syst9m Water Inventor Our ~ng the inspection period, the following problems were identified in SI performance: -

During perforuance of S1-166.10, Accumulator / Injection Prin.ary and Seccnda ry Check Valve Integrity, the inspector determined that section 6.1 required that vaive 1-FCV-63-1 be in the open pos! tio Due to RHR being in service, the valve was shut and was required to be shut to perform this section of the surveillance instructio Discussions with the test director determined that per discussions with his supervisor it was his intentfon to NA the step that required valve 1-FCV-63-1 to be open and continue on with the surveillanc The inspector identified to the SOS that the procedure as written appeared inadequate for the present plant conditions and questioned the validity of NA'ing tne step that required 1-FCV-63-1 to be ope The SOS reviewed AI-47, Conduct of Testing, and determined that a procedure change would be required prior to continting with this portion of the SI. The surveillance was stopped and a procedure change was processe Calibration activities in progress associated with "Calibration of Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate For Remete Shutdown and Accident Monitoring" were witnessed by the inspecto No violations or deviations were identifie l 7. Monthly Maintenance Observations (62703) Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and com- ,

ponents were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted '

in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry ,

ccdes and standards, and in conformance with T l The following itens were considered during this review: LCOs were [

met while components or systems were removed from service; redundant 1 components were operable; approvals were obtained prior to initiating I the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and l were inspected as applicable; procedures used were adequate to l control the activity; troubleshooting activities were controlled and ,

the repair records accurately reflected what actually took place; j functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; QC records were main-tained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts

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and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; QC hold points were established where required and were observed; fire prevention controls were implemented; outside contractor force activities were controlled in accordance with the approved QA program; and housekeeping was actively pursued, Temporary Alterations (TACFs)

The following TACFs, were reviewed:

TACF 0-87-033-14, Temporary installation of condensate demin-eralizer high crud filte TACF 1-82-97-87, Remove UHI weight indication system from alarm circuitr No violations or deviations were identifie Work Requests The following work requests were reviewed:

The inspector monitored a portion of the work activities associated with WR B261129, troubleshoot / repair 1-PIC-1-31 The inspector monitored a re-tion of the work activities associated with WR 8780393, The activity consisted of trouble-shooting the Hydrogen Recombiner, 1-HTRA-083-0002B-B, electrical circuitry to determine the causes for inconsistent signal The inspector monitored a portion of the work activities associated with WR B76980 The activity consisted of trouble-shooting flow control valve 1 cCV-3-156 to identify the cause of valve leak-throug No violations or deviations were identifie Hold Orders The inspectors reviewed various H0s to verify compliance with AI-3, revision 38, Clearance Procedure, and that the H0s contained adequate information to properly isolate the affected portions of the system l

being tagged. Additionally the inspectors verified that the required

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tags were installed on the affected equipmen The following H0s were reviewed:

Hold Order Equipment HD 1-88-1401 IB-B Safety Injection pump oil cooler repai H0 2-88-629 ~.-FCV-67-182 ERCW flow control valv No violations or deviations were identifie . Event Follow-up (93702, 62703) At 3.02 on September 25, 1988 the Unit 1 "A" reactor trip breaker tripped due to 2 out of 3 SG level transmitter bistables being in the tripped position which satisfied the required logic for low-low SG water level on #2 SG. This occurred during the performance of SI-94.4, Reactor Trip / Engineered Safety Feature / Accident Moni-toring Instrument Steam Generator Level Channel Calibrations. This activity had been started on June 17, 1988 and had been interrupted :

due to rect valve repairs. The SI was recommenced on September 25, ,

1988 at 2:00 p.m.. The instrument foreman sent personnel to accum- '

ulator room #3 to perform the backfilling of the SG #2 sensing lines without receiving permission from the Unit 1 operations personnel, i The bistable status lights for the SG level loops were not verified prior to filling of the sense line Bistabies LT-3-51, -52, and -55, associated with SG #2 were assumed by the IM foreman to be in the as-lef t position (i .e. , tripped position). However, LT-3-55 was the only bistable tripped and backfilling LT-3-52 tripped its associated bistable which gave the 2 out of 3 logic required for the SG water level low-low signal and resulted in a reactor trip signal which opened Reactor Trip Breaker u ,. n ,

Administrative Instruction 47, Conduct of Testing, requires that for testing interruptions extending more than one shift the test director i

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shall determin, the i li tity of all plant conditions pertaining to the instruction befure re-initiating pe rfo rmance . Surveillance Instruction 94.4 was interrupted on August 26, 1988, and was re-ini-tiated September 25, 1988, and the test director did not determine the validity of plant conditions pertaining to the instruction before re-initiating performance. The failure to comply with the require-ments of AI-47 is identified as Violation 327,328/88-40-01, Failure to Meet the Requirements Specified for Conducting Test Activitie At 11:38 a.m. on September 27, 1988 an ABI was experiented when a unit operator accidentally opened breaker 23 on panel 3-M-7 which supplies power to radiation monitor 0-RM-90-101B causing a high radiation signa This event tecurred when the operator found

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breaker 24 on panel 1-M-7 in the' tripped position and during attempts to reset this breaker, his hand slipped and opened the 23 breake This issue will be tracAed as example 1 of shif t inspector item 88-40-GH-01, Personnel Related Event c. On September 27, 1988 the licensc3 was performing 51-166.18 as part of the restart activitie At 9:35 p.m. the itcensee stopped the running RHR pump and closed 1-FCV-74-1 to perform the leak rate tes At 1:40 a.m. the test director informed the control room that the valve had failed with a leak rate of 8.39 gpm, extrapolated to a full system pressure equivalent of 20.7 gp The a ceptance criteria is 1 gpm. The operatort entered the action statement for T.S 3.4.6. retroactive to 9:35 p.m., September 27, when the valve was initially closed. The appropriate REP was also entered for leakage in excess of I gpm. The valve was reopened at 12:47 a.m., September 28. After consulting with the Plant Manager and the Plant Reporting Supervisor, the SOS came to the conclusion that the plant had exited the LC0 and the REP when the valve was reopened at 12:47 a.m. The basis for this determination was that since the valve was now open, no leakage existed. The Basis for T.S. 3.4.6.2.f clearly states that the surveillance requirements for RCS Pressure Isolation Valves provide assurance of valve integrity thereby redu.ing the probability of gross valve failure and consequen' intersysten LOC The inspector informed the 505 that his interpretation did not take the Basis into accoun The SOS decided that management's interpretation of the issue was correct and told the inspector he was in agreement with that interpretation. This item will be tracked as URI 327,328/88-40-0 d. At 9:10 a.m. September 29, 1988 fuses were found to be missing from the power circuits in Unit Board 2A essential for transferring the Unit Board to the off site power source when a loss of onsite power occurs. This resulted in a loss of one source of offsite power to the Unit Board and entry into TS 3.8.1. The fuses were replaced and the LCO was exited at 9:20 a.m. on September 29. The licensee initiated PRO 2-88-238 and is reviewing the issue. This may require additional review by OSP headquarters electrical section staff. The licensee has verified that the appropriate fuses are now installed on both units. This does not constitute an immediate safety issue and dees not effect the restart of Unit 1. This item is identified as shift inspector item 88-40-GH-0 e. At 1:59 a.m. on September 29, 1988 an auxiliary building B train 1 solation was experienced. The isolation was generated f rom radi-ation monitor 1-RM-90-103 which is located riear the fuel pool are The NRC was notified via the ENS. Preliminary review of the event revealed that the signal was generated from instrument mechanic activities in the instrument cabinets which house equipment asso-ciated with the radiation monitor. This issue will be tracked as example 2 of shift inspector item SS-40-GH-0 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ .

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f. On September 29, 1988, the licensee reported that the personnel hatch that separates the Unit 1 upper and lower containment was found F opened at 2:20 p.m. LC0 3.6.5.5 was entered and the hatch was closed at 3:27 p.m. and the LCO exite The event was reviewed by the licensee and it was determined that the hatch had been opened earlier in the day by one of the craf tsmen and that the individual had assumed that another individual would close the hatch. As a result of this event all RWP's that allowed access from upper tn lower containment were rewritten to allow entry into only one portion of containment (either upper or lower, not both). The licensee deter- '

mined that the action statement time limit of the LCO had not been exceede g. At approximately 4:00 p.m. September 29, 1988 a temporary stop work was initiated by the plant manager as a result of the two events previously described. Only work essential for entering the next mode of operation and to support plant conditions was allowed to continu h. At 2:01 a.m. October 4, 1983 a reactor trip signal occurred on Unit I due to 2 out of 3 OPdT channels tripping. The reactor trip breakers were open at the time so an actual reactor trip did not occu The cause of the trip signal was the failure of the Protective Set .

Channel I OPdT channel during the time that the Protective Set Channel II was tripped for the performance of SI-94.22 (channel II prr,tection set calibrations), therefore generating the 2 out of 3 signals required for a reactor trip on OPdT. The licensee plans to replace the channel I OPdT module as corrective action to this event and evaluate the failure mechanism of the defective modul i. At 4:40 p.m. October 4, 1988 a reactor trip signal occurred on Unit 1 !

due to a steam /feedwater flow mismatch coincident with low SG 1evel ;

signal. The reactor trip breakers were open at the time so an actual reactor trip did not occur. The signal was generated due to back filling a steam flow instrument and calibrating the corresponding steam pressure instrument simultaneously, while the steam generator level channel was failed low. The low level signal was already present due to the failed channel and the simultaneous back filling and calibration generated the steam /feedwater flow mismatch s'gnal ,

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that completed the logic for the reactor trip signa investigation of this event is in progress by the licensee and the startup staff and wi ll be addressed in inspection report 327.- .

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12 Shift Inspector Followup Issues Issue Number Description Resolution 88-40-GH-01 Personnel related events.(2 examples)

88-40-GH-02 Missing fuses in common board 2 . Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarised on October 5, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The Startup Manager described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any of the material reviewed by the inspectors during the inspectio Inspection Findings:

One violation was identified in paragraph One unresolved item was identified in paragraph No deviations were identifie During the reporting period, frequent discussions were held with the Site Director, Plant Manager and other managers concerning inspection finding . List of Abbreviations ABGTS- Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System ABI - Auxiliary Building Isolation ABSCE- Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure APd - Auxiliary Feedwater AI -

Administrative Instruction A01 -

Abnormal Operating Instruction 1 AVO - Auxiliary Unit Operator

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ASOS - Assistant Shift Operating Superviso'.-

BIT - Boron Injection Tank C&A - Control and Auxiliary Buildings CAQR - Conditions Adverse to Quality Report CCP -

Centrifugal Charging Pump CCTS - Corporate Commitment Tracking System COPS - Cold Overpressure Protection System CS - Containment Spray CSSC - Critical Structures, Systems and Components

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CVI -

Containment Ventilation Isolation DC -

Direct Current DCN -

Design Change Notice DNE -

Division of Nuclear Engineering ECCS - Emergency Core Cooling System EDG -

Emergency Diesel Generator EI -

Emergency Instructions ENS -

Emergency Notification System ERCW - Essential Raw Cooling Water ESF -

Engineered Safety Feature FCV -

Flow Control Valve FSAR - Final Safety Analysis Report GDC -

General Design Criteria GL -

Generic Letter HIC -

Hand-operated Incicating Controller H0 -

Hold Order HP -

Health Physics IN -

NRC Information Notice I ."I -

Inspector Followup Item IM -

Instrument Maintenance IMI -

Instrument Maintenance Instruction IR -

Inspection Report

KVA -

Kilovolt-Amp KW -

Kilowatt KV -

Kilovolt LER -

Licensee Event Report LCO -

Limiting Condition for Operation LOCA - Loss of Coolant Accident l MI -

Maintenance Instruction l NB -

NRC Bulletin l NOV -

Notice of Violation l NRC -

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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OPdt - Overpower Delta Temperature OSLA - Operations Section Letter - Administrative OSLT - Operations Section Letter - Training OSP -

Office of Special Projects PMT -

Post Modification Test PORC - Plant Operations Review Committee PORS - Plant Operation Review Staff PRO - Potentially Reportable Oc:urrence QA - Quality Assurance QC -

Quality Control RCS - Reactor Coolant System REP -

Radiological Emergency Plan RG -

Regulatory Guide RM -

Radiation Monitor RHR -

Residual Heat Removal RWP -

Radiat'.on Work Permit RWST - Reactor Water Storage Tank SER -

Safety Evaluation Report

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SG -

Steam Generator SI -

Surveillance Instruction SOI -

System Operating Instructions 505 -

Shift Operating Supervisor SQM -

Sequoyah Standard Practice Maintenance SR - Surveillance Requirements SR0 -

Senior Reactor Operator STA -

Shift Technical Advisor STI -

Special Test Instruction TACF - Temporary Alteration Control Form TROI - Tracking Open Items TS -

Technical Specifications TVA -

Tennessee Valley Authority UHI -

Upper Head Injection UO -

Unit Operator URI -

Unresolved Item U500 - Unreviewed Safety Question Determination WCG -

Work Control Group WP -

Work Plan WR -

Work Request