IR 05000327/1990020
| ML20055H392 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 06/29/1990 |
| From: | Harmon P, Linda Watson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20055H391 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-90-20, 50-328-90-20, GL-82-16, NUDOCS 9007260138 | |
| Download: ML20055H392 (15) | |
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UNITED STATES
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, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N
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j; 101 MARIETTA STREET N.W.
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- ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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u Report Nos.:- 50-327/90-20, 50-328/90-20
~ Licensee:# Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place a*
1101 Markct Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.:- 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.1 DPR-77 and DPR-79-
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Facility - Nan,e:. Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: May 6, 1990 thru June 5 1990
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Lead Inspector: lM42 < /M
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POHarmon,-Spi #ResidentInspector.
Date Signed Inspectors:
D. Loveless,, Resident Inspector
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J. Brady, Project Engineer Approved by: MMM dbf!1o L. M Watson, Chief, Project Section 1 Dath 5fgned.
TVA Projects
'c SUMM R'Y s-Scope:
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This announced inspection' involved inspection effort by the Resident Inspectors
.is the. area of. operational safety verification ine'.uding control room
. observations. - operations performance, system lineups, radiation protection, safeguards, and housekeeping inspections.
Other areas inspected included maintenance observations, surveillance testing obervations, review of previous
- inspection findings, follow-up of events, revir.w of licensee identified items,
-and; review of inspector follow-up items.
-Results:
A weakness. previously identified in IR 327,328/90-14 regarding t.
use of unofficial-Justifications for Continued Operation (JCOs) was discovered in another instance in this report period. This second example of the use of JCOs instead of 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations is described in paragrcph 2.f.
Extensive use of overtime for the majority of plant personnel indicates a lack of
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management otersight in this area, paragraph 2.a.
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Compl'etion of the, Unit 1 Cycle 4 refueling outage occurred during the inspection period. During the Unit _1 startup following the refueling. outage, a reactor-trip occurred when operations personnel responded to a turbine trip event.
Operations personnel mistakenly isolated an operable feed pump during response to the turbine trip event.
This resulted in a loss of feedwater to'
. the steam ' generators and trip of the reactor on Lo-Lo SG water level,
. paragraph 8.
Modifications, maintenance and refueling activities were performed in a
- conservative, effective manner. - The number and complexity of-modifications performed successfully during the refueling outage with minimal schedule' slip is indicative of improvement in this area.
In particular, the licensee's ability to respond to the defective AlW cable during the outage was considered a strength, tio violations were identified.
One unresolved item * regarding excessive overtime is described-in paragraph 2.a; and will be tracked as URI 327,328/90-20-01.
An additional issue regarding changes to the impellers of the Unit 2 centrifugal charging pumps s.
was added to URI-327, 328/90-14-01, paragraph 2.g.
No deviations or inspector follow-up items were identified.
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- Unresolved items are matters for which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.
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REPORT DETAILS j
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Persons Contacted _
Licensee Employees J. Bynum, Vice President, Nuclear Power Production
W. Byrd, Manager, Project Controls / Financial
- C._ Vondra, Plant Manager R..Beecken. Maintenance Manager M. Burzynski, Site Licensing Manager
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- M. Cooper, Compliance: Licensing Manager i
J. Gates. Technical Support Manager W. Lagergren, Jr., Operations Manager M. Lorek, Operations Supervisor
- R. Lumpkin, Site Quality Manager R. Proffitt, Licensing Engineer R. Rogers, Supervisor Engineering-Support Section
- M. Sullivan,-Radiological Control Manager
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S. Spencer, Licensing Engineer
- P. Trudel, Project Engineer
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- C. Whittemore, Licensing Engineer
- Attended exit interview
' Acronyms and initialisms used in this report are _ listed in the last
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paragraph.
t 2.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
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a.
Control Room Observations The inspectors conducted discussions with control room operators, verified that proper control room staffing was maintained, verified that access to the control room was properly controlled, and that operator behavior was commensurate with the plant configuration and
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plant activities in progress, and with on-going control room
operations.
The operators were observed adhering.to appropriate, approved procedures, including Emergency Operating Procedures, for the on-going activities.
Additionally, ti.e -frequency of visits to the control room by upper management was observed for adequecy.
The inspector also verified that the licensee was operating the plant in a normal plant configuration as required by TS and when abnormal conditions existed, that the operators were complying with the appropriate LC0 action statements.
The inspector verified that leak rate calculations were performed and that leakage rates were within the TS limits.
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The ' inspectors observed instrumentation and recorder traces forJ abnormalities and! verified the status of selected control-room annunciators to. ensure that control room operators were well aware of-the status of the-plant.
Panel indications.were reviewed for the nuclear instruments, the emergency power, sources,.the. safety parameter display system and 'the radiation monitors - to ensure
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operability and operation within TS limits.-
No violations or
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deviations were observed.
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On May-31 the inspector ' witnessed the return to critical of' the-Unit I reactor from the Cycle 4-refueling' outage._ The evolution was
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well planned-and executed by the operations staff.
Adherence to-
procedures and attention to detail were evidenced by-the operators and reactor engineers involved in:the evolution.
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-The inspector reviewed the licensee's use of overtime in the area of-operations -against the requirements 'of Generic Letter 82-16 and
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AI-30,- Nuclear Plant Conduct. of Operations, Section 23,- Revision 30 as addressed in the licensee's response to the generic letter.
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inspector noted several ' items that appeared to violate. the requirements of AI-30 and TVA's commitments.
These include-the following:
No documented reason for 16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> shifts on attschment E's.
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Sixteen hour shifts worked that did not appear to be " extreme"
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cases as required by AI-30. (i'.e., regularly scheduled 16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />
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shifts,16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> shifts to cover for individuals on annual leave,
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etc.)
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Prior approval not received for exceeding the requirements of
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AI-30, Section 23.2, nor reasons' given for the infraction as
required by Section 23.4.
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Additionally, the inspector questioned whether the requirements of
- I Section 23.3 to -carefully select the duties of an individual working-in excess of 12 continuous hours were being met.
Regular and routine overtime appeared to be normal and accepted by plant management.
This item will be tracked as URI 327,328/90-20-01.
The inspector will complete the review of operations overtime and review overtime practices of other-groups in the plant that fall under the guidelines of GL 82-16 and AI-30.
b.
Control Room Logs The inspectors observed control room opentions and reviewed applicable logs including the shift logs, 0)erating orders, night order book, clearance hold order book and configuration log to obtain information concerning operating trends and activities. The TACF log was reviewed to verify that the use of jumpers and lif ted leads causing equipment to be inoperable was clearly noted and understood.
The inspector questioned plant management regarding night order #193, initiated as corrective action for the reactor trip discussed in
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paragraph 8a.-
The night order was subsequently revised and i:
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further discussed in' paragraph 8a.
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Secondary plant chemistry reports were reviewed and primary plant chemistry was verified to be within TS' limits.
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In -addition, the im'plementation of _ the -licensee's sampling prograr.1
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was observed.
Plant specific monitoring systems including seismic,
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meteorological and fire detection indications Jwere reviewed for-
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operability.
A review of surveillance records and tagout logs _was :
0 1; performed to confirm the operability of the RPS.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's provisions to assure that only licensed operators ' assumed the reactor control positions-and
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discussed the _ findings with plant management..
The inspector-
-determined that the plant did not have a procedure-that could be used
to determine all qualified watchstanders for~ licensed positions., As o
a result _ the Shift-Operating Supervisor 'could not demonstrate up-to-the-minute qualification status of licensed personnel on the-y current watch.
Further review indicated that all watchstanders were
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qualified.
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In response the licensee-determined that potential problems could be
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end of the inspection _ period that the licensee had placed a list of i
all qualified watchstanders in the control room.
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No violations or deviations were observed.
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c.
ECCS System Alignment i
.The inspectors walked down accessible ' portions of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater System to verify operability, flow path, heat sink, water supply, power supply, and proper valve and. breaker alignment.
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In addition, the inspectors verified that a selected portion of the containment isolation lineup was correct.
No deviations or violations were identified.
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.d.
Plant Tours
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Tours of the diesel generator, auxiliary, control, and turbine buildings, and exterior areas were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, potential fire hazards, control of ignition sources, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, missile hazards and plant housekeeping and cleanliness conditions.
The plant was observed to be clean and in adequate condition.
The inspectors verified that maintenance work orders had been submitted as required and that followup activities and prioritization of work was accomplished by the licensee.
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The; inspector visually inspected the major components for leakage,.
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proper lubrication, cooling water supply, and any general condition
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that might prevent, fulfilling their; functional requirements.. Plant
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' housekeeping wr.s' observed to be adequate in'a'l areas observedh Some staging arear. were cluttered due to' the. containment cleanup.:and closeout ' effort.
Considerable effort to clean these staging areas 'is
ongoing.
K The inspector observed shift turnovers'and determined that necessary
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information concerning the plant systems status was' addressed.-
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No violations or deviations' were observed..
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Radiation Protection
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The inspectors observed HP practices and verified the implementation j
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of radiation protection controls.
On a regular basis, RWPs :were
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reviewed 'and specific work activities were monitored to ensure the-activities were being, conducted in' accordance with the applicable RWPs.
' Workers were - observed for' proper frisking upon exiting
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f conteminated areas and the radiologically controlled area. Selected i
radiation protection instruments were. verified operable and
calibration frequencies were reviewed.
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Safeguards Inspection (
In the course of the monthly activities, the inspectors included a
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N.E review of the licensee's physical security program. The per#ormance of various shif ts of the security force was observed in-the conduct
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of daily activities including: protected and vital area access
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controls; searching of personnel and' packages; escorting of visitors; L_ '
badge issuance and retrieval; and patrols and compensatory _ posts.
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In addition, the inspectors observed-- protected area lighting, and protected anu vital area barrier integrity. The inspectors verified
interfaces between the security organization and-both operations and -
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't maintenance.
Specifically, the Resident Inspectors:
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1-(1) witnessed firearms training and qualification 2)
interviewed individuals with security concerns
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3) visited central and secondary alarm stations
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4) verified prote: tion of Safeguards Information l.
5) verified onsite/offsite communication capabilities
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Conditions Adverse to Quality l<
The inspectors reviewed selected items to determine that the licensee's problem identification system as defined in Al-12, Part III, Corrective Action, was functioning.
CAQR's were routinely
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l reviewed for adequacy in addressing a problem or event. Additionally E
a. samplei of the/ following-documents were reviewed '.for adequate
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handling:
m Work Requests F
Potential Reportable Occurrences
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Radiological incident Reports _.-
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't (4) Problem Reporting Documents
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_'(5) Correct-on-the-Spot Documents
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'(6) Licensee Event ~ Reports.
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Effective June 1, 1990, the corrective action. and problem-
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[a identification programs were revised and implemented by Site Standard
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Practice SSP-3.2, Problem Reporting, Evaluation. - and Corrective Action, Rev.' O.
The new standard' supersedes AI-12,. Corrective i
Action, Part I and Part III'.
The new standard addresses commitments
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made to the NRC in LER 89-031, Rev-.1, to change the CAQ program to
allow use of a single problem reporting document and to develop a
program to ensure proper.short term corrective actions are-taken to
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preclude repeated deficiencies.
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The inspector reviewed CAQRs associated with safety-related pumas.
J This was an area of-concern identified in NRC IR 327,328/90-14 w11ch l
involved an unplanned design change:to a' containment-spray pump, and l
was designated as URI 327,328/90-14-01.
After discoveHng that a
. design change had occurred on-the CS pump, the licensee dispositioned the' item by--issuing a Justification for Continued Operation rather than writing a -safety evaluation' per 10 CFR 50.59.- During the CAQR'
review conducted during the present inspection period, a similar situation was identified.where a change was made to a safety-related pump that was resolved in a manner similar'.to the CS pump issue.
This situation involved the 1983 replacement of the Unit 2 a
centrifuaal charging pump impellers with different impellers obtained
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from Watts Bar.
The Watts Bar impellers were of a different design that produced a higher pump head than the original impellers.
The new impellers were-designed to produce 1800 ft, of head versus the 1500 f t. of the ' original impellers.
The running speed was also
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different, 4830 rpm for Sequoyah vs. 4775 rpm for the. Watts Bar pumps.
The impeller changeout was accomplished by Maintenance
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Requests 168088 and 168089.
A problem identification report PIR-SQNNEB8643 was written detailing the condition that resulted from the change. With the new internals installed, the loading on the EDG was higher than the original value (680 vs 640 bhp).
The corrective actions for this PIR-were determined o require an ECN to change the J. y applicable drawings to identify the changes and to install flow
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orifices to make the pump performance match the original performance
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curves.
An ECN would also have required a safety evaluation per
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The PIR was revised to change the corrective actions
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to "None Required" based on a set of calculations that indicated'that the pump performance and EDG loading would be essentially the same as L
the original.
The revised'PIR also committed to test the pumps at p
the next refueling outage, Unit 2 Cycle 3, to verify that the
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p calculations were correct.
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y Westinghouse was contracted to: provide a Justification for Continued o
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Operation (issued December'8,1988) and a Safety Evaluation (issued December 12, 1988).
Both the - JC0 cand - the ' SE - were ~ written
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'specifically for ' the hydraulic performance of the new pumps, and:
neither addressed the motor duty'and=EDG loading' requirements.
The SE' concluded that the pump performance, although degraded, was still
within,.the' bounding requirements of 10 CFR 50.46.
The 1 test performed to verify the motor duty and EDG load.ing calculations. was SI-260, -SIS / BIT /RHR Flow Balance. and Pump Perfonnance.
The SI-260 was performed April 1989.
The-test data
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. indicated that the EDG' loading for the new-pumps was substantially.
higher than the revised PIR had calculated and also higher than the-E L'
design basisLfor the~EDG. The test data indicated that the 2A CCP
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was requiring.546 kw.(732 hp), and the 2B CCP required 564 kw (756
- hp).- Applying-the motor efficiency of 0.937 the ratings were 686 and.
I 708 hp, respectively. The original Sequoyah' pump performance was 650 hp and the EDG' loading assumed at 680 hp.
The review ~ of this q
information indicating? the - pumps were outside the design. basis
resulted in a decision to reject the, data-(based on the method used.
l being considered inadequate),'to continue operation, and to rerun'the
SI-260 at the next (Unit 2, Cycle 4) refueling outage. This decision
was. documented in a memo Trudel/LaPoint dated April 1989 j
l After inspection 327,328/90-01 which included a violation involving d
inadequate review ~ and analysis of Bulletin 88-04 for RHR pump
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deadheading.~ determination, the licensee reviewed the CCP issue and j
prepared ~ a JC0 for the CCPs. (Memo Edlund/ Wright, dated February 8, g
1990).
This JC0 contains references to the EDG loading calculation j{
having. adequate-margin, ' service, life of the motor, and hydraulic performance.
l The-in'spector informed the licensee May 7, 1990, that he considered
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l the. status of the CCPs' for Unit 2 to be questionable and requested q
that. documentation be provided for review.
The licensee' prepared a l
safety evaluation-dated May 9, 1990 and discussed the issue and the l
evaluation with the inspector on that date. The inspector questioned l
Llicensee personnel about the issue in de. tail and asked why the CCP t
pump problems were not disclosed during NRC inspection 327, 328/90-14 conducted in March through April 1990.
The licensee
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replied that even though a similar issue existed for the CS pumps, they thought the NRC was only interested in the " big picture" regarding JCOs being used instead of safety evaluations..Since the i
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licensee was aware of the CCP issue during the inspection, informing j
the inspectors that other pumps had been changed without proper.
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evaluation would have indicated that the CS pump problem was not an isolated problem.
The technical issue pertaining to the pumps is effectively identical to the URI described in IR 327,328/90-14, and will be included in the disposition of URI 327,328/90-14-01, Plant Discrepancy Requiring a 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation.
The licensee is presently researching open CAQRs to identify any
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other JCOs or similar unapproved and undocumented corrective actions that may have been used instead of official processes.
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During meetings with TVA management-personnel,.the issue of full i
- disclosure. was discussed.
While ithis specific instance is not a-clear-cut example of withholding pertinent information, the inspector expressed concern to ~ plant management that. employees appeared to be
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unfamiliar.with requirements regarding disclosure of relevant l
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R, information during inspections or investigations. Management agreed to publish notification to plant personnel reiterating TVA's position
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on disclosure and cooperation with' NRC inspectors.:
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With the exception of the-concern on the use of JCOs-described above, no
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trends"were -. identified in the operational safety verification _ area.
General conditions 11n the plant were adequate. The number of control room maintenance and modification items for Unit 2_have been reduced during f
this reporting period.
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Radiation protection and security are adequate to continue two unit operations.
No violations-or deviations were observed.
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SurveillanceObservationsandReview-(61726)
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Licensee activities-were directly observed / reviewed to ascertain that
surveillance of safety-related systems and components was being conducted in accordance with TS requirements.
The inspectors verified that: testing was performed.in accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; LCOs were met; test.results met acceptance criteria and were reviewed by personnel other than the indiv_idual directing the ~ test; deficiencies were identified, as appropriate, and any. deficiencies identif_ied during the testing were properly _ reviewed and resolved by management personnel; and system.
restoration was adequate.
For completed tests, the inspector verified that testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by qualified individuals.
-The-following -activity was observed / reviewed with no ' deficiencies
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identified:
SI-7, Electrical Power System: Diesel Generator for EDG 2AA No trends were identified in the area of surveillance performance during
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.this inspection. period.
The area of surveillance scheduling and management was observed to be adequate.
4.
. Monthly Maintenance Observations and Review (62703)
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Station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components
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were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and in conformance with TS.
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The following items were considered during this review:
LCOs were met.-
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,while components or. systems were removed ' from service;' redundant'
components were operable; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the-work;E activities-were ' accomplished using approved procedures and'.were.
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c, inspected as' applicable; procedures used were adequate to control the
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activity;; troubleshooting' activities were controlled and the' repair
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records accurately ' reflected - the activities; functional testing and/or
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calibrations were performed prior to returning components.or systems.to
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service; QC. records 'were maintained; activities were. accomplished by qualified -personnel; parts and z materials used'were properly certified;-
radiological controls were;1mplemented; QC hold points were-established 1"
-where. required-and. were observed; fire prevention controls were:
. implemented; outside-' contractor force activities were controlled in.
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accordance with the approved QA program; and housekeeping was actively
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pursued.
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On May 15; 1990, the licensee discovered a portion of cable used in wiring J
a new containment isolation indication board had badly deformed insulation
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. leaving-an exposed conductor.
The cable was identified as a portion of a
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5000 foot reel of WHE-1 (Mark Letter), SC #14 AWG wire from AIW corporation.
Further inspection showed approximately 250 feet of deformed or discolored insulation on one of the five conductors in the cable.
The licensee's actions regarding the cable were as follows:
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a.. < 0bserved the end' points of all cables installed in the plant that
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were'taken from the same reel for similar deformation'.
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Contacted AIW.for assistance.
AIW determined that the problem was most likely L an isolated deficiency in the manufacturer's curing process that cures 200 feet of cable at a time.
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Inspected a statistical sample of cable from the nine reels ordered from the same lot' (located at Hartsville Station) and ascertained with a 95% confidence level that 95% of the cables would be acceptable, d.
Determined that the cables installed in-the plant were for
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containment-isolation valves that would close should the cables short as a result of a similar problem.
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'The inspector reviewed all the licensee actions and findings and
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determined: that there had been an appropriate level of management o
attention, and that the problem had been adequately brought to a technical resolution.
No violations and no deviations were identified in the area cf Maintenance, m;
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Management Activities in Support of Plant Operations TVA management activities were reviewed on a daily basis by the NRC j
inspectors.
Resident Inspectors observed that planning, scheduling, work
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control and other management meetings were effective in controlling plant activities.
First line supervisors appear to be knowledgeable and involved in the day to day activities of the plant.
First line supervisor involvement in the field was observed and was adequate.
Management response. to those plant activ41es and events that occurred during this inspection period appeared timely and effective.
An example of this management action was the involvement of management in the AIW cable issue
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described in paragraph 4.
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6.
NRCInspectorFollow-upItems,UnresolvedItems, Violations (92701,9270?)
(Closed)VIC 327,328/89-29-01, Failure to Comply With AI-12.
l This violation involved failure to follow the requirements of the i
Corrective Action Program defined in AI-12 for freeze protection of the RWST level transmitters.
The licensee used an action plan to track this issue instead of the required corrective action program.
Corrective action for this violation involved review of action plans to ensure that
corrective action items were properly addressed in the corrective action
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program. and emphasis by the Interim Site Director and site managers on the importance of using the corrective action program. Action plans were
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reviewed for proper entry and disposition into the corrective action i
program by the NRC in IR 327,328/90-08 and were acceptable.
In addition,
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the corrective action program in general was reviewed during IR 327, 328/90-08 and found acceptable.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action and found it acceptable. This violation is closed.
(Closed) VIO ~327, 328/90-01-02, Inadequate Design Document and Safety Evaluation for RWST Level Transmitters.
This violation involved an inadequate design change and safety evaluation.
The inadequate safety evaluation was performed under the licensee's previous 10 CFR 50.59 program. The new program was reviewed in inspection
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327, 328/90-01 and 'found to be adequat?.
In addition, the procedural
changes implemented for the design control processes are adequate to ensure proper interdisciplinary reviews. This violation is closed.
(Closed)VIO 327, 3?8/89-19-05, Failure to Follow A01-4.
This violation involved a failure to place source range channel N-31 in bypass when the channe; was declared inoperable due to excessive noise which caused severe spi ing.
The result was that an unnecessary reactor k
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trip signal was generated during dropped rod troubleshooting.
Licensee actions involved issuin3 a training letter to licensed operators and STAS
addressing the failure to comply with A01-4.
The licensee corrective
actions were adequate. This violation is closed.
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(0 pen) VIO 327, 328/90-01-03 Inadequate Corrective Action for RHR Pump Deadheading.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated May 9,1990 to the
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Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty.
The inspector was concerned that the response did not adequately address
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violation A.1 in that the reason for using 20 minutes in the E0P review, L
rather than the 11 minutes that TVA calculated for the time to damage an RHR pump from deadheading, was not included.
This was considered significant because had the licensee used 11 mindes in the E0P review,
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the licensee would have concluded that the E0Pt would not adequately prevent pump-to-pump interaction consequences from deadheading. The level
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within TVA at which the decision was made to use the 20 minutes was also not addressed.
The inspector discussed this concern with the licensee.
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This violation will remain open.
7.
Licensee Event Report Followup (92700)
The following LERs were reviewed and closed. The inspector verified that:
reporting requirements had been met; causes had been identified; corrective actions appeared appropriate; generic applicability had '.en considered; the LER forms were completed; no unreviewed safety questions
_
were involved: and violations of regulations or Technical Specification conditions w been identified.
UNIT 1
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327/89-01 LCO 3.0.3 Entered When Two RWST Level Channels were
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Declared Inoperable upon Failure of Channel Check Criteria due to Flooding in the RWST Moat.
327/89-03 Brief Interruption of Control Power te 6.9ky Shutdown lostd
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Resulted in Auto Start of a MotW-Driven Auxiliar.
Feedwater Pump During Search for an Clectried Ground 327/89-05 Reactor Trip Signal Resulting from the Closure of the Nin Feedwater Regulating Valves on loss of Power to the Valve
Controllers due to Personnel Errer.
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327/89-08 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System ineperaMe
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Because of Closure of Tornado D opers.
327/89-11 Inadvertent Entry into Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.3 Ove to an inadequate ilesiduhl
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Heat Removal System Surveillance Irstruction, j
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The root cause evaluation for 1his LER did not address
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inadequacies in the 10 CFR 50.59 reviews for the RHR l
procedure changes.
However, these reviews were the subject
[
of escalated enforcement action in VIO 327, 328/89-15-05.
Corrective actions for safety review inedequacies and the
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safety review process in general were identified in the response to that.iolation which was reviewed and closed in IR 327, 328/90-01.
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4.
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r 327/89-23 Failure to Enter Limiting Condition for Operation 3.4.11 L
After Discovering the Reactor Coolant Vent System was Inoperable.
327/90-04 Two Handswitches Controlling Isolation Valves on the Steam Supply Line to the Unit 1 Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Found in the Manual Position for Unknown Causes.
l UNIT 2'
328/89-08 Sequoyah Unit 2 Reactor Trip Because of a Dropped Rod.
The additional source range reactor trip signal generated
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during troubleshooting of the dropped rod is addressed
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above under VIO 327, 328/89-19-05.
328/89-10 Failure to Perform a Surveillance Requirement Within the Specified Time Interval Because of Personnel Error.
328/89-11 RE-90-119 Radiation Monitors Inoperable Because of inadequate Source Check Performance.
This issue is also addressed in I V 327, 328/89-28-01.
328/89-12 One Train of the Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System Level Indication Inoperable Because an Isolatir 4 i
Valve was Inadvertently Left Mispositioned During Preventive Maintenance.
328/90-03 Inadvertant Containment Vent Isolation Event Resulting from'
a lack of Attention to Detail While Blocking a Radiation i
Monitor.
328/90-04 Use of W(z) Functions Containing an Error for Unit 2 Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor Surve111ances During Cycle 4 as a Result of an Error by the Fuel Ventoa.
328/90-05 Inadvertent Containment Vent Isolation Event Resulting form a Lack of Attention to Detail While Preparing for a Containment Purge.
8.
Event Follow-up (93702)
a.
On June 2, 1990, at 8:03 a.m., Unit 1 experienced a reactor trip from a Lo-Lo SG Level. The trip was caused by AU0s improperly isolating a main feed pump in response to a turbine trip.
During unit startup following a refueling outage, a turbine generator u,
trip occurred due to high ground fault current on the generator's neutral bus.
High leakage current on the neutral bus is indicative
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of insulation breakdown or high conductivity conditions in the
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generator's hydrogen atmosphere.
Rel>tively high leakage currents are typical following extended outages until the hydrogen dries and machine moisture is eliminated.. When the ground detector tripped the turbine generator at 7:45 a.m.,
reactor power was at 11% in preparation for the scheduled 103% turbine overspeed trip test, with MFP B providing feed to the steam generators.
When the turbine tripped, AV0s in the turbine building recognized that the turbine had tripped and proceeded to isolate equipment as
required to prevent secondary side water hansner and overcooling of the RCS.
The AV0s assumed that the reactor had tripped as well as i
the turbine, and also performed actions relative to a reactor trip,
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which includes isolation of the st>*am supply to the MFPs.
When the
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steam was isolated to the MFP, reactor power was at 11%, well above the value at which AFW is able to replenish water in the steam generators.
The result was a rapidly decreasing water level in all
SGs and a Lo40 Water level Trip.
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The reactor trip report identifies inadequate communication between the control room operators and the A00s in the turbine building, and
- nso inadequate training of the AV0s for different trip scenarios, such as a turbine trip without a direct reactor trip.
Plant response to the trip was nor:r:1. Operators responded in an adequate manner to the trip.
PORC reviewed thr-trip report and concluded that a Night Order should be issued to require that AUDs would not isolate the feed pumps following a turbine or reactor trip without first receiving direct orders from the Unit Operator, ASOS or SOS.
The subject night order,
- 193, was issued on June 2, immediately after the PORC meeting. The inspector reviewed the trip report and the night order at 8:00 p.m.
,
on June 2, and expressed concern to the Operations Manager that the night order effectively superseded training and standing orders for the AV0s, and could lead to serious problems if another trip occurred.
The night order as written directed AU0s to receive permission from control room operators prior to isolating Jan equipment following a unit trip.
In effect. AV0s would be unable to expeditiously isolate equipment as needed after a trip, but would have to wait for direction from the control room. Both severe water hammer and RCS overcooling have occurred in the past, and AV0s have been trained to immediately begin isolation of feed heaters and pumps.
Another consideration the night order did not address is the lack of specific training or procedures to the control rocm staff to
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replace that given to the AV0s.
Discussion with plant and shift personnel indicates that PORC directed the Operations Supervisor to issue the night order with direction explicit to and limited to the isolation of the feed pumps, but the operations supervisor wrote the night order in a manner that precluded the AV0s from taking needed immediate actions to isolate any equipment following a trip.
The plant manager, who was the PORC chairman, was interviewed by the inspector regarding the discrepanny between PORC's orders and the resultant night order.
The plant manager agreed that the incident warranted further investigation by the licensee.
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The night order was revised on June 3 with a requirement for the AU0s to receive permission from the control room prior to isolating the feed pumps.
This revision appears appropriate to prevent the inadvertant isolation of the feed pump,, but does not unnecessarily restrict the AV0s or contravene standard. instructions, training, or
. crew response to events.
9.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 5,1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The Senior Resident Inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below.
The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any of the material reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
During the exit interview, licensee management acknowledged the findings and observations presented by the inspectors. The plant manager agreed to investigate and resolve the discrepancy between POPC's understanding of the night order to be issued and the version that was written by the
Operations Supervisor, described in paragraph 8.
Inspection Findings:
Violations and Non-cited violations were not identified.
I One unresolved item was identified. URI 327,328/90-20-01, involving the i
management of overtime, described in paragraph 2.a.
An additional issue regarding changes to the impellers of the Unit 2 centrifugal charging pumps was added to URI 327, 328/90-14-01, paragraph 2.g.
During the reporting period, frequent discussions were held with the Interim Site Director, Plant Manager and other managers concerning
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inspection findings.
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~10. : List of Acronyms and Initialisms
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ABGTS-Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System I
Auxiliary Building Isolation
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ABI
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ABSCE-Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure Auxiliary feedwater AFW
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Administrative Instruction AI
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A01 Abnormal Operating Instruction
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Auxiliary Unit Operator AVO i
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ASOS -
Assistant Shift Operating Supervisor ASTM -
American Society of Testing and Materials BIT Boron Injection Tank
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Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant BFN
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Control and Auxiliary Buildings C&A
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CAQR -
Conditions Adverse to Quality Report CCS Component Cooling Water System
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CCP Centrifugal Charging Pump
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CCTS -
Corporate Commitment Tracking System l
Code of Federal Regulations CFR
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COPS --
Cold Overpressure Protection System
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CSSC -
Critical Structures, Systems and Components CVCS -
Chemical and Volume Control System Containment Ventilation Isolation CVI
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Direct Current
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Design Change Notice DCN
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Diesel Generator
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Division of Nuclear Engineering DNE
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Engineering Change Notice ECN
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ECCS -
Emergency Core Cooling System Emergency Diesel Generator EDG
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Emergency Instructions
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EI
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Emergency Notification System ENS
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'anergency Operating Procedure E0P
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Emergency Operating Instruction EO
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ERCW -
Essential Raw Cooling Water Engineered Safety Feature ESF
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Flow Control Valve FCV
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FSAR -
Final Safety Analysis Report General Design Criteria GDC
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General Operating Instruction G01
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Generic letter GL
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HVAC -
Heating Ventilation and Air Conditior5ng Hand-operated Indicating Controller HIC
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Hold Order H0
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Health Physics HP
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Instruction Change Form ICF
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Independent Design Inspection IDI
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NRC Information Notice IN
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Inspector Followup Item
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IFI
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Instrument Maintenance a
IM
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Instrument Maintenance Instruction IMI
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Inspection Report
IR
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Kilovolt-Amp
KVA
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Kilowatt
KW
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Kilovolt
?
KV
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Licensee Event Report
LER
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Limiting Condition for Operation
LCO
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Licensee Identified Violation
LIV
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LOCA -
Loss of Coolant Accident
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Main Control Room
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Maintenance Instruction
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MI
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Maintenance Report
s
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MSIV -
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NRC Bulletin
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NB
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NQAM -
Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRC
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OSLA -
Operations Section Letter - Administrative
OSLT -
Operations Section Letter - Training
Office of Special Projects
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Precautions, Limitations, and Setpoints
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Preventive Maintenance
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Parts Per Million
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Post Modification Test
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PORC -
Plant Operations Review Conrnittee
P0RS --
Plant Operation Review Staff
Problem Reporting Document
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Potentially Reportable Occurrence
PRO
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Quality-Assurance
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Quality Control
Radiation Control Area
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RCDT -
Reactor Coolant Drain Tank
Reactor Coolant Pump
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Regulatory Guide
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Radiation Monitor
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R0
Reactor Operator
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Rod Position Indication
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Revolutions Per Minute
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Resistivity Temperature Device Detector
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Radiation Work Pers11t
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RWST -
Refueling Water Storage Tank
Safety Evaluation Repo*t
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Steam Generetor
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Surveillance Instruction
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Special Maintenance Instruction
SMI
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S0I
System Operating Instructions
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SOS
Shift Operating Supervisor
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Sequoyah Standard Practice Maintenance
SQM
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SQRT -
Seismic Qualification Review Team
SR
Surveillance Requirements
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Senior Reactor Operator
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SS0MI-
Safety Systems Outage Modification Inspection
SSQE -
Safety System Quality Evaluation
SSPS -
Solid State Protection System
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Special Test Instruction
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TACF -
Temporary Alteration Control Form
TAVE -
Average Reactor Coolant Temperature
TDAFW-
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
t
TI
Technical Instruction
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TREF -
Reference Temperature
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TROI -
Tracking Open Items
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TS
Technical Specifications
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Tennessee Valley Authority
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UHI
Upper Head Injection
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UO
Unit Operator
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Unresolved Item
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USQD -
Unreviewed Safety Question Determination
Volts Direct Current
VDC
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Volts Alternating Current
VAC
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WCG
- Work Control Group
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Work Plan
WP
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Work Request
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