IR 05000327/1988044
| ML20205Q497 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 10/24/1988 |
| From: | Harmon P, Jenison K, Linda Watson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205Q475 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-88-44, 50-328-88-44, NUDOCS 8811090257 | |
| Download: ML20205Q497 (31) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION q f MOION 11
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Report Nos.: 50-327/88-44 and 50-328/88-44 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority :
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6N 3SA Lookout Place 1101 Parket Square .
Chattanooga, TN 37401 !
t Docket Nos.: 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.: DPR-77 and DPR-79 :
Facility Name: Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: September 13, 1988 thru October 5, 1988 ;
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Inspectors: [ d h M / .,f d /o[?/ IM f R_ M lenison, sp61of Resident Inspectw- Date signed '
,) f5 bM r Ad7 RDate b/l8f P. E. Harmon, genior Tesident Inspector Signed Resident Inspectors: P. G. Humphrey -
3 D. P. Loveless i W. K. Poertner Approved by: O L , 7'/, /
fv /d A SS
. WatsTn",~ Chief. Project Secticn 1 Das Tfcned TVA Projects Division 'i
) SUWARY i Scope: This routtne, announced inspection involved inspection onsite by the l Resident Inspectors in the areas of operational safety verification '
including operations performance, system lineups, radiation protection, :
safcguaros and housekeeping inspections; maintenance cbservations'
surveillance testing observations; review of previous inspection l findings; folicwup of events; review of licensee identifiad items; review of IENs; and review of IFI Results: One violation was identified: paragraph 5 - Failure to follow incere probe work instructions, 327,328/SS-44-02 i
One unresolved item * was identified: paragraph 2c - Adequacy of Fire Inspections, 327,328/SS-44-01 No deviations were identifie "Untesolved items are matters about which more infor.mation is i ( required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviation !
t 6811050:57 831023 POR ADOCK 05000327 o PDC
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Conclusions: In the area of Event Followup, one violation was identified, !
327,328/88-44-02. The areas of Operational Safety Verification, l Maintenance Surveillance, and Extended Control Room and Plant !
Activity 00servation appeared to be adequate to support current i plant operation One issue was identified that requires i
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resolution prior to the ret; art of Unit 1, 327,328/SS-44-01, Adequacy of Fire Watche ,
?,n those it0ms designated as "closed" the licensee's actions !
appeared to be adeouat The items designated as "open" required l further review by the inspector or further action by the licensee :
as identified in the body of the report. Some issues listed as i I
"open" were found to be adequately corrected to support the restart of Unit 1 and were determined to be resolved for unit I
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restart. One item remains open from this report which requires resolution prior to Unit I restart. It is URI 327,328/87-76-04, i Fifth Vital Batter t i
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REPORT DETAILS !
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1 Persons Contacted i i !
j Licensee Employees ;
i *T. Arney, Quality Assurance Audit Manager !
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R. Beecken, Maintenance Superintendent !
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J. Bynum, Vice President, Nuclear Pcwer Production t M. Cooper, Compliance Licensing Manager !
D. Craven, Plant Support Superintendent
< H. Elkins, Instrument Maintenance Group Manager ;
] R. Fortenberry, Technical Support Supervisor '
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J. Hamilton. Quality Engineering Manager ,
) * Hipp, Licensing Engineer !
- J. Kearney, OA Supervisor f J
J. La Point, Acting Site Director !
, L. Martin, Site Quality Manager i
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- J. Naik, Plant Operations Review Committee L
- J Patrick, Operations Superintendent !
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R. Pierce, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor j
- * Purcell, Licensing Engineer ,
l M. Sull han, Radiological Controls Superintendent (
i M. Ray, Site Licensing Staff Manager l
, R. Rogers, Plant Reporting Section i B. Schofield, Licensing Engineer j S. Smith, Plant Manager [
S. Spencer, Licensing Engineer l
.l G. Toto, Advisor, Office of Nuclear Power r j C. Whittemore, Licensing Engineer
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' Attended exit interview .,
NOTE: Acronyms and initialisms used in this report are listed in the last paragrap .
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j Operational Safety Verification (71707)
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[ Plant Tours i f
The inspectors observed controi room operations; reviewed applicable !
i logs including the shift logs, night order book, clearance nold order book, configuration log and TACF log; conducted discusstrsns with control room operators; verified that proper control roon [
1 staffing was maintaita ;; coserved shift Jrnovers; and confirmed !
I operability of instrumentatio The it.. pectors verified the
! operability of selected e ergency systers, ard verified compliance
- with TS LCO Tne inspectors verified that maintenance work orders 1 had been submitted as required arid that followup activities and j prioritication of work w9% accoPplishes by the licensee.
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h Tours of the diesel generator, auxiliary, control, and turbine l j buildings, and containment were conducted to observe plant equipment l
conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and , i i excessive vibrations and plant housekeeping / cleanliness condition t i !
i The inspectors walvad down accessible portions of the following ,
! safety-related systems on Unit I and Unit 2 to verify operability and l proper valve alignment: j l
a 1 Residual Heat Removal Unit 1 I Intermediate Head Safety Infection, Unit I f l
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I Safeguards inspection
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! In the course of the conthly activities, the inspectors included a l j review of the Itcensee's physical security progra The performance j j of various shif ts of the security force was observed in the conduct !
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of daily activities including: protected and vital area access !
controls; searching cf personnel and packages; escorting of visitors; badge issuance and retrieval; and patrols and compensatory posts.
i No violations or deviations were identified.
I Radiation Protection and Fire Protection I The inspectors observed HP practices and verified the implementation ,
) of radiation protection controls. On a regular basis RWPs were i reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to ensure the !
activities were being conducted in accordance with the appitcable ;
RWP Selected radiation protection instruments were verified !
! operable and calibration frequencies were reviewe {
The inspectors reviewed an issue involving the adequacy of fire protection watche The licensee interviewed all fire watches, i l
conducted an audit of each fire wate.t's time-in-area patterns using i the key card system, and is continueusly conducting on shift training !
. for all fire watche Some problems were noted with fire watch t l adequacy. This issue will be tracked as an unresolved item. URI l a
327,328/58-44-01, pending completion of the licensee's investigations ,
j and must be resolved prior to the startup of Unit j i :
No violathms or deviations were identifie I Monthly Surveillance CD5ervations (61726)
l l Licensee activities were directly observed to ascertain that surgeillance i of safety-related systems and co?ponents were being conducted in
{ accordance with T5 require ents, t
! The inspectors verified that: testing was perforried in accorcance with
) adequate procedures; t.est instry entation was calibrate 0; LCOs were ret; I
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, test results met acceptance criteria requirement.*, and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; deficiencies were I identified, as appropriate, and any deficiencies identified during the ;
, testing were properly reviewed and resolved by management personnel; and l system restorat:en was adequat For completec tests, the inspector ;
} verified that testing frecuencies were met and tests were performed by !
l Qualified individual l
! The inspector observed portions of SI-83, Channel Calibration for l
Radiation Monitoring System, for the source check / calibration of ;
1-R&90-106A. Results of the observation were satisf actory, !
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No violations or deviations were identifie I
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j 4 Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (92700) {
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The following LERs were reviewed and closed. The inspector verified that: l
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l reporting requirements had been tre t; causes had been identified; l
- corrective actions appeared appropriate; generic applicability had been l 1 consicered; the LER forms were complete; the licensee had reviewed the i event; and no unreviewed safety questions were involve !
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LER's Unit 1 (0 pen) LER 327/87012, Revision 1 Loss of Shutdown Decay Heat Removal From False Indications of RCS Level in Sight Glass due to Cebris Accumulatio ;
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- This LER addresses issues concerning approprine monito~ing of RCS water [
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level whan the RCS was in partici drain condition. The nature of the LER !
) is such that it does not affect power operation of the unit. Therefor [
! closure of the LER is not required prior to restart of Unit The t l resident staff will revtew and close this LER prior to the nest refueling l
) outage for Unit 2.
I This ites remains open.
} (Closed) LER 327/57037, Revision 1 Caracity of the Engineered Safety J Features Equip-ent Coolers has Been Determined Inadeauate for LOCA
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Conditions H'iAC Calculational Error,
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, In inspection report 327,30E/SS-19 the inspector reviewed Revision 0 of !
, this LER and cetermined that the !icensee's actions were adequate to allow f restart of Unit The LER was lef t open untti tt was revised and !
cetermined acceptable a9a the EROV cooler requirements were cetermined to i te satisfie l l
The licensee inue: Ee.ision 1 to ve LER on March 11, 198 The 05P !
statt revie ed this revisien of the LER in conjunction with T5 change l recuest SS-21. On August 15, 1933 the staf f issued T5 acencrent Ne. 79 l
[ for Unit 1 whien was accerpanied by the SE !
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1 The SER stated that in LER 87037, Revision 1 dated March 10,19BS, on !
i Sequoyah Units 1 and 2. TVA stated snat the corrective actions in the LER !
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as the ultimate heat sink temperature remains below S3 degrees F." TVA ,
! stated in a telephone call on August 11, 1958 that the engineered Ifety i
{ feature (ESF) coolers which are the subject of the LER were incluued in !
! the calculations submitted in its application dated June 2C.1985 for i
! proposed TS r.hange SS-21, l l
s The staff concluded in the SER that the results of the analyses presented r 8 by TVA as clarified by the August 11, 1988 telephone call justify an !
i increase in river water temperature limit to the proposed 84.5 degrees F, l and the proposed T5 change for the VHS maximum temperature was considered
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acceptable, j l
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I (Closed) LER 327/87027 Revision 2, Surveillance Requirerent Vas Not Being l J Fulfilled Because Four Essential Raw Ccoling Water Valves Were not Being (
j Verified in the Correc t Position Due to Procedural Erro :
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! This LER identifies a procedurai deficiency that resulted in the l requirements of TS 4.7.4.a not oeing re {
l This item was addressed in IR 327,323/SS-19 and the licensee's corrective !
4:tions were found to be acequate. The LER was left open pending review i of the revised LE The inspector reviewed the licensee's revised f J submittal and found it acequat !
i q This item is closed, j (Closed) LER 327/88010 Revision 1 An Inadequate Review of the Design J Basis of Two Engineered Safety Feature Actuated Valves Resulted in the !
) Potential for Plant Operation Outside of the Design Basi }
l j This LER stated that t,he salve stroke tires for valves LCV-62-135 and l LCV-62-136 were in error. This was identified in CAQR SQP 87144 The
LER was revie.co ic IR 327,328/85 27 and found adequate for restart of ;
Unit Howeser, it was left oper pending cc2pletion of corrective j j actions which were not scheduled for completion prior to restart of l
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Unit 2. The inspector reviewed the licensee's submittal and de termined i tnat the issue will not impact the restart of Unit 1 and t, hose valve !
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stroke times originally identified uncer CAQR $QP $71446 are acceptabl j This item is close (Closea) LER 327/55014, honcoepitance Vitn Configuration Control Require-eents following a Post Modification Test of a Radiation Monitor Resulted in a Containment Ventilation 1selatio !
On March 14, 1985, a CVI was initiated when Instrument Maintenance i personnel returred t, local sample pwp switen to tne normal position on j contairment purge exhaust ronitor 1-EM-90-13 The switch actuation
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caused a -- h Hgh radiation signal to be generated in the detector circuit a cf an EMI f rom tne switch contacts. The switch had been plas "off" position previously during a post modification test but an returned to normal while the monitor output was still in ' position. When the switch was returned to the normal !
rat itier., . ;;ulte Corrective actions for this LER included issuing a WR to replace the faulty switch, and the issuance of a memo to the IM to require them to inform operations before operating any radiation monitors which have ESF functions associated with them. This corrective action did not prevent a-ecurrence, as described in LER 327/88017, ano LER 327/88023. Corrective actions associated with LER 327/88017 and LER 327/88023 are considered to oe adaquate to close this LE i This item is close '
(Closed) LER 327/88017 Inadequate Tagging of a Radiation Monitor Pump Switch Results in a Containment Ventila. ion Isolatio On March 31, 1988, a train "A" CVI o,: curred when Operations personnel operated the containment purge exhaust monitor sample pump in an attempt to clear a local abnormal flow indicato When the pump switch was operated, an EMI spike was induced into the radiation monitor circuitry, causing a spurious high radiation signal to be generated in the monitor circui This caused a CVI signal to be generated. Operation of this same pump switch bad caused a previous CVI in the same manner on March 14, 1988, as detailed in LER 327/88014 The corrective actions for the previous CVI included ser. ding a memo to Instrument Maintenh1ce personnel ,
requiring that Operations personnel be contacted prior to actuating the sample pump switch so the radiation monitor could be placed in "Block" to prevent a CV In retrospect, the licensee indicated that the proper corrective action should have been to tag the pump switch to prevent
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operatio As part of the licensee's corrective actions, the pump switch was tagged, j and a WR was written to replace the faulty pump switc In addition, labels were placed on RMs whi h actuate ESF equipment to instruct ;
personnel to block the RM before any wo*k is performe This item is close (Closed) LER 327/88023, Failure to Bloc ( Radiation Monitor Before Ferformance of Work Results in a Centainment Ventilation Isolatio On June 7, 1988, a CVI was initiated on Unit 1 when Electrical Maintenance personnel were in the process of *aplacing a faulty fluw switch for the l
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, local sample pump for Unit 1 Containment Purge Radiation Monitor 1-RM-90-130. Previous CVIs associated with this flow switch are detailei in LER 327/83014 and LER 327/8801 The EM personnel were using WR B262490 to replace the pump switch when a CVI occurre The WR had previously baen reviewed by the ASOS, power to the pump had been remov9d before '.he work was initiated, and the ASOS and the work planners had
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concluded that no EMI spike could be generated when the pump switch was actuated during the performance of the WR. While the pump itself is powered from tha isolated 480-volt power supply, an auxilia ry set of contacts to indicate pumo stacus opens and closes in parallel with the pump power suppl These auxiliary contacts are electrically isolated f rom the 480-volt power supply, but are common to the 120-volt radiation analyzer power supply for the R Following this actuation, TVA determined that the cause of the previous events was not the pump switch itself, but the auxiliary contacts. The EM personnel and the ASOS did not follow the precaution label that had recently been attached to the RM as part of the corrective act.ons associated with a previous CVI reported in LER 327/8802 The WR was determined by the licensee to have been inadequately planned in that requirements to place the RM in "block" prior to beginning work was not included, which would have prevented this CV The Root Cause Assessment performed for this event concluded that '
50I-90.1B was inadequate and would be revised to require placing the RM in
"block" prior to performing any work on the R In addition, !QM-2, Maintenance Management System, was revised to include in the planners'
checklist an evaluation to determine if work to be performed has the potential to initiate an ES This item is close LER's Unit 2 (Closed) LER 328/88028, Two Reactor Trips During Unit Startup Resulting From Steam Generator Lo-Lo Level Which Were Caused by Feedwater Perturbation This report details two reactor trips, one on June 8 and one on June 9, 198 Both trips occurred immediately after startup during power ascension while the feedwater control system was still in manual contro '
The June 8 trip was attributed to inexperience of the operator at the controls fo" the feed station. The operator mistakenly believed the feed pump speed controller could be placed in the automatic mode after matching feed pump speed so the * peed demanded by the automatic controller. Due to the slow response of the speed controller (long reset time constant), a speed enor was still present in the automatic controller. When the operator placed the controller in automatic, the error caused the feed pump to r'1uce to minimum speed. This lower speed was insufficient to '
- overcome the pressure in the steam generators at that time. Tha resul was a rapid level decrease, which the operator attempted to correct by
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returning the controller to manual, opening the main feed control valves, and then raising feed pump speed. This resulted in over feeding the steam generators and a High-High level in steam generator number The 1 High-High level trips both the main turbine generatot and the feed pump I When the feed pumps were tripped, SG 1evels again dropped rapidly, resulting in a reactor trip on Lo-Lo SG level (18 percent).
On June 9, a reactor trip occurred when a feedwater transient was induced while the feed pump and the feed regulating valves were il manual mode of control during plant startup (19 percent power). The root cause of this l
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trip was attributed to the large number of secondary plant equipment preblems. The feedwater transient began when feedwater heaters began isolating feed flow due to high heater shell side liquid levels. The high heater shell side liquid levels were caused by excessive flow of gland sealing steam into the number 7 heater drain tank. The high flow was a result of manual operation of the gland sealing steam regulator and the gland sealing steam spillover valve, which were operating erratically in automatic. A backlog of maintenance on the balance of plant equipment had prevented timely correction of the regulator and spillover valve automatic controller malfunction. Backpressure in the number 7 heater drain tank caused the cascading drains in the number 6 heaters to back up and actuate tr,e automatic isolation of feedwater flow through the heater The high levels in the number 6 heaters also caused the high level vacuum drag valve to open and the heater shell began to be drawn down to the main condenser. Subsequently, the heater string isolation valves reopened and ,
reclosed several times. The resulting transient in feed flow eventually caused a Lo-Lo SG Level trip.
, Corrective actions for these events included actions to reduce the administrative duties of the ASOS to enable him to more closely supervise the operators during critical evolutions; reducing the maintenance backlog, especially on secondary plant control equipment; a requirement for the SOS and AS05 to review the plant activities and WR backlog before each shift relief; and revision to G0I-1 to give more guidance to the operators in controlling SG levels in the manual mod The corrective actions were reviewed and found acceptabl This item is close (Closed) LER 328/88033, An Inadequate Surveillance Instruction Resulted in '
the Upper Head Injection System Level Switch Setpoints Being in Noncompliance With Technical Specification Toleranc During the performance of a demonstrated accuracy calculation by the Division of Nuclear Engineering, it was discovered that incorrect level switch setpoint values existed in SI-196, Periodic Calibration of Upper Head Injection System Instrumentatio was revised to incorporate the correct level twitch setpoints and was subsequently performed to recalibrate all Unit 2 lev.1 switches. Upon completion of SI-196, the Unit 2 Upper Head Injection system was declared operable and the LCO exited, j The licensee reviewed the impact of this mistake on the DBA analysis for l Unit 2 operations. The mistake occurred during the most recent outage and I j the problem existed f rom restart until it was found and corrected on July 30, 1988. The analysis showed that, for the fuel burn-up of the Unit 2 core, the deficiency did not cause operation outside of the safety l analys' The worst case for the situation would have been at end-of-lif Westinghouse concluded that SQN Unit 2 cycle 3 remained in comp 11'ance with the regulatcry limits for the LOCA analysi _ _ . . ._ _ _ --
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8 The inspector reviewed revision 14 of SI-196 and verified the new differential pressure values. Additionally, the inspector verified that the vendor working lines are correctly marked on both units UHI system accumulator tanks and that signs were in place to ensure that the lines were not remove This item is close ,
(Closed) LER 328/88018, Containment Integrity Was not Properly Maintained Resulting in Noncompliance with TS due to an Inadequate Performance of the Recurrence Contro The licensee discovered that a threaded cap was installed on a tube fitting tee in the sense line to a local pressure gauge and was serving as the second barrier for containment isolation and immediately complied with the action statement of LCO 3.6.1.1, Containment Integrity, by restoring containment integrity within the required time limit The inspector verified that the sub,iect cap had been replaced by a valve and a cap. Additionally, the licensee conducted a review to identify caps within the containment integrity boundar No other pipe caps were identifie This item is close (Closed) LER 328/88013, Revision 1, Rod Control Deficiencies Caused
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Inaccuracies in the Rod Group Demand Position Resulting in Three Manual Reactor Trip This LER describes three events in which a manual reactor trip was initiated in accordance with the action statement of TS 3.1.3.3, Position Indication System - Shutdow These events were reviewed in detail as part of the Unit 2 restart shift coverag The inspector reviewed the licensee's submittal and proposed corrective action Restart corrective actions committed to by the licensee are complete and adequate for restart of Unit 1. Some corrective actions committed to be the licensee are longer term and dc not affect i Unit I restar !
This item is close (Closed) LER 328/88015, Performance of an Inadequate Maintenance instruction for the Inspection of the Reactor Trip Breakers Resulted in a Main Feedwater Isolatio This LER describes a maintenance activity that resulted in a feedwater isolatio _ -_ . .- .- _ -- . .- _ - _ _
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This event was reviewed as part of the Unit 2 restart shift coverage in inspection report 327,328/88-22 and the licensee's corrective actions were found to be adequat This item is close (Closed) LER 328/88030 The Failure to Identify the Effects of Excessive Post Trip Reactor Coolant System Cooldowns Could Have Caused Noncompi ance With Shutdown Margin Requirement This LER identifies a potential ter a loss of required shutdown margin following an end of cycle reactor trip and subsequent RCS cooldown below '
nominal no-load RCS temperature of 547 This area was inspected in IR 327,328/88-35 and resu. sd in potential vio-lation 327,428/88-35-01 which is being considered for escalated enforce-ment. The licensee's corrective actions are adequate to support two unit operations and this issue will be tracked under potential violation 327,328/88-35-0 This item is close (Closed) LER 328/88032 Emergency Gas Treatment System Design Feature Did Not Consider Single Failure Criteria.
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This LER identified a potential for a single failure occurrence causing the discharge modulating damper in the automatic EGTS train to fail open prior to initiation of the system or prior to arming of the swapover logic. This situation would result f rom a failure of the logic from either the auto path controls or the normal annulus pressure control. This potential failure could have kept the system from perfcrming its design function and could have resulted in whole body gamma dose at the site boundary in excess of 10 CFR 100 limits. This issue was identified as a rasult of the licensee's corrective action process and is documented on *
CAQR SQP88044 The inspector revfewed the following immediate compensatory corrective actions taken by the licensee to counteract this potential:
AI-49, Control and Tracking of Compensatory Measures, Attachment 1, Compensatory Measure Determination Sheet, dated August 8,1988, and it associated safety evaluatie CAQR SQP880445 Emergency Instruction E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Revision 5, dated August 2, 198 Function Restoration Guidelines, FR-Z.1, Response to High Cortainment Pressure, Revision 3, dated August 2, 1988 w -
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The inspector reviewed and discussed with the licensee the long term corrective actions which include modifications to the plant. Finally, the inspector reviewed with the licensee whether or not this issue's long term corrective actions should have been accomplished prior to the restart of Unit I and determined that the short term corrective actions were adequate.
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This item is close No violations or deviations were identifie . Event Followup (93702)
The inspectors reviewed an incident involving the accidental removal of a Unit 1 incore flux detector from the core during the performance of troubleshooting and repair activities per WR 8296449 on September 9, 1988.
d The activity was initiated to move the "A" detector to the zero reference position for recalibration of the position indicatio During the performance of this activity, an uncontrolled movement of the detector was experienced that resulted in the detector exiting the core. The movement was caused by loosening the spring loaded hold down reel without first locking the storage reel to allow the .ontrol room operator to drive the encoder to the desired locatio t l
Further review revealed that no significa1t radiation exposure was received by personnel associated with the event. A measured 30 mrem to the extremities of one individual had resulte The inspector noted that the instructions utilized appeared inadequate for the performance of the activity. However, the precaution section of the work request required that the storage reel be locked if the detector was to be driven to the bottom of the storage location. This precaution was not complied with and therefore resulted in the incident describe This "
issue is identified as violation 327,328/88-44-02, for Failure to Follow Work Instructions / Precaution . Inspector Followup Items (92701) ;
IFIs are matters of concern to the inspector which are documented and
, tracked in inspection reports to allow further review and evaluation by i the inspector. The following IFIs have been reviewed and evaluated by the inspecto The inspector has either resolved the concern identified,
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determined that the licensee has performed adequately in the area, and/or determined that actions taken by the licensee have resolved the concern.
- (0 pen) IFI 327,328/83-14-01, Resolution of Items Identified During Review of the ECA During a review of emergency procedures and emergency contingency actions the inspector noted several minor items to be evaluated by the licensee for possible addition to their procedures, t
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These items were reviewed by the NRC Resident Inspectors and discussed with the original inspectors and were determined not to be restrictions on Unit I restart. The items do not affect the operability of safety related systems nor do they affect the health and safety of the publi Therefore, this item is considered resolved for Unit 1 restart, but will remain open for tracking until the next audit of the emergency contingency action This item remains ope (Closed) IFI 327.328/88-19-02, Long Term Corrective Action Certain issues reviewed and discussed in inspection report 327,328/88-19 required long term auditing to ensure that committments or planned actions were completed by the license I In IR 327,328/88-19 URI 327,328/87-54-02, Adequacy of Sequoyah Seismic Qualification Progrma, was reviewed and close The following items were left open to be reviewed under 88-19-02:
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CAQR SQN 871457, seismic issues. The inspector reviewed the following WRs to resolve this CAQ Tighten volt meter 6.9 KV shutdown Bd 1A-A Pn1 16 B231382 Install mounting screw on Agastat relay B281452 Secure bolting on 125V Vital battery Bd 1 Pn1 3
- B234582 Currently available for work B257857 Clean pulling compound in Pn1 21 of 6.9KV SDBD 1A-A
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B231181 Cancelled to B281454 - Completed
- B257858 Awaiting modifications work B257892 Repair damage on cable in 125 VOC vital Bat Bd II B231384 Cancelled to 3257857 - See above B297897 Drain valve needs cap removed l B285372 Repair broken wire on 480 V Rx MOV Bd 1A-1A B257893 Cancelled - Licensee determined that the cables were adequate in the as-constructed condition B231385 Cancelled to B285303 - Cancelled 8231386 Tighten terminal block on 480 V shutdown Bd 2A-1A 3 B285373 Cancelled - Licensee determined that "as-is" I installation was adequate l B131151 Cancelled to 8240087 - Backup NIS source range
- B226340 In planning with engineering
- B247913 Available for work B285374 Cancelled - Licensee determined bracket was adequate as is B285303 Cancelled-Licensee determined that the component to be removed under this WR was not needed.
- *These WRs have not yet been completed.
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- Development of a procedure was in progress to address the requirements for maintaining seismic qualification of electrical components. Its issuance is being tracked under CAQR SQN 87145 Preparation of preventative maintenance . ,structions to address the inspection of seismically qualifies alectrical components are in progress and tracked for issuance on CAQR SQN 87145 Preparation of a briefing lesson plan was being developed to enhance the level of awareness of appropriate personnel on the proper instaliation and/or reinstallation of mounting hardware ;
to main ain seismic qualification. The licensee has
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incorporsted a video program for maintaining seismic This has
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qualifications into the employee training progra "
become req' ired training for all instrument, electrical and mechanical m'intenance personne Implementation of the licensee's corrective actions relative to CAQR SQN 871457 will be tracked as IFI 327,328/88-44-03. Specifically the following should be reviewed and inspected for closure of this !
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Issuance of a procedure for maintaining seismic qualificutions of electrical component Development of PMs for inspection of seismically qualified electrical component Closure of WR's B234582, B257858, B226340 and B24791 ,
IFI 327,328/88-19-02 is closed and IFI 327,327/88-44-03, example 1, will be opened to track the closure of the above three issues. This IFI is not required to be closed prior to restart of Unit ;
This item is close : In LERs 328/86-05, 328/86-11, 328/87-08 (Revision 1), 328/87-09 and !
328/87-10, the licensee committed to select a CVI Task Force to investigate five containment ventilation isolation events which '
occurred within the period from November 27, through December 21, 198/. The following recommendations were made by the task force in their final report:
5. Implement seal-in contacts in the radiation monitor iodine and particulate low flow alarm circuit I
! 5. Eliminate the local buzzer from the radiation '
monitors.
5. Secure the grounding cable to the radiation monitor side panel skid frame, i
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5. Change applicable drawings to show the reed switc All of the section 5.1 items were completed by the licensee by March 18, 1988 under WPs 7344-01, 7344-02, 7343-01 and 7343-02. A partial walkdown of the ccepleted work was performed by the inspector.
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5. Determine if an iodine prefilter less susceptible to clogging can be use '
The licensee determined that no filter change out was require . Continue to change out filters daily during startu ,
The licensee continues to change out. filters on a daily basis for Unit ;
5. Determine filter change out frequency during power operations by visual inspection of filters or by trending iodine flow rate Tne licensee performed this task. Unit 2 filters exhibit !
no problems. The Unit 1 filters are still getting dirty l from outage activit ; 5. Visually inspect and record condition of iodine prefilter
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on TI-16 form 'Worksheet TI-16.1C: Monitor / Analyzer Sampling' following any CV This has been implemented and is being done following a CVI.
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5. Operations should be informed whenever a heliarc (TIG)
welder is oowered up. Operations should then observe the RP-30 recorders on Centrol Room panel 0-M-12 for EMI spikes to determine whether monitors should be blocked.
j Operations is already being notified via welding permits which must go through the 505. The 50$ is then required to l
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log the welding permit number, starting time of TIG welding
, and effect on radiation monitors and NIS source range
! instrumentatio The craft foreman is responsible for notifying the SOS just prior to begirning actual welding.
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5. Check of power supply voltage for control room I annunciators should be incorporated into the Preventative l Maintenance Progra l This ite'n is being tracked under CAQR SQP-880064. The date j of anticipated completion is November 1, 198 The i
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specific item is documented and tracked in the licensee's TROI as NCO-88-0064-006 and NCO-88-0064-00 . Determine reason for intermittent annunciator operation and resolv . Improve the ground connections between the detectors and i skid fram These improvements include rerouting, shielding the cables in conduit, and terminating the cables more securel . DNE to determine if 2.5 second delay time has been justifie It may be possible to extend the delay tim . DNE has reported that the lower limit of detectable energy of the monitor is 200 ke NE to report on the t feasibility and effectiveness of increasing the !
discriminator level to reduce EMI-related CVI . DNE to report results of 'EMI Hardware of Radiation Monitors' to Sequoyah systems engineerin Section 5.4 items are scheduled for completion by DNE on October 1,
- 198 The specific item is documented and tracked in the licensee's
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TROI as SQP-88-0036 SEQ 1 The inspector reviewed the items and determined that TVA had performed an extensive review of the CVI events and that the recommended corrective actions appeared adequat Furthermore, all items that should be required for Unit 1 and 2 restart were complet The additional rc .ommendations of the task force were being tracked for completion by the licensee's CCTS syste '
This item is close CAQR Program The inspector reviewed and approved the CAQR program in IR
. 327,328/88-19. Long term performance of the program needed to be
reviewed. This program has now been superseded and will be further j referred to as the Old Progra In inspection report 327,328/88-29 the inspector reviewed the
- implementation of the Old Program and determined that it was adequately implemented and that no violations or deviations were idrntified with the Old Progra.n. The report continued to state that
- the implementation of the current program needed to De inspected following its implementation. An inspection of the CAQR process is
provided for on a routine basis by inspection module 40702, Audit Program, in the NRC Inspection Manual. In addition, a quality verification inspection is scheduled for the wi..ter of 1988.
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r Review of VIO 327,328/87-52-01, example B was completed in IR 88-19 with one item remaining open. Unit 1 cables are to be addressed by the long term cable management progra This item was tracked by the licensee's CCTS program as NCO-87-0324-035. C'osure of this issue s'1 require verification and inspection of closure of NCO 87-0324-035 and will be tracked in the future as a separate item designated as IFI S27,328/88-44-93, example ,
2, which is not required to be closed prior to restar^. of Unit ;
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This item is closed, t
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- URI 327,328/87-30-03, Reactor Coolant System Sight Glass Design, was ,
reviewed and closed in IR 327,328/a7-65. IR 327,328/88-19 determined that further review was required because the monitoring arrangement using a TV camera and monitor was not well designed to allow the control room operator to readily deter,aine the level in the sight ,
glas i During the most recent drain down of both Unit 2 and Unit 1 the licensee installed a TACF to utilize an existing pressure instrument ,
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to monitor RCS level on the control panel. This event is the subject of LER 327/87-12, Loss of Shutdown Decay Heat Removal Resulting From False Indications of RCS Level in Sightglass, which was reviewed and found to be acceptable for Unit I restart. The LER itself was left open to track long term non-restart related corrective action t This item is close LER 327/87-044 committed to implement certain actions te protect l l Plant electrical equipment from flooding caused by a moderate energy '
line brea The deficiencies associated with these actions were considered to have a low potential to impact the capability to safely shut the plant down. Therefore, these items were determined to be
- post-restar This position was reviewed and approved by the NRC ,
staff in IR 327,328/87-71 and IR 327,328/88-1 '
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The inspector determined that the two items were added to the licensee's CCTS as items NC0-87-0260-001 and NCO-87-0260-002 l l This item is close , LER 328/88-06 committed to the completion of work on certain human l
engineering deficiencie These items were identified during a l review of NUREG-0737, item 1.0.1. This review and the time f rames
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for corrective actions were reviewed and approved by the NRC/NRR i staff in an SER dated August 27, 1987 on the Detailed Control Room i Design Review. The following CCTS items have been initiated to !
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track these deficiencie NCO 86-0410-007 (LER 328/88-06)
NCO-86-0410-008 (LER 328/88-06)
NCO-86-0410-009 (LER 328/88-06)
NCO-86-0410-312 (LER 328/88-06)
NC0-86-0410-638 (LER 328/88-06)
NC0-86-0410-639 (LER 328/88-06)
NCO-86-0410-640 (LER 328/88-06)
NC0-86-0410-070 (LER 328/88-06)
NCO-86-0410-202 (LER 328/88-06)
NC0-86-0410-408 (LER 328/88-06)
NCO-86-0410-530 (LER 328/88-06)
The following items were closed by the licensee and indicated as complete in the CCTS. A survey of these items was completed and the inspector found no discrepancie Therefore, these items are considered closed:
NCO-86-0416-001 (LER 327/86-47)
NC0-86-0421-001 (LER 327/86-48)
NC0-87-0183-001 (LER 327/87-25)
NCO-87-0183-003 (LER 327/87-25) .
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NC0-87-0254-001 (LER 327/87-34)
NC0-87-0259-005 (LER 327/87-40) l NCO-87-0283-001 (LER 327/87-49) l NCO-87-0370-001 (LER 327/87-71) t NC0-87-0354-003 (LER 327/87-73)
NCO-87-0364-003 (LER 327/87-77)
NCO-88-0014-003 (LER 327/88-01)
NC0-88-0014-004 (LER 327/88-01) '
NCO-88-0014-005 (LER 327/88-01)
NCO-88-0014-006 (LER 327/88-01)
NCO-88-0028-001 (LER 328/88-01)
NC0-88-0017-001 (LER 327/88-02)
NCO-86 0410-310 (LER 328/88-06)
NCO-86-0410-311 (LER 328/88-06)
The following items are still considered open by the licensee and will remain open until the final review process is complete, testing ,
is complete, or a procedure update is complete. These items are :
i required by the licensee to be closed prior to restart of Unit 1.
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The inspector reviewed the status of these items and determined that appropriate progress towards completion of these items is being mad The inspector also verified that the items were being tracked by the licensee for closure prior to the restart of Unit These items are considered closed for NRC record purpose NCO-87-0254-003 (LER 327/87-34)
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NCO-88-0034-002 (LER 327/87-34)
NCO-87-0259-004 (LER 327/87-40)
NCO-87-0257-001 (LER 327/87-47)
NCO-87-0J64-001 (LER 327/87-77)
NCO-87-0364-005 (LER 327/87-77)
NCO-87-0364-007 (LER 327/87-77) ,
The inspector reviewed item NCO-88-0017-002, A Technical Specifica-tion Change Will be Submitted to Reflect that a Minimum of One Radiation Monitor Channel for Each ERCW Ef fluent Discharge Header is Required. The NRC staff will review this item further when the TS change is submitted by the licensee prior to issuance of the TS amendmen The inspector verified that preparation and issuance of the submittal was being tracked by the licensee on the CCT The inspector reviewed item NCO-88-0259-006, Shield Building Seals -
, A Design Criteria Will be Written for Penetration Seal Requirement This item does not affect system operability. The inspector verified that the licensee is tracking closure of the corrective actions on the CCT This item is considered closed for NRC record purpose All items associated with 88-19-02 are closed or tracked by alternate items as stated in the above paragraphs. Therefore, IFI 327,328/88-19-02 is close . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)
(0 pen) VIO 327,328/88-36-01, Failure to Test Containment Spray Inboard Containment Isolation Check Valves per Appendix J Requirement On July 8,1988 the inspector noted that the containment spray isolation check valves inside containment were not tested per Appendix J requirements. The licensee requested an exemption from the Appendix J requirements and 1 rom July 8, 1988 until July 11, 1988, continued to operate Unit 2 based on a justification for continued operation. On July 11, 1988 the NRC staff issued an exemption f rom the testing requirements of Appendix J based on the fact that there is a water seal on the outboard containment isolation valves and the system is a qualified closed syste On August 8, 1988 the licensee withdrew their initial exemption request i and issued a letter r0 guesting exemption for beth units with slightly different justifications and a lack of any additional testin On
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September 22, 1988 the staff issued the requested exemptions for Units 1 and This issue will remain open until a formal written response is rJceived from the licensee, however, this item is considered to be adequately resolved for the restart of Unit (Closed) VIO 327,328/87-71-01, Failure to Implement Adequate Design l Control, i
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The licensee was cited for failure to control the design process, in that, ,
design engineers f ailed to follow the requirements of design criteria SQN-DC-V-2.15. This criteria requires, i n part, that all test vents, drains and test connections shall, as a minimum, include one manual valve and a capped, threaded nipple. The cesign standard was not implemented on test connection lines for instruments PS-30-469, PS-30-478 and PS-30-48 The inspector reviewed the corrective actions as delineated in a February 27, 1988 letter from TVA to NRC. The licensee instructed, by memorandum, t all DNE/EEB employees to ensure inclusion of the required caps on design drawings. Additionally, these personnel were instructed to review design output documents when their associated design criteria are revised. All personnel were instructed by April 22, 198 The inspector verified field installation of WP 00027-01. The current as constructed system provides a locked closed isolation valve and a cap on the drain lines for these instrument This configuration meets the design criteri This item is close (Closed) VIO 327,328/88-06-03, Failure to Control Maintenance and Modification Activities That Allowed storage of Loose Conductive Material
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Within Safety Related Electrical Panel During a review of the EDG availability checklists the inspector noted ;
large amounts of conductive materials in the electrical panels. A further l review identified that the problem extended to other electrical panels as l well. The inspector's concern about conductive material within seismic l
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electrical boards was brought to the attention of licensee managen.en Because of the large amounts of material found and documented in inspection report 327,328/88-06, the licensee was cited for failure to ;
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control activities that affect qualit An information letter was sent to all operations personnel informing them not to store fuses inside seismic cabinet An inspection of all IE electrical panels was completed by the licensee on January 16, 1988, and all loose materiais were removed. The importance of strictly maintaining housekeeping requirements was also stressed to Maintenance and <
Modifications employees by managemen ;
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The inspector verified that all items identified in inspection report !
327,328/88-06 were removed and/or corrected. Additionally, a field walkdown of a selection of 480 V and 6.9 KV shutdown boards, MOV boards, EDG boards, logic panels and C&A boards was performed. The boards were :
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found to be free of conductive materials with one minor exception which
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was promptly corrected.
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(Closed) VIO 327,328/88-17-01, Use of Procedures for Maintaining Maintenance Activitie '
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions taken to correct and
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prevent re-occurrence, of the subject violatio It was determined that
- the actions taken were acceptable. However, the commitment for additional operator training in the area of TS had not been completed prior to this review but had been included as an open item on the CCTS, control number NC0880077003, and requires completion prior to Unit i restart.
i This item is closed, i (Closed) VIO 327,328/87-73-05, Failure to Perform Adequate Written Safety Evaluations for Modifications Involving Compensatory Actiont 'or Defeated Safety Function The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions to correct the situation and prevent re-occurrence and determined th6t the corrective measures are now l acceptable. In addition, previous reports addressing this issue were
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reviewe This item is closed.
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(Closed) VIO 327,328/88-26-01, Failure to Implement Procedures Associated with Configuration Contro The inspector reviewed the licensee's response and corrective actions and found them acceptable. This area was reviewed in detail as part of the Unit 2 restart effort and implementation of the configuration control
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program will be reviewed as part of the normal NRC shift inspection effort during Unit I restar This item is close (Closed) VIO 327,328/87-30-01, Loss of Control Over Plant Activitie This violation concerned multiple examples, identified in Inspection Report 327,328/87-30, of inadequate procedure implementation which caused
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concern for the licensee's ability to control operational activities,
) particularly in the area of system and equipment status and testin The licensee's response to this violation and the corrective actions implemented were reviewed in !R 327,328/8o 19 and were found adequate and acceptable. The item was lef t open, however, pending formal receipt and
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acceptance by the NRC of the licensee's official respons TVA's submittal concerning this item, dated April 20, 1988, was responded to by
. NRC letter dated May 10, 198 The inspector reviewed the corrective
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actions taken and found them acceptable.
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(Closed) URI 327,328/87-46-01, Justification for NDE of Component Cooling ,
Water System Shell Window Weld <
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The summary of the non-destructive examination justification proviiied by i
TVA in Memorandum L29-871001-966, G. Pit:l/R. Briggs, dated Octooer 1 ,
1987, was reviewed and discussed with TVA personne ~
Based on NRC inspector review comments, the TVA justification was revised to add
, additional information and clarificatio The revised justification was reviewed and discussed with TVA personne Licensee action on this item is adequat This item is close (Closed) URI 327,328/87-73-04, Minimum Operating Staffing Required for Compensatory Measure l
, This issue involved the minimum number of licensed personnel on shif t necessary to support two unit operatio During the operational readiness inspection IR 327,328/87-73 prior to i Unit 2 startup the NRC identified that TVA did not have adequate controls to manage the manual operator actions necessary to compensate for equip-
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ment or design problems. These operator actions were above and beyond
} those already established in the plant's emergency and abnormal operating procedure The NRC referred to those operator actions as compensatory measure TVA was requested to evaluate, using 10 CFR 50.59, the extent and impact of the compensatory measures during postulated accident conditions,
During the TVA evaluation it was identified that the minimum TS staf fing
. level may be insufficient for two unit operation for a main steam line
- break or LOCA with a loss of off-site power accident. Specifically, the '
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TS5 allow the minimum licensee shif t crew for two unit operation to be t comprised of 3 UOs,1 SOS and 1 ASO The 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation :
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determined that with the normal accident activities combined with the compensatory measures, an additional SRO would be needed to assist the lone UO on the non-accident unit that would have tripped due to a loss of off-site power.
] In the cover letter that transmitted IR 327,328/87-73 the NRC requested
! TVA to address this issue. In their supplemental response dated August ;
17, 1985 TVA concluded tnrough a subsequent 10 CFR 50.59 safety
- evaluation that the TS minimum crew was adequate due to the reduction of I compensatory measures (35 down to 18) corbined with changes to emergency
procedure E.1 and recent operator training at the simulato The inspector requested that TVA demonstrate that a single operator could ,
1 respond to a reactor trio due to a loss of off-site power and on I september 15, 1988, the inspector witnessed at the Sequoyah simulator that '
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utilizing the emergency operating procedures, the operator could safely maintain the plant in a post trip hot standby, natural circulation condi-i tion.
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e The inspector confirmed that a reduction of the required compensatory 1 measures, combined with the changes to emergency procedure E.1 had been accomplishe i This item is close (0 pen) URI 327,328/87-76-03, Fifth Vital Battery and Battery Room '
Deficiencie ; The safety system outage modification inspection (SSOMI) report 327,328/86-68 and Inspection Reports 327,328/87-40, and 327,328/87-76 identified several deficiencies associated with the fif th vital battery installation. Pending correction and NRC review of corrective actior., TVA has placed a caution order on the battery to prevent its use in satisfy d a; Technical Specification requirements for operatio The caution order '
does not prevent using the battery for emergencies. This unresolved item is being opened to track all fifth vital battery concerns that require resolution prior to accepting the battery for safety related use as a power source to fulfill Technical Specification requirement Items requiring resolution are: Seismic qualification documentation for correction of gaps between the bottom of the battery racks and the cement pad previously identified by NRC report 327,328/86-68, deficiency 0-2.4-12.
i The examination of the fifth 125V Vital Battery Rack disclosed
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that portions of the rack had not been installed in accordance with applicable design details. Gaps of up to 1/2 inch were !
] identified between the poured foundation and rack structural '
j members. The gaps ran the entire length of the rack assembly
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and produced a cantilever of the front portion of the rac Consequently, the potential for damage to vital battery cells because of an increase in vertical acceleration, or for overstress of rack members because of excessive deflection
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during a seismic event may exis i 1 The inspector reviewed calculation SCG-4M-00232 which documented '
1 the seismic qualification of the battery racks. The calculation i
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racks, shims are recommended (as a minimum), to be used only at 1 the holddown bolt locations." The inspector observed that the '
shims had been installed by the licensee.
These calculations are being reviewed by the NR !
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This item is open.
3 Bend radius violations on battery intercell connectors previously
! identified by NRC report 327,328/86-68, deficiency 0-2.4-1 ! IR 327,328/S6-68, deficiency 0-2.4-14 states that, intercell ,
connection cables which link Vital Bat +.ery Cells 52 and 53 l l
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i exhibit a bend radius which is less than the six inch minimum radius required by site specifications.
This item references the inter-tier cable connections. 'The inter-cell connectors are solid 2" Bus Bars. The inter-tier connectors are cables with inter-tier connector plates supplied by the vendor for use in this configuration (drawing- 400197C I
contract 832101). The type of cable used was multistranded {'
flexible (welding) cabl This cable, as a vendor subcomponent to the battery bank, is not
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subject to TVA's G-specificatior for field cable bend radius ,
requirement ,
The inspector verified that dr& wing 400197C shows the battery in
] The inspector verified the seismically tested configuratio l that the vendor documentation proved seismic qualification of the vital batteries. Therefore, the design is adequate.
The acceptability of the multistrand cable bend radius is currently under NRC review.
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- IR 327.328/86-68, deficiency 0-2.4-13 states that, several
wiring separation deficiencies were identified inside the fifth
vital battery boar The Sequoyah FSAR requiremen'. for a
! minimum of six inch separation oetween panel wiring of different safety divisions was not maintained for cables B1695/1A891,
B1715/1AS96 B1695/1AS9 ;
The cited cables (IAS91,1A892, and 1A896), were identified as t
t not meeting safety division separation criteria. However, they
' are non-train annunciation cables. The orange tags identifying these cables as train A related were inadvertently placed on i these cables during installation. This provided the appearance of train A cables being in the proximity to train 8 cables.
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- Annunciation cables are requiraa to be divisionalized by train i and they are allowed to be routed with safety division cable l WR B-212026, which replaced the orange tags on the cited cables !
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with white tags to clearly note their contrain dependency, has i
been complete i '
- This item is close HVAC duct installation seismic qualification documentation previously identified by NRC report 327, 328/86-68, URI U-2.2-1, c t
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ECN 5599 and WP 11368 added i. eating, ventilation and air conditioning l
(HVAC) to the new fif th vital battery room. The NRC inspectors found l
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that the installation did not appear to be adequately supported and restrained for seismic' loading The HVAC equipment was suspended approximately four feet from the ceiling and was supported only by the duct flange mounting bolts, with no lateral or further axial restraint The licensee indic?.ted that this duct run had .been seismically analyzed and qualified, but could not locate the reports to verify thi This item is open, k d. Certification for battery rack anchor bolts and battery rack bolts previously identified by NRC report 327,328/86-68, deficiency 0-2.1-7, Sample 45-1, 45- '
The inspection team identified a large number of cases in which material traceability documentation 'in the form of purchase order specifications, receipt inspection records, certificates of conformance, certified mill test reports, seismic qualifications, environmental qualifications or installation records either never existed, were misplaced or could not be located in a timely manne . Inspection sample number 45-1 for battery rack fasteners in battery room #5 stated that, the majority of installed fasteners did not have vendor or grade markings as required by ASTM A307, and that insufficient thread protrusion existed on at least 2 joint ,
Quality Information Release (QlR) NEB 87066 was generated February 18, 1987, to evaluate and document the disposition of unmarked bolting at SQN. This QIR refers to two nonconformance reports (NCR) at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. An extensive testing program being conducted at that time was expanded to include SQN and vendor-supplied bolting. Additionally, a recent research projett conducted by Singleton Materials Engineering Laboratories compiled this data in a statistical manne The results of testing 645 unmarked bolts show that 98.9 percent of the bolts met the mechanical property requirements of ASTM A307, Grade A material. The probability of an unmarked bolt meeting i the mechanical property requirements of ASTM A307, Grade A was i P=0.9842 in this test. Therefore, unmarked bolting material 1 installed in the field at SQN is considered to meet ASTM A307 )
material properties and can be used as is in applications where l ASTM A307 is require i
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Bolting is required to be procured as basic components (i.e., QA Level I or II). One of the technical requirements is that all bolting be marked with required grade markings in accordance with the applicable specification. Additionally, this require-ment is included in the QC receipt inspection requirements as part of the dedication packages, These measures should ensure future violations are avoide s
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The irtoector did not find examples of insufficient thread protrusio These have apparently been replaced as there was evidence of new bolting installation This item is close i Inspection sample number 45-2 on anchor bolts for battery rack in battery room #5 stated that, material documentation could not be locate Unsuccessful attempts have been made to link the anchor bolts installed under the fif th vital battery racks with a purchase '
requisition and/or sample test dat TVA material requisitions have been microfilmed by sequential preprinted 575 numbers and are therefore not easily retrievable. Documentation in the form of signoff exists in WP 11188 indicating that installation procedures were complied with and that the installation was acceptabl However, since the appropriate documentation has not been located, SQN plans to verify that the existing anchor bolts meet or exceed the material requirements by metallurgical !
evaluation. This evaluation will be completed by September 1 198 ;
This item is open, Walkdown inspection observation in 5th battery room identified by IFI 327,328/87-40-03.
- Panel 1A1 has three conduits with 15 to 20 caoles entering the top of the panel . The cables are subjected to a rough cut openin There should be a grommet to protect the cable l
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insulatio f During the licensee's insoection of this item the licensee could ,
not identify the conduits discussed because Panel 1A1 does not l exis Licensee personnel inspected several panels in the l vicinity of the fifth vital battery room and did not locate any j rough cut opening They assumed that an (Irlier inspection program had corrected the noted deficiency. The inspector observed the backside of Panel 1 in the fifth vital battery room ,
I and noted that there were 3 conduits with approximately 15 to 20 ;
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cables running into the top of the pano These conduits had t
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grommets installed that were apparently new. The inspector assumed that this was the same panel which was referred to in
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the inspection report and that a typographical eercr had
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1 When entering the 480V board room 1B, there is a base plate l approximately 3" high that presents a safety hazard. The plate t is used to hold a handrai :
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. This base plate presently holds the handrails whicn are left in place when the equipment floor hatch is open or closed. It is ,
removed to allow large carts access through the floor or vent !
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more equipment through the hatch. With the rails up this is not i'
a safety ha:ard.
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This item is close < A drip pan in the same room was held in place by bailing wire '
that was supported inadequatel The main concern is that the :
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pan can fall and damage safety-related devices on electrical ;
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equipmen '
The 480V board room 1B was inspected thoroughly by the licensee as well as the inspector and no drip pan was foun It apparently had aircady been remove i l This item is close !
! Cable was not properly supported behind the 6.9 KV switchgea l The cable is partially run in a non-safety-related tray, then in !
a safety-related tray, and then back in the non-safety-related tra During these transitions the cable lacks any suppor This cable routing is considered an example of poor qualit .
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The cable trays in the 6.9KV shutdown board rooms were !
inspecte A pair of cables were found coming out of the
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auxiliary control room in a train A cable tray at a point where :'
the tray turned and went down the length of the 2A-A 6.9KV shutdown board. They were routed beside the train A cable tray i tid- A . They were anchored with tie-wraps to the cable tray
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supports of tid-A, occasionally anchoring to the supports of I i cable tray GR- WRB261684 was initiated to place the cable in the proper cable tray tid- A . Another small cable run was :
, exarrined closely in the lowest tray over the east end of the l
2B-B shutdown boa It clearly ran in the tray and so was 1 I
dismisse '
1 The inspector had no further questions, q The same occurrence of unsupported cable was also observed for
) tray "NF-A".
! Cable tray NF-A starts near the ceiling of elevation 690 at
] coordinates A15 & R. It runs along the A15 line, turns north on the Q line, then turns up and. climbs to the ceiling elevation
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714, and levels out. It then turns east along the A14 line and
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ends at the A15 lin The cable tray continues on both ends under different names. This cable tray was inspected and found to be only a fraction filled with no cables entering or leaving the tray improperl The original inspector may have been in error on the cable tray I.0. or the licensee may have corrected the item under a different program. The general inspection of the shutdown board area performed by the licensee should ade-quately address this commen This item is close ' Cables routed in cable trays have, in most cases, been treatad with fire retardant. In one case, a safety related tray "PEA", ,
had a roll of bathroom tissue lying on the fire retardant. This was considered an example of poor housekeeping and a fire safety concer '
The cable tray PE-A was inspected to ensure that the clean-up in the shutdown board area performed by the licensee for l' nit 2 start-up had adequately removed any debris from this cable tray and it had.
The NRC Resident Inspectors perform housekeeping inspections on a routine basis during plant operations and have not noted any
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l major recent discrepancies.
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This item is close i URI 327, 328/87-76-03 remains open pending resolution of the remaining j
. unresolved issues described above.
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8. Review of Resolution of TVA Commitments made Ouring the Exit Meeting for ,
the Unit 1 SSO '
(Closed) Commitment to Perform a Multiple Point Test of CS Pump Flo This item was reviewed by the inspector and is documented in inspection
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report 327,328/83-3 This item is close (Closed) Commitment to Test the ESF Pump and Valve Logic ($!-68) Prior to
, Plant Startu This item was reviewed by the inspector and is documented in inspection i report 327,328/8S-3 Additionally, the GOI used for plant startup requires performance of 51-65 as a prerequisite to startu This item is closed.
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(Closed) Commitment to Support the NRC's Review of TS Change Regarding Pump Delta Pressure Requirement i Although the NRC did not consider this item a restart issue it was completed and the TS change was approved as amendment No. 80 for Unit t
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This item is close (Closed) Commitment to Determine Correct CS Heat Exchanger Delta Pressure Value l
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This isrue addressed the fact that the restart test functional matrix for
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CS heat exchanger differential pressure specified the manufacturer's value *
I of 10 PSID where recent system flow analysis calculations required the actual value to be maintained at 6 PSIO. The inspector wcs provided with revised values for function 72-003 and 72-018 which verified that the i correct value of 6 PSID was evaluate I Additionally, the inspector reviewed the Sequoyah design criteria document 50N-DC-V-275, containment spray design criteria and verified that it did L
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not contain the wrong heat-exchanger differential pressure value. The document did not specify any value although it did reference the flow ;
calculation which used a maximum DP of 6 PSIO. The inspector was i
- satisfied with the licensee's action to correct the restart test matri t Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 5, 1938, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The Senior Residents described l
, the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed f l below. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not ;
j identify as proprietary any of the material reviewed by the inspectors [
during the inspectio l Inspection Findings:
l One violation was identified in paragraph 5, 327,328/83-44-0 [
One Unresolved item was identified in paragraph 2c, 327,328/88-44-0 One inspector follow-up item was identified in paragraph 6a and 6d, !
327,328/85-44-0 l During the reporting period, frequent discussions were held with the Site ,
Director Plant Manager and other managers concerning inspection finding l
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1 List of Abbreviations AB3TS- Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System I ABSCE- Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure !
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Auxiliary Feedwater AI -
Administrative Instruction A01 -
Abnormal Operating Instruction AVO -
Auxiliary Unit Operator A505 - Assistant Shift Operating Supervisor BIT -
Boron Injection Tank C&A -
Control and Auxiliary Buildings CAQR - Conditions Adverse to Quality Report
- CCP - Centrifugal Charging Pump
CCTS - Cerporate Commitment Tracking System i
COPS - Cold Overpressure Protection System
! CSSC - Critical Structures, Systems and Components i CVI -
Containment Ventilation Isolation DBA - Design Basis Accident j OC -
Direct Current j OCN -
Design Ch*nge Notice
. DNE -
Division of Nuclear Engineering i ECCS - Emergency Core Cooling System EDG -
Emergency Diesel Generator I EI -
Emergency Instructions !
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Emergency Notification System l ESF -
Engineered Safety Feature ;
4 FCV -
Flow Control Valve '
i FSAR - Final Safety Analysis Report GDC -
General Design Criteria i GL -
Generic Letter :
HIC -
Hand-operated Indicating Controller l Hold Order
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HP -
Health Physics i
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IN -
NRC Information Notice IFI -
Inspector Followup Item
) IM -
Instrument Maintenance !
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Instrument Mainteaance Instruction IR -
Inspection Report i KVA - Kilciolt-Amp !
KW -
Kilowatt I q
KV -
Kilovolt [
j LER - Licensee Event Report l 1 LCO -
Limiting Condition for Operation !
l LOCA - Loss of Coolant Accident j j MI -
Maintenance Instruction ,
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J NB -
NRC Bulletin j NOV -
Notice of Violation !
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission l OSLA - Operations Section Letter - Administrative !
l OSLT - Operations Section Letter - Training OSP - Office of Special Projects
! PMT -
Post Modification Test PORC - Plant Operations Review Committee :
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PORS - Plant Operation Review Staff '
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PRO -
Potentially Reportable Occurrence r Quality Assurance
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Quality Control i RCS -
Regulatory Guide RM -
Radiation Monitor RHR -
Radiation Work Permit :
RWST - Reactor Water Storage Tank i SER -
Safety Evaluation Report SG -
Surveillance Instruction 501 -
System Operating Instructions .
505 -
Shift Operating Supervisor j SQM -
Sequoyah Standard Practice Maintenance '
SR -
Surveillance Requirements -
SRO -
Senior Reactor Operator
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Special Test Instruction TACF - Temporary Alteration Control Room .
TROI - Tracking Open Items i TS -
Technical Specifications !
TVA -
Tennessee Valley Autbarity r UO -
Unit Operator URI -
Unresolved Ites ,
Unreviewed Safety Question Determination
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USQD -
VIO - Violatie ,
WCG - Work Control Group !
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We 'c A Plan WR -
Work Request
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