IR 05000327/1988039

Insp Repts 50-327/88-39 & 50-328/88-39 on 880806-0912.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Including Operations Performance,Sys Lineups, Radiation Protection & Safeguards & Housekeeping Insps

ML20205K864
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	10/18/1988
From:	Harmon P, Linda Watson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205K723	List: IR 05000327/1988039 ML20205K719 ML20205K853
References
50-327-88-39, 50-328-88-39, NUDOCS 8811010376
Download: ML20205K864 (24)

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, 984*g O

k UNITED STATES i

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• .)* NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION  !

o REGION 11 ,

%'e,,,, j#, %1 MARieTTA ST., ATLANTA. OeORGiA 30323 I

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i Report Nos.: 50-327/88-39, 50-328/88-39  !

t Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority  ;

6N 3SA Lookout Place t Chattanooga, TN 37402-2901 Docket Nos.: 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.: DPR-77 and OPR-79 l

Facility Name: Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 ,

i Inspection Conducted: August 6 - September 12, 19ES ,

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Inspector: N ,3 g esident Inspector g /c jg})g

• at( Si ped

. . Harmon, Senfo -

I Resident Inspectors l

l i D. P. Loveless >

W. K. Poertner  !

j P. G. Hunpbrey {

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Approved by:

L. J.vdatson, ChTe f

/4 /8gned Da e JL j

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TVA Projects Section 1 i TVA Projects Division  !

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SUFF.ARY l 1 I

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Secpe: This routine, announced inspection involved inspection onsite by the t Resident Inspectors in the areas of operational safety verification [

?- including operations perrormance, system Itneups, radiation  !

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protection, safeguards and housekeeping inspections: ratetenance f M observations; surveillance testing observations; review of previous (

,, inspection findings; followup of events; review of licensee [

identified itens; and review of IFi j Results: Three violations were identifie f I Paragraph 7. - Failure to Follow Procedures, Two example l (327,323/85-39-01) l

! l l Paragraph 7. - Failure to Meet Require ents of TS 3.3.1 and 3. l l (327,32S/88-39-02) r l

l Paragraph 7. - Inadequate Work Pla ,

l (327,328/88-39-03) e i i No deviations, unresolved items or IFIs were identified.

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8311010376 881020 PDR ADOCK 05000327 O FDL '; i i i

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2 l Closures:

(Closed) LER 327/87043, Control Room Isolatio !

(Closed) LER 327/87070, revision 1, Diesel Generator Voltage Low When Output Bresker Closes Because of a Component Defect Found During 7 Surveillance Testing and Design Deficiency Outside of Plant's Design l Basi i

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(0 pen) LER 327/88007, Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment !

Enclosure Envelope. Closed for restar l (Closed) LER 327/8S020, Cold Over Pressure Protection Syste [

(Closed) LER 327/SS018, Incomplete Posting of Signs Frohibiting the Use of Portable Radies Resulted in Radio Transmission Interference {

and Subsequent Generation of a Reactor Trip Signa [

(Clos (d) LER 327/88019, revision 1 Reactor Trip Signals Generated [

from Electromagnetic Interference Caused by Welding Machine Operated !

at High Frequency Near Source Range Nuclear Instru.aent Cablin (Closed) LER 327/88022, Reactor Trip Signal Generated from i

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Electromagnetic Interference Caused by Welding Machine Operated at High Frequency Near Source Range Nuclear Instrument Cablin f (Closed) LER 328/58010. "A" Centrifugal Charging Pump Placed in the Pull-to-Lock Position While the Second Pump was Inoperable, j (Closed) LER 328/88003, revision 1, Ice Butidup in the Flow Passages I of the Ice Condense i

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(Closed) LER 328/S4019, Inadequate Work Control Caused Two Emergency l Core Cooling System Pum;s to be Inoperabl !

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(Closed) LER 328/89020, Isolation V Ive LLC.T Failur (

(Closed) LER 32S/88021, incomplete Testing of Unit 2 Containment I Penetration Overcurrent Protective Devices, t (Closed) 1.CR 328/SS022 Unquaitfled Butt Splic (Closed) LER 323/SS023, revision 1, Reactor Trip on Steam /feedflow Mismatch Coincident With Lew Stea? Generator Level Due to Plugged Sight Glas (Closed) LER 328/85026, revision 1, Inadequate Configuration Control Caused Two Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Paths to be Inoperable Resulting in honcompliance With TS 3.7. (Closed) LER 32S/S5027, Reactor Trip Resulting R c- SteaWeed ater Flow Mismatch Coincident With low Steam Generator Level Caused by a Missing Diod . - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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(Closed) LER 328/88006, Main Steam Isolation and Reacter Trip Due to Maintenance Activitie, and Inherent Instrument Response During Steam Plant Heatu (Closed) TI 2500/19, Reactor Vessel Pressure Transient for Pressurized Water Reactor (Closed) P21-86-01, Atwood and Morrill Main Steam Isolation Valves Spring Failure Caused by Quench Crack (Closed) IFI 327/85-17-06, 328/85-17-05, Feedwater System Valve (Closed) IFI 327,328/87-76-05, Cable Routin (Closed) URI 327,328/88-17-02, Inadvertent LCO entr (Closed) URI 327,328/87-52-03, Inadequate ERCW Drawin (Closed) VIO 327,328/87-78-01, Operator Overtim (Closed) VIO 327,328/88 ',9-01, Polar Crane Wall Penetration Seal (Closed) VIO 327,328/88-?0-03, Failure to Comply With TS LC (Closed) VIO 327,328/88-20-04, Failure to Ensure Timely Notification to the NRC of a loss of Safety Functions, (Closed) VIO 327,328/87-60-J2, Failure to Meet 50.59 on AFW Modificatio .. . _ _ _

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REPORT DETAILS

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees [

J. La Point, Site Director J. Anthony Operations Group Supervisor R. Beecken, Maintenance Superintendent i

'J. Bynum, Vice President, Nuclear Power Production

• M. Cooper, Compliance Liciosing Manager D. Craven, Plant Support Superintendent  ;

• H. Elkins, Instrument Maintenance Group Manager  :

R. Fortenberry, Technical Support Supervisor  !

J. Hami1*.on, Quality Engineering Manager l L. Martin, Site Quality Manager i R. Olson, Modifications Manager  :

'J. Patrick, Operations Group Manager  !

R. Pierce, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor  !

M. Sullivan, Radiological Controls Superintendent i,

• M. Ray, Site Licensing Staff Manager R. Rogers, Plant Reporting Section  !

8. Schofield, Lic7nsing Engineer r

• S. Smith, Plant Manager t S. Spencer, Licensing Engineer i C. Whittemore, Licensing Engineer r NRC Employees .,

• Attended exit interview [

t NOTE: Acronyms and initialisms used in this report are l'sted in the last l paragrap [

l Operationai Safety Verification (71707) {

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' Plant Tours The inspectors observed control room operations; reviewed applicable !

! logs including the shif t logs, night order book, closeance hold order }

j book, configuration log and TACF logi conducted discuss' ens with j 1 cot. trol room operators; verified that proper control roos, staf fing l l was mair.tained; observed shift turnovers; and confireed operability -

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of instrumentation. The inspectors verified the operability of l selected emergency systems, and verified compliance with TS LCOs.

l The inspectors verified that maintanance work orders had been sub-itted as required and that followup activities and prioritization l

l of work was accomplished by the license _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ ___

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. Tours of the diesel generator, auxiliary, control, and turbine

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buildings, and containment were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and plant housekeeping / cleanliness condition The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following safety-related systems on Unit 1 and Unit 2 to verify operability and i proper v!1ve alignment:

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Auxiliary Feedwater System (Unit 2)

Component Cooling Sysyem (Unit 2)

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No violations or deviations were identified, b. Safeguards inspection j In the course of the monthly activities, the inspectors included a j review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance i

of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct 4 of daily activities including: protected and vital area access

! controls; searching of personnel and packages; escorting of visitors;

> and badge issuance and retrieval; patrols and compensatory posts.

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In addition, the inspectors observed protected area 11ghting, protected and vital area barrier integrity. The inspectors verified l interfaces between the security organization and both operations and i eaintenanc Specifically, the Resident Inspectors:

l l (1) interviewed individuals with security concerns (2) inspected security during outages 1 (3) reviewed licensee security event reports

', (4) visited centrgi or secondary alarm station (5) verified onsite/offsite com unicatien capabilities

No violations or deviations were identified, i

c. Radiation Protectier.

! The inspectors cbserved HP practices and verified the implementation of radiation protect, ton centrol On a regular - is, Eps were reviewed and specific work activit,ies were nor .rm to ensure the activities were being conductes in accordanc- . ' te applicable RWP Selected radiation protection instr .re verified eperable and calibration frequencies were reviewee (1) Special Report SP12 was reviewed by tFe inspector. This report provided details of t,he licensee's noncompliance with the technical specifica+4 e *+;irement to treat radiosctine liquid affluaa** ,..., so ciscr.arge into the Tenr.essee Rive On June 8, 1953, the licensee's chemistry personnel determired that the projected dase due fo liquic effluent, releases for tre conth

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of June- would exceed the 0.12 milltrem limit specified by LCO '

3.11.1.3. The action required the preparattun and submittal of the Special Report. The projecte.1 dose was above the limit due .

to a combination of low river flow caused by the current drought L conditions and higher than normal activity releases from the previous month. Thr. projected dose is computed using the average of the previous two months in combination with 1/5 of the current actual river flow for the dilution facto L Although well within the allowable limits of T.S. 3.11.1.1 and 3.11.1.2 isotopic concentration and dose limits for the previous month, ' sher th:n normal releases were experienced during Ma !

This t.sulted from equipment tralfunctions in the condensate demineralizer waste evaporator (CCWE) system when evaporator bottoms were spilled to the CDWE building floor. The cause of this spill has been attributed to beating the evaporator bottoms j too rapidly during startup of the uni The actual dose attributable to the release of liquid efflusnts for the month of June was within T.S. limit (2) The inspector observed the distribution of Potassium Iodice (KI) t tablets, "Thyro-Block tn to the public as required by the

, i Radiological Emergency Plan for the pit t. ONP-REP section 1 i states that, "TVA recomends protective actions to these l agencies in accor:iance with figure 10-1 and existent conditions, o but the , ate and local governments are respo.sible for deciding I if any actions are needed and what they should be. Potential I recomendations for dose reduction for the public are: ...

tJse of Petarsium Iodide (KI). (TVA has K! av.11able for public l utili:stion at state direction, according to specific agteements i with the various States.)" l t

The tablets were easy to obtain; instructions were adeawate, and

, the distribution was properly documented for future referenc l

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The AI is to be utili:ed during a radiological emerge 'cy tra; ;

causes the release of excessive amounts of scioactive iodine i The KI will saturate the thyroid of the individual and reduce or :

eliminate the uptake of radioactive lodine (

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l No violations or deviations cere identified.

l 3. Engineered Safety Features WalAdown (71710)  :

l The inspector verified operability of the Interr'ediate Head Safety j Injection System on Unit 1 by cc pleting a walkd:wn of greater than M*, c,f a the system. Tne smte~ was verified to be in accorcan:e with the process {

flow diagram as it, cated on TVA .irawing 1,2-47WS11-1, Revisien- j No violations or deviations were identifie !

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4. Monthly Surveillance Observations (61726)

Licensee activities were directly observed to ascertain that survaillance of safety-related systems and components was being conducted in accordance with TS requirement <

The inspectors verified that: testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; LCOs were met; test results met acceptance criteria requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; deficiencies were identified, as appropriate, and any deficiencies identified durirg the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by management personnal; and system restoration was adequat For completed tests, the inspector verified that testing freqt.encies were met and tests were performed by qualified individual The inspector observed a performance of SI-37.1, Containment Spray Pump 1B-B Quarterly Operability Test -

Unit 1. This special performance included a three point verification of the pump curve as committed to during the SSQE inspectio The pump passed the acceptance criteri The inspector observed a portion of SI-68, Functional Test of Containment Spray Pumps and Associated Valves, performed on CS pump 1A-A. No deficiencies were note The inspector reviewed a completed SI-139, Determination of tht Moderator Temperature Coefficient. No deficiencies were note No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observations (62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and in conformance with T The following items were considered during this review: LCOs were met while components or systems were removed from service; redundant components were operable; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; procedures used were adequate to control the activity; troubleshooting activities were controlled and the repair records accurately reflected what actually took place; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; QC records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; QC hold points were established where required and were observed; fire prevention controls were implemented; outside contractor force activities were

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controlled in 6ccordance with the approved QA program; and housekeeping was actively pursue The inspectors reviewed activities in progress associated with Work Plan 6674-1 which was initiated to replace free-end type annubar flow elements, 1-FE-72-13 AND 1-FE-72-34, with a fixed-end mounted typ This modification was implemented to resolve instrument indication errors associated with 1-FE-72-34 in the containment spray system. Howeve' '

annubar 1-FE-72-34 was removed from its location in the procent .

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the perforated tubing enclosing the element was found to be missin Condition Adverse to Quality Report, CAQRSQP880452, was generated to document and evaluate the condition. Subsequently the missing tubing was located in the bottom of the refueling water storage tank. A diver was sent into the tank and the item was retrieve Flow element, 1-FE-72-13, located in the adjacent process line was also modified. However, no problems were noted with this element when removed from the pipin No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (92700)

The following LERs were reviewed. The inspector verified that: reporting requirements had been met; causes had been identified; correcti' e actions appeared appropriate; generic applicability had been considered; the LER forms were complete; the licensee had reviewec the event; and no unreviewed safety questions were involve LER's Unit 1 (Closed) LER 327/87043, Control Room Isolatio In Ju'y, 1987 with unit 1 in mode 5, an inadvertant control room isolation occurred during surveillance testing. The surveillance testing was being performed on sample flow switches for the main control room intake process radiation monitor 0-P.M-90-206. Following the control room isolation it was verified by operations personnel that no high radiation levels existe The licensee determined that electrical disturbances from chattering of the tested flow sw tch contacts produced a series of electromagnetic i

interference induced spikes on control room air intake radiation monitor 0-RM-90-12 This issue was examined in NRC inspection report 327,328/88-27 and it was determined that the licensee had several similar occurrences. As a result of these occurrences the licensee had written a CAQR which resulted in design change (DCR) 2276. Completion of this DCR is not scheduled to be completed prior to startup of Unit The licensee's corrective actions appear to be adequat This item is close _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

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6 1 (Closed) LER 327/87070, revision 1, Diesel Generator Voltage Low When Output Breaker Closes Because of a Component Defect Found During Surveillance Testing and Design Deficiency Outside of Plants Design Basi This LER was reviewed in IR 327,328/88-27 and left open pending completion of changes to the PMT procedures that were identified as deficient in the LER and issuance of calculations suppcrting two unit operation TVA issued calculation SQN-E3-002 on September 11, 198 This calculatior, verifies that the EDGs are capable of supplying all required electrical loads during combined loss of offsite power and design basis accident The calculation was submitted for NRC review and concurrence. The inspector reviewed the results of the calculation and the revised PMT and determined the diesels are capable of performing their safety functio This item is close (0 pen) LER 327/88007, Auxiliary Building Secondary Contait..nent Enclosure Envelop The inspectors reviewed the issues associated with meeting the TS requirement for verification that the auxiliary building gas trestment system can maintain the spent fuel storage area and the engineered safety feature pump rooms equal to or more negative than minus 1/4-inch water gauge while maintatiing a vacuum relief flow greater than 2000 cfm and a total system flow within 17% of 9000 cfm. A problem was identified when the blast doors to the Unit I containment were open thereby incorporating the Unit 1 containment into the ABSC A temporary alteration was implemented to re-configure the Unit 1 containment purge system to prevent air in-leakage during the time periods when the blast doors are opened. However, the unit 1 blast doors will be closed prior to the unit restart and this problem will no longer exis Therefore, this issue will not be a Unit I restart restrain This item will remain open pending long-term corrective action .t is presently tracked on the corporate commitment tracking system, control nucber NCO-88-0046-003, to insure that required measures to meet the TS are implemented when either unit is in operation and the blast aoors are opened on the opposite uni This item is resolved for restart of Unit (Closed) LER 327/88020, Cold Over Pressure Protection Syste On May 11, 1988, Shearon Harris reported, via the ENS, that the COPS system could inadvertently actuate during a main steamline break when the RCS temperature was less than 350 degrees F, if this event was accompanied by a single failure of an RCS T hot channel. This inadvertent actuation would cause the power operated relief valves to open and exacerbate the

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decreasing RCS pressure transient associated with the main steamline break accident. Shearon Harris had notified Westinghouse and several other plants were identified that had the same type of design (not including Sequoyah). INP0 was notified by the licensee through the normal notification proces On May 12, 1988, at approximately 8:00 the NRC Region II project engineer assigned to Harris, and the SRI at Harris, determined that this issue could be applicable to Sequoyah. The project engineer phoned the onsite NRC staff at Sequoyah. The licensee was informed by the onsite NRC staff that this issue could affect the impending startup of Sequoyah Unit 2. TVA contacted Harris and Westinghouse and determined that the situation was applicable to Sequoyah and determined that the corrective action applied at Harris was acceptable. TVA initiated corrective action through the use of a TACF by lif ting the arming signal leads, and establishing compensatory administrative action In NRC inspection report 327,328/88-28, the onsite NRC staff resolved this issue for the startup of Sequoyah Unit On June 9,1988, the licensee issued LER 327/88-20 which described the actions taken for Sequoyah Unit 2 and described permanent corrective actions that will be taken before the startup of Sequoyah Unit 1. The permanent actions include disarming the signal input into the COPS through the use of a toggle switch in the control roo CFR 50.59 evaluations were performed for both unit In the case of Unit 2, the 50.59 review was performed as part of the TACF. In the case of Unit 1 it was performed as part of the modification adding the toggle switch. The inspector reviewed these safety evaluations as part of TI 2500/19 which has been satisfactorily accomplishe This item is close In addition, TI 2500/19 is close (Closed) LER 327/88018, Incomplete Posting of Signs Prohibiting the Use of Portable Radios Resulted in Radio Transmission Interference and Subsequent Generation of a Reactor Trip Signa ,

This LER addresses generation of a reactor trip signal by modifications personnel making radio transmissions from the number 4 accumulator room to support valve testing. The reactor trip breakers were open at the time so a reactor trip did not actually occu The inspector reviewed the licensee's submittal and proposed corrective actions. The licensee e.ommitted to review SCN's that resulted in the installation of new electronic equipment that may be susceptible to radio transmission interf erence by November 30, 1988 and revise procedures by December 29, 1988, if require The licensee also committed to investigate the feasibility of reducing the maximum power level of radios by August 31, 1988. The inspector found the licensee's submittal adequate

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for restart of Unit 1 and based on the licensee's proposed corrective action this item is close This item is close (Closed) LER 327/88019, revisio,1, Reactor Trip Signals Generated ' om Electromagnetic Interference Caused by Welding Machine Operated at H19,i Frequency Near Source Range Nuclear Instrument Cablin This LER addresses several reactor trip signals that were generated by a source range channel spike caused by welding near source range instrument cabling. The reactor trip breakers were open at the time so an actual reactor trip did not occu The inspector reviewed the licensee's response and proposed corrective actions. To prevent reoccurrence the licensee has placeo both source range detector input signals into the RPS in the bypass position to prevent inadvertent trip signals being generated. This action is allowed by the TS with the reactor trip breakers open and the unit in mode The licensee also plans to replace the installed Westinghouse NIS equipment with Gamma-M.trics hardware which is less susceptible to electromagnetic interference by cycle 4 restart of Unit This item is closa (Closed) LER 327/88022 Reactor Trip Signal Generated from Electromagnetic Interference Caused by Welding Machine Operated at High Frequency Near Source Range Nuclear Instrument Cablin This LER is fdentical to LER 327/88019 above and is closed out based on the review and closure of LER 327/8801 This item is close LER'S Unit 2 (Closed) LER 328/88010, "A" Centrifugal Charging Pump Placed in the Pull-to-Lock Position While the Second Pump was Inoperabl The inspector reviewed this LER and determined that this event resulted in Violations 50-327,328/88-20-01 and 50-327,328/88-20-03. The commitments and corrective actions are being tracked as open items associated with the violation Based on the issuance o' the violations, this item is close (Closed) LER 328/88003, revision 1, Ice Buildup in the Flow Passages of the Ice Condense The inspector reviewed the condition of the ice condenser at the time of the buildup and during the process of cleaning which consisted of manual chipping and scraping of 'he ice in the flow passages. \f ter the cleaning effort was completed, ice buildup still existe .

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An evaluation performed by the Westinghouse Corporation, determined the ice condenser to meet the current TS requirement with the remaining ice buildup. Westinghouse indicated that a computer analysis had been run with 15% of the flow passages blocked and concluded tnat the condenser would be within the design limits of containmen Therefore an operable ice condenser consisted of an ice bed with less than 15*. total flow passage blockag The licensee utilized the information acquired via the TVA/ Westinghouse Safety Evaluation Report and Special Maintenance Instruction 2-61-2 to revise SI-106 to incorporate this methodology in determining ice condenser operabilit Various other short term and long term actions were either implemented or committed to, to ensure that equipment, monitoring, and evaluations would be performed to insure that the ice condenser would perform its intended function. The inspector reviewed these corrective actions and commitments and determined that they had either been completed or were currently being tracked as an outstanding work requirement on the CCTS (items NCO-88-0041-002 thru NC0-88-0041-011).

This item is close (Closed) LER 328/83019, Inadequate Work Control Caused Two Emergency Core Cooling System Pumps to be Inoperabl TS 3.5.2 requires for Modes 1, 2, ar.d 3, a minimum of two independent ECCS subsystems operable with each subsy; tem comprised of, among other equip-ment, one operable centrifugal charging pump and one operable RHR pum The action statement allows or.'y one train to be inoperacle. On April 7, 1988, with Unit 2 in Mode 3 it was determined that TS LCO 3.0.3 Fad been in effect, without the knowledge of the unit operators, because the handswitches both for the B train RHR pump and the A train centrifugal charging pump had been placed in pull-to-lock. This resulted in two independent trains of the emergency core cooling systems not being avail-abl Since both trains were operable, T.S. 3.0.3 was in effec The initial corrective actions associated with this issue included the return to service of the A train centrifugal charging pump. In addition, corrective actions included the establishment of an on shift advisor for the Unit 2 startuo and the establishment of a work control group concept implemented by standard practice SQA 199, Integrated 5:hedule and Work Control. These activities were inspected and determineo to be acceptable to continue the Unit 2 startu In addition, the NRC issued violation 327,328/88-20-01. The licensee's initial corrective actions appear to be adequat Supplemental corrective actions will be reviewed as part of violation 327,328/88-20-0 This item is close .

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, 10 (Closed) LER 328/88020, Isolation Valve LLRT Failur The inspectors reviewed this issue in Inspection Report 327,328/88-36 and had determined that this issue was a Unit I restart item. The field work associated with the replacement of the Unit I valves has been completed and this item is being tracked on the CCTS, item #NC0880120002 for Unit 1 and item #NC0880120001 for Unit 2 for final closecut. Based on the licensee's tracking of these open items, no further NRC tracking will be require This item is close (Closed) LER 328/88021, Incomplete Testing of Unit 2 Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protective Device This LER addressed a programming error that selected some Unit 1 penetration breakers in lieu of Unit 2 breakers as required to satisfy the TS requirement. The root cause was determined to be a result of a footnote in surveillance instruction that referenced breakers that were common to Units 1 and The inspector reviewed the documentation presented by the licensee in relation to the reported event and determined that the corrections had been made in SI-258.1, rev. 1 and SI-258.2, rev.19 to satisfy the

, requ'rement of the T This '+.em is closed.

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(Closed) LER 328/88022, Ur. qualified Butt Splice, This item is addressed and tracked in violation 50-327,328/88-28-0 Therefore furtner NRC tracking of this LER will not be require This item is closed.

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(Closed) LER 328/38023, revision 1, Reactor Trip on Steam /Feedflos l Mismatch Coincidert With Low Steam Generatur Level Oue to Plugged Sicht i Glass.

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The ilspector reviewed the corrective actions implemented by the licensee and further reviewed the commitments. It was determined that all the commitments have been completed with the exception of some repairs to the main feedwater pump turbine t',]h and low pressure stop valves and high pressure governor valve These repairs deal primarily with the efficiency of the equipment and not the ability to perform its intended function. Work Requests, B751430 and B751429, have been generated to track and perform the repairs during the next refueling outage. Based on the above, further tracking will not be require This item is close . . .

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(Closed) LER 328/88026, revision 1, Inadequate Configuration Control Caused Two Auxiliary Feedwater Flce Paths to be Inoperable Resulting in Noncompliance with TS 3.7. This LER addresses the miswiring o' valves 2-LCV-3-172 and 2-LCV-3-175 such that with 3-172 in manual, 3-173 could be operated and with 3-175 in r.anual, 3-172 could be operate The inspector reviewed the licensee submittal and proposed ccrrective actions. The inspector determined that all corrective actions committed to by the licensee have not been completed and are not scheduled for completion prior to restart of Unit 1. The inspector determined that the condition described in this LER would not have prevented the AFW system from performing its intended function during an accident or plant transien The valves would have operated properly in the automatic mode of operation and the valves would nave operated properly if the associated AFW pump was operating. Based on this revie.i and the licensee's proposed corrective actions the inspector considers this item close This item is close (Closed) LER 328/88027, Reactor Trip Resulting From Steam /Feedwater Flow Mismatch Coincident With Low Steam Generator Level Caused by a Missing Diod This LER addresses a reactor trip caused by a missing diode in the test circuitry of valve 2-FCV-3-103, the loop 4 MFW flow control valve, that resulted in the valve going closed with the unit at powe The inspector reviewed the licensee's submittal and corrective actions implemented to date, including replacing the missing diode and checking a'l other valve cirbuits Cor both Units 1 and 2 with satisfactory result Although other corrective actions are not scheduled for completion until aftce this report 1c; par 1od, this event was reviewed in detail during the NRC shif t coverage fnr the Sequoyah Unit 2 restart effort and NRC con-currence was obtained prior to returning the unit to powe.*. Based on this review the inspector nas no further cuestion This item is close (Closed) LER 328/88006, Main Steam Isolation and Reactor Trip Due to Maintenance Activities and Inherent Instrument Responsa During Steam Plant Heatu This LER addresses an operational event that resulted in a main steam line isolation, reactor trip signal and several main feedwater isolation This event was identified and reviewed in depth in inspection report 327.328/88-02 and resulted in violation 327,328/88-02-01 being issue Based on this review the inspector considers this item close This item is close No violations or deviations were identifie _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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t 12 Event Followup (93702, 62703) During the performance of SI-82.2, Functional- Tests for Rsdiation Monitoring System on August 31,.'1988, an inadvertent CVI was init'ated at 9:20 a.m. as a result of IMs performing procedure steps out of sequence. The test involved using a digital multi-meter (DMM)

to perform various checks of the 2-RM-90-106 containment radiation monitor circuits. Part of the test involved using the DMM to insert a test current to check the resistance of the monitor's output relay This test must be performed while the monitor's test switches are in the "Block" position to prevent the output relay from actuating a CVI from the test signa At that point in the procedure, the IMs had directed the UO to place the block switches in their proper position, and successfully performed the resistance check. SI 82.2 step 5.4.12.7 then directs the IMs to set the DMM to the 48 vdc scale to read voltage at the test point. 'The next procedure step, 5.4.12.8, directs the IMs to have the U0 return the block switch to the Off position, which effectively allows the monitor's c.,utput relays to actuate a CVI if a . radiation alarm is received on the monitor. The IMs performed step 5.4.12.8 before step 5.4.12.7. This condition caused a CVI on the A train valves when the block functior was removed because the output relays were still receiving the current signal from the DMM, which simulates a radiation alar The CVI that resulted from this event functioned as designed. After verifying that no high radiation condition existed, the U0 returned the containment ventilation system to normal and reset all alarms. A 4-hour notification was niade to the NRC incident response center at 9:54 a.m. in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72.b.2.ii requirement This event was caused by a failure of personnel to fullow procedure S1-82. 2, and is identified as VIO 327,328/88 49-0 On September 3, 1988, during pe rf ormar.ce of 51-83, Channel Calibration of Radiation Monitoring System. an ABI was initiated when'

a test signal was injected while the channel was not placed in the Blocked position as required by the procedur Failure to follow procedure SI-83 is considered a second example of VIO 327, 328/88-39-01, c. On August 30, 1988, SI-90.72, Reactor Trip Instrumentation Functional Test of Delta T/Tave Channel IV, Rack 13 was being performed. on Unit 2 RCS loop Tave. The IMs had placed the loop Tave bistables in the tripped condition and the associated test switch in test, then declared the channel inoperable and entered LCO 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. At the time, 51-26, Loss of Offsite Power with Safety Injection, was being performed on Unit 1. Operations personnel were concerned that spurious actuations of another loop Tave bistable during the EDG m

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loading tests could cause a trip of Unit 2, which was at 98* powe If a second loop Tave bistable trip had occurred, a reactor trip signal from 2 out of 4 (2/4) Overtemperature Delta T and/or 2/4 Overpower Delta T reactor trip circuits could have occurre :onsequently, the IM test director placed the loop 4 Tave bistables back in the normal position, but chose to leave the channel's test switch in the test position. The Tave instrument loop is inoperable when either the bistable is tripped or the test switch is in the test positio The loop 4 Tave channel remained inoperable, even though the bistables were returned to normal. The IM personnel assumed that the SI-26 test would take only 15 minutes, and that they could then resume their SI 90.72 testing. The fact that the channel was still inoperable was not recognized by the operations staf The IMs did not back out of the procedure in the proper order by placing the test i switch in the normal position prior to placing the bistables in normal. As a result, the Tave channel and the attendant Reactor Trip System Instrumentation channels and Engineered Safety Features Actuation channels receiving inputs from the Tave channel remained in an inoperable condition until 4:30 p.m. when the condition was recognized by the plant operators and returned to norma T.S. 3.3.1 requires the reactor trip system instrumentation listed in table 3.3-1 to be operable and that table notation Action 6 be entered as the Action Statement when less than 4 channels are operable. Action 6 requires that with the number of operable channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, power operation may continue provided the inoperable channel is piaced in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and the Minimum Channels Operable requirement is me The requirement to place the Tave channel and '

its attendant reactor trip cnannels in the tripped condition was not

<ccomplished unt'l 4:30 T.3. 3.3.1 requir.s the 2ngineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFA5) ',nstrumantsciori channels shown in table 3.3-3 to be operabl With loop Tave inoperable. the High Steamline Flow Coincident with Low Sttamiine Pressure or Low-Low Tave functional unit is eiso i i nope ra'ol e . Table rotation Action 16 requires that with the fiumber of cparable channels one less than the Total number of Channels, oporrtion niay proceed nrevided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within one hou This was not accomplished until 4:59 p.m. , 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> and 20 minutes af ter the Tave channel was placed in an inoperable status. Failure to enter the appropriate action statements as required by T.S. 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 is identified as violation 327,328/88-39-0 The condition of having inoperable instrumentation channels without entering the appropriate Action requirements was recognized by plant personnel during operator review of plant log The appropriate action statement was then entered and the channel placed in the tripped conditio This event was reported to the resident

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inspection staff but was not considered to be reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 reporting requirements, During the afternoon of August 15, 1988, a severe electrical and rain storm occurred in the area of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant and is attributed with the following incident At approximately 4:14 a loss of power to the Meteorlogical Monitoring Tower (MET) occurred and resulted in a loss of '

transmission to the plant. This inc' dent was attributed to a lightning st '" at the tower. The applicable TS actions were

implemented, ine sack-up po.ver fource was energized immediately and allowed monitorir < r of the 1ccal wind conditions. The MET computer was later returned f operation and the TS action statement was exite At 4

20 p.m. the inter-tie bus between the 161 kv and 500 kv buses tripped offline due to a fault on the line to the Moccasin Bend

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substr i'n and the 'n-line power control breaker (PCB)-984 opene All fo n of the in t -tie bus PCSs tripped offline immediately after PCB 9M opened, de rlizing the inter-tie bus. The fault condition on the Moccasin Benu itne cleared and PCB-984 reclosed automaticall Condenser circulation water pumps 2A and 2B tripped at the same time that PCB-984 opened. As a result only the 2C pump remained in service and the condenser began losing vacuum. The two tripped pumpt were restarted and normal condenser operation was resume Thi: as attributed to a local lightning strik At approximately 4:51 p.m. a loss of CSST-A and start bus 1A and 2A

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occurred. The loss apparently was caused by a high moisture condition in the back of the start bus 2A normal feeder breakne (1512) cabinet. This resulted in a loss of power tr 6.9 Av shutd wn board IB-B and suosequent starting of the fou, emergency diesel generators. An cutomatic swapover to M 3T-B and the alternate feeder breakers did not occur as designed occause CSST-B was in a maintenance outage and the alternate feeder breakers, feeding stort bus IA and 2A, were tagged out. Unit 2 was unaf fe:ted by this incident as a result of teing fed from the Unit 2 station service transformers 2A and 2 Further equipment losses resulting from the loss of CSST-A were the cooling tower lights and lif t pumps and the plant security compute Power was restored to common board A within the hou The operating personnel handled the event in an expedient and .

effective manner. These operator actions were credited with preventing a reactor trip on Unit e. At 9:43 p.m., on August 4, 1988, with Unit 1 in mode 5 and Unit 2 at 98*. power, load shedding occurred on the 1 B-B 6.9 kv shutdor h,ard

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during the performance of WP 7152-01. This WP was being performed to change the load sequence time for the containment spray system from ,

30 to 180 seconds. At the time of the event, power to the UVX relays '

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43TL switch was placed in test to prevent inadvertent diesel start t Oue to a sequencing error in the WP a lead was lifted in the UVY t relay circuitry that resulted in a 1B-B shutdown board load shed. OG 18-B was in test at the time and did not start and connect to the board. Shutdewn board 18-8 was reenergized at 10:04 After an initial investigation of t.he event to determine the cause, it .sas

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mistakenly concluded that the WP did not cause the event and work was recommenced. At 4:01 a.m. , en August 5,193S, shutcown board IB-B again load shed. Operations personnel reenergized the board and the WP was terminated until the preolem with the WP could be identified.

The WP was subseauently performed successfully on August 6, 198 The fact that WP 7152-01 was inadequate and resulted in a loss of kv shutdown board 1B-8 is identified as violation 327,328/88-39-03 for failure to establish, implement and maintain maintenance orocedures.

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15 p.m. , on August 2.1988, both trains of EGTS were declared inoperable because it was discovered that the system may not meet the i design basis when assuming a single failure. It was discovered j during a design revie,y of the system that a single failure causing

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the discharge modulating damper in the automatic train to fail open prior to initiation of the system or prior to arming of the swapover logic could preclude the system from performing its design function The design functions of the :ystem are to maintain the annulus at a

slight negative pressure and ensure that t hr

of fsite release is maintained within l'mi cs. With the d<rrar failed open, the annulus

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would still be maintained at a negative pressure, however all EGTS

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flow would be directed out the stack Instead of a small portion being i

directed out the stack and the rest beirc returned to the annulu The licensee revised Emergency Instruction-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and Function Pastoration Guideline FR-1, hosponse to High Centainmen'. Prossure, tc perform operator actions to manually swanover to the standby train after 30 minutes if toe standby controller is producing full outpu This action will ensure that the EGTS system is operating r:roperly and that the release is within limits. The EGTS system was declared operable at '0:45 p.m., on August 2, 1988, and the LC0 was exite . 10 CFR Part 21 Report Follow-up (90712)

(Closed) Part 21 P21-86-01, Atwood and Morrill Main Steam Isolation Valves Spring Failure Caused by Quench Crack This issue was addressed in Inspection Report 327,328/88-27 and was left open pending completion of Unit 1 corrective action T h t- inspector verified that the Unit 1 inspections were complete This item is close *

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9. Inspector Followup Items (92701)

IFIs are matters of concern to the inspector which are documented and tracked in inspection reports to allow further review and evaluation by the inspector. The following IFIs have been reviewed and evaluated by the inspecto The inspector has either resolved the concern identified, determined that the licensee has performed adequately in the area, and/or determined that actions taken by the licensee have resolved the concer (Closed) IFI 327/85-17-06, 328/85-17-05, Feedwater System Valve This IFI was initiated to evaluate the licensee's process for controlling the installation of safety related material that has been identified as nonconforming or has inadequate documentation. This IFI arose when a valve stem with outstanding licensee identified QA exceptions to vendor documentation was installed on valve 1-FCV-3-4 This issue was reviewed in NRC inspection report 327,328/88-27, and the conclusion was reached that the certificate of conformance (C0C) was retrieved. The C0C was inspected by the NRC and the nonconformance was appropriately cleare This inspection report also concluded that there was no technical concern related to this individual materia This IFI was lef t open in order to enst.re that program changes were implemente The inspector reviewed administrative procedure (AI) -11, Receipt Inspection, Nonconforming Items, QA Level / Description Changes and Substitutions. This procedure requires that the deficiency (CAQR or other deficiency) be cleared prior to declaring the affected equipment operabl Thit appears to be adequate corre:tive actio This item is close (Closed) IFI 327,328/87-76-05, Ccble Reuttr Tnis IFI was established as the result of a generic review conducted during the review of violation 327,328/87-52-02, example F in inspection report 32/,328/87-76. This IFI addressed two Unit 1 cables which would be add"essed by the long term cable management progra As a result of this IFI the licensee performed a walk down of the routes for cables IV1936A and IV1881A by WR B27062 The licensee determined that the field route of IV1936A agreed with the route listed on the pull card except that it was routed in tray RB- In addition IV1936A was shown routed in RB-A on the Appendix R drawings. There does not appear to be a separation problem. Finally, tray RB-A was inspected to determine overf111 and determined to be acceptabl This item is close .

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10. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)

(Closed) URI 327,328/88-17-02, Inadvertent LCO Entr The inspectors reviewed this issue which involved the inadvertent entry into several LCOs without the knowledge of the operators who were at the controls. This issue was addressed by the NRC in a letter (McCoy/ White)

dated March 24, 1988. The Itcensee responded to this issue in a letter (Gridley/public document desk) dated May 5, 1988, (RIMS L44 880505 802).

In the above referenced licensee response each of the inadvertent LCO entries was discussed and the corrective actions for each issue were described. The corrective actions were reviewed by the inspector and appeared to be adequat This item is close (Closed) Violation 327,328/87-52-03, Inadequate ERCW Drawin This violation addressed the fact that the licensee's document control measures failed to assure proper review for adequacy of ERCW flow drawing 47W845 in that the drawing did not properly reflect the deletion of the 738 and 747 series relief valves located downstream of the ERCW strainers, by ECN 2860 (1980 timeframe). This violation was forwarded in a letter (Ebneter/ White) dated September 25, 1987. The licensee responded to this violation in a letter (Gridley/ document control desk) dated November 10, 1987, and denied the violation because the drawing deviation on these relief valves had been previously identified by TVA. The NRC responded to the TVA den 111 in a letter (Richardson / White; dated January 15, 1988, in which it was stated that "you can not deny the violation since, in fact, it occurred." It further states that based on t;.: information in the response, we consider that this violation meets the criteria for a licensee identified violation and will be dispositioned as such. Finally, it states that no further response was required with regard to this its TVA implemented everal corrective actions in response to this violation which included those actions necessary to correct the specific drawing and changes to Sequoyah Enqineering Procedure (SQEP) - 43, Control of Drawing Deviations. These corrective actions appear to be adequat This item is close (Closed) Violation 327,328/87-78-01, Operator Overtim This violation addressed a failure to adequately implement the requirements of AI-30 Nuclear Plant Conduct of Operation and AI-2, Assignment of Responsibility, for operator overtim This violation was responded to by the licensee in a letter (Gridley/

Document Control Desk) dated April 13, 1988. This letter was responded to by the NRC in a letter (Barr/ White) dated May 10 1988. The inspector

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reviewed the 11censee's corrective actions and they appear to adequately address overtime managemen This item is close (Closed) Violation 327,328/88-19-01: Polar Crane Wall Penetration Seal The inspector reviewed documentation presented by the licensee to reflect the actions taken to correct the areas identified in the violation and to avoid further infractions. The inspector determined that both the Units 1 and 2 crane wall penetrations and seals below elevation 693.0 were walked down and the discrepancies identifiad. The physical work on each crane wall has been completed and only 2 drawing revisions remain outstandin A commitment date of October 1,1988, has been made by the licensee to have these 2 drawings completed. In addition, these two outstanding drawings are being tracked on the licensee's CCTS and additional tracking will not be require This item is close (Closed) Violation 327,328/88-20-03: Failure to Comply With Technical

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Specification Limiting Condition for Operation This item was addressed in inspection report 327,328/88-36 and the Licensee's commitments were found to be acceptabl However, the issue remained open pending the completion of additional TS training for the Unit 1 operators per the licensee's commitment. The training is currently in a completion phase and being tracked as an open item required for Unit I restart en the licensee's CCTS, control number NC088006900 Therefore, further tracktry will not be require This item is close (Closed) Violation 327,328/88-20-04: Failure to Ensure Timely Notification to the NRC of a Loss of $1.fety Function This item was reviewed in inspection report 327,328/83-36 out remained open pending a formal review and evaluation of the licensee's respons Based on review of the licensee's response to the violation, the issue is now resolve This item is close (Closed) Violation 50-327,328/87-60-02, Failure To Meet 50.59 on AFW Modificatio This item was reviewed in inspection report 327,328/87-60 and it was determined that the licensee's corrective actions were adequate for restart, howEver the violation was left open because all corrective actions had not been completed and the violati was under review for escalated enforcemen Subsequently, in a lev' dated May 9, 1988 the

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licensee was informed that a notice cf violation would not be issue This item is closed based on the fact that a violation'was not issued and that the inspectors concern that unit 2 would be restarted ' with an inoperable AFV pump was resolved prior to restar This item is close . Independent Audits A followup inspection of the Sequoyah facility was conducted by American Nuclear Insurers ( ANI) between July 5-8,19SS to establish the nuclear liability risk presented by Sequoyah to the insurance pool. A previous inspection was conducted December 8-11, 1987 and 16 recommendations were made to improve the site's ratin The followup inspection closed 13 of the original 16 recommendations and opened no new items. Left open were threa items dealing with the conduct of PORC meetings and tracking of PORC effectivenes The followup inspection made observations in the area of root cause assessment performed by the P0RS staf The Plant Assessment Section Supervisor agreed to incorporate these observations into the process and the ANI inspectors consequently made no recommendations'in this are . Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 12, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph The Senior Resident dascribed the areas inspected and discusstd f n deta'l the inspection findings listed below. The licensee acknowledged tSe inspectio, findinos and did not identify as croprieta>y any of the material reviewed by the inspectors duririg the inspect!o Inspecticn Findings:

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Three violations were identified in paragrapF 7 327,328/83-39-C1 - Feilure to Follow Procecures, Two (xample '

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327,328/88-39-02 - Failure to Meat Requirements of TS 3.3.1 and 3. ,328/88-39-03 - Inadequate Work Pla l No deviations, unresolved items or inspector follow-up items were l ider tifie During the reporting period, frequent discussions were held with the Site l Director, Plant Manager and other managers concerning inspeciio;. finding !

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12. List of Abbreviations, Initialisms and Acronyms ABGTS- Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System ABI -

Auxiliary Building Isolation ABSCE- Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure AFW -

Auxiliary Feedwater AI -

Administrative Instruction A01 -

Abnormal Operating Instruction AVO -

Auxiliary Unit Operator A505 - Assistant Shift Operating Supervisor BIT -

Boron Injection Tank C&A -

Control and Auxiliary Buildings CAQR - Conditions Adverse to Quality Report CCP -

Centrifugal Charging Pump CCTS - Corporate Commitment Tracking System COPS - Cold Overpressure Protection System CS -

Containment Spray CSSC - Critical Structures, Systems and Components CSST - Commom Station Service Transformers CVI -

Containment Ventilation Isolation DC -

Direct Current DCN -

Design Change Notice ONE -

Division of Nuclear Engineering ECCS - Emergency Core Cooling System EDG -

Emergency Diesel Generator EI -

Emergency Instructions ENS -

Emergency Notification System ESF -

Engineered Safety Feature FC/ - Flow Control Valve FSAR - Final Safety Analysis Report GDC -

General Design Criteria GL -

Generic Letter HIC -

Hand-operated Ir.dicating Controller H0 -

Hold Order HP -

Health Physics '

IN -

NRC Information Notice IFI -

Inspector Followup Item IM -

Instrument Maintenance IMI -

Instrument Maintenance Instruction IR -

Inspection Report

KI -

Potassium Iodide KVA -

Kilovolt-Amp KW -

Kilowatt KV -

Kilovolt LER - Licensee Event Report LCO -

Limiting Condition for Operation LLRT - Local Leak Rate Test LOCA - Loss of Coolant Accident MI -

Maintenance Instruction NB -

NRC Bulletin NOV -

Notice of Violation NRC -

Nuclear Regulatory Commission OSLA - Operations Section Letter - Administrative

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OSLT - Operations Section Letter - Training OSP -

Office of Special Projects PMT -

Post Modification Test PORC - Plant Operations Review Committee P0RS - Plant Operation Review Staff PRO -

Potentially Reportable Occurrence QA -

Quality Assurance QC -

Quality Centrol RCS -

Reactor Coolant System RG -

Regulatory Guide RM -

Radiation Monitor R4R -

Residual Heat Removal RWP -

Radiation Work Permit RWST - Reactor Water Storage Tank SER -

Safety Evaluation Report SG -

Steam Generator SI -

Surveillance Instruction 501 -

System Operating Instructions SOS -

Shift Operating Supervisor SQM -

Sequoyah Standard Practice Maintenance SR -

Surveillance Requirements SR0 -

Senior Reactor Operator SSQE - Safety System Quality Evaluation STI - Special Test Instruction TACF - Temporary Alteratior. Control Form TROI - Tracking Open Itens TS -

Technical Specifications TVA - Tennessee Valley Authority URI -

Unresolved Item USQD - Unreviewed Safety Question Determination WCG - Work Control Group WP -

Work Plan WR -

Work Request

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