IR 05000327/1998004
| ML20247L609 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247L564 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-98-04, 50-327-98-4, 50-328-98-04, 50-328-98-4, NUDOCS 9805260026 | |
| Download: ML20247L609 (30) | |
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l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos:
50-327, 50-328 License Nos:
50-327/98-04, 50-328/98-04 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
Facility:
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2 Location:
Sequoyah Access Road Hamilton County. TN 37379
Dates:
March 15, 1998 through April 25, 1998 Inspectors:
M. Shannon, Senior Resident Inspector R. Starkey, Resident Inspector R. Telson, Resident Inspector D. Thompson, Safeguards Inspector (Sections S2-S7)
R. Gibbs, Reactor Inspector (Section M8.10)
Approved by:
Harold O. Christensen, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects f
l Enclosure 2 9805260026 980515 PDR ADOCK 05000327 O
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. Units 1 & 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-327/98-04. 50-328/98-04 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations.
maintenance, engineering, plant support, and effectiveness of licensee controls in identifying, resolving, and preventing problems; in addition, it included the results of security and maintenance region based inspections.
Doerations A negative finding was identified in that operators did not ensure an
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accurate boric acid addition calculation prior to a manual makeup to the volume control tank (VCT) which resulted in an unplanned boration event (Section 01.2).
A positive finding was identified as a result of the licensee's thorough e
investigation into the unplanned boration event and the initiation of several corrective actions to prevent recurrence (Section 01.2).
A violation was identified for not performing Technical Specification
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(TS) surveillance 4.8.1.1.1.a. after the emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil transfer pump automatic start circuitry was disabled (Section 01.3).
A negative finding was identified when the inspectors observed water
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dripping from the vital 1B-B emergency raw cooling water (ERCW) system 480 volt ac (Vac) motor control center (MCC).
This adverse condition had not been identified by the licensee (Section 02.1).
Maintenance A positive finding was identified.
Based on a random visual check of
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the Unit 1 ice condenser (IC)
it appeared that the licensee's program had been aggressive and effective in maintaining passages in a free flow condition, minimizing debris in the ice condenser, and minimizing ice buildup on the intermediate doors (Section M3.1).
A concern was identified with the process for randomly sampling of the
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ice condenser ice basket weights due to approximately one third of the ice baskets in the Unit 1 IC. and a lesser percentage of baskets in the Unit 2 IC. becoming frozen in place (Section M3.1).
Engineering A positive finding was identified in that the licensee has taken e
appropriate corrective actions to periodically monitor and refurbish reactor protection system power supplies (Section E2.1).
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Plant Suonort The licensee was complying with the criteria of the Physical Security
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Plan for alarm stations and communications (Section S2.3).
The random review of plans and interviews with appropriate individuals
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verified that changes did not decrease the effectiveness of the' Physical Security Plan (Section 53.1).
The contractor Protective Services security personnel met the
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suitability requirements for employment and were appropriately trained in accordance with the regulatory requirements specified in the Physical Security Plan Contingency Plan, Training & Qualification Plan. and associated security program implementing procedures prior to their assignment to on-shift security operational duties (Section S5.1).
The licensee's security management structure and chain-of-command were
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in conformance with the approved Physical Security Plan. Contingency Plan. Training and Qualification Plan. and licensee procedures and applicable regulatory requirements, and were adequate and appropriate for their intended function.
The licensee's proprietary / contract security force maintains the capability to respond to security threats.
incidents, or other contingencies (Section S6.3).
Licensee-conducted audits were thorough, complete. and effective in
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terms of uncovering weaknesses in the security system, procedures, and practices.
The corrective actions taken were technically adequate and performed in a timely manner (Section S7.1).
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Reoort Details Summary of Plant Status
- Unit 1 operated at full power for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 operated at full power for the entire inspection period.
Review of Uodated Final Safety Analysis Reoort (UFSAR) Commitments While performing inspections discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the UFSAR related to the areas inspected.
The inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the observed plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters.
I. Operations
. Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
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Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations.
In general the conduct of operations was considered to be good based on control room observations and the decreasing number of. operation's issues identified during this period.
Shift turnovers and mid-shift briefings were considered to be good.
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01.2 Unit 2 Unclanned Boration Event a.
Insoe.ction Scone (71707)
The inspector reviewed the circumstances which resulted in an unplanned boration event on Unit 2.
b.
Observations and Findinas On March 20, 1998, during a manual makeup to the VCT. a miscalculation resulted in blending too much boric acid to the VCT. As a result, the reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature decreased approximately 0.5 degree F and reactor power decreased approximately 0.5%. The manual i
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makeup was intended to raise the VCT level from approximately 22% to 40%
to support a post maintenance test for the chemical and volume control I
system (CVCS) sampling system.
The licensed operator performing the calculation obtained the wrong value from the boration tables and consequently miscalculated the blend.
A second licensed operator, checking the first operator's calculations, did not refer back to the boration tables and thus did not detect the error..
Instead he concluded that the calculation was correct and, as a I
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result, approximately 35 additional gallons of boric acid were injected into the RCS.
With the exception of the calculation and verification errors, operators had correctly followed procedures, properly monitored changes in reactivity during the evolution and took appropriate actions when the plant responsed to the unplanned boration was observed.
The licensee investigated this event under level-B PER No. SO980263 DER.
The inspectors attended the MRC on March 23, at which this PER and its corrective actions were discussed. The inspectors noted that the MRC was thorough in its deliberations on this event.
Several corrective actions were initiated including a procedure change to provide the
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i actual calculation steps necessary to identify the appropriate settings l
for the blender control setups when performing a manual makeup to the
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VCT, and to ensure proper verification in the future. Additionally, the licensee performed a review of operations procedures that directly affect reactivity which have actual or embedded calculations to ensure they are properly performed, documented and verified as necessary. The inspectors concluded that the licensee conducted a thorough investigation into the unplanned boration event and initiated several corrective actions to prevent recurrence. This is considered a positive finding.
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Conclusions l
The inspectors concluded that operators did not conduct or properly l
verify an accurate boric acid addition calculation prior to a manual makeup to the VCT and an unplanned boration event resulted.
This is identified as a negative finding.
A positive finding was identified as a result of the licensee's thorough investigation into the unplanned boration event and the initiation of several corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
01'.3 Failure to Perform TS Surveillance with the Emeraency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pumo Automatic Start Circuitry Disabled a,
Insoection Scoce (71707)
l The inspectors reviewed the licensee's determination that work activity performed on the IA-A EDG day tank level switches did not impact EDG operability.
b.
Observations and Findinas On March 24. 1998, the licensee performed maintenance on the 1A-A EDG fuel oil day tank level switches.
The 11:30 a.m. control room log entry documented that the fuses for the EDG fuel oil day tank level switches were pulled per hold order (HO) 1-H0-98-555.
The entry further stated
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"This disables the automatic start of the fuel oil transfer pumps on low fuel oil day tank level" and "Since the automatic start function is not required by Technical Specification and is not tested by SI-7.
operability of the 1A-A EDG is not impacted." The fuses were reinstalled approximately 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> and 20 minutes later.
The inspectors reviewed this issue and found that TS 3.8.1.1.b requires
" as a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be operable: Four separate and independent diesel generator sets each with a separate fuel storage sy a m containing a minimum volume of 62.000 gallons of fuel and a separate fuel oil transfer pump. The UFSAR.
Section 8.3.1.1. Description - Diesel Fuel Oil System, states " Transfer of fuel between the seven day supply tanks and the engine day tanks is accomplished automatically (emphasis added) by a pair of pumps controlled by float-operated switches (emphasis added) which sense fuel level in the engine day tanks." The TS definition for Operability, section 1.19. states "A system. subsystem, train, or component or device shall be Operable or ha'.e Operability when it is capable of performing its specified functions and when all attendant.
. auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component or device to perform its functions are also capable of performing their related support function."
Because the 1A-A EDG fuel oil transfer pumps could not perform their intended function of automatically filling the EDG day tanks, the TS-required 62.000 gallons of fuel would be unavailable to the 1A-A EDG without operator intervention to periodically start and stop the fuel oil transfer pumps.
The inspectors determined that this rendered the 1A-A EDG inoperable and the licensee was required to enter the Action statement of TS 3.8.1.1.b. which would have required the licensee to verify offsite power sources available per TS surveillance 4.8.1.1.1.a within one hour and every eight hours thereafter.
The failure to perform TS surveillance 4.8.1.1.1.a after disabling the 1A-A EDG fuel oil transfer pump automatic start circuitry, is considered to be a violation (VIO 50-327/98-04-01).
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Conclusions A violation was identified for not performing TS surveillance 4.8.1.1.1.a. after the 1A-A EDG fuel oil transfer pump automatic start circuitry was disabled.
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment l
02.1 Water In a Vital 480 Vac Motor Control Center a.
Insoection Scoce (71707)
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's follow up and corrective actions after the inspectors observed and reported water exiting a cubicle located in the 480 Vac 1B-B ERCW motor control center.
b.
Observations and Findinos During a routine tour of the ERCW building, on April 20, 1998, the
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inspectors observed a pool of water at the base of the 18-B ERCW motor coritrol center.
Further observations revealed that water was slowly dripping from the bottom of the MCC.
The licensee was immediately notified of the adverse condition.
Later during the morning of April 20. the licensee removed _the 1B-B MCC covers to identify.the source of the water.
Water was found in the MCC's control power transformer cubicle and in the MCC's auxiliary relay panel.
Further investigation determined that the water was coming from the ERCW traveling screen start /stop control switch junction box.
Rain water had apparently traveled down the side of the ERCW building wall and entered the junction box and continued to migrate inside the electrical cable sheathing to the MCC.
Further investigation revealed a substantial amount of water within the 2B-B traveling screen control switch junction box.
Discussions with the licensee indicated that the control switch junction boxes had not been sealed properly and that installation of a splash shield above the switches would be pursued.
The inspectors observed that splash shields had.previously been installed above both train "A" traveling screen control switch junction boxes.
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c.
Conclusions A negative finding was identified when the inspectors observed water dripping from the Vital 18-B ERCW 480 Vac Motor Control Center. This adverse condition had not been identified by the licensee.
II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments a.
Insoection Scoce (61726 & 62707)
Using inspection procedures 61'/26 and 62707. the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing maintenance and surveillance activities.
The inspectors observed or reviewed the following work activities and surveillance:
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WO 97-009437 Implement DCN T-12958-A. Stage 5. Remove
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Jumpers from Thermocouple JB's per F-13966-A and Tape Flex Conduit (EDG 1A-A)
WO 98-003190 Perform Set point Change on EDG 1A-A Day
Tank Level Switches 2-SI-SXP-074-201.A Residual Heat Removal Pump 2A-A
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Performance Test 0-SI-1FT-090-206.0 Radiation Monitoring Sample Flow Liquid
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Flow Alarm Functional Test and Calibration I
1-SI-106.2 Ice Condenser - Ice Bed Unit 1
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2-SI-106.3 Ice Condenser - Ice Bed Unit 2
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0-MX-MXX-061-001.0 Ice Condenser Ice Servicing
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0-SI-MIN-061-004.0 Ice Condenser Top Deck Doors
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SI-108.1 Ice Condenser Intermediate Deck Doors -
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Visual Inspection. Lift Test and Ice Removal (Unit 1)
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SI-108.4 Ice Condenser Intermediate and Lower Inlet i
Doors and Vent Curtains (Unit 1)
0-SI-MIN-061-003.0 Ice Condenser - Ice Baskets
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1-SI-CEM-061-058.0 Ice Condenser Chemistry - Unit 1
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1-SI-IXX-061-138.0 Backup Ice Condenser Temperature
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Monitoring 1-SI-MIN-061-107.0 Ice Condenser Floor Drains
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b.
Observations and Findinas In general the conduct of maintenance and surveillance activities j
observed was good.
Section M3.1 provides a detailed discussion of those
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activities related to the ice condensers.
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Conclusions f
l The conduct of maintenance and surveillance activities observed was f
good.
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M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation M3.1 Ice Condenser Maintenance and Surveillance Activities a.
Inspection Scooe (61726)
Inspectors reviewed the licensee's surveillance program for the maintenance of IC ice flow passages and ice basket weights.
The inspection included a review of the surveillance instruction and data from recently completed surveillance, a walk-down of the at-power-accessible portion of the Unit 1 IC and discussions with associated maintenance and engineering personnel.
b.
Observations and Findinos The inspection focused on two primary areas:
Maintenance of Ice Flow Passages
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Maintenance of Ice Basket Weights
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Maintenance of Ice Flow Passages The inspectors were informed that the licensee attempted to inspect 100%
of the ice flow passages at the beginning and end of each outage to verify that the passages were being maintained with less than 10%
blockage.
A formal written program documenting this practice was not available for review. The surveillance instruction did, however.
contain direction as to how ice passages were to be inspected and assessed, and appeared to meet TS requirements for maintaining less than 15% blockage.
The licensee stated that a computer program was used for randomly selecting passages to be inspected and the statistical model for determining the required 95 percent confidence interval.
The inspectors did not evaluate the effectiveness of the computer program or statistical model during this inspection period.
On April 6, 1998, the inspectors performed a random visual check of the Unit 1 IC upper and intermediate doors, ice baskets and flow passages (as viewed from above).
The inspectors noted that none of the doors had ice accumulation, the cooling units appeared to be draining properly, no debris was found in the area of the intermediate doors or in the ice bays, the ice passages appeared to be relatively clear. and the ice baskets appeared to be structurally soun _
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l Maintenance of Ice Basket Weights l
The inspectors were informed that the licensee attempts to weigh all l
accessible ice baskets at the beginning and end of each outage and replenish all baskets having reduced ice weight.
A formal written program documenting this practice was not available for review.
The surveillance instruction did, however, contain direction as to how ice baskets were to be weighed and appeared to meet TS requirements.
The inspectors were informed by the licensee that approximately one third of the ice baskets in the Unit 1 IC and a smaller percentage of the baskets in the Unit 2 IC, had become frozen in place and could not be weighed.
Efforts to prevent baskets from becoming frozen in place and/or to free the frozen baskets had not been effective.
TS require a minimum total IC ice weight of 2.082,024 lbs at a 95% level of confidence. This is statistically demonstrated at least once per 18 months by weighing a representative sample of at least 144 of the 1944 ice baskets. Whether an acceptable " representative sample" can be obtained given the large number of unweighable baskets, is identified as an unresolved item (URI 50-327. 328/98-04-02).
The inspectors were informed that the licensee used a computer program for randomly selecting baskets to be weighed and a statistical model for determining the required 95 percent confidence interval.
The inspectors did not evaluate the effectiveness of the computer program or statistical model during this inspection period, c
Conclusions A positive finding was identified based on a random visual check of the Unit 1 IC that the licensee's program has been aggressive and effective in maintaining passages in a free flow condition, minimizing debris in the ice condenser, and minimizing ice buildup on the intermediate doors.
A URI was identified concerning the potentially inadequate sampling of IC ice basket weights.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (92902)
M8.1 (Closed) LER 50-327/97-008-01: Failure to Properly Perform Surveillance Testing on the Containment Air Return Fan Start logic, the Blackout and i
Auto Sequencing of the Station Fire Pumps, and Three Functions of the i
Solid State Protection System.
The licensee added additional details to this LER which discussed inadequate surveillance testing of three functions of the solid state protection system (SSPS). The surveillance inadequacies were identified during the licensee's continuing review of Generic Letter 96-01 issues. The three SSPS functions were described in
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l the LER.
Following identification of the inadequate surveillance the l
licensee tested both trains of SSPS on each unit and found them to be operable. Applicable procedures were revised to properly test parallel l
SSPS inputs and a vendor review determined that no other parallel input paths exist.
Revision 0 of this LER was closed in IR 50-327, 328/97-06.
M8.2 (Closed) LER 50-327/97-013-00: Missed surveillance as a Result of an l
Inadequate Procedure.
In March 1990, a surveillance instruction was revised into a new procedure format. The revision inadvertently omitted the fuel handling exhaust fan "A" breaker from the surveillance.
The breaker provides the isolation function between 480-volt shutdown board l
2A2-A and the fuel handling exhaust fan "A" In August 1997, the licensee discovered that the breaker was not included in the appropriate surveillance instruction. TS 4.8.3.3.b requires that at least once per 60 months each circuit breaker is subjected to an inspection and preventive maintenance in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations.
Prior to this discovery, in May 1996, the breaker had I
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been successfully tested under the requirements of TS 4.8.3.3.a. which is an 18 month functional test of a representative sample of circuit breakers.
During the revision process to correct the procedure iri October 1997 the licensee identified that the surveillance on the fuel handling exhaust fan "A" breaker, required by TS 4.8.3.3.b. had been last performed in March 1989, and was therefore outside the 60 month required inspection interval.
This i.s identified as a failure to follow the surveillance requirement of TS 4.8.3.3.b.
The licensee subsequently l
completed the procedure revision and successfully performed the 60 month
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surveillance on the breaker. Additionally. the licensee initiated other corrective actions, as described in the LER, to prevent recurrence.
This failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is being
treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section IV of the NRC l
(NCV 50-327, 328/98-04-03)
M8.3 (Closed) LER 50-327/97-012-00: Manual Reactor Trip Due to Loss of i
Control Air.
This event was discussed in Inspection Reports60-327 l
328/97-08 and 97-12.
In addition to this LER. the licensee performed an event critique which was documented in PER No. SO971825PER. The LER and PER initiated corrective actions which appeared to adequately address
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the root causes of the event.
No new issues were revealed by the LER or the PER.
M8.4 (Closed) EA 96-414 (01013): Failure to Correct Repetitive Problems With a Main Feedwater Isolation Valve Brake Assembly.
The inspectors verified the corrective actions for the above violation described in the licensee's response letter, dated January 23. 1997, to be reasonable and complete.
The inspectors verified that the motor brake was replaced and i
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retested. verified that spray shields were installed above the motor brake assembly to prevent water impingement on the motor operator and brake assembly for the Unit 2 feedwater isolation valve. visually verified that no other feedwater valves had a water intrusion problem, and verified that the rubber hoses from the tell-tale drains were replaced.
These actions were completed prior to startup from the October 1996 forced outage.
M8.5 (Closed) EA 96-414 (01033): Failure to Adequately Correct the Effects of a Deluge Actuation.
The inspectors verified the corrective actions for
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the above violation described in the licensee's response letter, dated January 23. 1997, to be reasonable and complete.
The inspectors verified that the Unit 2 turbine impulse pressure switches were replaced, and that the junctions boxes were sealed to prevent water intrusion.
The inspectors noted that the licensee did not identify any additional safety related/ quality related junction boxes with water intrusion.
The licensee did identify additional non-safety related junction boxes with water intrusion, which were corrected.
Proper sealing techniques were incorporated into the turbine building related procedures.
M8.6 (Closed) LER 50-328/96-005-00: Manual Reactor Trip, as a Result of an Unexpected Loss of Load, with Feedwater Isolation and Auxiliary
Feedwater Start.
The events described in this LER were addressed in the
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closure of the escalated action violations related to the same event, l
in Sections M8.4. M8.5. and E8.2 of this report.
No new issues were l
revealed by this LER.
M8.7 (Closed) EA 96-414 (02013): Procedure Violations for Reactor Trip
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Breaker Maintenance.
(Closed) EA 96-414 (02023): Failure to Follow TS 3.a.1.22.g for an Inoperable Reactor Trip Breaker.
The inspectors verified the corrective actions for the above violations I
described in the licensee's response letter, dated January 23, 1997, to be reasonable and complete.
The inspectors verified that the procedures for testing the reactor trip breakers and bypass breakers, were revised to include continuity checks across the auxiliary contacts after removal and reinstallation of the inertial latch and prior to placing the breakers into service. The inspectors also observed the performance of the continuity checks for the auxiliary contacts.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed the revisions to Site Standard Practice procedure SSP-2.51. Rules of Procedure Use, which provided requirements for adequately documenting the performance of steps out of sequence.
The second violation was due to not recognizing that the reactor trip l
breaker was inoperable and the corrective actions for the first l
violation will correct this problem.
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M8.8 (Closei) VIO 50-328/97-03-04: Failure to Adequately Test the Reactor l
Trip Breaker P-4 Function.
The inspectors verified the corrective actions for the above violations described in the licensee's response
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letter, dated June 11. 1997, to be reasonable and complete.
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violation was related to the escalated enforcement action EA 96-414 and l
the corrective actions for that violation to test the reactor trip breaker, were also applicable to this violation.
In addition, the plant work order process was revised to provide an Operations Work Order Pre-
l Approval checklist, to address work activities that could potentially invalidate previous surveillance activities.
These procedural changes were made in Site Standard Practice procedure SSP-6.31. Revision 8.
Maintenance Management System Pre-and Post-Maintenance Testing.
M8.9 (Closed) LER 50-328/97-001-00: Missed Surveillance on the Turbine Trip Contacts of the Reactor Trip Breakers.
_(Closed) LER 50-328/97-001-01: Missed Surveillance on the Auxiliary Contacts of the Reactor Trip Breakers.
The events described in these LERs were addressed in the closure of violation 50-328/97-03-04. related to the same event, in Section M8.8 of this report.
No new issues were revealed by the LERs.
M8.10 (Closed) IFI 50-327. 328/97-17-05: Follow-up of Maintenance Rule Related Activities.
This item was issued to identify the need to follow-up two areas of concern regarding adequate implementation of the Maintenance Rule.
The first item identified that the licensee's Maintenance Rule procedure contained misleading information concerning the classification of functional failures with regard to return to service errors after performance of a maintenance activity.
The second item related to the adequacy of monitoring of the reactor protection system under the Rule, i
The inspector reviewed these concerns and this review resulted in the l
following conclusions:
The first concern was that the licensee had not revised their Maintenance Rule implementing procedure (SPP-6.6. " Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring. Trending, and Reporting -
10 CFR 50.65." Revision 0) to clarify the definition of maintenance to include operational errors associated with a maintenance activity as discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.160. " Monitoring the effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants." Revision 2.
The licensee had provided examples in SSP-6.6 which could lead systems engineers to misclassify maintenance associated operational errors as not being maintenance preventable functional failures under the Rule.
The inspector reviewed the current procedure (SSP-6.6. Revision 1) and
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determined that the specific examples had been removed from the procedure, and had been repiaced with a logic flow chart for classification of these errors.
The inspector reviewed the flow chart
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and determined that it was adequate for classification of maintenance related operational errors under the Rule.
This part of the IFI is closed.
l The second concern related to the licensee's monitoring of the reactor protection system.
In order to resolve this concern. the inspector reviewed the system performance criteria, Maintenance Rule and non-Maintenance Rule data, system surveillance testing, block and logic diagrams, and interviewed the system engineer and the Maintenance Rule coordinator. Two issues were of concern. The first issue was that the
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system may not be monitored at a low enough level to prevent masking of L
problems, which would eventually result in a plant trip or an t
inadvertent safety system actuation.
The licensee's performance criteria and Maintenance Rule data collection was established to monitor reliability at the train level.
However, additional discussion with the system engineer determined that system monitoring in many cases went to
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a far lower component level. This was evidenced by the fact that the
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system engineer reviews all work orders on the system and personally
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resolves most of the deficiency reports on the system.
The system engineer provided a computer listing of all failures of the Eagle 21 l
portion of the system as evidence of this detailed monitoring.
The second issue related to unavailability monitoring for the reactor protection system.
Prior to this inspection, the licensee had conducted a review of their monitoring of the system. This review resulted in the identification of a problem of not monitoring unavailability for the system, which had been classified as risk-significant under the Maintenance Rule. This problem was reported on Problem Evaluation l
Report SO980217PER, and at the time of this inspection, corrective actions were well underway. The corrective actions included the following:
The Eagle 21 portion of the system had been reclassified as non-risk significant, and the solid state protection system and the reactor trip breakers had been classified as_ risk-significant in accordance with the probabilistic risk assessment and expert panel judgement.
The 1996 and 1997 unavailability data had been collected for the risk-significant portion of the system, and this data had been verified to be in accordance with the values used in the probabilistic
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risk assessment. The procedures and performance criteria were in the process of being revised to reflect the new system classification and problem evaluation report corrective actions.
The inspector determined that these corrective actions would result in compliance with the Maintenance Rule. This part of the IFI is closed and a non-cited violation is identified NCV 50-327, 328/98-04-04. Failure to Monitor
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Unavailability of the Reactor Protection System Under the Maintenance Rule.
This licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
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l III. Enaineerina E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment l
E2.1 Replacement of Reactor Protection System Power Suooly CaDacitors l
a.
. Inspection Scooe (37551)
L The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action plan for j
replacing Aztec American, model RT and RS series, reactor protection system power supply capacitors, b.
_0 observations and Findinas
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l On April 12,1998. Unit 2 experienced an apparent intermittent failure of a-5 volt power supply in protection set 1 of the reactor protection system causing various alarms associated with Loop 1 and 2 steam flow and feed flow were received. 0perators, upon receiving the alarms, transferred the controlling channel from channel I to channel II.
No plant perturbations were encountered. The faulty power supply was subsequently replaced.
During the review of this event the inspectors learned that the faulty power supply was of a type identified by Westinghouse as being subject to failure when left in service for more than five years. The licensee was informed by letter from Westinghouse in May 1997 that refurbishment of Aztec /,carican model RT and RS series power supplies was recommended at five y.
' interats unless power supply ripple monitoring was used to verify power supply performance.
The. licensee subsequently wrote PER No. SQ971844PER to document the issue and to' initiate a corrective action plan.
Prior to notification
of the recommended refurbishment interval,' the licensee had been measuring ripple voltage at 12 week intervals as part of the preventive maintenance program.
Following notification the monitoring frequency was increased to once every six weeks. The licensee had replaced the input filtering capacitors of the power supplies in 1991 which improved their reliability.
Since 1991 there have been no other failures of
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these power supplies at Sequoyah, j
l The inspector, in discussions with site engineering, learned that the
licensee experienced some delays in finding a qualified vendor to refurbish the power supplies, but that a contract had been recently established with a qualified vendor.
The licensee plans to replace all 104 of the affected power supplies between both units, and to establish a plan for future periodic refurbishment.
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c.
Conclusions The inspector concluded that the licensee had taken appropriate corrective actions to periodically monitor and refurbish reactor protection system power supplies.
This is a positive finding.
E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903)
E8.1 (Closed) URI 50-327. 328/96-13-04: Evaluate the Adequacy of the Fail-Open Design of the RCP Seal Leakoff Isolation Valve.
The events associated with a failure of the RCP seal leakoff valve were discussed in Inspection Report 96-13. -Inspectors questioned whether the valve design to fail open upon loss of control power or air was appropriate.
the effects of the fail-open design on probability and consequences of a small-break loss of coolant accident and whether these solenoid valves should be required to meet the electrical equipment environmental qualification (EO) rule (10 CFR 50.49).
The NRC concluded that (1) the fail-open design of the RCP #1 seal leakoff isolation valve was not inappropriate. (2) through a review of the Sequoyah Individual Plant Examination program that the subject failure mode was insignificant, and (3) the ASCO solenoid valves (seal leakoff isolation) were not required to meet the EQ Rule. This item is considered closed.
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E8.2 (Closed) EA 96-414 (01023): Failure to Implement Corrective Actions For ASCO Aging Problems.
The inspectors verified the corrective actions for the above violation described in the licensee's response letter, dated January 23. 1997, to be reasonable and complete.
The inspectors verified that an engineering evaluation was completed as scheduled by July 16. 1997, and that all ASCO valves were replaced as necessary during the Unit 1 and Unit 2 cycle 8 refueling outages (spring and fall 1997).
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's preventative maintenance program for replacement of aging ASCO solenoid valves as specified in
~ Preventative Maintenance Work Instructions" for Unit 1 ~U1 Solenoid Valve Replacement Evaluation. PM# 062891000. Revision 0" ar:d for Unit 2
~U2 Solenoid Valve Replacement Evaluation. PM# 062892000. Revision 0."
The licensee's preventative maintenance program for replacement of ASCO solenoid valves appeared to be appropriate.
E8.3 (Closed) EA 96-414 (02033): Failure to Perform an Immediate Inoperablity/ Deportability Report.
The inspectors verified the corrective actions for the above violations described in the licensee's l
response letter, dated January 23, 1997, to be reasonable and complete.
l The licensee identified the reason for this violation as a failure by
the management review committet. (MRC) to use the proper proc 6ss for the f
reexamination of deportability issues.
Based on this fiading a I
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bilefing of the MRC members was conducted to discuss appropriately processing PERs.
IV. Plant Sucoort (
S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment S2.3 Alarm Station and Communications
a. Insoection Scooe (81700)
l-The inspector evaluated the licensee's alarm stations and communication equipment to ensure that the application of the criteria of the Physical Security Plan (PSP) were implemented.
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b. Observations and Findinas
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The inspector verified that annunciation of protected and vital area alarms occurred audibly and visually in the alarm stations.
The licensee l
equipped both alarm stations with communication equipment and closed-circuit television (CCTV) assessment capabilities.
The protected area (PA) alarms were assessed by security officers and CCTV.- Alarms were tamper-indicating and self-checking and provided with an uninterruptible l
power supply. These alarm stations were continually manned by capable-
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and knowledgeable security operators. The stations were independent yet redundant in operation. The Central Alarm Station interior was not visible from within or from outside the PA. and no single act could remove the capability of calling for assistance or otherwise responding to an alarm.
The walls, doors. floors, and ceilings.in the alarm stations were bullet-resistant.
The licensee provided means for monitoring and observing, by CCTV.
persons and activities in the isolation zone and exterior areas within the PA. These means provided for assessing intrusion alarms for possible threats occurring in the isolation zone and exterior areas within the PA.
The transmission and control lines used in the CCTV intrusion alarm assessment system had line supervision and tamper indication.
-The inspector evaluated the equipment, operation, and maintenance of internal and external security communication links and determined that they were adequate and appropriate for their intended function.
Each security force member could communicate with an individual in each of the continuously manned alarm stations, who could call for assistance from other security force personnel and from local law enforcement agencies.
l The alarm stations had the capability for continuous two-way voice
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communication with local law enforcement agencies through radio and the
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conventional telephone service. The licensee had compensatory measures for defective or inoperable communication equipment.
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c. Conclusions The licensee was complying with the criteria of the PSP for alarm stations and communications.
S3 Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation S3.1 Security Prooram Plans a.
Insoection Scone (81700)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's PSP. Revision 5. and the Security Personnel Training and Qualification Plan (T&OP). Revision 22. and found that both plan submittals were in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p).
b. Observations and Findinas Review of Revision 5 to the PSP submitted for approval, verified the licensee's compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p).
The PSP changes were made to define the requirements of the contract security force and to delineate the responsibilities of the shift coordinators.
The T&OP Revision 22 changes defined the training responsibilities of the contract training coordinator and the weapons qualification *quirements for the contract supervisors and Central and Secondary Alarm 5tation operators.
c. Conclusions The random review of plans and interviews with appropriate individuals verified that the changes did not decrease the effectiveness of the PSP.
S5 Security Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification S5.1 Security Trainina and Qualification a.
Inspection Scope (81700)
The inspector reviewed this area to ensure that contractor security personnel were appropriately trained in accordance with the regulatory requirements identified in the PSP. Contingency Plan (CP). T&OP. and associated security program implementing procedures prior to their assignment to on-shift operational duties.
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b.
Observations and Findinas The inspection focused primarily on the adequacy and effectiveness of j
security personnel selection and security program training for the newly
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. hired contract security force personnel.
l The inspector verified that employment suitability requirements for those personnel hired by Contractor Protective Services for positions within the contract security force were satisfactorily met.
The inspector
determined that prior to assignment, applicants for contract security force positions were subjected to a screening program to determine if
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l their backgrounds and physical / mental qualifications were such that they i
met the criteria identified in the T&OP. These basic criteria included evidence that the individual was a high school graduate or had passed an
equivalent performance examination: had no felony involving the use of a weapon, or a felony conviction that related to the individual's
. reliability; and was at least 21 years of age or older The inspector verified that the above attributes were successfully met by the 31 newly hired individuals selected for the contract security force positions.
l The security program of instruction for the 31 newly hired individuals selected for the contract security force positions was qualification as
i an Armed Response Officer (AR0). This Basic ARO course of instruction was utilized to provide training for all armed response personnel.
The inspector verified that this course satisfactorily provided the needed training to accomplish the T&QP commitments for all tasks except supervisory tasks.
The Basic ARO course satisfactorily provided the knowledge and skills necessary for qualification-assigned positions to include a practical knowledge in the procedural implementation of i
security requirements; individual post techniques and skill level i
procedures: and weapons training and qualification on the issued security L
handgun, response r1fle, and shotgun.
The central focus of the Basic ARO course was blocks for T&QP Task Qualification. Weapons Training, and On-Job-Training (0JT). Additional blocks of training included General Employee Training. Site Knowledge.
Security Force Organization and Chain-of-Command, Regulatory Requirements. Use of Force and Delegation of Authority, Design Basis Threat. Radiological Emergency Plan, Protection and Handling of Safeguards Information. Safeguards Contingency Plan. Radio Communications, and Defensive Tactics.
The T&QP Task Qualification block of the Basic ARO course consisted of 64 hours7.407407e-4 days <br />0.0178 hours <br />1.058201e-4 weeks <br />2.4352e-5 months <br /> of T&O task qualifications to ensure that trained and qualified personnel were assigned to the security force.
The inspector verified, through the review of lesson plans for associated tasks, and observations and interviews of the new officers, that they had received proper j
instruction and demonstrated the ability to perform the duty assignment The inspector also verified that the post techniques, skill level l
procedures, and procedural requirements were appropriately learned by the
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officers through their satisfactory completion of graded practical proficiency exercises and written examinations.
The physical fitness of the new officers was verified through review of physical fitness examination records.
T&QP ARO qualifications were reviewed for the new officers on the following tasks:
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Perform Surveillance of Protected / Vital Area Boundary
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Respond To and Assess Alarms
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Conduct Searches of Protected / Vital Areas
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Apprehend / Detain Unauthorized Personnel
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Respond to Safeguards Contingency Events l
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Direct Response Team Activities la
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Verify Visitor / Employee Identification and Access
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Authorization
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Ensure Authorized Escorts i
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Issue Appropriate Access Control Badge l
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Control Protected Area Access
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Recognize Unauthorized Materials
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Conduct Hands-on Pat-down Personnel Search
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Conduct Hand-held or Control Walk-through Metal Detector
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Search
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Control Walk-through Explosive Detector Search
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Conduct Package Search
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Conduct Vehicle Search
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Conduct Patrol of Protected / Vital Areas
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Escort Personnel and/or Vehicles Within the Protected Area J
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The Weapons Training block of the Basic ARO course consisted of 64 hours7.407407e-4 days <br />0.0178 hours <br />1.058201e-4 weeks <br />2.4352e-5 months <br /> of weapons familiarization and qualification through lectures, written examinations, and practical proficiency exercises.
l The new officers commented that the firearms instructors provided
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excellent one-on-one instruction on shooting techniques.
Approximately one-half of the new officers had never handled the weapons used on-site.
Upon completion of weapons training, all 31 of the new officers qualified on the weapons used, which speaks highly of the quality of instruction provided.
The personnel selected for contractor security supervisory positions
(lieutenants and sergeants) were all former or current members of the
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security force.
In order to meet T&OP requirements, it was necessary to either initially qualify and/or requalify these personnel for their new supervisory positions.
The inspector reviewed records to verify that the Contractor Protective Services supervisory personnel were appropriately
trained and qualified in accordance with T&QP requirement _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -
I The Basic ARO course also included a block for Site Knowledge.
This I
block, consisting of a lecture and site tour, included identifying the PA i
l boundary locations and access points, the buildings within the PA and their relationships by elevations and physical layout, and the vital area locations in relation to buildings and access points.
Also included was a lecture on security force organization and chain-of-command, which l
provided the new officers with an understanding of the design of the
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security force organization and chain-of-command to be followed. A lecture on regulatory requirements was also included, which provided the j
new officers with a general knowledge of the regulatory requirements for the physical protection of nuclear power generating facilities. A l
lecture on the use of force and delegation of authority was taught which provided the new officers with specific guidance on the use of force.
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including the use of " deadly force." and the authority to carry weapons.
I Additionally, a lecture on the design basis threat was provided. This block included the NRC-identified " design basis threat." upon which the physical protection of nuclear power generating facilities is predicated j
and the types. organization, operational methodology and psychological profiles of potential adversaries to nuclear power generating facilities.
The Basic ARO course included a lecture and written examination on the Radiological Emergency Plan.
This block provided the new officers with an understanding of the responsibilities of security force members during
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a radiological emergency, including accountability, evacuation, and access control.
The inspector verified through test scores that each of
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the new officers received appropriate course instruction and successfully completed the written examination.
The final block of the Basic ARO course consisted of 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br /> of OJT
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training.
During this time period, the new officers were placed with experienced officers who were performing on-shift operational duties.
The inspector determined that each of the new officers had been provided ample opportunity to work on the various security posts to which they could be assigned.
During the period of March 29-31. 1998, the inspector interviewed 9 of the 31 new officers on their ability to perform security duties.
The inspector determined through these one-on-one interviews that the new officers were receiving proper aid and instruction from the experienced officers on shift and that they were being treated in a l
professional manner by their fellow officers. Also, during the one-on-one interviews, the inspector determined that the new officers felt that they were a part of the security force and were being perceived as such by their fellow officers.
Positive feedback was received from each of the six officers interviewed.
l The inspector also verified that the response capabilities of the new officers and new supervisors were appropriately tested.
On March 26, 1998, a response drill was conducted.
The drill was conducted to train the new officers in the duties of responding to threats and other I
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l contingencies to protect the plant against radiological sabotage in accordance with the CP and associated procedures. A walk-down of plant vital systems, security areas, and defensive positions was given to all new officers by the security training staff prior to the drill.
The response team consisted of on-shift security officers with new officers assigned to each response post. The on-shift officers were directed to advise the new officers on response duties and responsibilities which included response tactics, effective communications, defensive positions, use of force, tactical deployment techniques, and command and control.
Pre-drill and post-drill briefings were conducted by the security shift supervisor. The security training staff participated by serving as one of the adversaries and as drill controllers. Two new contract sergeants acted in the capacity of the security shift supervisor and as the Central / Secondary Alarm Station supervisor. The drill scenario consisted of adversaries entering the PA and attempting to damage the residual heat removal service water pumps.
The response team implemented the appropriate actions to protect critical plant safety systems.
The security supervisors in the drill gathered and dispersed information to the appropriate personnel, identified the adversary target, established
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proper defensive positions, communicated with plant operations personnel, and maintained proper command and control of the event.
The drill was
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successfully implemented.
c. Conclusions The inspector concluded, through review of the selection process, review of lesson plans, and performance of in-field observations that adequate and effective preparations had been fully implemented to ensure successful transition to a contract security force on March 29, 1998.
Contractor Protective Services security personnel met the suitability requirements for employment and were appropriately trained in accordance with the regulatory requirements specified in the PSP, CP, T&OP, and associated security program implementing procedures prior to their assignment to on-shift security operational duties.
The inspector also determined that the basic security force officer training, which was successfully completed by each of the 31 newly hired individuals, adequately met the knowledge and skills necessary for qualification and posting to duty assignment.
Review of lesson plans verified that the Basic ARO training course met che requirements of the PSP, CP, T&OP, and associated security program implementing procedure requirements.
Review of examination results and performance observations verified that the 31 newly hired contract security personnel successfully completed the Basic ARO training course.
Observations and review of records verified that the new contractor security supervisors were l
qualified to assume their new positions.
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l S6 Security Organization and Administration S6.3 Staffina Level a.
Insoection Scooe (81022)
The inspector reviewed this area to verify that the on-site physical protection system and security organization were designed to protect against the design-basis threat for radiological sabotage described in 10 CFR 73.1.
b. Observations and Findinas Effective March 29.1998, at 12:00 p.m.. the Sequoyah site security force changed from a proprietary security force to a contract security force.
The inspector was on-site for the changeover.
The inspector determined that the licensee continued to maintain safeguards requirements in accordance with NRC regulations and the licensee's PSP. The inspector verified that the contractor had agreed, in the contractual agreement, to abide by the NRC regulations and the licensee's PSP requirements.
The contractor elected to accept all members of the current security force who applied for a position.
Currently 43 of the proprietary security force have accepted positions with the contractor.
Forty-three proprietary security force, although afforded the opportunity to be part of the contract security force, declined a position with the contractor.
The contractor hired and trained 31 additional personnel to maintain an adequate number of armed responders.
The licensee retained four individuals from the existing security force to act as shift coordinators and hired one from Watts Bar to act as a Shift Coordinator.
Currently, they will remain on shift with the authority to direct physical protection activities of the organization.
Each shift coordinator will also have additional responsibilities which include, plans and procedures, training. systems and equipment, tracking and trending, and regulatory compliance.
Each shift will have one contract lieutenant and one sergeant responsible for shift supervision, who were all fonner or current members of the security force. The contractor has a nuclear experienced manager who is responsible for providing oversight of the contract security force.
The contractor's newly trained security personnel were integrated into the shifts.
The inspector verified that the newly hired individuals were trained to perform their assigned duties in accordance with the PSP.
The j
training of the new contractor security force is discussed in paragraph l
SS.I.
The inspector verified that the licensee has established a chain of
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succession through all levels of the security organization.
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Additionally, the inspector determined that effective communications existed between the members of the security organization who direct the security activities for each shift and the individual in charge of all operations on-site.
l The inspector verified that the total number of officers and armed officers immediately available at the facility was sufficient to fulfill response requirements in accordance with the PSP.
The inspector noted. during discussion with security personnel, that the proprietary security force were concerned that the " armed responders" were to receive a reduction in salary.
Additionally, each member of the proprietary security force lost long-term retirement benefits and vacation time, and had increased costs for medical coverage.
The inspector noted that the contract management team met with the proprietary force in December 1997, to explain the contractor's transition schedule and company policies and had published newsletters on March 6. 9. 11. and 18, 1998, to inform security personnel of the status of the changeover, and to answer officer concerns.
Licensee Human Resources provide the proprietary force with a benefit briefing, which included retirement services, followup sessions to discuss any additional concerns that personnel may have, financial counseling service, and resume preparation with a follow-on 60 day job counseling service.
c. Conclusions The licensee's security management structure and chain-of-command were in conformance with the approved PSP. CP. T&OP. and licensee procedures and applicable regulatory requirements and are adequate and appropriate for their intended function.
The inspector observed officers in performance of their duties during the inspection and concluded that the officers continued to meet PSP and regulatory requirements in a very professional manner. The licensee's proprietary / contract security force maintains the capability to respond to security threats, incidents, or other contingencies.
S7 Quality Assurance in Security and Safeguards Activities S7.1 Audits and Corrective Actions a.
Insoection Scooe (81700)
Based on the commitments of Chapter 11 of the PSP the inspector evaluated the licensee's audit program and corrective action system.
This also ensured compliance with the requirement for an annual audit of the security and contingency programs.
During the inspection, a small representative sample of the problems identified by audits was evaluated
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.by the inspector to determine whether review and analysis were appropriately assigned, analyzed, and prioritized for corrective action and whether the corrective action taken was technically adequate and performed in a timely manner.
b.
Observations and Findinas The licensee's program commitments included auditing the security program, including the Safeguards CP. at least every 12 months. A special. NA-SE0-98-25 audit of the pre-transition from proprietary to contract security was conducted between February 2. 1998, and March 30, 1998. -The audit was thorough. complete, and effective in determining that the contractor was ready and capable of providing required security at the site.
c.
Conclusions Licensee-conducted audits were thorough, complete, and effective in terms of uncovering weaknesses in the security system, procedures, and practices.
The audit report concluded that the security program was effective and recommended appropriate action to improve the effectiveness of the security program.
The licensee had acted appropriately in response to recommendations made in the audit report.
The inspector determined that audit findings and recommendations were reviewed, appropriately assigned, analyzed, and prioritized for corrective action.
The corrective actions taken were technically adequate and performed in a timely manner.
V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 6.1998 and on March 31. 1998 for the regional based inspections.
The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The licensee stated they did not agree that a violation of TS Surveillance 4.8.1.1.1.a took place. They stated that an automatic start of the 1A-A EDG fuel oil transfer pumps is not specifically required by TS LCO 3.8.1.1: that UFSAR. Section 8.3.1.1. which describes the automatic operation of the fuel oil transfer pumps, is viewed as a design capability, not as a TS operability item: that the alarm response procedure for day tank fuel oil level abnormal takes credit for fuel transfer pump manual operation; and that the TS surveillance requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.3 does not test the automatic operation of the fuel oil i
transfer system.
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Based on the above. the licensee does not believe that operation of the l
EDG fuel oil transfer pumps in manual, rather than automatic, affects the ability of the EDG to perform its intended safety function and does not
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believe that a violation of TS occurred.
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During the inspection period, the inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials would be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee
- Bajestani. M.
Site Vice President Burton. C.. Engineering and Support Systems Manager
- Butterworth. H., Operations Manager
- Gates. J., Site Support Manager
- Freeman E. Maintenance and Modifications Manager Herron. J.. Plant Manager l
Kent. C.
Radcon/ Chemistry Manager
- Koehl. D. Assistant Plant Manager O'Brien. B., Maintenance Manager
- Salas. P., Manager of Licensing and Industry Affairs Valente J., Engineering & Materials Manager
- Attended exit interview l
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering
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IP 61726:
Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations
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IP 71707:
Plant Operations
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IP 81022:
Security Organization IP 81700:
Physical Security Program For Power Reactors IP 92902:
Followup - Maintenance IP 92903:
Followup - Engineering
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ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED Ooened l
Iype Item Number Status Description and Reference VIO. 50-327/98-04-01 Open Failure to Perform TS Surveillance l
4.8.1.1.1.a (Section 01.3).
URI 50-327. 328/96-04-02 Open Potentially Inadequate Sampling of IC Ice Basket Weights Due to large number of Unweighable Baskets (Section M3.1).
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l NCV 50-327, 328/98-04-03 Open/
Missed Surveillance as a Result i
Closed of an Inadequate Procedure (Section M8.2)
NCV 50-327, 328/98-04/04 Open/
Failure to Monitor Unavailability Closed of the Reactor Protection System Under the Maintenance Rule (Section M8.10)
Closed Tvoe Item Number Status Description and Reference LER 50-327/97-008-01 Closed Failure to Properly Perform Surveillance Testing on the Containment Air Return Fan Start Logic, the Blackout and Auto Sequencing of the Station Fire Pumps, and Three Function of the Solid State Protection System (Section M8.1).
LER 50-327/97-013-00 Closed Missed Surveillance as a Result of an Inadequate Procedure (Section M8.2).
LER 50-327/97-012-00 Closed Manual Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Control Air (Section M8.3).
VIO 50-327, 328/EA 96-414 Closed Failure to Correct Repetitive (01013)
Problems With a Main Feedwater Isolation Valve Brake Assembly (Section M8.4).
VIO 50-327, 328/EA 96-414 Closed Failure to Adequately Correct the (01033)
Effects of a Deluge Actuation (Section M8.5).
LER 50-328/96-005-00 Closed Manual Reactor Trip, as a Result of an Unexpected Loss of Load, with Feedwater Isolation and Auxiliary Feedwater Start (Section M8.6).
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26 VIO 50-327. 328/EA 96-414 Closed Procedure Violations for Reactor (02013)
Trip Breaker Maintenance (Section M8.7).
VIO 50-327, 328/EA 96-414 Closed Failure to Follow TS (02023)
3.3.1.22.g for an Inoperable Reactor Trip Breaker (Section M8.7).
VIO 50-328/97-03-04 Closed Failure to Adequately Test the Reactor Trip Breaker P-4 Function (Section M8.8).
LER 50-328/97-001-00 Closed Missed Surveillance on the Turbine Trip Contacts of the Reactor Trip breakers (Section M8.9).
i IFI 50-327, 328/97-17-05 Closed Follow-up on Maintenance Rule l
Related Issues (Section M8.10)
LER 50-328/97-001-01 Closed Missed Surveillance on the Auxiliary Contacts of the Reactor Trip Breakers (Section M8.9).
URI 50-327, 328/96-13-04 Closed Evaluate the Adequacy of the Fail-Open Design of the RCP Seal Leakoff Isolation Valve (Section E8.1).
VIO 50-327. 328/EA 96-414 Closed Failure to Implement Corrective (01023)
Actions For ASCO Aging Problems (Section E8.2).
VIO 50-327, 328/EA 96-414 Closed Failure to Perform an Immediate (02033)
Inoperability/ Deportability Report (Section E8.3).
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ARO
- Armed Response Officer CCTV -
Closed Circuit Television CFR - Code of Federal Regulations CP
- Contingency Plan CVCS-Chemistry and Volume Control System DCN - Design Change Notice EDG - Emergency Diesel Generator EQ
- Environmental Qualification ERCW
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Essential Raw Cooling Water IC
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Ice Condenser H0
- Hold Order MCC - Motor Control Center MRC - Management Review Committee NCV - Non Cited Violation NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission OJT - On-Job Training PA
- Protected Area PER - Problem Evaluation Report PSP - Physical Security Plan RCP - Reactor Coolant Pump SI
- Surveillance Instruction SSP - Site Standard Practice SSPS
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Solid State Protection System T&OP
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Training and Qualification Plan TS
- Technical Specifications TVA - Tennessee Valley Authority UFSAR
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Updated Final Safety Analysis Report l
URI - Unresolved Item V-AC
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Voltage-Alternating Current VCT - Volume Control Tank VIO - Violation WO
- Work Order