IR 05000327/1988047
| ML20196D048 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 11/28/1988 |
| From: | Humphrey P, Jenison K, Poertner W, Linda Watson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196D043 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-88-47, 50-328-88-47, NUDOCS 8812080190 | |
| Download: ML20196D048 (24) | |
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"A UNITED STATES g
.g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e
REGION 11 o
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101 MARIETTA ST N.W.
e,,,e ATLANTA, GEORGIA 3o323 Report Nos.:
50-327/88-47 and 50-328/88-47 Licensee:, Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place 1101 Market Square Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.:
50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.:
DPR-77 and DPR-79 Facility Name:
Scequoyah Units 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: October 12-19, 1988 l
Inspectors: l ).ki,wlt k
_ ///?p/2p Jenlson,ftartdpManager Date Signed I 8 b/ut An
//bol0 PgHumphrey,~5Sif4I~nspector Date Signed i AAnb. tri
></2s/w,
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p PoertneFyjshift 1nspector Date Signed
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Approved by: d/f l,./ M
//bts/A&
L.W atson, Chief, Project Section 1 Da1/e S%ned TVA Projects Division SUMMARY Scope:
This announced inspection involved onshift and onsite inspection by the NF.C Restart Task Force.
The majority of expended inspection effort was in the areas of extended control room observation and operational safety verification including operations performance, system lineups, radiation protection, and safeguards and housekeeping inspections.
Other areas inspected included maintenanca observa-tions, review of previous inspection findings, follow-up of events, review o f_
licensee identified items, and review of inspector follow-up items. During this period there was extended control room and plant activity coverage by NRC inspectors.
Results:
No violation were identified.
Seven unresolved items * were identified.
327,328/88 47-01, Inadequate Maintenance Activities, paragraph 8.a
- Unresolved items are matters about which more information '
required to determine whether they are acceptable or Nay involve violations or deviations.
8812000190 881120 PDR ADOCK 05000327
PNV
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327,328/88-47-02, Foreign Material in Valve Body.
paragraph 8.c 327,328/88-47-03, Spill in Auxiliary Building.
pary raph 9.a 327,328/38-47-04, ABI on October 14, 1986.
paragraph 9.b 327,328/88-47-05, Inadvertent CS Test Signal, parsgraph 9.d 327,328/88-47-08, Reactor Trip Signal on October 18, 1988.
paragraph 9.e 327,328/88-47-09, Feedwater Isolation Signal on October 18, 1988, paragraph 9 f
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Two licensee identified violations were identified.
327,328/88-47-06, Inadequate SOI.
paragraph 10
l327,328/88-47-07, Failure to Follow Procedures.
paragraph 12
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No deviations were identified.
In the area of Event Follow-up, five unresolved items were identi-
fied.
In the area of maintena**ce two unresolved items were l
identified.
Licensee identified violations were identifieo in the
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areas of maintenance and restart determinations.
The areas of Operational Safety Verification, Surveillance, and Extended Control i
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Room and Plant Activity Observation appeared to be adequate to l
support current plant operations.
No issues were identified that require resolution prior to the Pastart of Unit 1.
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In those items designated as "closed", the licensee's actions appeared to be adequate.
The items designated as %;en" required
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further M yiew by the inspector or further actica by the licenste as
identified in the body of the report. Some issues listed as "open"
l were found to be adequately corrected to support the restart of Unit I and two unit operation.
There were no items which remain
j onen from this repcet that require resolution prior to Unit 1 restart.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J.
LaPoint. Acting Site Director
- T. Arney, Quality Assurance Audit Manager
- R. Boecken, Maintenance Superintendent J. Bynum, Vice President, Nucinar Power Production M. Ccoper, Compliance Licensing Manager
- 0. Craven, Plant Support Superintendent H. Elkins, Instru ent Maintenance Group Manager R. Fortenberry, Technical Support Supervisor J. Hamilton, Quality Engineering Manager
- G. Hipp, Licensing Engineer L. Martin, Site Quality Manager R. Olson, Modifications Manager J. Patrick, Operations Superintendent R, Pierce, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
'M. Purcell, Licensing Engineer
- M. Ray, Site Licensing Staff Manager R. #ogers, Plant Reporting Section
"S. Smith, Plant Manager S. Spencer, Licensing Engineer M. Sullivan, Radiological Controls Superintenden+
C. Whittemore, Licensing Engineer Other NRC Reprssentatives
- S. Richardson, Director, TVA Projects Division (TVAPO)
- F. McCoy, Assistant Director for TVA Inspection Programs, TVAPD
- L. Watson, Chief, TVA Project Section 1 R. Wescott, Plant Systems Engineer
- Attended exit interview NOTE: Acronyms and initialisms used in this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Sustained Control Room Observation (71715)
The inspectors observed control room activities and those plant activities directed from the control room on a routine basis for the entire period of this report.
a.
Control Room Activities Including Conduct of Operations The inspectors reviewed control room activities and verified that operators were attentive and responsive to plant parameters and conditions; that operators remained in their designated areas and
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were attentive to plant operations, alarms and status; that operators l
employed communicat. ion, terminology and nomenclature that was clear and formali and that operators performed a proper reitef. prior to
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being discharged from their watch standing duties.
Operator repeat-back of verbal instructions and announcement of operstional activities was oracticed by the control room operational
personnel and witnessed by the shif t inspector during the course of
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the shift observance.
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No deficiencies were identified,
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b.
Control Room Manning I
The inspectors reviewed control room manning and determined that
Technical Specifications (TS) requirements were met and that a i
professional atmosphere was maintained in the control room.
The
inspectors found the noise level and working conditions to be acceptable and observed that radios or other non-job-related material
did not exist in the control room. The control room appeared to be i
clean, uncluttered, and well organized.
Special controls were
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established to limit personnel in the control room inner area.
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Operator compliance with regulatory and TVA administrative guidelines
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In one specific instance the control room operational area was cleared of non-operational personnel to allow for the ordered review i
of work activities in progress while maintaining positive operator control over two unit plant operation.
No deficiencies were identified.
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c.
Routine Plant Activities Conducted In or Near the Control Room
P The inspectors observed activities which ruuire the' attentir.n and
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direction of control room personnel.
The inspectors observed that
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necessary plant administrative and technical activities conducted in
or near the control room were conducted in a manner which did not
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compromise the attentiveness of the operators at the controls.
The i
'icensee has a Shift Operations Supervisor office in the control room
area in which the bulk of the administrative activities, including f
the authorized issuance of keys, take place.
In addition, the
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licensee has H0, WR, 51, and modification matrix functions to release
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the licensed operators from the bulk of the technical activities that
could impact the performance of their duties.
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Control Room Alarms and Operator Response to Alarms
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The inspectors observed that control room evaluations were performed utilizing approved plant procedures and that control room alarms were responded to promptly with adequate attention by the operator to the alarm indications.
Control room operators appeared to believe tt.e alarm indications. None were identified by the inspectors that were ignored by the operators.
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The inspector reviewed the annunciator response procedure for alarm
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27 on panel XA-55-120, Steam Generator blowdown Liquid Monitor
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Instrument Malfunction.
No problems were identified with the procedure-e.
Fire Brigade The inspectors reviewed fire brigade manning and 'uslifications on a
routine basis. Both manning and qualifications were found to meet TS requirements.
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Fire brigade activitics were witnessed by the shift inspector during a response to a fire alarm in the computer room of the power office ouilding on October 12, 1988.
The alarm had resulted from smoke emerging from the HVAC duct resistance heaters. These heaters had not been in servf ee recently due to weather conditions and when
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energized the particles that had collected on the heaters burnt off.
The fire brigade response was rapid and the source was located and I
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properly evaluated.
No deficiencies were identified.
f.
Chift Briefing / Shift Turnover and Relief The inspectors observed that U0s completed turnover checklists,
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coriucted control panel and significant alarm walkdown reviews, and
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reviewed significant maintenence and surveillance activities prior to
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relief.
The inspectors observed that sufficient information was
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transferred on plant status, operating status and/or events and abnormal system alignments to ensure the safe operation of the Units.
The inspectors observed the ASCS relief and conclu6d that sufficient
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information appeared to be transferred of, plant status, operating status and/or events, and on abnormal system alignments to ensure
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safe operation.
l The inspectors observed shift brief t.igs conducted by the of fgoing
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personnel assignments were made clear to onccming operations l
personnel. Significant time und effort was empent'ed discussing plant
events, plant status, expected shift activities, shift training,
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significant surveillance testing or maintenance activities, and
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unutual plant conditions.
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No deficiencies were identified.
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Shif t Logs, Records, and Turnover Status Lists The inspectors reviewed 505, U0, and STA logs and determined that the logs were completed in accordance with administrative requirements.
TS intpectors verified that entries were legible; errors were corrected, initialed and dated; logbook entries adequately reflected plant status; significant operational events and/or unusual parameters were recorded; and entry into or exit from TS LCOs were recorded promptly. Turnover status checklists for UOs contained sufficient required information and indicated plant status parame-
ters, system alignments, and abnormalities. The following additional logs were reviewed:
Night Order Log
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System Status Log
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Configuration Control Log Key Log
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Temporary Alteration Log
LCO Log
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In particular, the inspector verified that a configuration control log entry was generated for pressure switches 1-PS-68-68 and 1-PS-68-66 when the switches were removed from service for I maintenance activities.
i No deficiencies were iden*1fiew h.
Control Room Recorder / Strip Charts and Log Sheets
The inspector observed operators check, install, mark, file, and route for review, recorder strip charts in accordance with the
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established plant recesses.
Control room and plant equipment logsheets were found to be complete and legible; parameter limits were specified; and out-of-specification parameters were marked and reviewed during the approval process.
In particular, the inspector witnessed strip chart time identifi-cations of the chart paper to indicate abnormaltties during the l
performance of equipnient testing.
No deficiencies were identified.
3.
Management Activities
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TVA management activities were reviewed on a daily basis by the NRC shift inspectors and startup manager.
First line supervisors appear to be i
knowledgeable and involved in the day to day activities of the plant.
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First line supervisor involvement in the field has been observed.
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general, management response to those plant activities and events that occurred during this inspection period was quick and effective.
No deficiencies were identified.
4.
Site Quality Assurance Activities in Support of Operations During the inspection period, the site QA staff performed audits, inspections, and reviews of the following:
sis required for mode change
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HP activities
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TACFs
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These audit areas were reviewed by the inspector and found tn be adequately resolved by the licensee. The inspector reviewed QA audit reports QSQ-M-88-738 and QSQ-M-88-749 in detail, and identi fied no discrepancies. Day-to-day involvement by the site QA staff in unit operations appeared to be adequate.
Finally, the inspector conducted a weekly discussion with QA management in order to determine management involvement and to review planned audit activities.
The inspector identified no issues.
No deficiencies were identified.
5.
Chronology of Unit 1 Plant Operations The following list ptovides a chronology of significant Unit 1 activities from September 25, 1988 through the end date of this inspection.
a.
The NRC Restart Task Force began shif t coverage on September 25, 1988.
At that time, the unit was in mode 5 with preparations underway for entry into mode 4.
i b.
Unit 1 entered mode 4 on September 27, 1988, at 3:45 p.m. and began performing activities required for entry into mode 3.
c.
Unit 1 RCS was f.eated to 335 degrees F on October 9, 1988 to continue testing and prepare for entry into mode 3, 6.
Operational Safety Veritication (71707)
a.
Plant Tours The inspectors observed control room operations; reviewed applicable logs including the shift logs, night order book, clearance hold order book, configuration log and TACF log; conducted discussions with control room operators; verified that proper control room staffing
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was maintained; observed shift turnovers; and confirmed operability of instrumentation.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, and verified compliance with TS LCOs.
The inspectors verified that maintenance work orders had been submitted as required and that followup activities and prioritization of work was accomplished by the licensee.
Tours of the diescl generator, auxiliary, control, containment and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and plant housekeeping /clernliness conditions.
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following safety-related systems on Unit 1 and Unit 2 to verify operability and proper valve alignment:
Residual Heat Renoval (Units 1 and 2)
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Safeguards Inspection In the course of the monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities including: protected and vital area access controls; searching of personnel and packages; escorting of visitors; badge issuance and retrieval; and patrols and compensatory posts.
In addition, the inspectors observed protected area lighting, and protected and vital area barrier integrity. The inspectors verified interfaces between the security orgarization and both operations and maintenance. Specifically, the Shift Inspector visited the secondary alarm station and reviewed activities in progress.
No violations or deviations were identified.
c.
Radiation Protection The inspectors observed HP practic<ts ed verified the implementation of radiation protection controls.
On a regular basis, RWPs were reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to ensure the activities were being conducted in accordance with the applicable RWPs.
Selected radiation protection instruments were verified operable and calibration frequencies were reviewed.
R*P 88-1-00301, Unit 1 Containment, was reviewed by the inspectors to determine that protective clothing, precautions, briefing documen-tation, and personnel exposur=. were recorded as required.
No discrepancies were noted.
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No violations or deviations were identifie,-_
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7.
Shift Surveillance Observations and Review (61726)
l Licensee activities were directly observed / reviewed to ascertain that surveillances of safety-related systems and components were being con-ducted in accordance with TS requirements.
The inspectors verified that:
testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; LCOs were met; test results met acceptance criteria requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; deficiencies were identified, as appropriate, and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by management personnel; and system restoration was adequate.
For completed tests, the inspector verified that testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by qualified individuals.
The following activities were observed / reviewed with no deficiencies identified:
Surveillance Instruction, SI-276, Rev. 15, Auxiliary Feedwater Automatic Control Valves Operability, was reviewed while testing was in progress. The inspector noted that two of the valves included in the test did not meet the acceptance criteria. It was further noted I that test deficiencies were documented for review and disposition.
This activity was determined to'be acceptable.
During the inspection period, the following problems were identified in SI performance:
The inspector reviewed the completed SI package for SI-654, Fire Header Valve Seals Inspection. The inspector observed that the seal verification had not been completed for valve 1-26-814 and that the procedure had been reviewed by the ASOS and the STA and that a deficiency had not been documented in the SI package.
During discussion with the STA, it was determined that the valve was not required to meet TS requirements.
However, the STA agreed that the valve should be checked as required by the procedure or that a deficiency should be documented in the SI package.
The SI package was still in the review process, the valve is not listed in the TS and the valve does not affect system operability, therefore the inspector considers that no violation occurred.
The SI was subsequently satisfactorily completed by checking valve 1-26-814.
The inspector had no further questions.
During the performance of SI-2a7.700, Response Time Test of Auxiliary Feedwater System Auto Start Relays, the licensee determined that the seal-in relay for the MFPT B trip signal was defective. The licensee initiated a PRO and a work request to replace the defective relay.
The inspector had no further questions.
No violations or deviations were identifie..
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8.
Monthly Maintenance Observations (62703)
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components
were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance i
with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and were in conformance with TS.
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I The following items were considered during this review:
LCOs were met l
while components or systems were removed from service; redundant components were operable; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the i
work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were l
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inspected as applicable; procedures used were adequate to control the activity; troubleshooting activities were controlled and the repair
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records accurately reflected what actually took place; functional testing and/or calibratians were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; QC records were maintained; activities were
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accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; QC hold points
were established where required and were observed; fire prevention
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controls were implemented; outside contractor force activities were
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controlled in accordance with the approved QA program; and housekeeping l
was actively pursued.
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a.
Review of Maintenance Activities
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I During this inspection period the licensee identified problems with the following maintenance activities:
The licensee identified that the #4 RCP lower thrust bearing and
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seal water return RTO le&ds were reversed.
The licensee
determined that the leads were reversed in July or August due to
a drawing deficiency that was generated during a walkdown. The
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leads were reversed without verifying where they actually l
terminated.
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The licensee identified that the maintenance activities
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associated with replacing the diaphragm on valve 1-FCV-62-70 I
were inadequate and resulted in diaphragm failure, valve
closure, and isolation of the normal RCS letdown flowpath.
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These items are identified as URI 327,328/88-47-01 pending completion
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of the licensee's investigation.
These items do not affect the restart of Unit 1.
b.
Temporary Alterations (TA"s)
The following TACFs were review =J-TACF 1-85-070-30, Auxiliary Building General Exhaust Fans l
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TACF 0-88-09-959, Temporary Fire Hose Connection from a Mobile Water Treatment System to DWST Drain No violations or deviations were identified.
c.
Work Requests
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The following work requests were reviewed:
Work activities performed per Work Request, WR B780366, were reviewed by the inspector. This activity consisted of adjusting the alarm set point to the upper end of the tolerance band on radiation monitor 1-RM-90-123. The adjustment w t ', required because the monitor was in a continuous state of alarm.
The inspector reviewed WR B772541.
This WR was initiated to repair valve 1-FCV-003-136A which leaked through.
During the maintenance activities associated with this valve, the licensee determined that a rag was lodged on the seat of the valve. This valve had been previously disassembled and reassembled to correct the valve leak but the activity was unsuccessful.
Initial investigation by the licensee determined that the rag was probably left in the valve during the previous maintenance I
activity.
This is identified as URI 327,328/88-47-02 pending completion of the licensee's investigation.
This does not affect the restart of Unit 1.
No violations or deviations were identified,
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d.
Hold Orders The inspectors reviewed various H0s to verify compliance with AI-3, revision 38, Clearance Procedure, and that the H0s contained adequate information to properly isolate the affected portions of the system being tagged. Additionally the inspectors verified that the required I
tags were installed on the affected equipment.
The following H0s l
were reviewed:
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Hold Order Equipment 1-88-107 Evaporator Hand Switch, 1-HS-62-184 2-88-531 Unit 2 SG Layup Water Treatment l
Recirculation Pumps 2, 3, & 4 1-88-1457 1C CCP Room Cooler No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Event Follow-ur (93702, 62703)
a.
At approximately 1:00 a.m., on October 13, 1988, water was noticed on the floor at elevation 669 in the auxiliary building.
Investigation by the licensee determined that the water resulted from the drain
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valve for RM 0-90-122 being left open and from flow blockage of the floor drains.
This resulted in the water from the drain valve spilling onto the floor. The RM had been backflushed earlier on the previous shif t.
However, the operator had forgotten to close the drain valve as required by the backflushing procedure.
This is identified as URI 327,328/88-47-03 pending completion of the licensee's investigation.
This does not affect the restart of Unit 1.
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b.
At 2:28 p.m.,
on October 14, 1988, a B train ABI occurred during the performance of SI-82, Functional Tests for the Radiation Monitoring System.
The SI was being performed as the PMT for WP 11266 that installed a seal-in circuit for radiation monitor 0-RM-90-103.
The licensee determined that the seal-in circuit had not deenergized prior to unblocking the radiation monitor. This was caused by having a multi-meter set to read resistance attached across the high radiation contacts.
This setting provided a shunt around the high radiation contacts which kept the downstream seal-in circuit energized regardless of whether the contacts were open or shut.
To prevent reoccurrence, the licensee revisec' SI-82 to ensure that the seal-in circuit was deenergized prior to unblocking the radiation monitor.
The licensee also plans to install an indicating light on the seal-in reset switch to indicate when the seal-in circuit is energized.
This is identified
.s URI 327,328/88-47-04 pending completion of the licensee's investigation.
This does not affect the restart of Unit 1.
c.
At 2:17 a.m., en October 16, 1988, valve 1-FCV-62-70 failed shut and resulted in the isolation of the normal RCS letdown flow path.
The operators placed excess letdown in service and stabilized pressurizer level at approximately 60*..
A WR was initiated to repair the valve and it was determined that the valve diaphragm had failed. After the valve was repaired and functionally tested normal RCS letdown was reestablished. As a rr ult of this event the licensee determined the diaphragm failed as a result of previous maintenance activities conducted on the valve.
This event was discussed earlier in paragraph 8.a.
d.
At 9:13 p.m., on October 17, 1988, a containment spray test signal was generated during the performance of SI-227, Response Time Testing Reactor Protection System Trip Functions. The signal occurred during the performance of step 6.2.3 which required the IM to depress Manual Input Function Test Switches I and III associated with the test in progress.
The IM instead depressed switches I and III associated with Containment Spray Test.
These switches were located in the panel above the ones that were identified in the procedure.
As i result of depressing the wrong switches, a containment spray test signal was generated. Tne test signal did not initiate a containment spray start signal because the start signal circuitry was inten-tionally blocked. This is identified as URI 327,328/88-47-05 pending completion of the licensee's investigation. This does not affect the restart of Unit _ _ - _ - - _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
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At 11:13 a.m., on October 18, 1988 a reactor trip signal was
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generated on Unit 1 due to low-low level in SG #3. The reactor trip i
breakers were open at the time so an actual reactor trip did not
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9-occur. The trip signal was generated due to maintenance personnel l
l operating a radio in the #1 fan room located inside containment. One t
channel of SG #1 low-low level was already tripped due to calibration
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activitie> and when the radio signal picked up the other channel, the
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2 out of 3 logic was completed and t5e trip signal was generated.
This is identified as URI 327,328/88-47-08 pending completion of the
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licensee's investigation.
This does not affect the restart of
Unit 1.
f.
At 3:13 p.m., on October 18, 1988 a feedwater isolation signal was
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generated on Unit I due to high-high SG level in SG #1.
The signal
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was generated due to the feed regulating bypass valve opening during
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the backfill of SG level transmitter 1-LT-3-42.
1-LT-3-42 shares a
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common reference leg with 1-LT-3-174 which supplies the control signal
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to the bypass valve.
The bypass valve was in automatic during the backfill and the backfilling operation generated a low SG level
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indication that resulted in the bypass valve receiving an open
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signal.
The reactor operator noticed that the bypass vaive had
opened and placed the valve controller in manual and shut the valve.
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At the time of the valve closure, SG level was approximately 74%.
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However, the cold feedwater injected into the SG was heated to RCS t
j temperature and level continued to increase to greater than the 75%
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SG level feedwater isolation signal.
This is identified as URI i
327,328/88-47-09 pending completion of the licensee's investigation.
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This does not affect the restart of Unit 1.
I 10.
NRC Inspector Follow-up Items, Unresolved Items, Violations, Bulletins i
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(Closed) IFI 327,328/88-37-03, Failure to Meet the Requirements of 10 CFR f
50 Appendix R,Section III.J
Prior to the July 1988 Special Appendix R Compliance Inspection (327,
328/88-24), the licensee discovered that additional 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> emergency
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I lighting would be required in both Units 1 and 2.
These areas are
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l associated with procedures from Revision 9 of Calculation SQN-SQS4-0127, (
Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown in Accordance with 10 CFR 50,
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Appendix R.
l The lighting units were added in accordance with DCN M0055SD, The units were inspected by the staff on October 6, 1988.
All lighting was l
determined to be adequate for the tasks involved.
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t This item is closed.
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(Closed) IFI 327,328/88-37-04, Failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.G.2 As a result of the March 1988 Special Appendix R Compliance Inspection (327,328/88-24) findings, TVA evaluated the potential for loss of all RCS letdown paths due to spurious closure of valves, and/ or loss of coolant due to spurious actuation of block valves.
From this evaluation, TVA dissovered three areas in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building as well as the Unit 1 Containt..ent Annulus which required modification.
These modif1-cations consisted of the addition of eight sprinklers in the Containment Annulus, the addition of I sprinkler head in 6.9 KV Shutdown Board Room A, the addition of 1 sprinkler in the Reverse Osmosis Room, A10, elevation 734, the rerouting of Cable IV55988 in Room A10 and the wrapping of conduit IPP750A.
Work plans for all of the above items were audited on October 6, 1988, and were found to be complete.
Sprinkler locations were checked by field inspection and by photographs. The cable wrap on cable 1PP750A was also field inspected and found to be adequate.
This item is closed.
(Closed) URI 327,328/88-29-06, Design Issues i
These issues were identified in the Sequoyah Unit 1 Safety System Quality Evaluation which was performed to review the adequacy of the design and as-built configuration of the Unit 1 Containment Spray System.
These examples involved certain design and/or calculation deficiencies.
a.
TVA has integrated into the plant records the test data and documentation supporting the fact that booted mechanical penetrations through the shield building are qualified for all design service and environmental conditions.
No further action is requir;d.
This item is closed.
b.
As a result of actions taken by TVA during the NRC inspection effort and subsequent work by TVA, it was determined that an NRC identified shift in pressure boundaries resulting from new calculations did not impact any hardware.
This item is closed, c.
TVA has reexamined the transient loads on the containment spray ring header as a result of questions raised concerning the prediction of the loads. The predicted loads are relatively small when compared to the design loads of the support mechanisms.
TVA has committed to perform additional calculations in order to refine the predictions and verify some initially used assumptions.
This additional effort will be completed post-restart.
Tiiis item is close ____-_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.
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N
1 d.
This issue reflected a composite of three separate matters, all of which have been addressed by TVA.
An error in a piping elbow as-built dimensien in a walkdown package was corrected by TVA to i
resolve one item. For another item, an error on a summ.ry page of a
.
calculation set was corrected.
In the last matter TVA acknowledged that some piping analysis isometric drawings for Units 1 and 2 used
- only Unit 2 hanger marks.
_
This item is closed.
j.
e.
Two documentation problems which were identified have been corre:ted by TVA. The first issue related to a relocation of a pipe support without a recheck of adjacent nozzle loads but the subsequent
,
'
evaluation indicated no significant affects on the pipe, support., or equipment.
The second issue involved a dimensional difference between actual and
analyzed design conditions which had not been addressed. Subsequent j
TVA analysis demonstrated no significant impact.
!
This item is closed, f.
TVA committed to perform a minimum of a three point test for the I containment spray pumps prior to the restart of Unit 1.
The tests I
have been completed and observed by the Resident Inspectors, i
]
This item is closed.
l g.
TVA has revised the NPSH calculation for the containment spray pumps and used the maximum flow rate.
The results indicate acceptable
NPSH.
This item is closed.
h.
TVA has completed unique calculations for the Unit I containment i
spray pump heat exchangers to verify the adequacy of the existing configuration based on unique Unit I nozzle loads to resist all loading conditions.
These calculations indicate the current configuration meets the design criteria.
This item is closed, l
i 1.
TVA has reviewed the containment spray heat exchanger system calculations for consistency with the FSAR, the design system.
criteria and the component specifications.
As a result of these l
j reviews, differences were identified.
These differences have been justified on the basis that the values used were conservative.
,
This item is close i
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J.
TVA provided an analysis for the unlikely situation of an Annubar flow measurement device being clogged and has described the operator actions necessary to allow him to assess whether flow has been
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established.
TVA also determined that there is sufficient flow to
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the spray ring header even when the mini flow line is opened and l
,
operating.
On a related issue TVA is correcting the calculations which address accuracy and repeatability.
,
This item is closed.
k.
TVA located a failed Annubar and removed it from the containment spray system.
The new Annubar has two support points and is constructed from a more ductile stainless steel and is expected to l
function without failure.
It was also determined that no other I
single side supported annubars exist in other safety-class systems,
.
i l1 This item is closed.
[
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l 1.
TVA has demonstrated that the scenario presented has been addresseo i
in the design and is acceptable with respect to any leakage path to
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the atmosphere via the RWST.
I
This item is closed.
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h m.
TVA has corrected a typographical error on an instrument data sheet i
and has initiated action for an update to the next revision of
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WCAP 11239. Additionally TVA has demonstrated that the accuracy of
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l the instruments will maintain the design safety limits for operation.
i
Thi, item is closed.
j n.
TVA has explained the source of the discrepancies in the accuracy of l
.,
RWST level measurements. The values in WCAP 11239 were furnished by
]
TVA and the current WCAP revision will be updated as a nonrestart l
item.
)
This item is closed.
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i
"
o.
TVA has clarified an apparent error in an identified weld.
This t
discrerancy was found to be a documentation problem, i
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This item is closed.
i j
p.
TVA has completed unique calculations for the Unit I containment
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spray pump heat exchangers to verify the adequacy of the existing l
.
configuration based on unique Unit I nozzle loads. These calcula-I
]
tions indicate the current configuration meets the design criteria.
j This item is closed.
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-, -. - - - -. -. _. - _. - _. _ -. _ _ _ _ _. - _ -. _..,.
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. - -. ~ - -.
. _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
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q.
TVA has completed additional work on the three issues encompassed by
this item.
Issue one addressed the seismic qualification of the
,
bolting between the containment spray pump motor and the base plate l
assemoly. TVA provided additional documentation which was acceptable.
l t
The second issue addressed calculations that define the correct
'
nozzle loads on the Unit I containment spray pumps. These loads have been incorporated and the anchorage design for the pumps has been (
checked and found to be adequate.
The third issue addressed the slotted holes found in the pump base
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pads.
No design changes were necessary to resolve this issue.
A l
generic review was also made on this item where embedded, non-sleeved i
anchor bolts were utilized.
!
This item is closed.
r.
TVA has verified that calculations exist for all loading cases described in the FSAR and specifically for the effects of the
containment spray system piping supports on the steel containment l
vessel. These calculations include the global effects. In all cases L
the stresses met the allowable stress criteria. Additionally, for local stres;es it was reverified that TVA had considered the thermal i
i effects of local pipe support attachments.
!
This item is closed, s.
TVA has completed revisions to the calculations in which errors were
,
found. These calculations dealt with the design of members and welds for the containment spray heat exchanger supports.
The completed l
revisions indicated that stresses still meet the design allowables.
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This item is closed.
[
(Closed) Shift Inspector Item, 327,328/88-40-GH-01, Examples 1 and 2.
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Example 1:
The inspector revNwed the accidental ABI that occurred on September 27, 1988, as a result of an operator inadvertently tripping the
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power supply to radiation monitor 0-RM-90-101B. The licensee's analysis j
that this was caused by the operator's hand slipping while attempting to r
open ar adjacent breaker resulting in the wrong breaker being opened was
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verified by the inspector.
The licensee determined that this was an i
isolated occurrence and provided the operators with a lessons learned f
presentation of the event.
.
Exan.ple 2: The inspector reviewed the licensee's analysis of the event on
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September 29, 1988, which resulted in a B train ABI signal.
The signal was caused by an electrician bumping into a time delay relay for radiation monitor 0-RM-90-103, while performing work inside the instrument panel
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P
.,_.m
~..__, -.-<--
w n.c,,
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________
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_ _ _ __--_ - ____
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._ __ ______-
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housing the relay. The investigation determined that the event was an isolated event as documented in LER 50-327/88-04. In addition, the correc-tive actions will be tracked under the LER.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Shift Inspector Item, 327,328/88-40-GH-02.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's analysis of the incident involving fuses missing in the potential transformer for the alternate feeders to 6.9 kv unit boards 2A and 2C. The condition was identified by the licen-see on September 29, 1988, and was immediately corrected. The fuses were determined to have been removed following an electrical thunder storm that occurred on August 15, 1988.
The cause was determined to be a result of an inadequate System Operating Instruction, $01-202.1, whien was utilized to restore the system to normal operation, but did not contain steps to ensure that the PT fuses were reinstalled.
This is identified as licensee identified violation 327,-
328/88-47-06. This does not affect the restart of Unit 1.
This issue was identified by the licensee and prompt corrective action was taken.
As a result of OSP management review, this issue was determined to be a licensee identified violation and is designated LIV 327,328/88-47-06. A notice of violation will not be issued and because of the corrective action accomplished by the licensee no further review is necessary.
This item is closed.
11. Shift Inspector Followup Issues Issue Number Description Resolution 88-40-GH-01 Personnel related Closed in paragraph events (2 examples)
10 of this report.
88-40-GH-02 Missing fuses in Closed in paragraph unit board 2A 10 of this report.
88-46-DL-01 SI-166.6 UHI 88-46-PH-01 1-FCV-63-598 Leak 12. Review of Engineering Assurance Restart Determinations The following references were reviewed to evaluate whether Engineering Assurance restart determinations were adequate:
a.
QA Memo to file (Martin /Wilkey) dated September 24, 1988 b.
EA Memo to file (Von Weinsenstein/Malone) dated March 21, 1988
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c.
CAQR SQT880215 EA Restart Determinations d.
QA Memo to file (Martin /Wilkey) dated September 22, 1988 e.
EA Memo to file (Von Weinsenstein/Malone) dated July 1, 1988 f.
EA monitoring report EAM-003 g.
EA memo to file (Von Weinsenstein/Malone) dated August 9, 1988 h.
CAQR SQE-88038-1803, EA Restart Training 1.
EA Memo to file (Capozzi/Trudel) dated July 8, 1988 j.
DNE Memo to file (Trudel/ Knight) dated September 8, 1988 k.
DNE Memo to file (Trudel) dated July 22, 1988
As a result of NRC activities. Sequoyah QA evaluated the EA restart determinations identified in references b, c, e and g. The licensee's i
evaluation and verification process was outlined in reference d, and the
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results were documented in reference a.
t
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The results of this evaluation were that QA identified no instance where l
the EA restart determination was rejected. Three instances were identi-fied where additional information was necessary in order for QA to agree
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with the EA restart determinations.
These items were SQP-ECN-7210,
PIR-SQN-MEB-87115, PIR-SQN-MEB-8704, and were resolved to the satisfaction
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of QA in reference a. In consideration of the sample size, and that the I -.
issues evaluated were not a random sample, QA concluded, in reference a, that there was a 95% confidence that EA restart determinations were
adequate.
The inspector reviewed references a, b, and d through k.
It was deter-
_
mined by the inspector that the issues involved mainly administrative a
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issues.
The inspector identified no items which were incorrectly deter-l mined to be nonrestart.
The inspector reviewed reference e to determine if adequate resolution of
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the CAQR was achieved.
Reference e determined that restart procedures SQEP-45, and SQEP-70 had not been fully complied with administrative 1y.
,
In addition, reference c determined that no restart determinations were inadequate. The inspector determined that the corrective actions for the administrative errors were adequate.
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Reference b was reviewed by the inspector after resolution by the licensee on September 29, 1988. The corrective actions implemented by the licensee appeared to be adequate and the issues had been previously identified through the licenwe's corrective action process as affecting the restart of Unit 1.
The administrative issues identified above are examples of
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failure to follow procedure. This issue was previously identified by the licensee and corrective actions were reviewed and found to be adequate.
As a result of OSP management review, this issue is considered to be a licensee identified violation, LIV 327,328/88-47-07. A notice of viola-tion will not be issued and because of the corrective action accomplished by the licensee no further review is necessary.
This item is closed.
13.
Maintenance Program Backlog Review (62700)
This inspection is a continuation of the inspection initiated in IR 327,328/88-46.
The intent of this inspection is to establish the amount and extent of backlogged maintenance at Sequoyah and to determine if this backlog is ac:eptable for the licensee to enter mode 2.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's maintenance management system program description documented in Standard Practice SQM-2, Maintenance Management System, revision 3, dat:d July 7, 1988.
This document de-scribes the system that the licensee uses to prioritize inprocess plant equipment corrective maintenance. The definitions tre as follows:
Priority 1 Emergency - life / limb, property damage.
The work may begin in parallel with planning on authorization of the Shift Operating Supervisor.
I Priority 2 Immediate attention hinders station l
operation, or has the potential to hinder station I
operation.
Start in less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Priority 3 Routine - Has potential to degrade station operation generally has sufficient priority to force a planned system outage (if needed).
Start within 7 days.
Priority 4 Routine - Necessary but can wait for a currently scheduled system outage (if needed). Start
)
within 21 days.
Priority 5 Routine - Forced outage work (mode 3, 4, or 5 outages of less than 2 weeks duration).
Priority 6 Routine - Extended outage (greater than 2 weeks duration) or refueling outage (mode 5 or 6).
Priority 7 Routine - Work on spare equipmen _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
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l When Unit 1 enters mode 2, the licensee currently has scheduled all priority 1 through 4 work to be complete. The inprocess plant equipment corrective maintenance work backlog is composed of work in priorities 5 and 6.
Work to be conducted on priority 7 equipment and work to be completed under service awards (painting floors and walls, cutcing grass.
- ?tc.) is not included in the following discussion. The current inprocess plant equipment corrective maintenance work backlog is distributed approxi-mately as follows:
Component / Category Number Workable Can't Work WRs in Mode 1 in Mode 1 Breakers / Battery
18
Calibrations
5
Chillers / Ice Condenser
6
Cables / Conduits
24
Dampers / Filters
12
Fans
13
rianges
6
Flow Instruments
8
1
Insulation / Painting
13
l Level Instruments
3
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Limihorques
11
Limit Switches
3
Motors / Diesel
18
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Piping / Fitting
13
I Pressure Instruments
11
Radiation Monitors
7
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Structural / Hangers
19
l
{
Temperature Instrs
4
Valves
68
,
Ground Wire
6
i P250/ Annunciators
10
(
Total 335 279
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I The current inprocess plant equipment naintenance backlog does not appaar
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to be excessive, does not exhibit any particular pattern with respect to component, system or failure mode, and does not appear to be an impediment to Segnoyah Unit 1 mode change operations.
J No violations or deviations were identified.
14.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 19, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The Startup Manager de-scribed the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection find-ings listed below. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and
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did not identify as proprietary any of the material reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
Inspection Findings:
Seven unresolved items were identified.
i 327,328/88-47-01, Inadequate Maintenance Activities.
i paragraph 8.a i
327,328/88-47-02, Foreign Material in Valve Body.
paragraph 8.c l
327,328/88-47-03, Spill in Auxiliary Building.
paragraph 9.a
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l 327,328/88-47-04, ABI on October 14, 1988.
paragraph 9.b l
327,328/88-47-05, Inadvertent CS Test Signal.
I paragraph 9.d j
327,328/88-47-08, Reactor Trip Signal Generated on October 18, l
1988.
[
paragraph 9.e l
327,328/88-47-09, Feedwater I sol a *.i on Signal on October 18, 1988.
paragraph 9.f
I Two licensee identified violations were identified.
j 327,328/88-47-06, Inadequate SOI.
f paragraph 10
327,328/88-47-07, Failure to Follow Procedures, paragraph 12 l
l No viciations, deviations, or inspector follow-up items were identi-
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fied.
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During the reporting period, frequent discussions were held with the Site Director, Plant Manager and other managers concerning inspection findings.
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15.
List of Abbreviations Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System j
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Auxiliary Building Isolation
AB4
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Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure
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Administrative Instruction AI
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Abnormal Operating Instruction AOI
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Auxiliary Unit Operator AVO
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Assistant Shift Operating Supervisor A505
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Boron Injection Tank BIT
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Control and Auxiliary Buildings C&A
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Conditions Adverse to Quality Report CAQR
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Centrifugal Charging Pump CCP
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Corporate Commitment Tracking System CCTS
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Code of Federal Regulations CFR
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Cold Overpressure Protection System COPS
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Critical Structures, Systems and Components CSSC
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Containment Ventilation Isolation CVI
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Direct Current DC
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Design Change Notice DCN
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Demineralized Water Storage fank DWST
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Division of Nuclear Engineering DNE
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Engineering Assurance EA
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Emergency Core Cooling System ECCS
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Emergency Diesel Generator EDG
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Emergency Instruction EI
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Emergency Notification System ENS
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Engineered Safety Feature ESF
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Flow Control Valve FCV
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Final Safety Analysis Report FSAR
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General Design Criteria GDC
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Generic letter GL
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Hand-operated Indicating Controller HIC
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Hold Order H0
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Health Physics HP
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Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning HVAC
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NRC Information Notice IN
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Inspector Followup Item IFI
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Instrument Maintenance IM
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Instrument Maintenanco Instruction IMI
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Inspection Report
IR
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Kilovolt-Amp
KVA
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Kilcwatt
KW
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Kilovolt
.
KV
<
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l
LCO
Limiting Condition for Operation
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Licensee Event Report
LER
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Licensee Identified Violation
LIV
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Loss of Coolant Accident
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Main Feed Pump Turbine
MFPY
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MI
Maintenance Instruction
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NRC Bulletin
NB
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Net Dositive Suction Head
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRC
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OSLA
Operations Section Letter - Administrative
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Operations Section Letter - Training
OSLT
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Office of Special Projects
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Post Modification Test
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Plant Operations Review Committee
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PORS
Plant Operation Review Staff
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Potentially Reportable Occurrence
PRO
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Potential Transformer
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Quality Assurance
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Quality Cor. trol
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Reactor Coolant Pump
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Reguletory Guide
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Radiation Monitor
-
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Resistance Temperature Detector
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Radiation Work Permit
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Reactor Water Storage Tank
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Safety Evaluation Report
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Surveillance Instruction
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SOI
System Operating Instruction
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SOS
Shift Operating Supervisor
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SQEP
Sequoyah Engineering Procedure
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SQM
Sequoyah Standard Practice Maintenance
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SR
Surveillance Requirements
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Senior Reactor Operator
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Special Test Instruction
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Temporary Alteration Control Form
TACF
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TROI
Tracking Open Items
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TS
Technical Specifications
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Tennessee Valley Authority
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UHT
Upper Head Injection
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U0
Unit Operator
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Unresolved Item
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USQD
Unreviewed Safety Question Determination
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WCG
Work Control Group
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Work Plan
WP
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Work Request
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