IR 05000327/1999002

Insp Repts 50-327/99-02 & 50-328/99-02 on 990214-0327.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations, Maint & Engineering

ML20206C098
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	04/23/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206C088	List: IR 05000327/1999002 ML20206C084
References
50-327-99-02, 50-327-99-2, 50-328-99-02, 50-328-99-2, NUDOCS 9904300179
Download: ML20206C098 (8)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11'

Docket Nos: 50-327,50-328 License Nos: DPR-77, DPR-79 Report No: 50-327/99-02, 50-328/99-02 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)

Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 Location: Sequoyah Access Road Hamilton County, TN 37379 Dates: February 14 through March 27,1999 Inspectors: M. Shannon, Senior Resident inspector D. Starkey, Resident inspector R. Telson, Resident inspector Approved by: P. Fredrickson, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects t

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-327/99-02,50-328/99-02 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance and engineering. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspectio Operations e A Non-Cited Violation (NCV) was identified for failure to perform a proper independent verification when tagging out a safety injection pump. This failure resulted in the racking out and tagging of an incorrect 6.9 kV safety related breaker (Section 01.2).

• Fuel handling personnel were thorough in the handling and inspection of new fuel for the U2C9 refueling outage (Section 01.3).

l e The Management Review Committee was effectively performing its duties and senior l plant management was actively involved in the committee meetings (Section O7.1). !

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Report Details 1

~ Summarv of Plant Status Unit 1 operated throughout the inspection period at 100 per cent powe Unit 2 began coasting down from 100 per cent power on February 20,1999, in preparation for a

' refueling outage scheduled to start on April 18,1999. When the inspection period ended the l unit was at approximately 74 per cent powe l. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)

The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was considered to be satisfactor .2 improper Indeoendent Verification Curina Taa Out of Safetv-Related Breaker a.- lbspection Scope (71707)

The inspectors reviewed the circumstances related to operators disconnecting, tagging out, and then independently verifying the wrong 6.9 kV safety related breaker while placing a hold orde Observations and Findinos On February 26,1999, two assistant unit operators (AUO), using Hold Order 2-HO-99-0623, were dispatched to the 2A-A 6.9 kV shutdown board to tag out the breaker for the 2A-A safety injection pump for a scheduled maintenance activity on the pum According to the licensee's investigation, the first AUO, responsible for placing the hold order, located the correct breaker, compartment 15, specified on the hold order. He then left the area to obtain a racking tool, but failed upon return to reidentify the correct breaker. As a result, the AUO mistakenly racked out and tagged the adjacent breaker, compartment 16, which was the alternate feeder breaker to the 2A-A 6.9 kV shutdown board. (This did not result in the 2A-A 6.9 kV shutdown board being inoperable). When the second AUO arrived to pedorm the independent verification for the hold order, he 1 compared the hold order tags to the hold order sheet but did not verify that the tags l were hung on the correct breaker. Maintenance personnel walking down the hold order clearance, prior to beginning work, identified the tagging error which was then correcte The inspectors reviewed Site Standard Practice Procedure SSP-12.6, Equipment Status Verification and Checking Program, Revision 10, for licensee expectations regarding independent verification. SSP-12.6, Section 5.0, defines independent verification, in l

part, as "an act pedormed ...that confirms, substantiates, or ensures that an activity or

- condition has been implemented in conformance with specified requirements." SSP-12.6, Section 3.3.1, states that independent verification is required for the components listed in Appendix A of SSP-12.6, which includes the emergency core cooling syste i

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10 CFR 50, Appenu a 9, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings requires that " Activities affe< t quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures ......an . all be accomplished in accordance with these instructions and procedures for dew ining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished." Tis ; ailure to perform a proper independent verification as required by SSP-12.6 is identified as a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, instructions, Procedures, and Drawings. The violation is identified as a Non-citea Violation (NCV)

50-328/99-02-01, Failure to perform proper independent verification when tagging out SI pump 2A-A. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Problem Evaluation Report (PER) No. SO99001610PE Conclusions One NCV was identified for failure to perform a proper independent verification when tagging out a safety injection pump. The failure resulted in the racking out and tagging of an incorrect 6.9 kV safety related breake .3 New Fuel Recelot and Handlina Inspection Scope (71707)

During this inspection period the inspectors observed the licensee's receipt and inspection of new fuel for the upcoming Unit 2 refueling outage (U2C9). Observations and Findinas inspectors conducted frequent observations of the receipt and inspection of new fuel for the U2C9 refueling outage. The inspectors verified that the licensee conducted the receipt and inspections according to Fuel Handling instruction Procedure, FHl-1, Receiving, Returning, inspecting and Storing New Fuel and Inserts, Revision 53. The inspectors observed that the AUOs and the fuel handling senior reactor operator (SRO)

were thorough and meticulous in performing the fuel inspection Conclusions Fuel handling personnel were thorough in the handling and inspection of new fuel for the U2C9 refueling outag j 07.1 Review of Manaaement Review Committee Inspection Scope (40500)

i The inspectors observed the performance of the Management Review Committee l (MRC) on several occasions during this report perio l l

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3 Observations and Findinos The inspectors attended several MRC meetings over the course of the inspection period. .The committee is chaired by the plant manager and is normally attended by the

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site vice president and various department managers. The inspectors observed that senior managers closely reviewed the root causes and corrective actions associated with individual PERs to ensure that deficient conditions were adequately addresse Senior management oversight continued to be evident during MRC meetings and has resulted in increased emphasis on root cause identification and corrective action Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the MRC was effectively performing its duties and that senior plant management was actively involved in the MR Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)

08.1 (Closed) LER 50-327/98003: Reactor Trip Resulting from a Failure of a VitalInverter and a Subsequent Inverter Failure. This event was discussed in inspection Report (IR)

50-327,328/98-11. No new issues were revealed by the LE .2 (Closed) Violation 50-327/98-11-01: Failure to Enter TS 3.0.3 When LCO for TS 3.3. was not met. The inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated March 2,1999, to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems were identifie .3 (Closed) Violation 50-327/98-11-02: Failure to Follow EOP Resulting in Exceeding RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits. The inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's revised response letter, dated March 19,1999, to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems were identifie . Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments Inspection Scope (61726 & 62707)

The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing maintenance and surveillance activitie Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed and/or reviewed all or portions of the following work activities and/or surveillances:

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• WR C442756 Identify and repair source of electrical short in auxiliary control room panel

• WO 99001993 Repair U2 TDAFW trip and throttle valve Conclusions The above maintenance and surveillance act'vities i were completed in accordance with l procedures and performed by knowledgeable personne M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)

M8.1 (Closed) LER 50-327/97013. Revision 2: Missed Surveillance as a Result of an inadequate Procedure. Revision 2 of this LER was issued when additional conditions were identified during the performance of the corrective actions of the LER. On December 16,1998, plant personnel determined that two penetration over-current protection fuses were not included in the surveillance program. One of the fuses supplied power to the Unit 1 reactor building code call (medical / fire alarm) system. The other fuse supplied power to the Unit 2 backup control instrument loops. Upon identification of the missed surveillance, operations personnel entered the appropriate TS action statement and subsequently verified that the fuses met the surveillance requirements. The appropriate procedures were then revised to include the fuse Other than the identification of the two fuses which were not surveilled, identified during the licensee's extent of condition review, no now issues were revealed by Revision 2 of l the LE Revision 0 to this LER was discussed and closed in IR 50-327,328/98-04 and resulted ,

in the identification of a NCV. Revision 1 to this LER was discussed and closed in IR !

50-327,328/98-0 . Enaineerina l E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)

E (Closed) IFl 50 327/97-18-05: Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Update to include Plant Modifications to the Main Switchyard. This IFl was opened to track the completion of the UFSAR revisions for plant modifications to the main switchyard. The inspectors verified that the UFSAR Chapter 8.2, Sections 8.2.1-8.2.1 were revised by UFSAR Revision 13 to include the previous modifications to the main switchyard. in addition, the inspectors verified that UFSAR 8ection 8.2.2, Transmission System Studies, was revised by UFSAR Revision 14, to provide operational guidance in the event that sections of the system became available, such as a loss of the 161-kV capacitor bank The inspectors concluded that the UFSAR revisions were appropriat E8.2 (Closed) IFl 50-327. 328/97-08-03: Removal of Information From the UFSAR. This issue involved the acceptability of removing information from the UFSAR for reasons other than actual changes to the facility or procedures. The inspectors discussed this issue with the NRC Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) Sequoyah project manager and L_

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were informed that removal of information from the UFSAR is an industry generic issu An NRC staff position is forthcoming, but has not yet been developed. This item is being administratively closed, with concurrence of the NRR project manager, based on the industry-wide generic nature of the issu I V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on April 2,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings !

presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee M. Bajestani, Site Vice President C. Burton, Assistant Plant Manager H. Butterworth, Operations Manager J. Gates, Site Support Manager E. Freeman, Maintenance and Modifications Manager J. Herron, Engineering and Support Systems Manager C. Kent, Radcon/ Chemistry Manager D. Koehl, Plant Manager B. O'Brien, Maintenance Mananer P. Salas. Manager of Licens" .nd industry Affairs M. Lorek, Acting Engineering Materials Manager INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED -

IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Process to identify, Resolve, and Prevent Problems IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 92901: Followup - Operations IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance IP 92903: Followup - Engineerir g i

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ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Opened 50-328/99-02-01 NCV ' Failure to Perform Proper independent Verification j When Tagging Out SI Pump 2A-A (Section 01.2).

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50-327/98003 LER Reactor Trip Resulting From a Failure of a Vital Inverter and a Subsequent Inverter Failure (Section O8.1).

50-327/98-11-01 VIO Failure to Enter TS 3.0.3 When LCO for TS 3.3. Was Not Met (Section 08.2).

50-327/98 11-02 VIO Failure to Follow EOP Resulting in Exceeding RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits (Section 08.3).

50-327/97013, Rev 2 LER Missed Surveillance as a Result of an inadequate Procedure (Section M8.1).

50-327/97-18-05 IFl Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Update to include Plant Modifications to the Main Switchyard (Section E8.1).

50-327,328/97-08-03 IFl Removal of Information From the UFSAR (Section E8.2).

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