IR 05000327/1989019
| ML20246M642 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 08/25/1989 |
| From: | Jenison K, Linda Watson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20246M584 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-89-19, 50-328-89-19, NUDOCS 8909070214 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML20246M642 (27) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -
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.l Report:Nos.if 50-327/89-19, 50-328/89-19:
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-Docket Nos.: '50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.: 'DPR-77 and DPR-79'
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a LInspection1 Con'uctedi ~ July 6,71989 thru August"5, 1989
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s Date Signed-l J Jenison, g nior Resident Inspector
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'P. Harmon,15enior Resident Inspector?
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D. Loveless, Resident Inspector
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-L.:$rtson,sChief, Project Section 1 Ddte Signed
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H SUMMARY
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iThis announced: inspection: involved inspection effort by the Resident Inspectors j
in ~ the fareafof 7 operational safety, verification including control ' room y
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- observations, operations performance,. system lineups, radiation protection, yj safeguards', E and shou' ekeeping inspections.. Other. areas inspected included
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maintenance observations, surveillance testing observations, ' licensee self
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' assessment) capabilities, design changes; and modifications,; review of' previous.
l Linspectioni findings, follow-up' of events, review of licensee identified' items, and review of? inspector follow-up items.
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Results.:
- Two violations and one non-cited violation were identified:
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- NCV 327, 328/89-19-03, MG Set Maintenance, Paragraph 4.b.1
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VID-327; 328/89-19-05, Failure to Follow A01-4, Paragraph 9.b w
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failure to Comply with TS Action
,VIO 327, 328/89-19-07,
. Statement, Paragraph 9.c I
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,8909070214 890823
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PDR ADOCK 05000327 Q
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Five-unresolved items were identified:
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URI.327,'328/89-19-01, Manual Manipulation of Motor-0perated
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Valves, Paragraph'2.a
'URI 327, 328/89-19-02, Key. Control. Program, Paragraph 2.d
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URI-327, 328/89-19-04, Airborne Conditions Resulting from Maintenance Activities, Paragraph 8 URI.327,328/89-19-08,-Availability of All Procedures Required
'to Comply With TS Action Statements,.
Paragraph 9.c URI 327, 328/89-19-09,- Diesel Fuel Oil Tank Level Calculations,
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Paragraph 11
' One Inspector Followup Item was identified:
IFI 327, 328/89-19-06,- Inaccurate ENS. Report, Paragraph'9.b During the-inspection period Unit 2 experienced a reactor trip from 100% power.
.The -plant responded as expected in all respects.,The cause of the trip was
' determined to be a. dropped rod.. The licensee was not able to determine the actual rod involved or the specific fault that caused the rod to drop.
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of the trip are contained in paragraph 9.
Other issues detailed in'this report
. include: the ' granting Lof" a waiver of compliance - for-the RCSL vent system
.(described in paragraph 5) and problems encountered by the licensee concerning
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.a failed excore power range detector (described in paragraph 9.c).
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-The' areas of Operational Safety, Maintenance,'and Surveillance appeared to be adequateL and fully capable of supporting current plant operations.
The a
observed activities of the Operations section involved inattention to detail when making an ENS notification of an operational event, failure. to follow procedure.and a non-conservative interpretation of TS requirements.
Details of these deficiencies. are contained in paragraph 9.
Other than the issues noted y
above, no weaknesses were identified during this inspection period.
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The licensee announced the selection of a new plant manager, Mr. Calvin A.
Vondra', during'this inspection period.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons. Contacted
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Licensee Employees
- J. LaPoint, Site Director R. Beecken,. Maintenance Superintendent
- #*M. Cooper, Compliance Licensing Manager D. Craven, Plant. Support Superintendent S. Crowe,-Site Quality Manager R. Fortenberry, Technical Support Supervisor J. Holland, Corrective Action Program Manager W. Lagergren, Operations Superintendent
- C Mason, Acting Plant Manager
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- M. Burzynski, Site Licensing Staff Manager A. Ritter, Engineering Assurance Engineer R. Rogers, Plant Support Superintendent
- B. Schofield, Regulatory Licensing Manager M. Sullivan, Radiological Controls Superintendent S. Spe_ncer, Licensing Engineer
- P. Trudel, Sequoyah Project Engineer, DNE
- C. Vondra, Plant Manager C. Whittemore, Licensing Engineer NRC Employees
- L. Watson, Chief, Project Section 1
- Attended exit interview on August 4, 1989
- Attended exit interview on August 15, 1989 Acronyms and initialisms used in this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
Control Room Observations The inspectors conducted discussions with control room operators, verified that proper control room staffing was maintained, verified that access to the control room was properly controlled, and that operator behavior was commensurate with the plant configuration and plant activities in progress, and with on going control room operations.
The operators adhered to appropriate, approved procedures, including procedures covering reactor trip, loss of rod drive motor generator set, and CVI.
The inspector determined that Operations personnel failed to follow the appropriate procedures to take a Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation channel out of service in the proper manner.
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H This ' failure to follow an approved procedure resulted in an
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inadvertent ESF actuation several hours later when the failed channel spiked above the trip setpoint.
This event is described in Paragraph 9.
The frequency of visits to the. control room by TVA management'was observed and determined to be adequate..The licensee temporarily assigned additional personnel to the control room as a result of the unit 2 reactor trip that is described in parsgraph 9.
The additional personnel included an SOS and Operations Duty Manager on each shift.
The inspector also verified that the licensee was operating the plant in a normal plant configuration as required by TS and when abnormal conditions existed, that the operators were complying with the appropriate LCO action statements.
In one instance, described in Paragraph 9, the operators did not comply with the required action statement.
Instead, the provisions of TS 3.0.3 were entered.
The inspectors also verified that leak rate calculations were performed and that leakage rates were within the TS limits. Finally, the inspectors reviewed instrumentation and control room indicators to ensure that safety limits were not exceeded.
The inspectors observed instrumentation and recorder traces for abnormalities and verified the status of selected control room annunciators to ensure that control room operators understood the
' status of the plant.
The inspector reviewed the computer trends and recorder traces. which were compiled for the reactor trip report described in Paragraph 9.
Operations' personnel and the Event Investigation Team assigned to the Trip Report were knowledgeable and familiar with the recorded information.
During a control. room tour on July 25, 1989, the inspector questioned the operators on Unit 2 regarding the evolution they were conducting to locate and quantify RCS Unidentified Leakage.
The leak rate was approximately 0.8 gpm, and had been slowly increasing over the previous several days since plant startup following the reactor trip.
Operations personnel stated that part of the action plan to locate the leak consisted of hand-tightening four motor operated valves in the BIT flow path.
The valves, FCV-63-25, 63-26, 63-39, and 63-40, are normally closed valves in the flow path from the high-head safety injection pumps, through the BIT, and then to the RCS.
These four valves receive opening signals-when a Safety Injection signal is initiated to allow the contents of the BIT to be injected.
Since the BIT had previously exhibited indication of backleakage from the RCS, these valves were suspected of being the source of the Unidentified Leakage.
The action plan called for these valves to be manually checked closed by declutching the motor operator and using the handwheel to confirm the valves were on their valve seats.
This manual manipulation was documented as complete at 10:27 a.m. on July 25 1989.
At approximately 1:30 p.m. on the same day, the inspector questioned the operators concerning this practice.
The inspector
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discussed the practice of manually positioning valves with Operations personnel, and stated that the valves should be considered inoperable since the manual manipulation constituted an invalidation of the applicable stroke time test of the valves.
The stroke testing is:
part of the surveillance requirements of these particular valves to verify operability.
Operations personnel subsequently performed the applicable stroke testing of the valves that had been manually manipulated.
This was completed at 10:05 p.m. on July 25, 1989.
On July 26, 1989, the inspector discussed, with the Operations Supervisor, the manual positioning of valves which have operability validation by stroke time testing.
The Operations Supervisor agreed that the valves were technically inoperable from the time they were manipulated manually until the stroke time testing was re performed.
The inspector requested information regarding any other valves which may have been made inoperable by this process, and what methods or programs were in place to control the practice.
The licensee'has determined that the four. valver described above were the only valves involved in this issue.
Licensee investigation revealed that there are ne programs or restrictions in place to prevent the practice of manual positioning of valves.
The licensee further stated that a similar concern had been expressed by INPD inspectors.following the May 1989 INPD Special Assist Audit.
Specifically, the Operations Supervisor stated that INPO had stated that Operations personnel did not understand the implications of manual manipulation of motor-operated valves.
A program to address the INP0 findings had been initiated but was not complete or in place at the time of the incident.
The licensee is presently developing a program to control the manual manipulation of all motor operated valves. A Night Order was issued on July 28 to all Operations personnel to preclude hand tightening of motor opera 4ad valves.
The Night Order also specified that any such valve that equires hand tightening will be operated via a WR, and will be consid3 red inoperable until such time as stroke time testing can be performed.
The potential for causing motor-operated valves to be made inoperable should be eliminated by the implementation of an acceptable program.
This issue will be considered as an Unresolved Item, URI 327, 328/89-19-01, Manual Manipulation of Motor-Operated Valves.
Resolution of this URI will include a determination of BIT system operability following the manual manipulation of the motor-operated valves, a determination of the licensee's programmatic control over plant activities and a review of the licensee's corrective actions in response to this issue.
I Panel indications were reviewed for the nuclear instruments, the emergency power sources, the safety parameter di; play system and the L
radiation monitors to ensure operability and operation within TS l
limits.
Control Rod insertion limits were observed to be as spr:ified in the TS.
No violations or deviations were observe __ _ __
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Control-Room Logs
.The ~ inspectors observed control room operations and reviewed applicable logs including the shift logs, operating orders, night order book, clearance hold order book, configuration log to obtain information concerning operating trends and activitfes.
The TACF log was reviewed to verify that the use of jumpers and lifted leads are clearly noted and understood.
The licensee is actively pursuing correction of conditions requiring TACFs.
No issues were identified with these specific logs.
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Plant chemistry reports were reviewed to confirm steam generator tube integrity in the secondary and to verify that primary plant chemistry is within TS limits.
The implementation of the licensee's sampling program was observed.
Plant specific monitoring systems including seismic, meteorological and fire detection indications were reviewed for operability.
Performance of daily surveillance was observed and results reviewed for compliance with TS. A review of surveillance records and tagout logs was performed to confirm the operability of the RPS.
No violations or deviations were observed.
c.
Safety-Related System Alignment The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following safety-related systems on Unit I and Unit 2 to verify operability, flow path, heat sink, water supply, power supply, and proper valve and breaker alignment:
Unit 1 RHR Unit 2 RPS solid state system alignment Unit 2 control red drive system including reactor trip breakers No deviations or violations were identified.
d.
Plant Tours Tours of the diesel generator, auxiliary, control, and turbine buildings, and exterior areas were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, potential fire hazards, control of ignition sources, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, missile hazards and plant housekeeping and cleanliness conditions.
The plant was observed to be clean and in adequate condition.
The inspectors verified that maintenance work orders had been submitted as required and that followup activities and prioritization of work was accomplished by the licensee.
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'The inspector visually inspected the major components for leakage, proper lubrication, cooling water supply, and any general condition that might prevent fulfilling their functional requirements.
During observation of. the work associated with the unit 1 MG sets described in paragraph 4, the inspector noted the use of an apparently uncontrolled key to the rod control cabinets..The ASOS in charge had brought the wrong set of kcys to the MG set room. When the instrument maintenance technicians arrived they had a key to this cabinet on their personal key ring.
Certain cabinet door keys are controlled by the hey log program and only the SOS can aut3orize the use of such keys.
While the licensee's control process allows issuance of keys on a permanent basis to certain individuals, the inspector was not able to ascertain the details of the issue prior to closure of the report period.
The specific instance described tbove will be reviewed to determine whether the event constituted a violation of the key control program.
This will be tracked as URI 327,328/89-19-02, Key Control Program.
The inspector observed shift turnovers and determined that necessary ir. formation concerning the plant systems status was addressed.
No violations or deviations were observed.
e.
Radiation Protection The inspectors observed HP practices and verified the implementation of radiation protection controls.
On a regular basis, RWPs were reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to ensure the activities were being conducted in accordance with the applicable RWPs.
Workers were observed for proper frisking upon exiting contaminated areas and the radiologically controlled area.
Selected radiation protection instruments were verified operable and calibration frequencies were reviewed.
The following RWPs were reviewed in detail:
RWP 89-0005, 1-A RHR Pump Room k
No violations or deviations were identified.
f.
Safeguards Inspection In the course of the monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program.
The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities including: protected and vital area access controls; searching of personnel and packages; escorting of visitors; badge issuance and retrieval; and patrols and compensatory posts.
In addition, the inspectors observed protected area lighting, and protected and vital areas' barrier integrity.
The inspectors
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L verified _ interfaces between the security organization and both operations and maintenance, Specifically, the Resident Inspectors:
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inspected security during outages 2.
visited central alarm station 3.
verified protection of Safeguards Information 4.
verified onsite/offsite communication capabilities During the inspection period, the inspector observed certain safeguards act vities which appeared to violate the requirements of 10 ' CFR Part 73.
These items will be ' addressed in a separate l
inspection. report in order to protect the security information involved with the issues.
(see paragraph 4.b.7)
g.
Conditions Adverse to Quality The inspectors reviewed selected items to determine that the licensee's problem identification system as defined in AI-12, Corrective Action, was functioning.
CAQR's were routinely reviewed for adequacy in addressing a problem or event.
Additionally, a sample of the following documents were reviewed for adequate handling:
1.
Work Requests 2.
Potential Reportable Occurrences 3.
Test Deficiencies 4.
Licensee Event Reports 5.
Secerity Degradation / Incident Reports 6.
Drawing Discrepancies No items were found that were not identified and corrected in the appropriate manner.
No violations or deviations were observed.
3.
Surveillance Observations and Review (61726)
Licensee activities were directly observed / reviewed to ascertain that surveillance of safety-related systems and components was being conducted in accordance with TS requirements.
The inspectors verified that: testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; LCOs were met; test results met acceptance criteria and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; deficiencies were identified, as appropriate, and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by management personnel; and system restoration was adequate.
For completed tests, the inspector verified that testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by qualified individuals.
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The following activities' were observed / reviewed with no deficiencies identified:
SI-17, Containment Shield Building Emergency Gas Treatment System flow.
51-11, Reactivity Control Systems, Moveable Control Assemblies.
The inspector observea a performance of 51-11 on July 11, 1989.
The instruction had been modified to perf orm current measurements on the rod drive gripner coils.
This wat part of the licensee's investiga-tion of the cause of the dropped rod / reactor trip event.
No trends were identified in the area of surveillance performance during this inspection period.
The area of surveillance scheduling and management was observed to be adequately controlled and the completion of 15 surveillance requirements was discussed routinely during the daily staff management meeting.
No cases were identified where TS required surveillance were not performed as scheduled.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observet 'ons and Review (62703)
Station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and in conformance with TS.
The following items were considerert during this review:
LCOs were met while components or systems were removed from service; redundant components were operable; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; procedures used were adequate to control the activity; troubleshooting activities were controlled and the repair records accurately reflected the activities; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; QC records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; QC hold points were established where required and were observed; fire prevention controls were implemented; outside contractor force activities were controlled in accordance with the approved QA program; and housekeeping was actively pursued.
a.
Temporary Alterations (TACFs)
The following TACFs were reviewed:
TACF 2-89-49-085, RPI Temporary MoniMring Instrumentation to Support Restart No violations or deviations were identified.
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b.
Work Requests The following work requests were reviewed:
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WR B264651 - Unit 2 MG Set Voltage Regulator Meter This activity was performed to support the restart activities following the reactor trip described in paragraph 9.
During work on the control rod drive system on Unit 2 the ASOS noted that the B MG set was reading a lower voltage than expected.
He manually took control of the set and adjusted the voltage to equal that of the other set.
Following this action the MG set tripped when the rods were in motion.
During at. tempts to move the rods the set tripped two more times.
It was ' determined that the problem was in the indication and the subject WR was written to repair it.
The following documents utilized in support of this work activity were reviewed:
SQM-2, Maintenance Management System MI 6.20, Configuration Control During Maintenance Activities 501-85.1, Control Rod Drive and Rod Position Indication System This WR stated that the installed volt meters were to be calibrated.
It did not identify the type of M&TE to be used, the procedure to be used, or the acceptance criteria.
The actual calibration performance used a digital M&TE volt meter, as indicated on the MI-6.20 documentation.
However, no surveillance procedure was used and no acceptance criteria was recorded.
Finally, no PMT was cited on the WR despite the fact that the affected rod drive MG set had tripped three times during the reactor restart commenced on July 13.
These issues were discussed with the Maintenance Superintendent on July 14, and prompt corrective action was taken.
This type activity is normally performed in an acceptable manncr and no maintenance programmatic issues were identified.
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because the installed volt meter portion of the rod drive MG set performs no safety related or accident mitigation functions, I
low safety significance was involved in this issue.
This NRC identified violation is not being cited because criteria
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specified in section V. A of NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied. As a result of these considerations this issue will be tracked as non-cited violation (NCV) 327, 328/89-19-03, t
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No additionair corrective action is necessary and therefore, this item is closed.
2.,
WR B790864'- RPI E-13 Drifting WR B790863 - RPI C-11 Drifting These two WRs were reviewed as part of the. Unit 2 restart review-conducted by the licensee and-independently by the Resident Inspectors.
RPI C-11 had experienced a momentary transient thatJ resulted in a rod deviation alarm approximately two days. prior -
to the reactor trip described in paragraph 9.
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These two rods were monitored with special instrumentation that was installed under a TACF to support the restart of Unit ~2
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that commenced on July 13.
The inspector had no further comments.
3.
- PM 1117, B-B Auxiliary Air Compressor Rebuild This activity involved the tear down and rebuilding of the B-B auxiliary air. compressor.
The inspector observed the maintenance area between work activities and found the housekeeping, preservation of equipment and storage of replacement parts to be excellent.- -The craftsman was knowledgeable and the foreman was involved in the work activity.
The inspector noted that the reassembly procedure included several QC hold points.
4.
PM 1643 B-B Auxiliary Air Compressor Aftercooler PM 1451 B-B Auxiliary Air Compressor Air Dryer These maintenance activities appeared to be accomplished in-an adequate manner.
PM 1451 was to be only partially completed because of. a lack of repair parts (seats and pilot -valves).
The inspector had no further comments.
5.
WR B795368 Fifth Vital Battery Equalizing Charge l.
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The inspector had no comments.
6.
WR 790904 Unit 1 Source Range Channel II This SR channel began spiking after passing and receiving permissive P-6.
The channel's trip function was placed in Bypass.
The licensee was not able to determine the cause of the spiking.
After the performance of the trouble-shooting procedure, the channel was taken out of Bypass.
Within seconds of taking the channel out of Bypass, the channel spiked above the trip setpoint, and initiated an
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ESF signal in the -form of a reactor trip signal.
Since the Operations staff had not properly taken the channel out of service,. the maintenance activities were not considered contributors to the incident.
The inadvertent trip event is described further in paragraph 9.
Safeguards Equipment WRs Several WR's wre reviewed as part of the safeguards /public safety inspection conducted by 'the Resident Inspectors this month.
This inspection and further information on these WRs was discussed with NRC Region II security management on August 10,1989 (Watson, McGuire) and will be reviewed in subsequent security inspections.
No violations or deviations vire identified.
c.
Hold Orders The inspectors reviewed the follo. ing H0s to verify compliance with AI-3, Clearance Procedure, ard that the H0s contained adequate information to properly isolate the affected portions of the system being tagged.
Additionally, the inspectors verified that the required tags were installed on the affected equipment.
Hold Order Equipment HD 2-89-689 B-B Auxiliary Air Compressor HD 2-89-696 SG Hold Up System H0 1-89-468 Auxiliary Equipment Floor Equipment Drain Sump Operating Permit Equipment OP 0-89-302 Condenser Circulating Water Traveling Screen Wash Pump Caution Order Equipment CO 2-89-597 2B Condensate Booster Pump CO 2-89-213 6.9 kv 28-8 Shutdown Board Auxiliary Feeder No violations or deviations we e identified.
5.
Management Activities in Support of Plant Operations
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TVA management activities were reviewed on a daily basis by the NRC inspectors.
Resident Inspectors observed that planning, scheduling, work control and other management meetings were effective in controlling plant activities.
First line supervisors appear to be knowledgeable and involved in the day to day activities of the plant.
First line supervisor involvement in the field has been observed, and is considered adequate.
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Management response to those plant activities and events that occurred during this inspection period appeared timely and effective. An example of this management action was the well-organized and efficient execution of a power reduction to effect repairs on the 2A main feed pump condenser rupture disk. The power reduction and the isolation and repairs were well planned and implemented.
As a result, a fairly difficult-repair was
completed on schedule and with minimal impact.
Management involvement in the investigation and recovery from the reactor trip from full power was very effective.
In particular,-the coordination of. troubleshooting activities and the acquisition of temporary video monitors focused on the rod bottom lights for the subsequent startup was expedited by direct management involvement.
During the inspection period, the licensee incorporated TS change #52, which ' implemented the requirements of the Reactor Coolant System Vent System (RCSV) as contained in TS 3.4.11.
The change had been submitted in 1984, but was delayed in processing and implementing due to the extended shutdown.
The change was issued and became effective in June 1989.
On July 30, 1989, Operations staff personnel notified the Site Licensing -
staff that both Unit 1 and Unit 2 were not in compliance with part of the surveillance requirements for Operability of the RCSV.
Namely, the provision in SR 4.4.11 which requires the manual isolation valves upstream of the solenoid operated vent valve to be locked open.
The manual valves are located in inaccessible areas and cannot be accessed to place locking devices on until the plant is in Mode 5.
Although the licensee is able to provide assurance that the valves are open (validated lineup check sheets), the locking devices are not installed.
Strict interpretation of TS 4.4.11 requires the locks to be present to demonstrate Operability.
The licensee entered action statement 3.4.11.a on July 31, which requires the inoperable path to be restored to operable status within 30 days or the plant to shut down within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to Mode 4.
On August 3, a telephone conference between NRC headquarters staff and TVA management resulted in a verbal waiver of compliance on the requirement to lock the affected valve.
This allowed the licensee to exit the LCO.
The waiver was granted to allow the time to process and issue an exigent change to the TS which removes the locking requirement from consideration for Operability.
The TS change was issued on August 11, 1989.
6.
Site Quality Assurance Activities in Support of Operations During the inspection period, the site QA staff performed audits, inspections, and reviews.
These issues were reviewed by the inspector and found to be adequately resolved by the licensee.
The following audits were reviewed by the inspectors:
SQA 89-816, Plant Operational Condition.
This audit was designed to assess whether Operations personnel were receiving the necessary support from management and maintenance to correct deficiencies.
The
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audit concluded that' an adequate level of support was available. : No adverse findings or CAQRs were written for this area.
SQA 89-711, Event / Incident Investigation.
Thi: audit was' performed-to assess _. the effectiveness of ' the 'new process employed' to investigate and. report on plant events such as trips, personnel
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injuries, etc.
The principal change in how these events are
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investigatedLis.in the makeup and control of the investigating team.
Previously. -the Plant -Operations Review Staff (PORS) provided' both
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the team leader and most of the teas members.
The new team is an ad-hoc team formed ifor a specific incident.
Team members are
. assigned depending on the needs.and. circumstances.of the event.
The1 audit indicated that conflicting procedures and requirements caused-
. problems in several areas.
CAQR SQQ890404 was written to consolidate the controlling procedures into a single document.
' SQA-89-753, Screening Reviews and Safety Evaluations.
This audit assessed-the new, interim program for-level II' reviewers.
Of'168 documents involving screening reviews / safety evaluations, QA had
- identified only one which had passed throughL the. level II reviewers with technical inadequacies.
The audit concluded that the new program was effective in eliminating most of the errors in the old program.
- In addition to the above audits, the inspector discussed several recent issues with the-Site QA Manager and the QA Surveillance Group Manager.
The inspector determined that QA involvement in these issues was adequate.
The previous memorandum of understanding between the Site QA Manager and the Plant Manager that addressed QA participation in plant incident reviews. has been replaced.
The superseding process is described in QA instruction QMI 716.8, Plant Incident Investigations.
7.
- NRC. Inspector Follow-up Items, Unresolved Items, Violations (92701, 92702)
(Closed) VIO 327, 328/88-29-02, Failure to Follow Maintenance Related
- Procedures.
This violation involved four examples of failure to follow electrical-maintenance procedures.
The specific maintenance items were corrected under WR 8261005 and drawing deviation 88DD3821.
Generic improvements were also made in the licensee's housekeeping practices, SQA-66, Plant Housekeeping.
The licensee's corrective action was adequate.
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This violation is closed.
l (0 pen) URI 327, 328/89-09-02, UHI Isolation Valve Operability.
In March,1989 the licensee erected a scaffolding through the yoke of UHI isolation valve 1-FCV-87-24, obstructing valve travel.
The licensee determined that the valve was operable and could still perform its
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intended function.
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This. item: remains open pending formal determination by NRR-of the' safety. significance of this inoperability.
(Closed) URI: 327,.328/89-18-01, Cold Leg Accumulator Level Indication.
The 'inspectorsL continued to review the questions' raised in IR 327,
.328/89-18: throughout this inspection period.
On ; August. 2, 1989. the licensee made a determination regarding the operability of the cold leg accumulators described in LCO 3.5.1.1 and SR 4.5.1.1.2 for the operability of-the level and pressure channels..This question was reviewed by NRR and-resulted in TS. change 89-37.
This item is. closed.
(Closed) VIO 327, 328/88-29-03, As-constructed Drawing. Deficiencies.
This violation involved four examples where the as-constructed condition of the plant were not represented in system drawings.
The licensee's corrective actions. included issuance of.CAQRs SQN 880393, 0400, 0405, and-0406.
Programmatic' corrective actions were addressed -in SQN 880393 and included procedural changes to M and Al-9, Letdown, Seal Water, Residual Heat Removal, and Lower Supports for Cor.tainment Spray Heat Exchangers, and M and AI-10, Testing of Expansion Anchors Set in Hardened Concrete.
The licensee's corrective actions were adequate.
This violatiori is closed.
(Closed) IFI 327, 328/88-16-01, ESF EDG Start Training for DPSO.
This IFI. involved deficiencies in the training supplied to DPS0 personnel.
The inspectors noted ESF EDG start training deficiencies in NRC inspection report 327, 328/87-59 and the licensee committed to train DPS0 as a result -
of inspection 327, 328/88-16.
TVA accomplished the required ~ training in course M&TE 201, Power Distribution, completed in May and June 1988.
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This item is closed.
(Closed) VIO 327, 328/88-39-01, Failure to Follow SI-82.2, Functional Test for Radiation Monitoring System, and SI-83, Channel Calibration for Radiation Monitoring System.
This violation addressed a containment ventilation isolation and an auxiliary building isolation that resulted from failures to follow SI-82.2 and SI-83.
The immediate corrective actions in response to the' two ventilation isolations were timely and adequate.
Long term corrective-actions, which included training and procedure revision, are complete and adequate.
This violation is closed.
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1(Closed).IFI - 327, 328/89-18-08,- Failure to Follow RCI-1,. Radiological
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Contro1 Practices.
' This' ' event - involved an escorted visitor that failed to ' follow the requirements of RCI-1.
A radiological incident report (RIR 89-78) was generated following discussions' with the Senior. Resident-Inspector.
This
- issue was discussed with NRC and TVA management and was adequatelys resolved.
-This IFI is closed.
(Closed) VIO 327, 328/88-28-01, Failure to Follow Maintenance Procedur6s.
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This.- violation. involved two examples of failure to follow. ' maintenance-procedures.
Immediate corrective action in both examples was timely and adequate.
.Long term. corrective action involved ' craft training and '
procedure revision and.was determined to be' adequate.
- This' violation is closed.
(Closed) VIO. 327, 328/88-39-02, Failure to Meet TS 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 Requirements for OPDT and 0 TDT.
-This ' violation involved the performance of a reactor trip instrumentation
- functional test of. delta T/ TAVE in which the loop bistables were not placed in the tripped condition within six hours of when the channel; was declared inoperable.
This plant condition was reported in LER 328/88-036 (discussed below. in this report), and resulted from a failure to.
coordinate and control plant testing in accordance with AI-47, Conduct of Testing.-
The licensee's initial corrective action and long term corrective actions were adequate.
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This violation is closed.
8.
. Licensee Event Report Followup (92700)
. UNIT 1-(Closed) LER 327/88-028, Failure to Perform Fire Watches This ' LER was addressed in inspection report 327, 328/89-12 and closed.
Although it was appropriate to close the fire watch issue, the issues of.
. plant configuration. control, and hold order use were not completely it addressed.
As a ' result, the issue of failure to control plant-
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configuration resulting in two airborne conditions (described in LER
.327/88-028) will be tracked as unresolved item URI 327, 328/89-19-04, as discussed under LER 327/88-031 below.
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This LER remains closed.
(Closed) LER 327/88-031, failure to Perform Fire Watches L:____-_:_______-___-
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This LER addressed the failure to complete a TS LCO 3.7.12 required fire watch.
The licensee's corrective action for the fire watch and the associated breaching permit were acceptable.
The cause of the missed fire watch was a high airborne radioactivity condition in the auxiliary building.
This high airborne radioactivity condition resulted from two related plant activities.
The B train waste gas compressor (WGC) was run for approximately five minutes providing a vent' path for the VCT.
Approximately 10 minutes following the completion of the VCT venting, routine preventive maintenance (PM 1612-077 and PM 1613-077) was performed on the WGC strainer.
The licensee identified the airborne radioactivity condition promptly due to improvements made in personnel monitoring equipment (Beta Max whole body monitors).
Response in the radiological controls area was timely and adequate.
The connection between the airborne activity levels and the maintenance activities was not addressed in this LER.
Three previous airborne related events have occurred and are described in LER 327/86-001, LER 327/88-028 and special report 88-11.
This issue along with the other issues identified will be reviewea to determine if maintenance and operations coordination problems exist that result in the loss of control over certain system parameters, and will be included in the resolution of URI-327, 328/89-19-04.
This LER is closed.
UNIT 2 (Closed) LER 328/88-036, Failure to Comply with a Technical Specification Action Statement for a Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Channel Resulted in an Inadvertent Entry into TS 3.0.3.
This LER addressed the performance of a reactor trip instrumentation functional test of delta T/ TAVE in which the loop bistables were not placed in the tripped condition within six hours of when the channel was declared inoperable.
This plant condition resulted from a failure to coordinate and control plant testing in accordance with AI-47, Conduct of l
Testing.
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Licensee corrective actions were adequate and included operator and instrument technician training.
Most commitments are complete.
Two commitments are scheduled for completion and are being pursued by the l.
licensee as CCTS commitments NCO 88 0201 004 and 005.
This LER is closed.
9.
Event Follow-up (93702)
a.
Unit 2 experienced a reactor trip from 100% power at 11:34 a.m. on July 10.
The first out annunciator indicated the cause of the trip as a Negative Flux Rate Trip on excore power range channels 2 and 3.
This trip is usually caused by a single or multiple dropped rods l
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. blown fuses or other power or control faults in the rod control circuitry.
Other. possible failures which could have resulted -in 'a negative flux. rate trip were investigated. These included possible
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failure Lof the 48 volt de power supply to 'the trip breaker undervoltage coils, and procedural errors which could result in-testing on both Reactor Protection trains simultaneously.- A review.
of the L applicable' computer trends and the recorder _ traces was conducted independently by the inspector 6nd the licensee's event investigation staff.
The inspector agreed withithe conclusion reached by the event investigation ' staff that a dropped rod had occurred and was the cause of-the trip.
The Axial Flux Difference-recorder trace, -in particular, exhibited the characteristics of-a single rod dropping while the plant is at power.
All systems
. operated as expected during and following the trip.
Immediately following the trip, operators controlled Auxiliary Feedwater flow rates to' limit the RCS.cooldown to approximately 543-degrees.
Consequently, emergency boration was ' not required.
With the exception of Source Range Nuclear Indication channel N-31, all-systems functioned as required.
b.
When nuclear power dropped below the P-6 setpoint on the Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrument channels, the Source Range channels were automatically reenergized, as designed.
Channel N-31 exhibitad severe spiking and noise, and was declared inoperable by the ASOS.
The' ASOS did not refer to the appropriate procedure for placing a failed. NI channel out of service.
The procedure governing operation with failed - Nuclear Instrumentation channels is A0I-4, Nuclear.
Instrumentation Malfunctions,- Revision.9.
This procedure requires the operators to place the failed detector's level trip swi+,ch in the-
. bypas:: position.
This prevents the failed channel's level trip function from tripping the reactor if the bistable actuates.
Since the logic coincidence for the Source. Range High Flux Level trip is 1 out of 2, the Bypass function is provided to allow one of the two channels to be taken out of service for maintenance or surveillance.
Because A01-4 was not implemented, the operators forgot to place the channel -in the bypass - position, and the level trip bistable for channel N-31 remained active.
' After clearing all trip signals and stabilizing the plant, licensee personnel began the process of troubleshooting.to ascertain the cause of the trip.
This process included closing the reactor trip breakers in order to. check out the Reactor Protection System in accordance with SI-93, Reactor Trip Instrumentation Functional Tests.
While the trip breakers were closed, NI channel N-31 spiked above the setpoint for the Source Range High Flux level Trip.
A reactor trip signal was initiated and opened the trip breakers at 6:57 p.m..
Since this constituted an ESF actuation, the event was reported to the headquarters duty officer at 7:30 p.m.
as required by 10 CFR 50.72.b.2.ii.
The cause of the trip was reported as an instrument
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. failure..The report to.the. duty officer did not specify that the N-31 channel had been previously declared inoperable andla failure to-follow the. requirements of A01-4 was. the actual root cause of the..
event.- 'This information was available.to the. operations-staff at the.
L time ofi the phone report.
The' inspector questioned the individuals
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involved;in the ENS report, and concluded that the error in reporting.
the ' cause as a failed instrument channel -was not intentionally misleading. : A followup.- report -to correct the error was made the following day, July 11.
Failure to follow the provisions of A01-4 :is. identified as a violation of the requirements of T.S. 6.8.1, and will be tracked as VIO 327, 328/89-19-05, Failure to Follow AOI-4.
The. inaccurate report made.to. the headquarters duty officer is a matter of concern because the -relevant information was. available to the operations
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staff ;to 'make ' a fully accurate report to the ENS duty. officer.
Inattention to detail was the. apparent cause. of the inaccurate u
report.
This. issue was discussed at' length with' plant management,.
who agreed that more attention to detail.is ~ required by plant staff
. in -- making ENS. reports.
P1 ant management agreed to. implement corrective. actions to ensure-that the Operations. staff is aware. of the importance of the reports. Corrective actions will be reviewed to'
ensure such ' reports are made with the appropriate level of care in i
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the future.
This issue will be tracked as IFI 327,1328/89-19-06, Inaccurate ENS Report.
c.
On July 22,1989 at 2:58 a.m. the power range channel N43 on Unit 1 failed.
The operators entered LCO 3.3.1.1 action statement #2 which allows. power operations to continue provided four criteria are met.
Item c of Action Statement #2 states:
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2.c Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal-to 75% of Rated Thermal Power and the Power Range, Neutron Flux trip setpoint is reduced to'less than or equal to 85%
of Rated Thermal Power within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
In addition to performing either of the two choices above, item d of Action Statement #2 further requires:
2.d..The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO, as indicated by the remaining three detectors, is verified consistent with the normalized symmetric power distribution obtained by using the movable incore detectors in the four pairs of symmetric thimble locations at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> when Thermal Power is greater than 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
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The licensee decided to monitor the QPTR rather than reduce power below 75% and reset the trip setpoint to 85%, as allowed by action 2.c.
However, after approximately 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> it became obvious that,
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due to two inoperable incore probes and procedure misinterpretation,
- the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> requirement to verify the QPTR with the incore system in L_
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action 2.d would not be met.
At the end of the 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> the decision was made.' to enter LC0 3.0.3 which allows one hour to correct the problem or be in Hot Standby in the next six.
Five hours later the QPTR was properly verified and the LC0 for 3.0.3 was exited.
Reactor power was not reduced during this event.
On July 24, 1989, the inspector questioned the SOS on why he entered 3.0.3 as opposed to bringing the Unit.to 75% power.
The SOS'
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responded that 3.0.3 was the proper place to go when the action statement expired since entry into TS 3.0.3 provided for those circumstances not directly provided for in the Action Statements.
The inspector questioned the SOS on the reason why the plant had been at 100% when action statement 3.0.3 required the plant to be in Hot Standby approximately 2 and one half hours later.
The SOS stated that they only had to go to,75%, then they could comply with action statement 3.3.1.1 action 2.d.
The inspector explained that this seemed to be a discrepancy in their logic.
A power reduction below 75% would have satisfied all the requirements of action statement 2.d..
Since the Action Statement could have been met, entry into TS 3.0.3 was not appropriate.
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Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 requires all four power range channels to be operable.
Action statement 2 allows power operations to continue provided in part that, either, Thermal Power is restricted to less than or equal to 75% of Rated Thermal and the Power Range, Neutron Flux high trip setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of Rated Thermal Power within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; or, the Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio is monitored at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Technical Specification 3.0.1 states ' that upon failure to meet the Limiting Condition for Operation, the associated Action requirements shall be met.
In this case, the Action Requirements listed as Action 2 for TS 3.3.1 could have been met by reducing power below 75%.
Using the provisions of TS 3.0.3 to allow an additional 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> to meet the Action Statement is not appropriate.
Failure to meet the requirements of Action Statement 2 for TS 3.3.1 is a violation (VIO 327, 328/89-19-07, Failure to Comply with TS Action Statement).
Additionally, the SOS stated that the first alternative allowed under Action 2.c, i.e., power reduction to 75% in addition to resetting the Power Range Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint to 85%, could not have been performed because the procedure to reset the trip setpoints to 85%
had never been approved.
He explained that this had come into play in the decision making process.
The inspector discussed the specifics of the procedure which would be used to reset the trip bistables to 85% while one power range channel was in the inoperable / tripped condition.
The inspector agreed with licensee personnel that such a procedure would require jumpers, lifted leads and other configuration change mechanisms that are not
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considered sound Operations practices with the plant at power. The l
licensee indicated that rather than employ such practices to reset
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the bistables, the plant would be placed in' a condition where' the requirement was not: applicable.
The licensee had placed the procedure in. an " inactive" status and had. not. resolved ' the inadequacy of the TS action statement.-
lIn theiinstance described above',,there was' no procedure available' to.
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allow compliance with one. alternative ' permitted by an Action
. Statement.
. hen the inspector ~ asked. licensee personnel whether all W
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other TS Action. requirements-are covered by approved procedures, the licensee was.not able to provide. such assurance.. Since operations involving safe operation of the plant are required.to have approved-procedures to ~ control.those operations, the licensee was asked to provide assurance that all Action Statement requirements do', in. fact,
. have approved written procedures.
The licensee stated in.the exit
' interview that they would not make this commitment.
This issue will receive additional NRC review 'and will be tracked as. URI 327, 328/89-19-08, - Availability of All. Procedures Required to Comply '
With TS Action Statements.
10.
Licensee.Self Assessment Capability (40500)
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Activities of the Sequoyah Plant Operations Review Ccmmittee (PORC) were reviewed in order to verify compliance with applicable regulations as.
defined in, but not limited to, the Sequoyah TS.
The committee was evaluated in terms of TS requirements, previous enforcement, Land industry'
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standards.
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The PORC charter was reviewed to verify incorporation of:
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The PORC is composed of Plant Management and Supervisory Personnel with diverse technical backgrounds.
The PORC meets at least once per calendar month to review matters required by the TS related to safe'
plant operation.
The PORC is composed of the following members:
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Chairman: Plant Manager Member:
Operations Superintendent
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Member:
Operations Supervisor
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Member:
Site Radiological Control Superintendent
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Member:
Technical Support Superintendent
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Quality Engineering Manager Member:
Division of Nuclear Engineering
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Representative A quorum of the committee exists when the chairman or his designated alternate and four other members including alternates are present.
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The PORC is required to meet 'at least once per calendar month and as convened by the PORC Chairman or his. designated alternate.
All alternate members shall be appointed in writing by the PORC Chairman to serve on a
. temporary basis; however, no more than two alternates shall participate as voting members in PORC activities at any'one time.
PORC serves in an advisory capacity to the Plant Manager and as an investigating and reporting body to the NSRB in matters related to safety in plant operations.
The Plant Manager has the final responsibility in determining the matters that should be. referred to the NSRB.
The PORC meets once each month, or more frequently, as required.
A special PORC meeting may be convened, as requested by management.
In the event that committee business must be transacted on an expedited basis during non-work ' hours, the licensee has provided a process to conduct PORC activities by allowing a member or members to be considered present if they are in telephone communication with the committee.
The PORC is required to maintain written minutes of each PORC meeting that, at a minimum, document the results of all PORC activities performed under the responsibility and authority provisions of the TS.
The inspector reviewed PORC meeting minutes for and attended a sample of PORC meetings between April 6,1989 and June 14, 1989.
The PORC met TS 6.5.1 during this period and appeared to be well managed.
This review only sampled minutes / meetings for the period prior to June 15, 1989.
This area will also be reviewed in the future, after the licensee's corrective actions for VIO 327, 328/89-15-04 have been implemented, in relation to PORC responsibilities for oversight of safety evaluations and unreviewed safety question determinations required by TS 6.5.1.6.
The inspector had no further questions concerning the period reviewed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Design, Design Changes and Modifications (37700)
The inspector reviewed the following design changes and modifications.
These design changes and modifications were determined by the licensee to not require approval by the NRC.
WP 11196, Post Accident Sampling, Heating, Ventilation, and Air
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l Conditioning System.
This Work Plan wat designed to eliminate the j
temporary changes implemented by TACF 86-2014-31.
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l ECN 5061, ERCW Supply Header Thermocouple.
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ECN 5911, Waste Header Installation.
This ECN was designed to eliminate Lthe' temporary changes'. implemented bycTACFs 81-328-77 and 82-266-67,
- ECN
- 6152, Nodify -SPDS Console.
This ECN was. designed to. install RVLIS~
. software changes into the SPDS.
WP.6189, Incore Thermocouple. 'This Work Plan was designed to upgrade the
< Post Accident Monitor by replacing the incore thermocouple.
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The. inspector verified that the modifications and-design changes were controlled by approved site procedures and that proper-considerations were
_ given' for. the following:
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post modification ~ testing requirements surveillance, maintenance, and operating procedure ~ changes-
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drawing changes
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operator. shift training
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The inspector did identify that several of the modifications and design changes -included screening. reviews and amended 10 CFR 50.59 reviews.
The use of screening reviews and the adequ'acy of the licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 safety review program are under review by both the licensee and the NRC.
Sequoyah QA is presently reviewing completed design change safety-evaluations to determine if they were appropriately - accomplished.
Preliminary indications from the QA review are that approximately 20% of
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l the safety evaluations performed had irregularities and minor review issues associated with them.
Finally, the inspector reviewed a design change associated industry.
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problem.
This industry problem is related to the availability of diesel fuel and is described in IEN 89-50, Inadequate Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel _. Supply.
This IEN addresses fuel oil consumption calculations that L
were not updated when Diesel Generator modifications were completed.
Sequoyah specific calculation SQN-18-D053 EPM CWP dated December 15, 1986 was determined by the licensee to be out of date and based on a DG rating of. 3800 KW vice the present rating of 4400 KW.
Three independent non-QA
. calculations were generated.
These calculations indicated that the fuel requirement was approximately 61,000 gallons as compared to a TS requirement of 62,000 gallons _.
The DG fuel oil storage tanks were determined to be able to store the TS required amount of fuel in
- accordance with Technical Instruction TI-41.
Further detailed QA calculations are being prepared by DNE.
In order to determine compliance with TS 3.8.1.1, these calculations will be reviewed in a future inspection, and will be tracked as URI 327, 328/89-19-09.
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Facility Modifications (37701)
a During the restart of Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 the staff reviewed numerous facility modifications and additions that required prior Commission review and approval. These items were published in Salety Evaluation reports and the implementation was inspected on site as part of the 94300 restart item closure process.
During this inspection, the inspector noted only one modification (UHI system vents) that occurred since the last inspection and required prior Commission review and approval.
This modification is currently under review.
Review of the licensee's process for making the determination of whether Commission approval is required prior to making facility modifications will be conducted during a future inspection.
Therefore, inspection
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activities under this module are considered closed for the inspection-o period.
13.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 4 and 15, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The Senior Resident
' Inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below.
On August 4,1989, the licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any of the material reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
On August 15, 1989, the licensee stated that violation 327, 328/89-19-07 would be denied, and the resolution of URI 327, 328/89-19-08 would not be pursued, because they did not feel that a problem existed.
Inspection Findings:
Two violations, and one non-cited violation were identified:
NCV 327, 328/89-19-03, MG Set Maintenance, Paragraph 4.b.1 VIO 327, 328/89-19-05, Failure to Follow A01-4, Paragraph 9.b VIO 327, 328/89-19-07, failure to Comply with TS Action Statement, Paragraph 9.c Five Unresolved items were identified:
URI 327, 328/89-19-01, Manual Manipulation of Motor-Operated Valves, Paragraph 2.a URI 327, 328/89-19-02, Key Control Program, Paragraph 2.d URI 327, 328/89-19-04, Airborne Conditions Resulting from
,
Maintenance Activities, Paragraph 8
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l URI 327, 328/89-19-08, Availability of All Procedures Required l
to Comply With TS Action Statements, j
Paragraph 9.c j
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URI 327, 328/89-19-09, Diesel Fuel Oil Tank Level Calculations, Paragraph 11 One Inspector Followup Item was identified:
IFI 327, 328/89-19-06, Inaccurate Emergency Notification System Report, Paragraph 9.b During the reporting period, frequent discussions were held with the Site Director, Plant Manager and other managers concerning inspection findings.
14.
List of Acronyms and Initialisms ABGTS -
Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System ABI
-
Auxiliary Building Isolation ABSCE -
Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure AFW Auxiliary Feedwater
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Administrative Instruction AI
-
A01 Abnormal Operating Instruction
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AVO Auxiliary Unit Operator
-
ASOS -
Assistant Shift Operating Supervisor ASTM -
American Society of Testing and Materials BIT Boron Injection Tank
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Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant C&A
-
Control and Auxiliary Buildings CAQR -
Conditions Adverse to Quality Report CCS Component Cooling Water System
-
-
Centrifugal Charging Pump CCTS -
Corporate Commitment Tracking System CFR Code of Federal Regulations
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COPS -
Cold Overpressure Protection System CS Containment Spray
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CSSC -
Critical Structures, Systems and Components CVCS Chemical and Volume Control System
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Containment Ventilation Isolation DC
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Direct Current DCN
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Design Change Notice DG
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Diesel Generator DNE Division of Nuclear Engineering
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Division of Power System Operations DPS0
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Engineering Change Notice ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System
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EDG Emergency Diesel Generator
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EI Emergency Instructions
-
-
Emergency Notification System E0P
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Emergency Operating Procedure E0
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Emergency Operating Instruction ERCW Essential Raw Cooling Water
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ESF Engineered Safety Feature
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Flow Control Valve FSAR -
Final Safety Analysis Report
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GDC General Design Criteria
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GOI.
General Operating Instruction
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Generic Letter GL
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Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning HVAC
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HIC.
Hand-operated Indicating Controller
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H0
. Hold Order
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HP Health Physics
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ICF Instruction Change Form
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IDI
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Independent Design Inspection IN
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NRC Information Notice IFI Inspector Followup Item
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IM
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Instrument Maintenance IMI Instrument Maintenance Instruction
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IR
Inspection Report
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KVA
Kilovolt-Amp
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Kilowatt
KW
-
KV
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Kilovolt
LER
-
Licensee Event Report
LC0
Limiting Condition for Operation
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LIV
Licensee Identified Violation
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Loss of Coolant Accident
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-
Main Control Room
MI
Maintenance Instruction
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M
Maintenance Report
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-
NB
-
NRC Bulletin
-
Notice of. Violation-
NQAM
Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual
-
NRC
-
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OSLA -
Operations Section Letter - Administrative
OSLT -
Operations Section Letter - Training
Precautions, Limitations, and Setpoints
--
-
Preventive Maintenance
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Parts Per Million
-
Post Modification Test
i
Plant Operations Review Committee
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PORS -
Plant Operation Review Staff
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PRO
-
Potentially Reportable Occurrence
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-
Quality Assurance
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Quality Control
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-
QPTR -
Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio
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RCDT -
Reactor Coolant Drain Tank
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Reactor Coolant Pump
-
-
Regulatory Guide
,
-
I
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-
Radiation Monitor
R0
-
Reactor Operator
Rod Position Indication
-
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Revolutions Per Minute
-
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Resistivity Temperature Detector
-
-
Radiation Work Permit
RWST -
Refueling Water Storage Tank
Safety Evaluation Report
-
-
Surveillance Instruction
-
SMI
Special Maintenance Instruction
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SOI
System Operating Instructions
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SOS
Shift Operating Supervisor
-
SQM
Sequoyah Standard Practice Maintenance
-
SQRT -
Seismic Qualification Review Team
.SR
-
Surveillance Requirements
.SR0
Senior Reactor Operator
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550MI -
Safety Systems Outage Modification Inspection
SSQE -
Safety System Quality Evaluation
SSPS --
Solid State Protection System
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Special Test Instruction
-
TACF -
Temporary Alteration Control Ferm
TAVE
Average Reactor Coolant Temperature
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TDAFW -
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
TI
Technical Instruction
-
TREF -
Reference Temperature
TROI
Tracking Open Items
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TS
-
Technical Specifications
Tennessee Valley Authority
-
UHI
Upper Head Injection
-
U0
-
Unit Operator
Unresolved Item
-
USQD -
Unreviewed Safety Question Determination
VDC
Volts Direct Current
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VAC
Volts Alternating Current
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WCG
-
Work Control Group
WP
Work Plan
-
Work Request
-
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