IR 05000327/1989004

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Insp Repts 50-327/89-04 & 50-328/89-04 on 890117-20.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Ie Bulletin 80-11 & Snubber Surveillance Programs
ML20235M124
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 02/15/1989
From: Belisle G, Lenahan J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235M115 List:
References
50-327-89-04, 50-327-89-4, 50-328-89-04, 50-328-89-4, IEB-80-11, IEB-84-03, IEB-84-3, NUDOCS 8902280127
Download: ML20235M124 (6)


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:__ -_-__-___________ - gAQCIOp

O UNITED STATES - j j' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o

REGION 11 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W.

%,,,,

ATLAN1 A, GEORGIA 30323 l Report Nos.: 50-327/89-04 and 50-328/89-04 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 6N38 A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.: 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.: DPR-77 and DPR-79 Facility Name: Sequoyah 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: January 17-20, 19 9 - '- - [[ Inspector: , Date Si ned i J. J. Lenahan F .-66td f Tf ' Approved by: G. A. Belisle, Chief YV D' ate / Signed Test Programs Section Engineering Branch ! Division of Reactor Safety - ! SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of licensee action on previous inspection findings, IE Bulletin 80-11, the Unit 1 piping thermal expansion program, and the Units 1 and 2 snubber surveillance programs.

Results: In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.

The licensee took prompt corrective action to resolve concerns 'regarding snubber functional testing procedures.

The revised procedures are conservative and exceed the Technical Specification requirements in several areas.

These actions demonstrated positive licensee initiatives and program enhancements which go beyond minimum NRC requirements.

8902280127 890218 PDR ADUCK 05000327 o PDC ! _ _ _ - _ - _ _ -- _____- _ _ _ _ _- .

__ - . . , . . ! I l REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted ! Licensee Employees

  • M. Cooper, Compliance Licensing Manager C. R. Farreau, Mechanical Maintenance Manager, TVA Nuclear Maintenance Division
  • D. C. Hafley, Cranes and Civil Features Supervisor, TVA Nuclear

! ! Maintenance Division R. C. Murray, Engineering Associate, System Engineering

  • J. Proffitt, Compliance Engineer S. Taylor, Civil Section Supervisor, Division of Nuclear Engineering R. Thompson, Modification Engineer
  • S. Smith, Plant Manager

, Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included four engineers.

NRC Resident Inspectors K. Jenison, Senior Resident Inspector P. Harmon, Resident Inspector

  • Attended exit interview 2.

(Closed) IE Bulletin 80-11, Masonry Wall Design (25537) During an Integrated Design Inspection (IDI), NRC personnel from the Office of Special Projects (OSP) identified a deficiency pertaining to missing calculations for design of masonry block walls. This problem was identified as IDI Item No. D4.3-9.

A followup inspection, documented in Inspection Report Nos. 50-327, 328/88-13 was performed by OSP in February 1988 to review the corrective actions for this item.

In response to this item, TVA performed calculations on the nine worst case reinforced masonry block walls and verified that the design of these walls met NRC IEB 80-11 criteria.

The licensee also evaluated nine other walls and verified that design of those walls also complied with NRC criteria.

The licensee committed to evaluate the remaining reinforced masonry walls after restart of Unit 2.

This commitment is being tracked as Item Number NC0-87-0361-086 on the commitment tracking system.

IDI Item D4.3-9 was closed in Inspection Report No. 50-327, 328/88-13. The inspector discussed the status of this commitment with licensee personnel.

These discussions disclosed that the licensee plans to complete the evaluations during 1989.

While performing walkdowns to evaluate the reinforced masonry walls, the licensee identified a construction deficiency where angles restraining the L_ _ - __--_- _ _ _- -_.- _ .i

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . . .

l tops of 16 masonry walls had been omitted during construction.

Nonconformance CAQR SQT 88-0177 was written to document and correct this deficiency. WorkPlan(WP) 0000-04 was written to install the missing clip angles.

The licensee determined that the installation of the missing angles was required on five walls prior to restart of Unit 2.

The remaining walls were acceptable without the angles; however, the missing angles will be installed to restore the original design margin.

The inspector examined the angles installed under WP 0000-04 on the masonry walls listed below in the Auxiliary Building and verified that the angles had been installed in accordance with the details shown on the design drawings: a.

Elevation 690, Sections A19-A19 and C19-C19, Hot Sampling Room b.

Elevation 734, Section F16-F16, Vital Battery Board Room I c.

Elevation 734, Sections A6-A6, 86-86, and J16-J16, Auxiliary Control Instrumentation Room ' The inspector also examined quality records documenting inspection of anchor bolt installation and/or welding required for installation of the angles on the walls listed above.

In order to determine the construction practices used in the original construction of the masonry block walls, the inspector examined construction specifications, quality assurance requirements, material test reports, and daily inspection checklists.

The masonry walls were constructed by a contractor, The Garland Sherman Company, under TVA Contract numbers 71C54-54861 and 72C53-83453.

The inspector reviewed the construction specifications, and construction Procedure Nos. C-4 and 68, Inspection of Contract Masonry Work.

The inspector noted that installation of the angles discussed above were not part of the construc-tion specification.

Discussions with licensee engineers disclosed that the masonry contractor was not responsible for installation of the angles.

Procedures C-4 and 68 specified the inspection and documentation requirements for masonry walls constructed in safety-related structures.

Inspection requirements included testing of mortar samples, inspection of wall layout, and inspection of installation of grout and reinforcing steel. Results were documented on Quality Control Checklists.

The inspector examined completed Quality Control Checklists which document inspections of the block walls performed in April through May 1972. The results of-tests performed on the masonry units (blocks) were also documented on these records.

Based on review of the contract specifica-tions, inspection procedures and inspection records, the inspector concluded that the masonry block walls were constructed in accordance with descriptions in the updated FSAR Appendix 3.8E, FSAR Table 3.8.4-1, and the original design drawings.

IE Bulletin 80-11 was previously inspected and documented in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-327, 328/81-04; 50-327, 328/86-24; and 50-327, 328/88-09.

Based on the results of these and the current inspections, and the _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _

! . . . .

acceptance of the licensee's design criteria, as documented in NRC Inspector Report Nos. 50-327, 328/88-13, IE Bulletin 80-11 is closed.

Within the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.

3.

Thermal Expansion Test (Unit 1)70370 The inspector examined Special Test Instruction STI-121, Hot Thermal Expansion Verification.

This procedure provided instructions for verification by visual examination that piping had adequate clearance for thermal expansion.

The specific piping / supports to be examined and the acceptance criteria were designated by the Division of Nuclear Engineering (DNE). The test instruction provided for monitoring the piping at ambient temperature, when the reactor coolant system temperature was between 325 F and 350 F, and when the reactor coolant system was at or near normal operating temperature (between 540 F and 547 F).

The inspector examined the completed piping thermal expansion test data sheets, the test log, and the deficiency log.

Three deficiencies were identified during the test.

One was identified and rasolved prior to start of the test, one involved a loose jam nut which was resolved using normal maintenance procedures, while the other, DN-3 required res11ution on Attachment 6 to STI-121, Potential Thermal Interference Evaluation / Resolution Report.

Deficiency DN-3 involved interference of the snubber on hanger 1-SGBH-108 with structural steel.

This problem was corrected by realigning the snubber under Work Request Number B-231818. The inspector reviewed the completed Work Request which documented that the work had been completed.

Within the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.

4.

Refueling Activities (Units 1 and 2) (86700) In a letter dated October 17, 1984, the licensee provided a supplemental response to IE Bulletin 84-03, Refueling Cavity Water Level.

In this letter, the licensee committed to move only one irradiated fuel assembly at a time inside the reactor cavity. This commitment stated that a second irradiated element would not be moved inside the reactor cavity until the proceeding assembly had been moved through the transfer tube into the Auxiliary Building side of the transfer canal.

The letter stated that these commitments would remain in effect until the issue of the cavity seal adequacy was resolved.

IE Bulletin 84-03 was reviewed by a Region II I inspector and closed during an inspection documented in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-327, 328/85-31.

The issue of the cavity seal adequacy was , considered resolved by NRC when IEB 84-03 was closed; therefore, this commitment to move only one irradiated fuel assembly is no longer applicable.

l The inspector reviewed Section 6.10.1 of Maintenance Procedure MI-2.1.1, Removal of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head and Attachments.

Section 6.10.1 , l covers installation of the inflatable cavity seal and connection of the l_ backup air supply.

The inspector also reviewed TVA corporate procedure ! No. 1801.03, Special Nuclear Material Management, and Fuel Handling Instruction (FHI) 7.

These procedures have been recently revised to I _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _. _ _ _ _ - - - - _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - -. _ - -. - _ _. _ - - - - - _ - - _ _ _. -. - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - _ _. _. - _ _ _ _ _ _

__ _- _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ - _ - - - _ - _ - - _ _ __ _.

.-_ _.

' - - ..

delete the commitment discussed above.

The revised procedures permit handling four irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies within the refueling canal simultaneously.

The four assemblies will be in the following locations: a.

A maximum of three in.the refueling canal, one in the upender or in the fuel transfer canal, and two in the rod cluster control changing fixture.

b.

One within the reactor vessel area.

If this fuel assembly is not over the reactor vessel area, it will be considered to be within in refueling canal area.

During review of the procedures MI-2.1.1 and FHI-7, the inspector noted that the procedures did not require monitoring of the backup air supply to the inflatable seal.

Discussions with licensee.

engineers disclosed that the monitoring was performed during previous outages on a daily basis by maintenance personnel, but that the results were not documented.

However, licensee management stated that procedure FHI-7 would be revised to include requirements for monitoring the backup air supply system (verify adequate pressure in the air bottle and verify that all valves are open between air bottle and inflatable seal) once per shift during refueling by refuelirg personnel.

This will ensure a backup air supply in case of failure of the service air supply.

Within the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.

5.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) (Closed) Unresolved Item 327/88-45-01, Additional Snubber Functional Test Lots.

The licensee performed a detailed review of the snubber functional testing procedure (SI-162.2, Snubber Functional Testing) in response to the inspector's concerns regarding the Technical Specification require-ments for testing of additional snubbers when functional test failures occur.

As a result of this review, Procedure SI 162.2 was extensively revised to better define and control the snubber functional-testing programs.

The inspector examined Revision 8 of SI 162.2 and noted the following changes: a.

Snubbers are not categorized into accessible or inaccessible groups for functional testing purposes b.

Subgroups for functional testing were selected based on design (4 subgroups) and environment (1 subgroup).

The subgroups are defined in detail in the procedure.

c.

The initial sample lot for functional testing will be at least ten percent of each subgroup.

A minimum of two snubbers will be tested from each subgroup.

- - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - - - - - - -

__ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _, _ _ - - - ' ' - . ,.

.

d.

Additional snubbers -are required to be tested if more than one snubber fails the functional tests in subgroups with more than 225 snubbers.

For subgroups with less than 225 snubbers, additional snubbers are required to be tested if any test failures occur within the subgroup.. The subsequent test lots equal five percent of the subgroup and include only snubbers within the subgroup, unless failure analysis. indicates that failures may be generic to snubbers _ in other subgroups, e.

The methodology for failure analysis has been strengthened.

The licensee management was very responsive in revising the-functional testing procedure (SI 162.2) to clarify the testing requirements in ' areas where the. Technical Specifications (TS) are ambiguous. The revised procedures' are conservative and exceed the TS requirements in several areas.

Subsequent to the inspection documented.in Inspection Report No.

50-327, 328/88-45, the licensee re-examined the.four functional test failures that occurred during July - September 1988.

The failure analysis disclosed that one failure was - caused by paint on. the snubber which restricted snubber movement, two failures were caused by corrosien from glycol, while the cause of the other failure was unknown internal damage..The licensee examined all snubbers in areas in Unit I where painting had been completed and determined that no other snubbers had been contaminated with paint. The results of this inspection is documented on an engineering evaluation dated October 15, 1988.

The licensee also inspected snubbers.in areas subject to possible contamination by glycol and verified that no other snubbers had been corroded by glycol.

The results of this inspection is also documented on an - .neering evaluation dated October 15, 1988.

After review of the results of the engineering evaluation and reinspection, the inspector concluded that the snubber functional testing had been completed in accordance with the require-ments of TS 3/4.7.9 prior to restart of Unit 1.

6.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on January 20, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.

The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results.

Proprietary information is not contained in this report.

Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee. The licensee committed to revise procedure FHI-7 to include requ!rements for monitoring of the backup air supply to l' the inflatable cavity seal once per shift during resueling operations.

l ! ! i ! -- -- - _ _ -_- }}